

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTION IN INDIA

VOLUME ONE

POLITICAL SURVEYS

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PREFACE

We have great pleasure in placing in the hands of our readers the first volume of **FOURTH GENERAL ELECTION IN INDIA**. The volume originally formed a special number of the *Political Science Review*, a quarterly journal of the department, which is being released in book form to attract a wider reading public. The planning of the volume started about six months before the advent of general elections when a thematic outline was evolved and communicated to prospective writers both in India and abroad. The response to our invitation fortunately has been more generous than what we had hoped for. Our gratitude to the contributors knows no bounds and we, in fact, shine only in their reflected glory.

The underlying assumption in the planning of the volume has been that election politics when viewed on the continuum of political development in the life story of a political system is much more comprehensive than voting behaviour which is the end product but certainly not the be-all and end-all of election politics. This assumption is more relevant in developing countries like India where politics is not independent of the infra-structural pulls and pressures as it is in developed countries, though even there, more often than not, the autonomy of politics has tended to appear more a myth than a reality. This digression apart, the point of emphasis here is that the volume has been so planned as to cover election politics on the eve of and through the fourth general election in all its dimensions and ramifications. The study of voting behaviour has not been viewed here as an isolated and sporadic phenomenon but as organically linked with the democratic politics of the country in general and its election politics in particular. Thus the volume on fourth general election in India offers a study of Indian political system in action through the specific, sharp and illuminating focus of the fourth general election.

The canvass of the volume as envisaged here became too wide to be accommodated within the confines of one volume, which had,

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therefore, to be brought out into two parts. The major dimensions of the theme covered in present volume relate to "PROMISE" which embodies a review of party manifestoes; "CHOICE OF CANDIDATES" which, besides outlining the selection process of Congress candidates, has two case studies (one of Bihar and another of U.P.); the "CAMPAIGN" which deals with campaign techniques and organization with the help of a case study in Jaipur district (Rajasthan); Select State-wise Surveys, which unfold the election panorama from the stage of political developments in the area during the inter-election years to the stage of poll verdict, its determinants and impact in all the States and union territories except Andhra;* and select constituency studies of the controversial election in North-East Bombay, besides the glimpses of the election scene in the Chief Minister's constituency in Rajasthan and the niceties of tandem voting in a Lok Sabha constituency of the same State. An effort is made in the introduction to weave together the main findings of the volume and append on their basis notes towards the evolution of a theory of election politics in India.

The thread left here is taken up again in the second volume of the study which covers such special foci as the following :

- (i) The fourth general election and the political system;
- (ii) Competition and response;
- (iii) Social groups and their participation;
- (iv) Determinants of voting behaviour; and
- (v) Press reactions and bibliography.

The volume has been dedicated to Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's democratic political system because the editors feel that, but for the foundational work done by the first Prime Minister of India, the country may not have survived the strains and stresses on the nerves of the political system particularly in the post-fourth general election period. This, however, is not to encourage any complacent view about the challenges of the political socialization, national integration and economic growth which still tend to threaten the future of parliamentary democracy in India.

* It has been covered in volume II.

PREFACE

We would not have succeeded in releasing the volume if the editorial board of the Political Science Review had not borne the onerous task of attending to it from the stage of its planning to seeing it through the press with all the zest and dedication at their command. We are equally indebted to Professor M.V. Mathur, the then Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for encouraging and inspiring us to undertake the publication of the volume. We are grateful to H.A.S. Jafri, Research Fellow in the South Asia Studies Centre, for preparing the index. Finally, we are thankful to S. B. Gupta, one of the old students of the department and the proprietor of M/s Bharat Printers for undertaking the printing of the volume.

We are personally responsible for the numerous limitations of the volume for which we crave the indulgence of the readers. If they find anything academically stimulating and exciting in the pages that follow, they owe it to the writers who in most cases have had the feel of the political environment about which they were writing and could, therefore, interpret the meaning of the general election (a supremely important event in the political development of the country) and its consequences for the political system in India with the knowledge and understanding of an insider, which has imparted both realism and depth to their analyses.

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—The Editors



IQBAL NARAIN AND MOHAN LAL

INTRODUCTION

ANY attempt to evolve a theory of election politics in India may prove to be as elusive as the voter was in the fourth general elections. Yet the academic adventure is worth the hazard for more reasons than one. First, the question, whether there is an emerging pattern (if any) in the election politics of the country, is one of the crucial indices of political socialization; one could attempt to measure with its help, how far democracy as a *value*, has been internalised among the political elite and the masses in the country. Secondly, a study of the nature of the election politics can help in understanding the implications of the fourth general elections, for the political development of the country in general, and for the Indian political system in particular. A deep probe into the pattern may be helpful in critically evaluating the real import of the so-called 'REVOLUTION BY BALLOT.' Finally, one may also know how far election politics in the country was a case of continuity and how far, if at all, it was a radical break with the design of earlier general elections on the one hand and the main stream of Indian politics on the other. Besides this utilitarian rationale in the specific Indian context, there is an academic rationale as well. Facts and data by themselves do not go very far unless weaved into a pattern to yield generalisations by way of empirical theory.¹

1. Cf. Robert A. Dahl : "A classification is a way of simplifying and, in this sense, 'distorting' reality. All empirical analysis requires some simplifying 'distortion'. If every atom were treated as unique, physics would be impossible; if every medical case were considered unique, no advances in medicine would occur. In empirical analysis knowledge consists of generalization, which requires one to exclude the unique in favour of the general properties of a concrete event or system."—*Modern Political Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 30.

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The Underlying Assumptions

There are a few basic underlying assumptions of the analysis being attempted here, which it may be worth while to identify at the outset by way of a preface to the theoretical formulations that follow.

First, election politics in India, as elsewhere, is not to be treated as a sporadic event in the life story of a nation. It is organically linked with and is a sharper than usual expression of the unities and contradictions (and of the continuous interaction between them) which constitute the core of the nation's political life. Thus, the dynamics of election politics in the country can neither be grasped nor meaningfully interpreted if divorced from the main stream of national politics.

Secondly, election politics is to be treated as a *wholistic* phenomenon on the conceptual plane, though it is in itself part and parcel of a broader whole—the nation's political life. Thus, the political climate on the eve of elections, party manifestoes, the pattern of electoral alliances, strategy and process of nomination, design, techniques, symbolism and themes of election campaign, the voter turn out, the voting behaviour and the motivations governing it, and the poll verdict and its over-all determinants, are just various chapters of one and the same story, pieced together through a continuous process of inter-connections and interactions.

Thirdly, and it follows as a corollary of the second assumption, that election politics is far more comprehensive than voting behaviour, which, though the net result of election politics, is far too specific and narrow to comprehend, let alone to confine within its fold, the vast and intricate panorama of election politics.

The Intervening Handicaps

It may also be added here that the task of evolving a theory of election politics is more baffling than stimulating. It is beset with several handicaps, the more important of which are :

- (i) India is a continent rather than a country. And added to it are the vast and varied plurality of its cultural texture;

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the different levels of socio-economic and political development in the country; the urban-rural and the elite-mass dichotomies and the consequent multiple-levels of political consciousness and involvement of the people; and, above all, the vexing, but none-the-less real, co-existence of tradition and modernity in the nation's life. The size of the country when combined with these complexities makes the task of gleaning an all-India pattern supremely difficult, if not impossible. For the same reason, all efforts at generalization become tricky, and, quite often, none too trust-worthy also.

- (ii) Scientific studies of the fourth general elections are few and these also are not available as yet. Even when available, these would not cover the entire country. One has, therefore, to rely largely, not on empirical studies, but on newspaper reports. Here also access is possible to national newspapers and party organs only. The vast treasure of information and insight in regional language newspapers is not within ones easy reach.
- (iii) Efforts at comparative analysis through the three preceding general elections are similarly handicapped. Empirical studies of earlier elections are few and far between,² which do not cover the entire country. It is also growingly

2. The more important studies that deserve a mention are : Fisher, Margret W, *The Indian Experience with Democratic Elections*, Indian Press Digests, Monograph No. 3, Berkeley, University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1956; Kogekar, S.V. and Richard L. Park (eds), *Reports on the Indian General Elections 1951-52*, Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1956; Poplai, Sunder Lal (ed.) *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India*, Delhi, Metropolitan Book, 1957; Poplai S.L (ed.), *1962 General Elections in India* New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1962; Suri, Surindra, *1962 Elections - a political analysis*, New Delhi, Sudha Publications; Talbot Phillips, *The Second General Elections*, New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1957; Sirsikar, V.M., *Political Behaviour in India, A Case study in 1962 General Elections*, Bombay, Manaktalas and Sons, 1965; Myron Weine and Rajni Kothari (eds) *Indian Voting Behaviour*, Firma, K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1965; Dastur, Aloo J., *Krishna Menon, Vs. Kripalani*, University of Bombay, 1967 and S.P. Varma and C.P. Bhambhri: *Election and Political Consciousness in India*, Meerakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967 For a select but useful bibliography which also covers articles published in learned journals in India and abroad see Rajni Kothari and Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-219.

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difficult to tap the secondary material in the national newspapers in regard to earlier elections on account of the intervening passage of time.

- (iv) Access to official party documents is stupendously difficult because the party bosses and managers do not always appreciate the need of a scientific probe by the academicians into the labyrinth of election politics.
- (v) The situation of paucity of data and facts to cover election politics on a country-wide basis increases the possibility of subjective bias and value judgements being imported in the building up of theoretical formulations and their projection even as descriptive hypotheses. This, perhaps, is one of the most serious handicaps of this analysis

It is, therefore, not surprising if the theoretical formulations attempted here are confined to fourth general election, which also are based largely on secondary data and information

II

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

By way of a characterization of the political climate on the eve of fourth general elections in India, one can hazard a descriptive hypothesis that economic, personal and regional considerations appeared to have an edge over the traditional, ideological, nationally cohesive forces which too were there—some weak, some strong but none of them occupying a deterministic position. The identification of the following specific aspects may bear out the general characterization attempted here :

- (1) Anti-Congressism was the keynote of the political climate. The growing disenchantment with the Congress was largely due to economic sufferings of the common man. As a result of the India-China and Indo-Pak conflicts, there was mounting pressure of defence budget on national economy resulting in inflation, increased tax burdens and ever soaring prices. Drought only added to people's sufferings, "while sluggish growth of agriculture until

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1965 even in good weather years was one of the main factors limiting the rate of growth of the economy as a whole."³ The challenge of educated unemployment and under-employment was assuming threatening proportions.⁴ It is, therefore, not surprising if regional movements like *Shiva Sena* were rising to exploit the deepening economic crisis for rousing particularist loyalties.

- (ii) There was growing alienation from the pre-independence nationalist past with the passing away of Nehru and the entry of a new generation of voters on the national scene (about 36 million who had attained the voting age since 1962 elections). In fact, India had already begun to enter an era of State-based regional politics even during the life-time of Nehru; his death accentuated the process, so much so that Congress hardly had a national leader with an all-India electoral appeal except, perhaps, Indira Gandhi.⁵
- (iii) The boss-based intra-party factional conflicts within the Congress were becoming ever more acute as the elections were drawing near. With Nehru, the great reconciler of factional conflicts no more on the scene,⁶ and with Lal

Max F. Millikan, 'India in Transition—Economic Development Performance and Prospects' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 3, April 1968, p. 538. Also see pp. 541–543, which particularly cover the years 1965–67.

cf., 'Absorbing this very large output of qualified man power was difficult enough even before the Indian economy started running down, but now the problem is even greater. The frustrated hopes of the unemployed infecting those still in schools and colleges, constitute a major political liability, as evidenced by the rash of student violence spreading throughout the country.'—Dilip Mukerjee 'India in Transition—Politics of Manoeuvre' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46 No. 3, April 1968, p. 517.

It is common knowledge that no Congress leader could command a patient hearing in meetings held in connection with the fourth general elections in Rajasthan except to some extent Indira Gandhi. The situation was no better in other States.

Myron Weiner seems to belittle Nehru's role in conflict-resolution within the Congress and over-emphasize the organizational resiliency of the Congress in his *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress*, The University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 11–13.

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Bahadur Shastri, the organization man also missing, the Congress bosses were free to ride roughshod, and create in the process situations in which factional fights even forced one or the other group leader to leave the parent organization.⁷

- (iv) None-too-sure of themselves, none-too positive either, the opposition political parties were both frustrated and aggressive. Political parties had come to realize that Nehru's passing away had made room for greater party competitiveness. Inspired by the Lohia thesis,⁸ they were, therefore, fanatically in search of forging alliances, almost irrespective of ideological considerations, to drive the Congress out of power.
- (v) One of the induced traditional elements into the political climate was the politics of the cow which the Jana Sangh hoped to exploit. The party did succeed somewhat in capturing particularly the rural and women vote in the name of the cow in backward parts of the country like Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. But, perhaps, the effort did not go very far on account of other pressing secular considerations—for example, the need to placate the Muslim voter.
- (vi) Finally, the two external crisis, the Chinese invasion of 1962 and Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, had considerably

7 The exit of Ajoy Mukherjee in West Bengal offers a classic example

8 The Lohia thesis, broadly speaking, followed the following plank

- (i) Development orientation and not ideology should be the basis of , polarization in developing countries,
- (ii) Development orientation should take into its stride both the problems of 'mind' and 'belly'. But unfortunately the left politics was too much under the influence of Communists who narrowly confined themselves to the prob'-ms of the mind like language and defence which tended to become subjects of rightist politics
- (iii) Since Congress was for chaos and not for development, the polarization should be on *Congress vs non-Congress* lines
For details see, Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, "SSP Approach," *Amrita Bazar Pat rika*, December 14, 1966.

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reduced the country's international stature, though India's performance in the Indo-Pak war boosted up the country's self-confidence.⁹ India, in fact, lost initiative in regard to international affairs in general and her own foreign policy in particular. The lowering of the international image had natural repercussions on the country's domestic policy, the ruling Congress party on balance suffering on both counts.

III

PARTY MANIFESTOES

The political climate of the country had its natural reflection in party manifestoes which by their very nature tended to be its *critiques* and *saviours*. As critiques, the party manifestoes of opposition political parties were basically anti-Congress, though all the manifestoes of all the political parties were inter-party critiques also. One may recall here in particular the animosity between the two Communist parties, with the CPI (Marxist) declaring that "major important task facing the party is that of fighting a rear guard action against its own brand of dissidents." As saviours of the situation, the parties had their own programmes, rooted in their respective ideological commitments. By and large, the parties of the right would glorify the individual, hark back to tradition and emphasize spiritual and moral regeneration of social life, while the parties of the left would attach primacy to public sector, swear by science and technology and pin all their hopes in economic regeneration of society. The Congress still emerged as following, by and large, the middle-of-the-road programme, with social control of banks and ceiling on urban property as added feathers to the party's ideological cap. If as critiques the manifestoes were largely negative, as programmes they were predominantly positive.

9. cf. William J. Barnads : "India in Transition : Friends and Neighbours." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 3, April 1968, pp. 48-49. Also see Iqbal Narain, "The Political System and External Crisis : Notes towards a theoretical framework of study", *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 1968, pp. 54-70.

What, however, distinguished the manifestoes of opposition political parties was that, more often than not, they also embodied strategy and techniques for wresting power from the Congress. The manifestoes could be taken as confessions on behalf of the opposition political parties of the fact that singly they were unable to dislodge the Congress from power; they would, therefore, envisage the need and possibility of alliances. The opposition to opportunistic unprincipled alliances was equally marked; one only wishes it were equally true of life as of the printed word.

Altogether, what distinguished the party manifestoes was their mixed character; they were an amalgam of critiques, programmes and strategy, a blending of negative and positive overtones, and a composite of ideology and practical wisdom. Anti-Congressism was the key-note of all the opposition party manifestoes and this was somewhat inherent in the one-party dominant situation that India was having through the last three general elections.

IV

THE ELECTORAL ALLIANCES

It was easy to talk of electoral alliances in the party manifestoes but really difficult to conceive them in actual life. That they were forged and operationalized was a great feat in *politicking*. That there could not emerge one all-India pattern of electoral alliances but several State-wise patterns testifies to the segmented and State-based character of Indian politics on the one hand, and situationally expedient and hence varied non-ideological party orientations of the electoral alliances on the other. It may be added here that electoral alliances had been forged in the pre-fourth general elections also,¹⁰ but they were neither so widespread, nor so varied as on the eve of the fourth general elections.

It may be useful to attempt a typology of electoral alliances insofar as it may provide instructive insight into their character.

10. The more conspicuous examples of the earlier electoral alliances are Samyukt Dal in Rajasthan (1952), United Left Front in West Bengal (1957 and 1962), Samyukt Maharashtra Samiti (1957 and 1962), and Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad (1957 and 1962).

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It may be pointed out at the outset that the proper unit for the typological analysis is the State because it is the objective political reality in the State which would determine the party attitudes towards the electoral alliances. Within this unit there can, however, be a three fold basis of typology : first, the position of the ruling Congress party, secondly, the position of the opposition political parties *vis-a-vis* the ruling Congress party and thirdly, the position of opposition political parties *vis-a-vis* each other. The following major types emerge on the basis of this criteria :

(i) There were States where the hegemony of the ruling party was being seriously challenged by *one* opposition political party which as such, enjoyed a position of assured dominance and superiority in relation to other opposition political parties which, in turn, were drawn to the electoral alliance on the terms and conditions of the dominant opposition party. This type may be called *one party dominant electoral alliance*. Its most conspicuous example¹¹ is to be found in Madras where the most dominant opposition party to challenge the Congress was the DMK which could, therefore, be easily recognised as the dominant partner by electoral allies which were Swatantra party, CPI(M), Muslim League and Forward Bloc.¹²

(ii) The other type relates to States where challenge to Congress came from the combined strength of two main opposition parties which were willing to ally as equal partners, with others joining at the periphery, because their separate pockets of influence did not cut very much across each other and, as such the alliance tended to be to their

11. Kerala, and Punjab also fall in the same category. In Kerala the dominant partner in the alliance against the Congress was the CPI(M) (which was also in the ruling party situation here) and the allies were the CPI, Muslim League, SSP, RSP, Kerala Socialist Party (KSP) and Peasants and Workers Party (KTP). In Punjab the main challenge to Congress authority came from the Sant Akali Dal which was the dominant partner in the electoral alliance which consisted of the CPI, CPI(M) and the Republican party.

12. For a detailed study of the deal between the DMK and other parties, see *Link*, December 4, 1966, p. 20 and December 18, 1966, pp. 14-15.

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mutual advantage. Rajasthan can be cited as a significant case in point where the two main allies were the Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties. Orissa and Bihar also seem to fall in the same category where the two main allies were Swatantra party and Jan Congress in the former case and SSP and CPI in the later case. This type can be indentified as *shared electoral alliance*.

- (iii) A third type can be observed in States where the two political parties offering main challenge to Congress authority also posed as serious ideological rivals to each other. They would, therefore, refuse to ally with each other but instead become nuclei of two sets of electoral alliances. West Bengal provides a classical example where CPI (M) and CPI, two main challenges to Congress authority, were too much of ideological rivals to ally with each other. The result was two sets of electoral alliances, popularly known as ULF and PULF.¹³ This type can be described as the *ideology-based rival electoral alliances*.

- (iv) A fourth type, which also overlaps, in some cases, the earlier types, relates to those States where some political parties, in spite of their weak position both *vis-a-vis* the ruling Congress party and dominant opposition political parties, decided to forge a separate electoral alliance to fight the ruling party as also the dominant opposition parties (or the alliance of the latter as the case may be). This type of alliance may have an ideological basis (or cover) or may be due to their non-acceptability as allies by the major opposition political parties. The electoral alliance of SSP, PSP, CPI (M) and CPI in Rajasthan or that of CPI, RPI and Toilers party in Madras can be cited

13. PULF consisted of the CPI, the Bangla Congress, the Forward Bloc and the Bolshevik party. ULF had as its constituents the CPI (M), the RSP, the SSP, the Socialist Unity Centre, the Workers party, the Forward Bloc (M) and the Revolutionary Communist Party of India.

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as examples.¹⁴ This type can be called *minor parties electoral alliance*.

- (v) Finally, there have also been States in which the dominant opposition political parties challenging the Congress found it advantageous to fight the ruling party alone and as such was not interested in electoral alliances but only in electoral adjustments as and where possible. One finds such cases in U. P. and M. P. where Jana Sangh, the key rival to Congress, had been interested in *ad hoc* and sporadic electoral adjustments. For example, there could be electoral adjustment in U. P. over 62 out of 425 seats between Jana Sangh and Swatantra, the former getting 50 and the latter 12. Similarly, in M. P. Jana Sangh had electoral adjustment with the SSP and Jan Congress. In Gujarat also, Swatantra party preferred adjustments with Jana Sangh, notwithstanding best efforts made by the PSP for an electoral alliance with it.¹⁵ This can be described as *electoral adjustments* which are distinct from electoral alliances because they are limited to few areas and do not cover even the major portion of the State as a whole.

One were to attempt a broad characterization of the electoral alliances against the perspective of the foregoing typology one could say :

- (a) That the electoral alliances were basically anti-Congress¹⁶ and hence predominantly negative in character,
14. Other examples include alliance between Ram Rajya Parishad, Hindu Maha Sabha and Arya Samaj in Punjab, Haryana, U P., Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh, popularly called Nationalist United Front.
 15. The indifference of the Gujarat Swatantra party to the electoral alliance with PSP is rather surprising because both the political parties had no common pockets of influence. In South Gujarat which is an industrial region, PSP was supposed to be stronger, while in the rest of Gujarat the Swatantra party was a potent rival to Congress. The indifference of the dominant opposition party may perhaps be explained only by what Shah, the Gujarat PSP Chief, called the "over ambitious and over optimistic posture" of the Swatantra party (*The Hindu*, November 22, 1966).
 16. That the alliances were motivated by anti-Congressism is evident from what Ram Sevak Yadav, the SSP General Secretary said of the alliances.

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- (b) That they were, by and large, non-ideological and non-programmatic¹⁷ and hence politically heterogeneous and incongruous;
- (c) That they were dominant opposition party/parties based¹⁸ and hence admitted of senior and junior partners in the electoral alliances;¹⁹
- (d) That by and large,²⁰ they primarily embodied a strategic plan for victory at the polls rather than for permanent partnership in government; and
- (e) That the parties in their political calculations about alliances also had in mind the idea of reducing the strength of their respective potential rivals.²¹

which according to him were just a way out to check the 'defeatist psychology' growing among the opposition parties on account of the monolithic character of the Congress (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, September 10, 1966). Even to Dr. Lohia the polarisation should follow the lines of Congress vs non-Congress. (n. 8) Basavpurniah of CPI (M) and C Rajgopalachari of Swatantra party also thought likewise. For the former see *The Hindu*, December 23, 1965 and for the latter *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, January 31, 1967.

17. Even in the first category of alliances where an attempt was made to evolve a minimum programme, no body seriously took it or bothered about it. One may also recall in this context that the seven-point programme of the Sant Dal-led alliance or twenty one-point programme of Swatantra Jan Congress alliance in Orissa would harp more on the misdeeds of the Congress than on its intrinsic positive content. One may further recall that the Muslim Leaguers while justifying their alliance with the CPI (M) said that, though the struggle over ideologies would go on, the alliance had political purposes. (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, December 16, 1966).
18. If the dominant opposition party was not willing to forge an electoral alliance, it would normally not come into being, as it is obvious from the case of U.P.
19. At times even the nomenclature of the alliance may admit of the pre-eminence of the dominant partner as in the Orissa alliance would talk of Swatantra-led coalition government in the State.
20. Except Orissa, Kerala and Rajasthan where the parties in alliance had elected even the leaders to head coalitional governments, this was true of most of the anti-Congress alliances.
21. Deen Dayal Upadhyaya took the position in a press conference that he would not deny the allegation that his party intended to eliminate other

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Finally, one could say that on the whole the electoral alliances remained a patch work—a bundle of ideological contradictions—quite often more skin deep than really effective. This was so all the more because the local and primary units resisted, though rarely successfully, the efforts of the higher units to impose an electoral alliance.²² For, the higher units did not always take note of the interests of local and primary units in the bargain that they struck.

V

THE NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES : STRATEGY AND CONSIDERATIONS

How politicking cuts across ideological considerations becomes more obvious as one moves from a resume of electoral alliances to the story of nominations. The nomination constitute a critical stage of election politics because electoral battle is half won once candidates are sponsored with political imagination. It is, therefore, not surprising if politics of nomination turns out to be a microcosm of election politics in its totality.

By way of a possible characterization of the nomination process, the following traits deserve a mention :

- (i) The nomination process at the party level cannot be treated as autonomous in any political system, more particularly, in non-western political systems like that of India and, still more particularly, in the specific context of a one-party dominant system. One finds two categories of limitations operating—first, *inter-party* limitations and secondly, *intra-party* limitations. The candidature of the

parties. (*Amrita Bazar Patrika*, October 16, 1966). For similar reasons, the CPI (M) would not allot any seat to CPI in North Malabar. Again, the CPI (M) would make the SSP to surrender 11 seats in Trivandrum in favour of RSP which had won no seats in 1965 elections.

- 22 For example, one witnesses the resistance of Gujarati Swatantra party against the directive of its central executive to enter into an alliance with Jana Sangh stiffer resistance coming from its district units. Similarly, Rajkot Jana Sangh unit could not reconcile itself with the surrender of Rajkot Lok Sabha constituency in favour of Minoo Masani. Again, the Mysore unit of Swatantra party received the direction from its High Command to enter into an alliance with the PSP in a very cold manner

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dominant ruling party, almost uniformly the Congress on the eve of fourth general elections, was the most crucial limitation in the category of *inter-party* limitations. It is interesting to note in this connection that opposition political parties would wait to announce their list of candidates or keep it flexible and tentative till the Congress list was out.²³ In the category of *intra-party* limitations, a party would find itself subject to contradictory pulls and pressures which may assume the form of bosses *vs* rank and file, factions *vs* party, infra-structural and feudal considerations *vs* ideology,²⁴ money *vs* work, high command *vs* local elites,²⁵ demands of electoral alliance *vs* claims of party workers, and prospects of victory *vs* party claims.²⁶ The ruling Congress party was most on the horns of the dilemmas identified here;²⁷ though other political parties could not also escape them.

23. The opposition political parties in Andhra and Mysore waited for the Congress list till the first half of December 1966.
24. For example the Madras correspondent of *Link* reported that candidates with financial capacity "have been preferred to those who hope to make up for this deficiency by their loyalty to the party's socialistic ideology" (*Link*, December 25, 1966, p. 15).
25. The Congress High Command was somewhat restrained because of the rules and mechanism governing nomination process and because of the growing importance of State level leaders. It should not be forgotten, however, that High Command exists in other political parties also. Thus the Swatantra High Command would reject the claims of the Gujarat unit. Altogether the local elites were more vocal this time than before as it was obvious from opposition to the candidature of S.K. Dey in Rajasthan, V.K. Krishna Menon in Maharashtra, Jagannath Rao in Orissa. In Andhra and Mysore many DCC or MCC leaders would leave or threaten to leave the Congress if their nominees were not given tickets.
26. For example, in the case of Punjab, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, the then Chief Minister, would concede that the prospects of victory had to be given due weight in the selection of candidates (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, January 1, 1967).
27. Sadiq Ali, AICC General Secretary, confessed that while distributing tickets, the party had to take into account several factors which do 'not give a representative character to the party', the situation being complicated all the more when there were 40 applicants for a seat. (*The Hindu*, January 11, 1967).

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(ii) It follows by way of a descriptive hypothesis that under the strain of the foregoing contradictory pulls and pressures the politics of nomination tended to outstrip the limits of the formal process and there was, more often than not, a gap between the theory and practice of nomination. The nomination process ultimately tended to become a case of trial of strength between the competing influences identified earlier and the strongest among them, singly or in conjunction with other forces, would prove to be deterministic, formal norms and ideological considerations playing, more often than not, a subordinate role within the confines of the competitive pool. The anxiety of the opposition parties to absorb the Congress left-overs would further relegate ideology into the background.²⁸ The strength of competing factors would differ from place to place and thus, nominations always came to have a *situational* orientation. Thus, the effort to identify a uniform pattern in the theory and practice of nomination strategy is more likely to mislead than to guide.

(iii) Generally speaking, however, it could be said that nomination of candidates was a multi-factor phenomenon, among which the two inevitable factors have been, the character of the party and the nature of the constituency. Thus, nominations have come to be a two way process, not merely because of interaction between party and constituency, but also because of the interaction between the top, intermediary and lower tiers within the party hierarchy. The general impression is that the upward flow of the influence of lower echelons has been less in comparison to the deterministic voice of higher echelons particularly at the State level.²⁹ Thus, the new rural elite emerging in

28. Rajasthan offers a striking example where a Swatantrite first defected to the Congress and later, being refused a Congress ticket, joined a left, party, calling refusal of the ticket 'a blessing in disguise' a. 'I was truly a socialist' (*The Hindu*, January 23, 1967).

29. Even the formal selection procedure of political parties like the Congress, Jana Sangh, DMK and the two CPIs can be said to have a bias in favour

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the wake of panchayati raj felt alienated from the Congress when its claims were ignored either in favour of sitting MLAs or in favour of an imposed choice from above.

(iv) A factor, most pronounced in the case of the Congress,³⁰ concerns the role of factions in the nomination process, in relation to which other factors would appear at best to play a *subsidiary-supplementing* role. This should not be surprising either because the one abiding political reality about the Congress is almost a malignant existence of factionalism. One may also add that factionalism seems to be organically linked with bossism within the Congress and the two, in conjunction with each other, would manoeuvre to dominate the politics of nominations. One may further point out that caste was an important ally of factionalism, its rather typical illustration being Bihar, where scheduled castes and scheduled tribes faction was led by K. B. Sahai, the Brahmin faction by B.N. Jha, the Bhumihar faction by M. P. Sinha and the Rajput faction by S. N. Sinha. It would be interesting to study the interaction between bossism and caste as bases of factionalism with a view to finding out whether bossism can be taken as a secularising factor *vis-a-vis* caste. The hypothesis developed here can be studied in relation to the following situations:

- (a) Where a boss does not exist but caste rivalries and factions exist (e.g., Bihar and Andhra Pradesh);
- (b) Where a boss, caste rivalries and factions exist (e.g., U. P.);

of higher echelons. See for a comparative study of the procedure followed by the Congress through the four general elections, Ramashry Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. I, No. 20, December 31, 1966, pp. 833-84.

30. Factional fights were reported even within CPI (M), SSP and Swatantra in regard to nominations. For example, in West Bengal, the extremists in the CPI (M), in a bid to outmanoeuvre the moderates, succeeded in getting tickets for the latter in constituencies where they had little chance to win (*Link*, January 8, 1967, pp. 14-15.) For factionalism in Swatantra see *Link*, November 20, 1966, pp. 22-23.

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- (c) Where the boss himself belongs to the dominant caste and where caste rivalries and factions do not matter (e. g., Bombay); and
- (d) Where the boss may be overwhelmingly strong, caste rivalries weak and factions exist. (e. g., in West Bengal and Orissa.)

Leaving aside the phenomenon of interaction for the time being, there seems to emerge an interesting pattern in regard to the role of Congress factions in the nomination process:

- (i) There were *boss-led dominant factions* like that of West Bengal ³¹ where the opposition-dissident faction, in spite of its significant size, failed to get its due share in terms of Congress tickets and were faced with no alternative except either to acquiesce or to quit.
- (ii) There were also *dominant factions* opposed by factions with *sizeable but not matching* strength and as such the latter, failing to get their due share in the Congress tickets, had, thus, even in some cases to leave the party. ³²
- (iii) There were also *evenly balanced factions* where the dominant and dissident factions were, in a rough manner of speaking, evenly balanced and, as such, both could claim Congress tickets roughly in proportion to the strength of respective factions. Bihar, U. P. and Madhya Pradesh offer significant illustrations.
- (iv) Finally, there were *factions with insignificant strength* as in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Mysore which could not make their presence felt in the bargain for Congress tickets and, in some cases, had no alternative, but to leave the Congress and contest elections as independent candidates.
- (v) One may also add here that the Congress CEC also had factional overtones which followed a rectangular pattern

31. It is reported that Atulya Ghosh saw to it that 20 MLAs and 4 MPs, who had questioned his authority, did not get tickets.

32. Rajasthan, M.P., Orissa and Punjab illustrate the point.

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as represented by Kamaraj, Indira Gandhi, the Morarji group and the Syndicate with State PCCs and/or dissidents having linkages with one or the other.³³ It will, therefore, not be surprising if the factions within the CEC would try to strike a bargain with each other to the advantage of their supporters.³⁴

In sum, however, it could be said that pull and pressure of factional politics in nominations accentuated the process of fragmentation within the Congress, which, in turn, led to the establishment of new parties with the initiative or help of Congress breakaways³⁵ and which, finally, accelerated political polarisation.³⁶

VI

THE CAMPAIGN

Like the party manifestoes and the nomination strategy, the imprint of one party dominant system has been obvious on the campaign pattern also. Every election campaign is a two way process of *image building* and *image destruction* with the political parties in the fray trying to project a positive self-image and simultaneously also attempting to destroy the positive image of political parties in the opposition. One could venture a descriptive hypothesis here, on the basis of Indian experience in the fourth general elections, that one party dominant system tends to create a situation of disequilibrium in the two way process with the balance heavily tilting on the side of image destruction and the election campaign in turn becoming

33. The Krishna Menon nomination case offers a classic example of factional overtones in the CEC.
34. Perhaps Kamaraj did not put his weight behind Krishna Menon because he wanted to neutralise opposition to the claims of K. B. Sahay faction in Bihar.
35. The more important of these parties were Janta party in Rajasthan, Jan Congress in Orissa and M.P., and Jan Kranti Dal in Bihar.
36. It is interesting to note that 5 out of 9 non-Congress governments have been headed by Congress break-away chief ministers, their names being Ajoy Mukherjee in West Bengal, Charan Singh in U.P., G.N. Singh in Madhya Pradesh, Mahamaya Prasad Sinha in Bihar, and Rao Birendra Singh in Haryana.

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overwhelmingly negative in character. The opposition launched an all-out offensive much more with the purpose of destroying the positive image of the Congress ³⁷ than of projecting a positive self-image and the Congress can be said to be, by and large, on the defensive, ³⁸ the defence also being diffused and, at times even self-contradictory rather than concerted. ³⁹ One may also add that the opposition would attack both Congress policies as also their implementation. An interesting, though understandable, variation on this score relates to the rightist and leftist political parties. The former would attack the policy plank of the Congress while the latter would be more critical of their implementation. ⁴⁰

A trend towards *contemporariness* was also discernable in the election campaign, though not always in a distinct and uniform

37. Madhu Limaye of SSP would describe S.K. Patil as (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, November 11, 1967) 'accident' minister and Subramaniam as 'famine' minister in a Calcutta campaign meeting (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, November 21, 1966). Again, A.B. Vajpai would portray Congress government as an 'anti-cow and anti-Hindi government' (*The Hindu*, January 18, 1967). Similarly D.M.K. posters would credit Congress with images of starving and misery-stricken people (*The Hindu*, January 29, 1967). Such examples can be multiplied.
38. This should not be taken to mean that Congress did not indulge in image destruction of other political parties.
39. This was most obvious in regard to Congress reaction to charges of economic hardships and issues like cow protection. For example, the Congress Parliamentary Party and the Congress Poll Strategy Convention tended to endorse a total ban on cow slaughter, though Morarji would dismiss the cow slaughter issue as a political stunt. While at Madurai meeting the Prime Minister would promise all effort to save the cow, she would absolve the Congress of its responsibility on this score as it was not a Hindu organisation.
40. Here one may recall the Swatantrite criticism of Congress role as quota permit Raj and a totalitarian regime and Jana Sangh's criticism of Congress defence and language policies. But the leftist Voter's Council in Bombay would like to defeat the Congress "to vindicate the policies of socialism, non-alignment and world peace" (*The Hindu*, January 7, 1967). Similarly, Ram Maharaj Lohia would satirically remark that the Congressmen had been able to bring so far about 3 lakh acres of land under co-operative farming as against 32 crore acres under cultivation. They, therefore, would require at least 5000 years to fulfil their last election promise (*Deccan Herald*, January 6, 1967).

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manner. This naturally implies a growing emphasis on the issues and problems of the day and increasing alienation from the nationalistic movement based propaganda on the one hand and personality cult of the past on the other.⁴¹ This signifies that Indian politics was beginning to come into its own, that a new generation was entering into Indian politics and that Congress was fast becoming a political party from a movement.

In spite of the note of *contemporariness*, the election campaign was *fairly, though not exclusively*, tied to infra-structural pulls and pressures. And this appears to be true of all political parties, irrespective of their respective ideologies. Thus, appeals to caste sentiment were most common in the States of Haryana, Gujarat and Bihar, while Maharashtra, Mysore and Andhra Pradesh would appear to be closely following on the heels. Similarly, religious sentiments were vigorously played upon in the Punjab, Kerala, Goa, and border districts of Assam. Regionalism was also worked up as and where convenient. Shiva Sena would give the slogan of 'Maharashtra for Maharashtrians.' The charges of discrimination within the States on regional lines were rampant as in Saurashtra in Gujarat, Vidharba in Maharashtra and so on. With regard to such territorial demands as inclusion of Chandigarh in the Punjab and Belgaun in Mysore, regionalism, as in some earlier cases also, would cut across party lines. Attempts were also made to exploit feudal loyalties with the help of princes who joined the Swatantra party in larger numbers in the fourth general elections than in the third general elections, though some were still with the Congress.⁴² In the criss-cross of

41. This should not be taken to mean that no appeal was made to the nationalist past on the Congress platform or no appeal was made in the name of Gandhi and Nehru. Congress leaders (for example Morarji) would still recall the role of the Congress in the emancipation of the country (*Amrit Bazar Patrika*, January 15, 1967). Indira Gandhi would be projected as the grand daughter of Motilal Nehru who had launched a Kisan movement in Rai Bareilly. (*The Hindu*, Supl. February 1967), and so on.

42. For details see *Link*, Vol. 9 No 22, January 8, 1967, pp 9-12. While in Orissa, Rajasthan and Gujarat most of the princes were in the Swatantra party, D.P. Mishra used them in Madhya Pradesh to extend the area of Congress influence.

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infra-structural pulls and pressures, it should not be surprising if ideology was more an absentee phenomenon than an active mobilising force. However, an important distinction need be made here: it is one thing to say that appeals were made to infra-structural loyalties during the election campaign and quite another to assign them a deterministic role in voting behaviour. The attempt here is to identify the former without necessarily signifying the latter.

Finally, one could also observe that levels of campaign were fairly differentiated in actual practice, though it is any body's guess how far it was by accident and how far by design. Thus, at the national level offensive and counter offensive would relate to general policy issues, achievements, short falls and such charges as corruption and patronage. But as one would move to State and local levels, one would find issues and problems of direct local concern being picked up and hammered.⁴³ It should, therefore, not be surprising if foreign policy issues were not much made of in the election campaign, though they were not altogether absent also.⁴⁴

In sum, one could say that the panorama of election campaign can be treated as a pageant combining tradition and modernity-not merely in the blending of *contemporariness* and *infra-structural appeal*, but also in the discreetly mixed use of traditional and modern media of mass propaganda.⁴⁵

VII

THE VOTER TURN OUT ⁴⁶

One perhaps is on a very tricky ground while analysing the factors responsible for the increase or decrease in voters turn out.

43. K. Rangaswamy, "Formidable tasks will test new government", *The Hindu*, February 23, 1967.

44. Relations with China and Pakistan did figure in election campaign.

45. Records of speeches and music would co-exist with *Kirtan* and *Bhajan Mandalies* and *Arati* (*The Hindu*, February 8, 1967 and February 10, 1967)

46. Average increase in turn out has been to the tune of 5.14, the turn out being 56.29 in 1962 and 61.43 in 1967. The highest average turn out (63.94) has been registered in general constituencies, while the turn out in the case of scheduled caste reserved constituencies has been 54.45% and in the case of scheduled tribe constituencies 46.12.

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The situation in this regard varies from constituency to constituency. Unless a number of constituency studies are undertaken with special reference to voter turn out, no satisfactory generalization is possible. Still one could hazard a working hypothesis that voter turn out has tended to increase in proportion to the *intensity of competitiveness* in a constituency, where the poll verdict could not be taken as a foregone conclusion and, therefore, the parties would concentrate their efforts and resources in tilting the balance of poll verdict in their favour. ⁴⁷ Competitiveness could in turn depend on (i) the near even distribution of committed voters between main political parties and the critical role of the floating voters or (ii) the fluid state of commitment and the consequent prospect of exploiting the situation with intensive efforts at electioneering. An allied hypothesis is that the propensity to campaign actively and intensely and the effectiveness of the campaign is in direct ratio to the degree of political competitiveness in an area.

It may, however, be added that mobilization through agitations can, perhaps, be taken as an independent (though not necessarily exclusive) variable in turn out factor analysis. This does not necessarily run counter to earlier working hypotheses and, in fact, may work in conjunction with them. Thus, one could see the results of mobilization through agitations in Bengal (66.10%), Madras (76.57%), Kerala (75.67%) and Haryana (72.65%).

The States which have registered an above the average increase have been Andhra (5.15%), Assam (9.6%), Gujarat(5.73%), Madhya Pradesh (8.97%), Madras (5.92%), Punjab (5.72%), Rajasthan (5.87%), and West Bengal (10.55%).

The States where the turn out has been below the average increase are Bihar (4.53%), Maharashtra (4.38%), Mysore (4.12%) and U. P. (3.13%).

47. The main hypotheses developed above can be best illustrated with reference to Madras and Punjab, where the element of competitiveness being acute, the voter turn out was 76.57%, and 71.18% respectively. This can be contrasted with the voter turn out in Maharashtra (46.84%) and Mysore (63.10%) where Congress victory could be taken for granted and Orissa (44.05%) where Congress defeat could be taken as a foregone conclusion.

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Finally, while organizational net work of major political parties can be taken as an auxiliary factor in voter-turn out, the same can hardly be said of literacy.⁴⁸ Thus, one has to make a distinction between literacy and political literacy⁴⁹ in the Indian context. One, therefore, finds that Maharashtra and Mysore with their higher literacy percentage are in the below the average voter turn-out category than Assam and M.P. which, in spite of their lower literacy percentage, are in the above the average voter turn-out category. The following table throws further light on the phenomenon:

TABLE I
Literacy and Voter Turn Out

<i>Name of State</i>	<i>Voter Turn out%</i>	<i>Literacy %</i>
1. Madras	76.57	30.2
2. Kerala	75.67	46.2
3. Haryana	72.65	23.7
4. Punjab	71.18	
5. Andhra	69.15	20.8
6. West Bengal	66.10	29.1
7. Maharashtra	64.84	29.9
8. Gujarat	63.70	18.4
9. Mysore	63.10	25.3
10. Assam	61.83	25.8
11. Jammu & Kashmir	58.79	10.8
12. Rajasthan	58.22	14.7
13. U. P.	54.55	17.5
14. M. P.	53.49	16.9
15. Bihar	51.51	18.2
16. Orissa	44.10	21.5
• India	61.43	24.0

48. Literacy, however, appears to be a factor in the increasing percentage of valid votes cast. Thus, in Kerala, with the highest literacy percentage, the percentage of the rejected votes was 3.64 and in Madras which comes next in the literacy scale, it was 3.86. In contrast in Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and U. P. with lower scales of literacy the percentage of rejected votes were 7.78, 7.36, 7.37 and 6.62 respectively.

49. The authors owe this point to an informal discussion with A. H. Somjee, Professor of Political Science, Vancour University, Canada.

VIII

DETERMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR*

The lack of pattern is no where more obvious and generalization no where more likely to mislead than in regard to determinants of voting behaviour. Thus, one can at best, and that also very cautiously, venture a few theoretical hypotheses:

- (i) Infra-structural pulls and pressures like casteism, linguism, regionalism, feudalism, and so on, more often than not, act as *conjunctional rather than exclusive* determinants of voting behaviour—working in collaboration with other factors rather than proving deterministic on their own. The wider the area of the constituency, the more the conjunctional character of the role of infra-structural determinants becomes obvious. This, of course, is more true of *multi-caste States* than of *dominant caste States*.⁵⁰ There also when the key contest is between candidates belonging to the dominant caste itself, the conjunctional role again comes into sharp focus. This may be particularly true of reserved scheduled caste or scheduled tribe constituencies.
- (ii) When one infra-structural pull works in conjunction with other infra-structural pressures, there is a neutralising, if not a secularising process,⁵¹ at work. Language may tend to cut across caste as in some constituencies of Madras, or caste considerations may weaken feudal hold as it is obvious in the context of the defeat of Maharaja of Kutch. Similarly, the support of royal house in Rewa was of little avail to D. P. Mishra on account of the

*The formulations here largely emerge from the State-wise surveys of General Elections included in this volume.

50. The role of caste may be more *exclusive than conjunctional* in dominant-caste States like Maharashtra and Gujarat and more *conjunctional than exclusive* in multi-caste States like U.P., Rajasthan and M.P.
51. The branding of the process as secular would involve value judgement in terms of one's preference for language over caste or for caste over feudalism. Hence the term 'neutralising' is being preferred here.

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interplay of caste in politics.⁵² It could be other way round also. Communal politics may buttress the politics of the cow as one finds in U. P., Delhi, Haryana, M. P. and Hyderabad.⁵³

- (iii) One may also add that, more often than not, secular and infra-structural considerations co-exist with each other—sometimes one wrestling for asserting its supremacy over the other and at others one strengthening the other. The situation can be credited with great secularisation potential even where the secular considerations may not prevail over infra-structural considerations but only interact with it. Thus, it is not merely that infra-structure influences politics but politics also influences the infra-structure. The interaction between infra structure and politics presents, like two faces of Janus, a somewhat paradoxical two-set hypothetical situation in which one hypothesis may tend to cancel out the other and yet the two do co-exist also. One hypothesis is that infra-structural pulls and pressures work in inverse proportion to the hold of secular considerations like the level of politicization, maturity of voters and their emphasis on economic considerations.⁵⁴ The other hypothesis is that infra-struct-

52 *The Hindu* March 3, 1967

53 For example, in Hyderabad the communal politics intensified by such slogans as 'Muslims are born rulers' and 'save the cow' relegated Congress to the third position, leaving the ground for Majlis-Ittihad ul-Musalmin and the Jana Sangh both of which together secured nearly 60% of votes in Yakutpura and Char Minar constituencies. Further the argument comes into bolder relief when it is recalled that cow could not prove to be a saviour in Puri the seat of the fasting Jagat Guru where the Jana Sangh nominee lost his security, and the PSP candidate was elected with 61.22% votes.

54 Perhaps, the politico economic backwardness of the voters in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Bihar accounts for the polarization of their preferences on caste. Again, conversely speaking Kamara lost in spite of the caste-composition of the constituency (35% Nadars and 20% scheduled castes). Anti Congressism would weaken feudal hold insofar as feudal allies of the Congress would not appear to cut the same ice as they would do when operating independently or as allies of other political parties. Rajasthan illustrates the point where the support of Kotah Jhalawar and Jaipur houses to Swa'intra Jana Sangh alliance proved more useful than the support of the Udaipur house to Congress. Cosmopolitanism may weaken the role of religion in politics as it is obvious in the case of West Bengal.

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ural pulls and pressures work in conjunction with and through secular considerations.⁵⁵ What is important to note (and it is not always appreciated), that both the hypotheses serve as an earnest for secularisation, the former more than the latter.

- (iv) A worth while distinction in the discussion of determinants relates to their *micro* and *macro* levels of manifestation and operation. A determinant which may appear to be lost or acutely neutralized in the criss cross of contradictory pulls and pressures at the micro level may yet be forging its identity in a slow, stealthy, piecemeal and subtle manner. And the identity, thus being forged, may become a tangible reality at the macro level. The linkages between the tangible identity at the macro level and its humble beginnings at the micro level - in fact, the process stretching from humble beginnings to the growth of the tangible identity - offers a fascinating vista of study in India's election politics. The point can best be illustrated with the role of ideology in elections. Ideology may appear to be diffused, severely neutralised, even mauled and almost lost in the labyrinth of hard economic realities⁵⁶ and infra-structural pulls and pressures. And yet as it reaches the macro level, it may have assumed a tangible identity that may have to be reckoned with. This may be more true of cadre parties with distinct ideological overtones than of parties of fluid ideological shades or of mixed centrist hue. Jana Sangh in U. P. and Madhya Pradesh and the two Communist parties in Kerala and West Bengal may be cited as examples. Thus, it may not always be reliable to assume that ideology is an absentee

55. Anti Congressism, itself a secular phenomenon, has helped the play of infra-structural pulls and pressures almost uniformly. The same is true of economic discontent.
56. Karni Singh of Bikaner would make a plea for independents on this ground and observe that "the number of mouths to be fed plus the yearly increase is a mathematical problem and no matter what may be our personal beliefs, hard cold facts and statistics cannot be ignored (Karni Singh : The Role of the Independents, *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, December 3, 1966).

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in the scheme of determinants of voting behaviour.⁵⁷ In fact, the role of ideology which had been considerably subsumed by the dominance of a single *centrist* party, may assume pronounced significance as the country moves from the present phase of unprincipled polarization to polarization on ideological lines.⁵⁸

IX

THE POLL VERDICT

One can best sum up the poll verdict in the perceptive observation of N. G. Goray :

The Indian people had behaved like a naughty child who rejects everything in hand but shows no precise likings and preferences for a new one.⁵⁹

But it is just not enough to identify the overwhelmingly negative character of the poll verdict. One may have also to add that anti-Congressism had been operationalised as an anti-Congress poll verdict largely by Congress itself, though the opposition political parties also played a limited role. The point being emphasized here is that the one party dominant system bred its own contradictions, which primarily account for the debacle of the Congress. One may refer to this context to factionalism within the Congress⁶⁰ and the

57. Even at the constituency level, ideology may not be completely absent as it is obvious from the case of Balrampur in U. P. (where A.B. Vajpayee was pitted against Subhadra Joshi) and Bombay North-East in Maharashtra where the contest was between Menon and Barve.

58. The need of polarization on ideological lines appears to be dawing on political parties in India with the fall of one non-Congress government after another, with the intra-coalitional tensions assuming menacing proportions and with the ever mounting cost of political instability in terms of development and democracy.

59. *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, March 5, 1967.

60. Factionalism ate into the vitals of the Congress and disrupted its organization *fully* in some States like Orissa, U P. and Bihar and *partially* in others as in West Bengal, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In contrast the success of the Congress in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Mysore was at least partly due to the home-grown character of the party. What was worse, the factions would seep down below from State to

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consequent factional bias in nominations⁶¹ and the role of Congress break aways; ⁶² the undue reliance on Congress bosses and the resultant neglect of the organization; ⁶³ economic discontent and the failure to meet local developmental pressures and other demands; ⁶⁴

district through city/town and block and village levels. Though perhaps to a lesser extent, the other political parties also had their share of factionalism which, in turn, affected their electoral fortunes. It was so with a difference it was not so much, technically speaking, a case of intra-party factionalism as of inter-party squabbles between political fellow-travellers like SSP and PSP, CPI and CPI (M) and Master Tara Singh Akali Dal and Sant Akali Dal. In contrast, again, the comparative homogeneity of Jana Sangh and DMK account for their success.

- 61 Factionalism did not merely encourage sabotage from within and without but it also did not permit judicious nominations in some cases. The result was that party-men, not getting Congress tickets, would fight as independents whose number naturally swelled, at least partly for this reason, during the fourth general elections. The victory of the independents in large numbers (37 in U P, 33 in Bengal, 68 in Andhra which comes to 37% of the total number of independents i.e., 376 who were elected) would affect the electoral fortunes of the Congress to a considerable extent. Dissatisfaction with nominations also weakened the mobilisation potential of the Congress even in the cases where the aspirants for tickets did not leave the party on not getting the tickets.
- 62 For example, the Bangla Congress affected the electoral fortunes of the Congress in 24 Parganas and Midnapur. Similarly, the Congress lost in those areas in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and Andhra where its off-shoots or individual dissidents left it. It may be argued that the Congress breakaways also divided the anti-Congress vote which tended to weaken the prospects of dominant opposition parties in some States like Rajasthan, U P and Orissa.
- 63 Classic example is provided by Biju Patnaik's Orissa where the gradual erosion of the organizational strength heavily cost the Congress party, its votes coming down to 33.66% in 1967 from its earlier score of 43.28% during 1961.
- 64 The panchayati raj institution played a key role here both in negative and positive terms, which perhaps at least partly explains the disenchantment of the Congress ruling elite with panchayati raj in the post fourth general elections period. U. P. provides a classic example of the negative role of panchayati raj institutions where the non-official functionaries in co-operation with the police and bureaucracy and with the connivance of the ruling Congress group at the State level indulged in corruption and antagonised the people to the disadvantage of the Congress. (For details see *L/NK* February 26, 1967, p. 19). The latter positive aspect can be illustrated with reference to what the Congress could achieve in Andhra Pradesh though factional ridden it could almost steel the areas of its support with developmental patronage through panchayati raj institutions. (*Ibid.*, p. 27) The re-organization of boundaries helped the Congress in Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and in Dharampur and Kanyakumari districts of Madras.

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alination of certain interest groups ;⁶⁵ and the psychology of indispensability and the attendant complascent attitude towards pressurized mobilization and strategic campaigning.⁶⁶ The opposition political parties deserve the credit for capturing the new voter to an appreciable extent⁶⁷ and forging workable electoral alliances. The latter minimized vote-fragmentation to the disadvantage of the Congress.⁶⁸

65. The Sikh community in Punjab, the Muslims in some parts of the U.P., Bihar and Bengal, the big business in some parts of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Orissa and U.P., the scheduled castes and tribes in U.P., Bihar, Orissa and Assam and the feudal lords in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Orissa and Madhya Bharat region of Madhya Pradesh can be cited as examples. For the development of this point, also see Iqbal Narain, *Fourth General Elections and Indian Political System, South Asian Studies*, vol 2 No. 2, July 1967 pp 131-150

66. In contrast the DMK could successfully isolate the Congress in Madras and the CPI (M) in Kerala. One may also recall in this context that the DMK could mobilize 62, 42, 695 (40.77%) voters in 173 constituencies from where it had contested, while Congress was favoured by 62, 84, 277 (41.04%) voters spread over 234 constituencies in the entire State. This should not be taken to mean that Congress did not resort to this at all. For example, D.P. Mishra's concentration on Vindhya and Kaushal regions in Madhya Pradesh and his leaving aside of the Madhya Bharat region paid dividends.

67. This is just being conveyed as a theoretical hypothesis. One may still recall in this connection that according to F.P.W. De Costa, out of every additional three votes cast during 1962 general elections, Congress can be presumed to have secured one vote. E.P.W. De Costa "A new model for election forecast" *The Hindu*, March 15, 1967. Perhaps during 1967 general elections the Congress got only one out of every four votes. This may be so because while the votes cast rose in 1967 to 145,866,510 from 115,168,890 in 1962 (registering 26.6% increase) the share of Congress rose only to 59,402,754 in 1967 from 51,509,084 votes in 1962 (i.e. an increase of 6.52% only).

68. It is important to note that the major electoral alliances appear to have cost the Congress seats rather than votes. The alliance got 88% seats with 52.4% of votes in Kerala, 76% seats with 53% of votes (DMK getting 59% seats with 40.7% votes) in Madras and 53.58% seats with 30.66% votes in Orissa. The same was to some extent also true of Rajasthan, Punjab, Bihar and Bengal. One may add that the two set alliances, as in Rajasthan, Punjab and Bengal did lesser harm to Congress electoral fortunes than one-set alliance as in Kerala and Madras. For example, in the case of

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X

AN OVERVIEW

In sum, one party dominance in India overwhelmed the election politics from the first act to the denouement as a *natural* obsession. Election politics by its very nature being a challenge-response process had to be keyed to the central note in the challenge, which was nothing but the phenomenon of one party dominance. This also accounts for the predominately negative overtones of election politics.

The singular contribution of the fourth general elections, again, had been to strike a wedge in the phenomenon of one party dominance and thereby unleash the forces of political polarisation hopefully to the advantage both of democracy and federalism in India. The party system having determined the contours of election politics in the fourth general elections to a decisive end, the election politics may help the party system attain a stage of political equilibrium through the fifth and sixth general elections. This appears to be the portent of fourth general elections for the future. And in the continuous and living interaction between party system and election politics lies the promise of Indian democracy ⁶⁹

One may also add in the end that the premises developed here tend in most cases to present in a systematic conceptual framework the findings that lie scattered in this volume; in some cases they supplement them, and, in still others, they project working hypotheses for research and study.

Punjab, one may note that while the two Akali Dals taken together increased their share in terms of % of vote from 11% in 1962 to 24.67% in 1967, the increase in the % of seats in proportion has been just 25% in 1967 from 21.35% in 1962.

69. For interesting side light on the interaction, see Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir: Voting and Elections, A Functional Analysis, *Political Studies*, Vol XV, June 1967, No. 2.

PART ONE
THE PROMISE

C. B. GENA

PARTY MANIFESTOES—
A REVIEW

POLITICAL parties in democratic countries become 'extra-active' on the eve of general elections. Each one of them, before approaching the electorate, issues election manifesto which declares the aims and objectives of the party and also provides alternative choices to the people. In fact, an election manifesto amounts to a fresh pledge which a political party undertakes to redeem. It is a strong reminder—a stock-taking sometime, as also a fresh appraisal of the programmes and policies by the political parties in the light of their experience during the inter-election years. In India also, various political parties published their election manifestoes on the eve of the fourth general elections in 1967.

Election manifestoes, have hitherto played a rather insignificant part in Indian elections.¹ Perhaps the experience, spread over three general elections² has taught the people of India not to take the promises incorporated in the manifestoes seriously. It seems that the electorate now knows that grandiose election manifestoes issued and lofty pronouncements made in their regard from public platforms lack the seriousness that alone ensures their implementation. Political parties, however, continue to issue the manifestoes in the belief that these will somehow influence the voter; they also make frequent references to them (less to their own manifestoes and more to those of other parties) for obvious reasons. This paper attempts a study of the election manifestoes of various national

1. This observation is based on the author's informal interviews with voters in an urban constituency. It becomes more relevant in view of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the electorate in India is illiterate.

2. Earlier general elections in India were held in 1952, 1957 and 1962.

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political parties³ particularly those issued on the eve of the fourth general elections.

I

A casual glance at the manifestoes of these political parties would show the consistent concern of parties⁴ in opposition with regard to the continuous monopoly of power enjoyed by the Indian National Congress. In several cases, it was obvious that, in spite of their ideological differences, political parties in the opposition had begun to think in terms of electoral pacts to oust the "entrenched Congress monster from power."⁵

An analysis of manifestoes shows that unlike the previous general elections, in the manifestoes of 1967 of some of the main opposition parties⁶ did not reflect a sense of pessimism and desperation. Instead, one might see certain amount of confidence in opposition circles to replace Congress rule at least in some of the States.⁷ Besides this image of optimism, one might also see that the political parties seemed to have realized the realities obtaining within the country on the eve of the fourth general elections. The Congress manifesto reflected that the party, unlike earlier occasions, had made some efforts to learn from its experience spread over the past two decades of unbroken rule. The opposition parties, comparatively speaking, seemed to have exercised some restraint this time in making fantastic promises to the people as they did in the past.

3. These parties are :

The Indian National Congress;
The Swatantra Party;
The Bhartiya Jana Sangh;
The Praja Socialist Party;
The Samyukta Socialist Party;
The Communist Party of India;
The Communist Party of India (Marxist);
The Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Maha Sabha.

4. Except Congress all the parties listed above in n. 3 remained in opposition in all the three Parliaments formed after each election.

5. *Swatantra Series*—1, 1962, p. 7.

6. These parties are : Jana Sangh, Swatantra party and Communist party of India (Marxist).

7. These States were : Rajasthan, U.P., M.P., Gujarat and Kerala.

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The manifesto of the Congress, like the manifesto of a ruling party, naturally began with a summary of its achievements during the past twenty years in general and the inter-election period in particular. It covered familiar ground in familiar phrases. It harped on what the party had done for the country since independence in the social, economic and political spheres. Consequently, old promises were spiced with two new ingredients: a vague promise about the ceiling on urban property and the need for social control of banks. Owing to repetitive character of the promises, the manifesto was made the target of strong criticism from various sources. It was called, "full of generalizations" "delightfully vague,"⁸ "high platitudes of vague promises,"⁹ "a familiar manifesto,"¹⁰ "stale, flat and unprofitable,"¹¹ "old wine in a new bottle,"¹² and so on. Krishna Menon¹³ was tempted to remark that "the Congress manifesto did not contain anything new, it is merely a more concentrated dose of the old socialistic contents."¹⁴ However, these criticisms were not relevant in the case of a ruling party, as its policies were already well-known and the election manifesto could only repeat them. Moreover, a ruling party, confident of retaining power, was not bound to produce an "exciting document," all the more when it had many contradictory pulls and pressures to reconcile within its own fold. On the whole, the Congress election manifesto was a balanced document re-asserting the resolve of the party "to play the historic role once again in fulfilling the nation's aspirations."¹⁵ Its motive force remained peace, prosperity and socialist pattern of society.

The Swatantra party manifesto began with a grim description of the state of the nation, which it described as being "in shambles in all spheres of national life."¹⁶ It asserted that the "ideological

8. *Link*, September 18, 1966, p. 5.

9. Prof. N.G. Ranga, Chairman of Swatantra Party.

10. *The Indian Express* (Editorial), September 15, 1966.

11. M.R. Masani, General Secretary of the Swatantra Party.

12. Sunil Mukherjee, leader of the CPI group in the third Bihar Assembly.

13. Krishna Menon was still a member of the Congress when this statement was made in October, 1966.

14. *The Hindustan Times*, October 11, 1966, p. 4.

15. *The Congress Election Manifesto*, 1967, para 48, p. 16.

16. *The Swatantra Party Election Manifesto*, 1967, p. 2.

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confusions and extravagant plans of the Congress"¹⁷ had brought disaster to the country and only the 'Swatantra alternative' could "pull the country out of the ditch." The manifesto for the fourth general election (second for the Swatantra party) was identical to the one issued on the eve of the third general elections in 1962.¹⁸ It was claimed that "the manifesto took the party thinking one or two steps further in the direction laid down by the first manifesto of 1962 election."¹⁹ With emphasis on "free-economy," that coloured its views on every issue, the Swatantra party claimed, "we stand in sharp contrast to the Congress," though an average voter could not possibly see how the Swatantra party could "make today's prosperity foundation of tomorrow's growth."²⁰

The Jana Sangh manifesto labelled the Congress rule as "corrupt, inefficient and effete." It claimed that the Jana Sangh stood as the "watch-dog of the people's rights and interests," as the party had "sound principles, clear policies and a definite programme with a pragmatic approach to all problems."²¹ But the manifesto did not say as to how the many problems facing the country could be solved. The Jana Sangh document, like that of the Swatantra party, listed various areas in which the Congress government had failed the country, particularly during the past five years and placed a 118-point programme to bring about a democratic revolution and give the country a "new direction." In all fairness, however, it could be noted that it did not offer any concrete methods or policies as possible solutions.

The manifesto of the Praja Socialist party (PSP), however, showed some refreshing departure from the beaten-track approach of the other political parties. For a party, which was quite a long way from power, the PSP manifesto took a noticeably balanced and restrained line in the formulation of its election manifesto. The document revealed some frustration and contained some impracticable suggestions too; but, by and large, the party had resisted the

17. *Ibid*

18. The party was formed in 1959.

19. M.R. Masani's statement in *The Hindustan Times*, November 19, 1966.

20. *n.* 16, para 10.

21. *The Indian Express* (Editorial), October 4, 1966.

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urge to indulge in verbal flamboyance or make tall promises. The party decried opportunistic attempts of opposition parties and declared that the implementation of policies laid down in its manifesto would not be possible if it joined a united front of the Left or forged an alliance with the Right. Hence it categorically chose to "go alone," as it would prefer to pose issues sharply and would be content to emerge as a small but cohesive unit with proven integrity. The manifesto claimed the PSP as "the only organized force working with single-minded devotion for the creation of a democratic society in India."²² The PSP envisaged the creation of a democratic socialist society", not unlike the Congress, it might be noted.

The Samyukta Socialist party (SSP) declared in its manifesto the utter necessity to "usher in a new era of plenty." It talked of a "Peoples Government" which, within six months of coming to power, would solve the country's vexed problems. The SSP document claimed that unlike the manifestoes of other political parties (which were merely indicative of intentions and policy statements in its view), its own "manifesto is programmatic, for it spells out a definite programme, with specific time limits, that the party would undertake if in power." Further, "the manifesto has shown the way in which necessary strength could be gathered to implement that programme."²³ However, the SSP appreciated that the first non-Congress government would be a "coalition of several parties."

The election manifesto of the Communist party of India set out as its short-term objective to overthrow the Congress regime in the fourth general elections. But to achieve this, the manifesto explained, a mere anti-Congress election front, irrespective of principles and policies, "just to win seats somehow" would not be of help. That, the party held, would go against democracy and progress. Therefore, ruling out any pact with "counter-revolutionary," "communal" and "pro-imperialist"²⁴ parties, the CPI hoped that if

22. Prem Bhasin, (General Secretary, PSP) in a report to the party's National General Council, A Party with a programme *Janata*, October 16, 1966, p. 5.

23. S.M. Joshi, 'None competent in Congress' *Indian Express*, January 23, 1967, p. 1.

24. These parties according to CPI are : the, Jana Sangh, the Swatantra party and the Hindu Mahasabha.

the "left democratic parties" came together and formed a front, they could command a majority and replace Congress rule. As for the long-term objectives, the CPI only repeated its well known theme and did not say anything radically different. However, there was one exception. Unlike its earlier manifestoes which "enumerated at least the most spectacular achievements of the Congress government and the difficulties that stood in its way,"²⁵ the manifesto of 1967 noted that "the chequered career of the Congress is studded with violated pledges and evil deeds," and, therefore, it must be "dislodged from power." The party considered *bandhs*, strikes and various other agitational devices as indications of the mood of the masses on the eve of the general election as "unmistakably in the favour of radical change."

A new feature in the manifesto of the CPI was an explanatory justification of the party's stand *vis-a-vis* the CPI (Marxists). The manifesto accused the Chinese Communist party for a split in the Communist movement in India and elaborated upon the differences between the CPI and its Marxist counterpart. It stated that the two Communist parties differed on the question of the country's defence, the character of the economy of the country and forming a front for the overthrow of the Congress.

The manifesto of the Communist party of India (Marxists), unlike that of the CPI, called for a "broad alliance of all democratic and progressive forces against the Congress" but conceded that the "major important task facing the party is that of fighting a rear-guard action against its own brand of dissidents."²⁷ That explains why a large part of the manifesto was devoted to an exposition of differences between the two parties. The manifesto made it abundantly clear that the two parties would continue to face each other in every aspect of political life. The manifesto would have the voter believe that nationalization was the panacea for all economic ills. The manifesto confirmed that the CPI (Marxist) did not believe in

25. Gena, C.B., "A Study of Party Manifestoes (1962)," *Political Science Review*, Jaipur, Vol. I, No. I, 1962, p. 126.

26. *The CPI, Election Manifesto 1967*, reproduced in M. Pattabhiram "General Elections in India, 1967" (Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967), p. 253.

27. *The Times of India*, December 20, 1966, p. 6.

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modest reforms, but sought dramatic results. The manifesto, therefore, was replete with the usual clichés about nationalization, rapid enlargement of public sector etc, envisaging a political, economic and social revolution. However, the manifesto also asserted that "the central task of the Left Communists is the isolation of the Congress."²³

The election manifesto of the Hindu Mahasabha had the deceptive virtue of promising all things to all men. The Mahasabha is perhaps even more obscurantist than the Jana Sangh. That explains why its manifesto was averse to the realities of the situation. The party continued to harp upon a "democratic Hindu State", making in the process some fantastic and, at times, contradictory, promises to the people. Although it stood for so many things, it did not care to explain how and with what it would translate them into practice.

The brief introduction of the election manifestoes attempted here would show that these were documents carefully prepared, full of pious intentions, couched in catchy phrases, but not very much serious about the existing problems of the country. The various opposition parties talked of alternatives, which the average voter would take to be as vague as the promises of the Congress. This view can be substantiated by an analysis of the policies of the parties on specific issues, to which we turn now.

II

Various political parties have devoted a great deal of space in their manifestoes to laying down policies and programmes which, in their view, would develop the economy of the country and make it self-reliant. The stress in all the manifestoes is primarily on production; the aspect of equitable distribution of what is produced is also recognised. Different parties, however, seek to prescribe specific methods to achieve this objective, as the political parties hold divergent views on the Indian economic situation.

On the basis of ultimate objectives in the economic sphere, Indian political parties fall in two categories : parties committed to

23. B.T. Ranadive, (a noted Marxist theoretician) "Left Reds hope to do better than Right" *The Hindustan Times*, December 14, 1966.

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some form of socialism; and parties which are opposed to it. Barring the "political parties of extreme reaction, such as the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra party, there is hardly any party which has not declared socialism as its ultimate goal."²⁹ The interpretation and the way to the socialist goal differ, nevertheless, from one political party to another. For the Congress, "socialism is neither a dogma nor a mere ideologue's approach, but a practical man's vision of how to achieve an independent economy with a promise of prosperity for the people."³⁰ For the two CPIs, socialism was the only way out of the 'prevalent economic confusion. Besides, the parties believed that socialism meant total control of the economy by the State. The socialist parties (PSP and SSP) were all out for socialism but of a milder nature than that of the Communists. The SSP wanted "all property used as a means of production which hire labour to be socialized,"³¹ while PSP brand of "socialism means equality and prosperity."³² The Swatantra party and the Jana Sangh were opposed to socialism. The Jana Sangh was of the view that "logically and inevitably, socialism leads to totalitarian state of monolithic type."³³ The Swatantra party was "totally opposed to socialism" and stood for a free and competitive economy. It favoured curtailment of the activities of the state in the economic sphere. The Hindu Mahasabha was not inhibited by *isms*. It stood for prosperity of the people but had its own way for its achievement. These views of Indian political parties about Indian economy can be elaborated further by a reference to specific economic issues : planning, agriculture and industry.

Planning

The Congress manifesto rededicated the party for planned

29. S.G. Sardesai, *India's Path to Socialism* (CPI publication no. 16, November 1966), p. 1.
30. K.D. Malaviya, "(Congress Manifesto Analysed)" *The Hitavada*, October 5, 1966.
31. Madhu Limaye, *Why Samyukta Socialist Party ?* (Popular Election Guides, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967), p. 15.
32. *The Praja Socialist Party Election Manifesto*, 1967, p. 5.
33. Deva Prasad Ghosh in the presidential address to the Fifth Annual Session of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh at New Delhi, December 1956; quoted by M. A. Jhangiani, *Jana Sangh and Swatantra : A Profile of the Rightist Parties in India*, (Manaktalas, Bombay, 1967), p. 74.

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development of the economy : "planning in India is not a question of economic growth. The plan is the blue-print of total national reconstruction."³⁴ Despite the set-backs, the Congress manifesto reflected the party's pride in the achievements of the three five-year plans. There was, however, no specific mention of planning in the present manifesto of the Congress.³⁵ It was equally silent on the place to be assigned to the Planning Commission about which there was a certain amount of controversy even among the Congress leaders. The party, however, sought to justify the mobilization of economic resources through state initiative and control. The party urged that "the state should play an active and dynamic role in planning, building and directing the economic development of the country."³⁶ It is said that a deliberate omission in the Congress manifesto of planning is understandable : "its real manifesto in respect of economic development is the fourth plan where it has already spelt out in detail what it proposes to do in the next five years."³⁷

The Swatantra party was not opposed to planning as such. In fact, the party (though opposed to socialization) believed in planning – of course, of its own version and brand. What it was opposed to was the Soviet type of coercive planning "which has failed so miserably here" and "believes in democratic planning by persuasion."³⁸ The party stood for a plan which had "for its foundation *dharma*, a plan that is based on the initiative of our people, a plan that stands for self-employment and security of our people, a plan that believes in our people."³⁹ The party was, therefore, opposed to the Congress way of planning. The party termed it as the effort

34. S.G. Barve, *Why Congress* (Popular Election Guides, Popular Prakashan Bombay, 1967), p. 34

35. All the three earlier manifestoes included detailed reference to five year plans and stressed upon the need for planning, especially in the Indian context.

36. P.R. Chakravarti, "Election Manifesto of the Congress," *Northern India Patrika*, October 27, 1966.

37. Virendra Agarwala, (Political Parties and their Manifestoes. *The Hitavada*, January 10, 1967.

38. *ibid.*, p. 12.

39. *Ibid.*, 1962, p. 11.

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made "to foist on the people of this country the Soviet pattern of state capitalism."⁴⁰ The Swatantra party held the view that the fourth plan be scrapped; the Planning Commission be replaced by "expert advisory bodies to help government to plan its own business."⁴¹

The Jana Sangh also believed "in economic planning, even, though it knows that the plans so far have failed to regenerate our economy and to relieve the sufferings of the people."⁴² The party held that "with a view to putting our national resources to maximum use in the minimum period of time planning is necessary."⁴³ But Jana Sangh wanted that a "plan should be based on our resources and capacities and should be pragmatic and aim at an organic growth of the country's economy."⁴⁴ The purpose of plans, according to the Jana Sangh, should be to lay foundations of a self-reliant, prosperous and egalitarian economy. The party manifesto held that "the system of micro-economic planning region-wise and project-wise to ensure balanced development and effective implementation," was necessary. Thus the need for planned economic development was recognised by the party; but it was critical of the composition of the Planning Commission, the manner and method of planning and the size of the plans.

The PSP manifesto showed a sympathetic approach to planned economic development, but its emphasis was "on the base and not at the apex". It would decentralize planning and give a more important role to administration at the district and the village levels: "district administration which is close to the people and has democratic foundations has to be the principal unit of economic planning."⁴⁵

40. M.R. Masani's statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, August 23, 1961, column 4296.

41. n. 16, p. 12.

42. *The Jana Sangh Election Manifesto*, 1967, p. 16.

43. *The Bhartiya Jana Sangh : Principles and Policy* (published by the party's central office, Delhi, 1967), p. 28.

44. n. 41.

45. Surendra Nath Dwivedy : *Why Praja Socialist ?* (Popular Election Guide, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967), p. 21.

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The SSP did not make specific reference to planning as such, but its economic programme was based on planning.

On planning, the two wings of the Communist party of India did not differ very much from the Congress. In their view, total planning of the country's economy and mobilization of material and human resources alone could co-ordinate economic development. The CPI stood to replace the five-year plans by an alternative peoples' plan, which would be worked out with the "objective of self-reliance, rapid growth, democratization of entire economy, social justice and people's welfare."⁴⁶ The party alleged that the Congress plan was not a people's plan and asserted that "planning must first and foremost be for the people." But the manifesto nowhere explained what the party exactly implied by a people's plan. The CPI (Marxist) held that the present plans which were implemented with money from the United States were "virtually mortgaging our economic activity to the imperialists." Instead, the party advocated "a people's economic plan of development and self-reliance."⁴⁷

The Hindu Mahasabha was committed to the planned economic development of the country, but it regretted that planning, as carried out by the Congress so far, had been wrongly conceived and badly executed. Therefore, the Mahasabha stood "for a basic change in planning."

Nationalization

The planned economy as conceived by the Congress, the Communists and Socialist parties implied the idea of mixed economy consisting of a public sector and a private sector, the former continuously widening. The Congress manifesto favoured a dynamic and growing public sector as an important tool for a socialist transformation of society. It was for this reason that the party proposed to widen the scope of cooperative movement. The Congress manifesto marked a radical departure from the party's earlier stand on social control of banking institutions. The PSP and the SSP also upheld nationalization of basic industries, but a little more than what the

46. n. 26, p. 266.

47. n. 26, p. 235.

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Congress conceded and a little less than what the Communist parties insisted upon.

The Jana Sangh and the Swatantra parties, on the whole, were opposed to nationalization. Jana Sangh believed in mixed economy in which private sector be given a relatively greater role. The party was against nationalization of banking in particular and of existing private sector industries in general. But the fact that the party stood for a mixed economy did give an impression that Jana Sangh stood for "half-hearted" concessions by way of nationalization of at least some of the industries. The Swatantra party also subscribed to mixed economy, but considered "limitations on private enterprise as the source of whatever confusion they see in the country or difficulties which are facing the country in the process of development." It held "free play of market forces the necessary correctives for distortions, imbalances, social injustice and inequalities."⁴⁸ Precisely, the party advocated free-competition.

The Hindu Mahasabha advocated that "all key industries must be owned and controlled by the state" and in case of other industries the state should give full facilities and protection; and, if necessary, aid be given to the investors in such industries. The Mahasabha manifesto permitted state interference in the private sector ultimately to bring in state control over this sector. Thus, the Mahasabha was not against nationalization but insisted that the keynote of its economic policy was "prosperity through competition for the benefit of the consumer."

Agricultural Policy

In the Indian context, the concern shown by political parties for a practical food policy and concrete agricultural procedures is understandable. Of course, they differ in how best to realize the objective. The issue cannot be separated from a reconstitution of the agrarian structure.

The Congress manifesto, in this context, held that "their land policies have introduced some major changes in the agrarian

48. *Manifestoes X-Rayed-Swatantra party* (Indian National Congress, Weekly Bulletin, New Delhi, December 12, 1966) p. 5.

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structure." It, however, conceded that "the land reforms have in some respects not been implemented effectively and assures the people for a vigorous implementation of land laws." But the party did not promise any new step to improve upon the existing land laws. There was a marked shift in the party's attitude towards irrigation schemes. It placed considerable emphasis on the improvement of minor irrigation projects instead of concentrating, as it did all along so far, on major and medium sized ones. The party repeated its resolve to effect modernization of agriculture. It promised to make adequate provision for fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, credit and improved tools and implements. The Congress advocated strengthening of the cooperative movement to free the cultivator from the shackles of local money-lenders by making credit available to him.

The Swatantra party manifesto referred to agriculture as "India's basic industry." It stated that the country's food problem could be solved only through recognition of peasant proprietorship and effective extension of incentives. The party advocated removal of all compulsory levies and all zonal and other barriers to the free movement of agricultural products. The party, hoped that abolition of land revenue, repeal of the 17th amendment, and freeing agriculture from the "fetters of state control," would by themselves boost agricultural production. Likewise, the party, "founded mainly to oppose the Congress move towards cooperative farming,"⁴⁹ showed its opposition to cooperative or collective farming. The party, on the one hand, assured highest possible prices to the farmer for his products, and on the other, guaranteed the essential food needs of the common men at lower prices if necessary by subsidising food.

The Jana Sangh gave first priority to agriculture and declared "intensive cultivation" as the kingpin of India's agricultural development. It specified that land belonged to the tiller and land reforms had to be directed to that end. The party promised credit facilities to the farmer by making statutory provisions for all banks to open branches in the villages. Minor and major irrigation schemes,

49. Ram Singh, *Swatantra's Goal in Swatantra Marches On* (Party Central Office, Delhi, June 1967), p. 17.

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provision of manures, fertilizers and seeds; reduction in land rents and insurance of crops were some other major suggestions.

The PSP's manifesto advocated revision of land laws, and substitution of land revenue by agricultural income tax. It supported the tiller as the owner of land, guaranteed him a reasonable price for his products and reduction in irrigation rates. An important suggestion in the manifesto was the creation of a land army to reclaim land and to cultivate it.

The SSP advocated reforms in the agricultural pattern more or less on the lines suggested by the PSP.

The two Communist parties of India stood for 'drastic' land legislation, ceilings at a lower figure, expropriation of land-lords and distribution of land among the landless and the smaller peasants. They promised drastic revision of land-taxation, fixation of prices profitable to the producer and levy of food only from the big land-lords.

The Hindu Mahasabha manifesto had also enumerated a number of measures for agrarian reforms. It strongly held that land ceiling and the related land reforms were not essential. It stood "for non-interference by state with the proprietary interests of land holders unless they neglect cultivation or allow useful land to lie fallow."⁵⁰

Along with measures for agrarian reconstruction, those related to forest development and cattle-wealth had also been considered by some political parties. The Congress manifesto promised that the party would pay attention to them. There was no direct reference to those subjects in the manifestoes of other parties except in those of the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha. The Jana Sangh held out promises to develop forests and amend the constitution in order to ban cow-slaughter. Mahasabha, though more communal than the Jana Sangh, did not specifically refer to a ban on cow slaughter and merely stated the importance of taking "steps for improving the breed of cows, bulls and other animals necessary for agriculture."

50. *The Hindu Mahasabha, Election Manifesto 1967*, reproduced in M. Pattabhiram, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

Industrial Policy

All the political parties in India were agreed that the key to modernization of an under-developed economy lay in industrialization. They regarded that industry and agriculture were mutually capable of national development. The manifestoes of all the parties, therefore, had stressed the need for the development of industries along with the revitalization of agriculture. Vital differences, nevertheless, existed in the approaches of political parties as to the pace and form of industrialization and the way in which they were meant to be carried out.

The Congress having gained some experience of giving effect to industrialization programme through the three preceding five year plans, took into consideration the inevitable difficulties. The fourth plan emphasised the party's commitment to continue efforts for industrialization. But the manifesto made it abundantly clear how the party had come to realize "that industrialization should not be at the expense of agriculture."⁵¹ That accounted for the absence of any detailed reference to its industrial policy in its manifesto of 1967.

Industrialization cannot ignore issues pertaining to labour reforms and the Congress showed awareness of this correlation. The manifesto categorically stated that "labour has a vital role to play in the economic development and reconstruction of the country."⁵² It, therefore, promised the labour a fair wage, reasonable conditions of work and minimum social security.

The Congress manifesto recognized the seriousness of the unemployment problem, though it stated that "neither agriculture, nor large scale industries nor even both of them together can absorb the growing number of the unemployed."⁵³ The party felt that though "improved methods of agriculture, increase in the crops in the year, work on the improvement of minor irrigation, building of social service institutions and large scale industries",

51. M. Pattabhiram, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

52. *n.* 15, p. 10.

53. *Ibid.*

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would "provide employment on an increasing scale, but that by itself cannot meet the needs of the situation."⁵⁴

The Swatantra party welcomed industrialization provided it was mostly left in the hands of the private sector. The manifesto sought "balanced development in which small and medium-labour intensive industries have priority over capital intensive industries."⁵⁵ The party did not oppose development of heavy and basic industries, commensurate with availability of resources, provided it did not result in the neglect of cottage and light industries producing consumer goods. As regards labour, the Swatantra party which once insisted, "on securing for the labouring classes a voice in the determination of national policies,"⁵⁶ now stood "for a fair deal to labour, both industrial and agricultural." The party recognized "the workers' right to collective bargaining involving, where necessary, the right to withdraw their labour," channelled through strong and responsible trade unions. The Swatantra party, unlike the Communist and the Socialist parties, wanted that the trade unions must be managed by the workers themselves and not controlled by the political parties as had hitherto been the case

The Jana Sangh, like the Swatantra party, found fault with the Congress : "industrialization has been excessively capital intensive because of priority to heavy industries, greater allocation to the public sector and foreign collaboration which has become a heavy burden on a capital scarce country like India", which "led to concentration both horizontal and vertical."⁵⁷ The Jana Sangh suggested a change in the investment pattern and advocated decentralization, *Swadeshi* and labour-intensity as guidelines not only for industrial development, but also as safeguards against unemployment, inequalities and foreign exchange shortages. The party's industrial policy stood for limiting the role of the State in industry to a competitor and not as a monopolist."⁵⁸

54. *Ibid.*

55. n. 16, p. 10.

56. Policy statement on labour adopted at the first national convention, Patna, 1960; reproduced in S.L. Poplai, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

57. n. 42, p. 22.

58. Balraj Madhok, *Why Jana Sangh ?* (Popular Election Guides) p. 17.

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The Jana Sangh manifesto did not refer to industrial labour in particular, though it conceded the feasibility to fix minimum wages at existing levels for agricultural labour. The party's affirmative stand on the right of the labour to organize and resort to collective bargaining and strike was like that of the Swatantra line. The party stood for fixed "national minimum" in wages and creation of permanent wage boards.

The PSP was silent on the expansion of industries except that any scheme of industrialization should pay attention to balanced development of all industries. The manifesto of the party briefly stated that the party would promote labour-intensive to medium and small industries. The central theme of the industrial policy of the PSP was that the willing and active cooperation of labour alone could promote industrialization and ensure increased industrial production. It advocated that labour be accepted as equal partner in both the nationalized and cooperative sector industries and proposed fixation of minimum wage in all occupations. The party stood for specific steps to counter unemployment and held the promise to "place greater emphasis on cottage industries, agro-industrial and labour-intensive techniques both in the rural and urban sectors of the economy so that conditions of fuller employment are created in the near future."⁵⁹

The SSP manifesto vaguely hinted at the party's industrial policy and made a fantastic suggestion that "the policy of industrialization can succeed only when supported by supplementary policies about property, language, caste, administration etc."⁶⁰ The party felt that "industrialization is not possible without science." The party stood for immediate takeover of all foreign assets which it considered responsible for the industrial mess the country had been forced into. In the sphere of the labour policy of the party, the manifesto did not have much to say except that it believed in a "vigorous, united trade-union movement within the fold of a single organization," which the party was prepared to guide and control. Unemployment was given credit as an inherent

59. *n.* 32, p. 191.

60. *The SSP Election Manifesto, 1967*, p. 8.

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evil of Congress industrial policy and the SSP thought that a change over from the former to the latter would solve the problem" "within six months" of its coming to power.

The CPI stood for a comprehensive programme of rapid industrial development in which the public sector must be in a commanding position and capital goods industries occupying the pride of place. The party would radically change the production and pricing policies based on cooperation of trade unions. It advocated rapid expansion of the State sector in different branches of economy, nationalization of all foreign enterprises, annulment of all collaboration agreements and repatriation of capital outside the country and a moratorium on debt repayments, thereby making the State the only monopolist. The CPI stood for the minimum need-based wage to the working class, and conceded them the right to strike, but the party hoped that the workers would exercise it democratically. As regards unemployment the manifesto suggested that "all schemes of automation be halted," even if it adversely affected production or efficiency.

The CPI (Marxist) pointed out the inadequacy of the advance made in industrialization. The party manifesto stated that all progress made had only resulted in strengthening the American imperialist hold on the country, out of which it needed to be salvaged. The party manifesto suggested, however, only familiar Communist reforms in the industrial field and for the working class.

The Hindu Mahasabha "cherishes the hope of making Hindustan one of the foremost flourishing countries of the world."⁶¹ Although the keynote of its industrial policy was "prosperity through competition for the benefit of the consumer,"⁶² yet it realized the importance of basic industries and assigned their ownership and control to the State. As to the State sector, the party would give special encouragement to cottage and small scale industries as well as to large scale ones. The party upheld that "equitable

61. *n.* 50, p. 221.

62. *Ibid.*

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distribution of industrial profits between workers, the entrepreneurs and the consumer”⁶³ be ensured. The labour policy according to its manifesto should be “aimed at encouraging cordial relations between the employer and the employee.”

III

Before attempting an analysis of the foreign policy pronouncements of political parties in their manifestoes, it may be useful for a better understanding of the consistency or otherwise in the party stands, if one takes note of a few important events of a far reaching character that had taken place since the third general elections in 1962. The first important event was a war with China in October 1962 and China's explosion of the atom bomb.⁶⁴ The second was the death of Jawaharlal Nehru⁶⁵, the architect and executor of India's foreign policy for almost two decades. Then came the armed conflict with Pakistan in 1965, which provided a different anvil for evaluation and assessment of India's foreign policy declarations.⁶⁶ Obviously, all these factors has pertinent relevance in the context of analysis that follows.

Broadly speaking, all political parties agreed that India's foreign policy should be such as to preserve the interests of the nation and promote world peace. Except the rightist parties,⁶⁷ others subscribed to non-alignment and condemned imperialism, and colonialism. However, in their ideological orientations each party differed from the other and in their approach to the various world problems each naturally had its own solution.

The Congress had been consistent in its foreign policy declarations since the first general elections in 1952. Although the pattern of India's foreign relations had substantially changed in the period between the second and the third general elections, and the

63. *Ibid.*

64. China exploded its first atom bomb on October 16, 1964.

65. Jawaharlal Nehru died on May 27, 1965.

66. The reason being that the conflict with Communist China was one against a country not having the same political character as that of Pakistan-aligned with the U.S.A.

67. The rightist parties referred to in this paper are : Swatantra, the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha.

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new realities were further underlined in the transition between the third and the fourth general elections, that did not bring about a change in the basic premises of India's foreign policy. The Congress maintained that the policies of peace, co-existence and non-alignment had stood the test of time and needed no radical change so long as India's national interests were fully safeguarded. Thus, like the earlier manifestoes, the manifesto of 1967 reiterated the Congress stand :

...It is in consonance with the best traditions of India's struggle for freedom and the striving for peace in which all thoughtful people in all parts of the world are engaged in this atomic age. Peaceful co-existence, non-alignment and disarmament are important aspects of this policy of peace and friendship with all countries especially our neighbours.⁶⁸

The party also reiterated its support for the liberation of countries continuing under colonial rule and for campaigns against racial discrimination in general and in South Africa, South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola in particular. It renewed its pledge to stand by the United Nations as an effective instrument of world peace.

The Swatantra party regarded "enlightened self-interest and progress towards world unity as the bases of a sound foreign policy."⁶⁹ The party manifesto declared that the Congress government's foreign policy had been an "utter failure;" non-alignment had lost all meaning, especially after the country's territorial integrity had been violated by China and Pakistan. Hence, the party wanted India to enter into proper defence alliances with reliable powers.⁷⁰ The Swatantra party's first premise and its overwhelming concern was the menace of China⁷¹ :

68. n. 15, p. 15.

69. n. 16, p. 15.

70. It is interesting to note that one or two members, at the party's Fourth National Convention in New Delhi held on December 12-13, 1966, went further and urged that the country must align with the west and more particularly with the U.S.A. *Asian Recorder*, Vol. XII, Col. 7482.

71. Minoo Masani made this quite explicit when, in a major policy statement, he said that international "reality is that the biggest threat to our independence, our way of life and our survival is that which comes from China." "*Our Foreign Policy : A Plea for Realism*", the text of a speech delivered by Masani in the Lok Sabha, November 15, 1965, printed by the Swatantra party.

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The party stands pledged to a firm and vigilant policy in dealing with Communist China and for active steps to end its aggression and to reoccupy Indian territories in its possession at the earliest possible moment. The party stands for the liberation of Tibet and for the recognition of the Dalai Lama as the Head of the Government of Tibet in exile.⁷²

The only major modification which the manifesto made in the party's known positions in the sphere of foreign policy was in its attitude towards Pakistan.⁷³ While it stood for seeking a peaceful relationship with Pakistan, it considered Pakistan's aggression in 1965 a serious breach of international good conduct that would deprive it of whatever legal status it has as a party to the Kashmir dispute.⁷⁴

The Jana Sangh's stand showed that its opposition to non-alignment was a "creed."⁷⁵ The party held that non-alignment could not be raised to the status of a permanent doctrine. But a reference in the same breath to bilateral alliances, "irrespective of their allegiance to the two power blocs betrayed the confusion into which its isolationist nationalism tended to lead it."⁷⁶ Jana Sangh would like India to pursue an independent rather than a non-aligned foreign policy in the "new situation"⁷⁷, partly created by Chinese and Pakistani aggression.

72. n. 16, p. 16.

73. The Swatantra party till 1965 insisted that any regional defence network to be adequate to India's needs must include Pakistan. In fact, the party maintained that "the first essential in India's defence is collaboration with Pakistan." *Swaraj*, September 25, 1965.

74. Before the change in the Swatantra party's attitude towards Pakistan "most of the prominent members of the party were pleading for policies calculated to bring about reconciliation with Pakistan." Sisir Gupta, Foreign Policy in the 1967 Manifestoes, *India Quarterly*, January-March, 1967, p. 30.

75. It is a radical departure from the party's earlier stand when it was committed to "follow a policy of non-alignment with the power-blocs, as also of non-involvement in international affairs not directly affecting Bharat." The Jana Sangh Election Manifesto, 1957 : published in S. L. Poplai, *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India*, (Metropolitan Book Co., Delhi, 1957), p. 143.

76. *The Hindustan Times*, November 8, 1966.

77. Balraj Madhok, Jana Sangh President, gives a very interesting description of the new situation in an article "India's Foreign Policy—The Jana Sangh

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The Jana Sangh manifesto devoted considerable attention to India's relations with China and Pakistan. In view of the fact that both Pakistan and China have, in collusion with each other, adopted hostile attitude against India, Jana Sangh's foreign policy "would aim at forging links with countries which can be helpful to India against either one or both of these hostile countries."⁷⁸ On China, the party categorically declared that it would oppose China's entry into the UN and would not enter into any negotiations with her unless China agreed to vacate aggression. It promised to recognize the government of Taiwan and Sinkiang and would like to accord recognition to the government of Dalai Lama in exile. The Jana Sangh also did not like the needless prattle about the Colombo Proposals. With Pakistan also, the party would refuse to negotiate unless aggression was vacated. Nevertheless, it sympathised with all the movements of the Pakistani people, "with whom India has no quarrel." It would also welcome any move to bring the two states closer, provided the move was not prompted by any "third power." Jana Sangh continued to have "faith in the ultimate unification of India and Pakistan."⁷⁹ The intense concern of Jana Sangh for overseas Indians and their alleged maltreatment found a strong expression in the manifesto.

The PSP sought an independent foreign policy. It opposed military alliances. Like the stand of the Congress, it recognized the need to preserve and strengthen the United Nations as an instrument of collective security. It advocated a leading role for India in Afro-

View". He writes : "India cannot afford to be non-aligned when instead of being a dis-interested spectator she has herself been forced into the fray. The world has now become multi-polar in which the two most live poles are New Delhi and Peking. Now it is for other countries to align themselves with either of these Asian giants or to remain non-aligned in respect of them. India cannot be non-aligned with herself. She needs friends, dependable friends, who would stand by her in her conflict with China... Furthermore, there is no really non-aligned country in the world. Even the USA and USSR have felt constrained to forge parallel military policies." *India Quarterly*, pp. 3-4.

78. *Bhartiya Jana Sangh - A brief outline of policies* (published by the party's central office, 1967), p. 4.

79. *n.* 42, p. 5.

Asian world. With regard to China, the manifesto said : "it considers that a settlement with China, is not in the national interest unless aggression is vacated." There was a plea for forging a close link with Asian countries against Chinese expansionism. The party manifesto was critical of the Congress policies for being lukewarm. That marked a departure from the stand taken by the PSP in 1962.⁸⁰ So also the party's stand *vis-a-vis* Israel (akin to that taken by the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra party), which considered that friendly relations with the Arab countries did not preclude cordial relations with Israel.

The SSP manifesto claimed that "borrowed clothing, borrowed industry, borrowed wealth, borrowed food and borrowed thinking have uprooted India's foreign policy"⁸¹ The indictment against Congress policies asked to reverse the processes "changing the principle of non-preference into a policy of non-alignment."⁸² That alone, it was advocated, would evoke equal co-operation from the people and governments of powerful countries like the USA and the USSR. With regard to divided countries, particularly India and Pakistan, the SSP sought to "pursue its clear policy of confederation or reunion"⁸³ According to it "where confederation is not possible on the governmental level, the people and their parties or organizations will carry on this work."⁸⁴

The CPI conceded that the Congress government generally pursued a policy of peace, non-alignment and anti-colonialism, but resented "vacillations and compromises under the pressure of Anglo-American blackmail." The party demanded that the policy of non-alignment be strengthened and based firmly on active and consistent anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The party found no advantage in India's continued association with the Commonwealth and insisted that India should quit it. The CPI pledged itself to "safeguard the Tashkent spirit, to work for the further realization of

80. The 1962 manifesto of the PSP committed the party "to support the government whenever it follows a genuine policy of non-involvement in power bloc politics."

81. *n.* 60, p. 13.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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normal relations between India and Pakistan and to struggle actively against new attempts by reactionary forces to aggravate and inflame relations between the two countries.”⁸⁵ With regard to India's relations with Communist China CPI manifesto recorded :

Despite the continued hostile attitude of China it is in the interest of the Indian people and the country as a whole to explore all avenues for a peaceful settlement with China either directly or through the good offices of friendly neutral powers and propose a no-war pact with China.⁸⁶

The CPI (Marxist) manifesto enumerated failures of the Congress government in the international affairs and concluded that “under the leadership of the Congress party, India's foreign policy is rapidly losing its independence and becoming subservient to the USA. Economic dependence is leading to political dependence.”⁸⁷ The party proposed :

An independent foreign policy based on opposition to imperialism, especially American imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and support to all freedom struggles; a policy based on opposition to nuclear war and imperialist wars and supporting peace and peaceful co-existence; a policy of firm friendship with all peace-loving countries; firm solidarity with Afro-Asian peoples and a break with the British Commonwealth.⁸⁸

The CPI (Marxist) had a distinctly different approach from that of the CPI to foreign policy issues particularly in regard to China and Pakistan :

In the interest of our own freedom and well being, the party demands that the government should take the initiative to have direct talks for a peaceful settlement with China ⁸⁹

And for Pakistan, the CPI (Marxist) demanded a peaceful settlement of all disputes so that the forces of reaction and imperialism could no longer exploit the situation to the detriment of the freedom of both countries.

85. n. 26, para 25.

86. *Ibid.*

87. The CPI (Marxist), *Election Manifesto*, 1967, p. 24.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

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The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the basic tenets of India's foreign policy pursued by the Congress government, when it recorded: "the foreign policy of any country cannot be based upon catch-words like non-alignment, disarmament, *panchsheel* etc." Instead, the Mahasabha urged that the foreign policy be "based on the enlightened self-interest of the nation and its preparedness to defend its frontiers from foreign aggression."

The foregoing resume of party stands on foreign policy issues make it clear that a broad consensus available during the first decade of independence was no longer there. The Chinese and Pakistani aggression and their increasing collusion, as well as India's performance during the past twenty years appear to have brought about a change in the attitude of political parties to international relations. There, however, appears a new type of consensus emerging among them that India's dependence on foreign countries had adversely affected its foreign policy. Similarly, all parties gave a clarion call for more realism in the formulation and execution of the country's foreign policy. However, this realism arose from the varying approaches of the parties and bore out different implications. In conclusion it might be mentioned that all the political parties sought to view the future foreign policy of India in relation to India's national interest in general and defence requirements in particular. China and Pakistan loomed large in foreign policy formulations of various political parties. It has been given out "that the parties generally have not bestowed much careful thought on the subject and they have no clear views on them."⁹⁰

IV

Since the third general elections, the frontiers of India had been violated thrice by China and Pakistan and both the countries continued to occupy large areas of Indian territory. There was a time, when it was thought that they might not attack India simultaneously but the situation has since changed considerably. Pakistan and China are in collusion and the joint threat from these hostile neighbours of India continues. The danger had increased since 1962 as China

90. n. 26, p. 146.

became a nuclear power soon after. It is against this changed background that one has to find out what the party manifestoes said as to the measures to be taken to secure the defences of the country. Though the humiliating defeat of Indian forces in 1962 had been more than compensated in the conflict with Pakistan, consequently rehabilitating a sense of confidence in the thinking of various political parties, the fact remains that the danger to India's frontiers continues.

The Congress realized as early as 1960 that "the frontiers with China have lately become danger zones and even the integrity of India has been violated" and conceded that "the country's defence organization should be strengthened with speed."⁹¹ This factor found expression in the party's manifesto of 1962. But the Congress, even after the humiliating experience of conflict with China, was satisfied just with the familiar repetition that "all efforts should continue to increase the defence strength of the country."⁹² Even the Chinese nuclear explosion did not bring about a radical change in the Congress pronouncements. When faced with a situation created by Pakistan's attack in 1965, it repeated the same platitudes and promised "to choose and deploy the best means of defence."⁹³ The party, however, expressed concern at the growing collusion between China and Pakistan and the manifesto referred to the "nation having pledged itself to vacate the aggression on its territories committed by China and Pakistan," and added that the "Congress stands committed to redeem that pledge."⁹⁴

91. Resolution adopted at the Sixty fifth Session of the Indian National Congress held at Bangalore, January 1960, n. 49, p. 192.

92. Resolution adopted by All India Congress Committee meeting at New Delhi in April 1963, reproduced in *India Quarterly*, New Delhi, January-March, 1967, p. 48.

93. A Resolution adopted by the Congress Working Committee meeting in New Delhi on 7 November 1965; *Ibid.*

94. It is interesting to note that the draft manifesto of the Congress did not make any reference to the vacating of aggression. It was only after strong criticisms of the omission at the All India Congress Committee meeting at Ernakulam that a para to this effect was added to the manifesto. The Ernakulam session was primarily held to approve and finalize the Congress manifesto.

The Swatantra party which initially did not make any mention of defence policy in the "statement of principles" adopted at the preparatory convention held at Bombay in August 1959, passed a resolution to this effect at the general council meeting of the party in Hyderabad in December 1959,⁹⁵ which outlined the party's defence policy. The party pledged to ensure India's defences, securing military aid "from the prosperous non-Communist nations of the world." The Chinese attack on India made the Swatantra party openly advocate alignment with the west against China.⁹⁶ Because of its policy of alignment, the Swatantra party's stand with regard to India's nuclear choice was evident in the resolution adopted by the general council of the party on May 28, 1966, which stated "India should not embark on any scheme of making nuclear weapons. Instead, the party wants India to seek an assurance from the USA."⁹⁷

National Security was claimed to be the guiding principle of the Jana Sangh approach to national defence. The party had advocated a high level of military preparedness in order to meet threats from China and Pakistan. The party was convinced that both these countries were India's sworn enemies and understood only the language of retaliation rather than appeasement. It was for this reason that the party ruled out any negotiated settlement with either of them. In such circumstances, the Jana Sangh felt the necessity of "vigorous military assistance from friendly countries and endorses the Congress government policy of securing assistance from whichever quarter it is available."⁹⁸ The party which consistently advocated the highest possible level of preparedness reacted to the Chinese nuclear test in the expected manner and demanded manufacture of

95. The Resolution on Defence was later approved by the First National Convention of the party held at Patna in 1960.

96. *n.* 26, p. 145.

97. That the USA alone could safeguard India's security interests is the considered view of Swatantra party. It often recalls the assurance given by President Johnson in October 1964, that the USA would guarantee full protection against nuclear threat, if India requested that.

98. A Resolution on Defence passed by the General Council of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh meeting in Delhi on 11-12 August, 1963; reproduced in *India Quarterly*, p. 69.

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nuclear weapons by India.⁹⁹ The manifesto of 1967 confirmed the party's stand on defence policy. It suggested immediate and long range solution to secure India's frontiers. The party advocated bilateral alliance on the basis of reciprocity and mutuality of interests and sought assistance from all possible quarters.

The PSP expressed concern over the "growing collusion between China and Pakistan" and stated that "the threat to India's security has increased manifold," and, therefore, it emphasized the need to strengthen India's defence with a sense of urgency. The PSP anticipated border conflicts of far more intensity "by a combination of forces hostile to India." Against such a contingency, the party manifesto advocated that "India must try for self-sufficiency in every branch of weaponry, nuclear as well as conventional."¹⁰⁰ The party gave highest priority to recovery of Indian territory lost to China and Pakistan. The party appealed for 'the widest association of the people with the defence effort,' so that the efforts of armed forces to defend the frontiers could be supplemented and strengthened. The party, therefore, held that consolidation of socialism within the country would not only help defence preparedness but would also accelerate the process.

The SSP manifesto gave out that "the needs of defence are firstly a strong will, secondly economic power and thirdly military strength."¹⁰¹ The party maintained that economic power and military strength were useless in the absence of a strong will to defend the country : "where the will is strong, enemy usually does not dare cast an evil eye."¹⁰² The party manifesto, however, did not spell out details whereby this "will" could be made "strong" preparatory to a sound defence of the country. In the contingency of war the SSP would not hesitate to "make radical and all round changes in the armed forces and stands for compulsory conscription."¹⁰³

99. A Resolution on "India and Bomb" passed by the Central Executive of the party on February 6 1966, reproduced in *India Quarterly*, pp. 69-70.

100. *n.* 32, p. 14.

101. *n.* 60, p. 12.

102. *Ibid.*

103. *Ibid.*

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The CPI stood for "an independent national policy of building a self-reliant defence potential," and advocated that "urgent steps must be taken to enlarge and strengthen our defence industries rapidly."¹⁰⁴ To meet the immediate needs of defence, CPI promised to explore the possibilities of securing help, but limited it to the Soviet Union, other friendly socialist and anti-imperialist nations. However, the CPI did not want strengthening of the defences of the country at the cost of the common people. Its manifesto recorded that the Indian defence forces continued to have "many of the inhibitions, nuances and anti-democratic and obsolete practices of the old imperial army."¹⁰⁵ It, therefore, insisted to instil "a national democratic ideology in the armed forces."¹⁰⁶

For CPI (Marxist) "India's security is threatened not by Pakistan or China but by the USA."¹⁰⁷ Hence the view "that the government should take initiative to have direct talks for a peaceful settlement with China and Pakistan."¹⁰⁸ The party was convinced that once the understanding was achieved, the entire programme of defence preparedness would be unnecessary and superfluous. The party deplored the pitiable condition of Jawans and pleaded for the reorganization of the army, by "granting of political right to the defence personnel."

The Hindu Mahasabha stood by "militarising the nation," but did not say exactly what it meant and what it would cost? The party manifesto advocated strengthening of defence forces, manufacture of nuclear weapons, training of the people in guerilla and mountain warfare and creation of a safety zone in areas bordering Pakistan. It stood for the recovery of lost territories and liberation of Tibet from the Chinese. The Mahasabha asked for reorienting the budget and plans, with a view to give top priority to defence of the country.

104. A Resolution passed by the Central Executive of the Party meeting in New Delhi in September 1965, reproduced in *India Quarterly*, p. 57.

105. n. 29, para 23.

106. *Ibid*

107. n. 87.

108. *Ibid*.

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The above analysis shows that all political parties are agreed on the need to strengthen India's defence preparedness. But while the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, Congress, CPI and PSP stand for a self-reliant defence potential, the Swatantra party, the CPI (Marxist) and the SSP do not consider it essential for different reasons. But many parties warn that self-sufficiency is not immediately possible. This inevitably leads them to plead for allies.

V

National unity, internal order and peace are of paramount importance for the security and strength of a country. This becomes all the more desirable in the context of a country like India struggling hard for economic development. Unfortunately, recent months (prior to election of 1967) have shown that law and order problem has assumed larger and alarming proportions, sometimes threatening the unity of the country and often jeopardising an orderly functioning of administration and carrying on of developmental activities. The government no doubt has a duty to maintain peace within the country. But equally relevant is the obligation of all other parties in this context. But the manifestoes issued by some of the parties were silent on this growing menace of violence. The manifesto of the CPI (Marxist), however, thought the growing unrest to be a sign of popular discontent against Congress rule and blamed the state's coercive apparatus for the accompanying violence. Although the various political parties recorded in their manifestoes the reasons that gave rise to fissiparous tendencies threatening the unity of the country, none, except the Jana Sangh, had suggested immediate steps to curb violence and safeguard unity. Some parties found the tendency inherent in the constitutional structure of India, while others blamed the policies pursued by the Congress government which resulted in frustrations and which in turn found an easy outlet in violent hooliganism.

The Congress was surprisingly silent on the issue in its manifesto. But the party conceded that "there are large heterogeneous and even fissiparous elements in the political life,"¹⁰⁹ but felt that these trends were "fast running out and the image of a homogeneous

109. n. 34, p. 61.

national community is daily becoming clearer.”¹¹⁰ The Congress was firmly determined to curb communalism and fight disruptive forces and confidently asserted its resolve to further the unity of India.

The Swatantra party felt that “as a result of the Congress party’s patronage of class conflicts, the country and the people so divided that national unity, achieved in 1947, is fast disappearing.”¹¹¹ It also added that “linguistic controversies, water disputes and territorial claims and counter-claims on the one hand and disputes among landlords and tenants, students and teachers, employers and employees on the other, present a dismal picture of a country divided against itself.”¹¹² The party concluded that two decades of uninterrupted rule by the Congress had produced such a state of affairs. The party sought to remedy this state of affairs by introducing a spiritual element in national life and by imparting moral and religious education.¹¹³

The Jana Sangh blamed the Communists for the disruptive tendencies in the country. The manifesto recorded that there were forces in the country which were working as fifth columnists of the enemies and had been threatening India’s integrity and sovereignty. The party promised to enact a law of treason to deal with these anti-national elements. The party also sought to take positive steps to strengthen sentiments of national unity, but did not specify as to what the steps would be. The party was of the opinion that seeds of disunity were inherent in the Indian constitution. It maintained, “the present constitution does not manifest the country’s basic unity.” Therefore, the Jana Sangh reaffirmed its “resolve to amend the constitution and declare India a unitary state.”¹¹⁴ The party did not believe in “unity in diversity” because it was, according to the party, the greatest obstacle to national unity.

The PSP blamed the Congress for the re-emergence of disruptive forces in national life. But the party, unlike its earlier attitude, did not take the issue seriously and avoided even a mention of the

110. *Ibid.*

111. *n.* 16, p. 2.

113. *Ibid.*, *n.* 17.

114. *n.* 16, p. 6.

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national unity in the present election manifesto.¹¹⁵ The change in attitude of the party perhaps implied that it was convinced of the basic unity of India. The party, like the Congress, took the present mob-violence as a transitory phase and did not consider it a threat to national unity.

The SSP manifesto made only a passing reference to the question of national unity. It simply declared, "the country has to be united and made safe from the strife and disintegration on accounts of language, region, caste and the like."

The two Communist parties did not regard 'popular upsurge' as posing a threat to national unity. Actually, the parties welcomed the upsurge and justified rightful protests and movements of students, workers and peasants against the Congress government. All objective conditions for the over-throw of the hated Congress rule and for carrying forward the national democratic revolution to completion are now maturing as never before...The mood of the masses is unmistakably in favour of radical change."¹¹⁶ The party promised to utilize the situation to establish a government of all democratic forces. It stated that national unity was only possible when such a government were formed. The CPI (Marxist) manifesto came out in unequivocal defence of the mighty movements in which millions had participated and braved the firing squads of the police to defend their livelihood and liberties. Like its counterpart, the party also considered *bandhs*, demonstrations etc., as a sign of failure of Congress policies and pledged itself to continue to organize and lead massive protests till the Congress government was replaced by people's government.

The cardinal creed of the Hindu Mahasabha was "loyalty to the unity and integrity of Hindustan." The party found all acts of disrupting national unity in the attitude and acts of minorities. It, therefore, advised the minorities "to merge in the main current of Hindu nationalism and give up separate national consciousness on the basis of religion and culture."¹¹⁷ The Mahasabha thus stood

115. The PSP manifesto of 1962 not only made a reference to this problem but also discussed various measures to bring about national unity.

116. n. 26. p. 2.

117. *The Indian Express*, October 20, 1966.

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for changing the complexion of the society from unity in diversity to uniformity and thereby bringing unity in the country. For a Hindu communal party like Mahasabha, this solution was not very unnatural. To supplement this process of national integration and give it a permanent basis, the party would revise the Constitution to turn India into a "democratic Hindu State."

VI

All political parties have dealt with the problem of education in their manifestoes. The views they put forward are, however, not related to the recommendations made in the exhaustive report of the recent Education Commission, a document which could have been the starting point of any serious discussion on educational reconstruction in the years to come. It would have been in the fitness of things if each party expressed through its manifesto the extent to which it was prepared to carry out the recommendations of the Commission. No party cared to do this. Instead, the parties had repeated their well-known views without taking into account the growing student indiscipline and necessity to root it out through necessary reforms in the educational system of the country.

The Congress manifesto noted with satisfaction that "India has taken great strides in the sphere of education since independence"¹¹⁸ So far, the Congress aimed at expansion of education through the three five-year plans, but now it promised to give more accent on quality improvement. The Congress agreed with the priorities recommended by the Education Commission and promised to divert the effort to "the transformation of the educational system so as to relate it to life, needs and aspirations of the people." But still greater emphasis in the manifesto remained on the expansion of educational facilities for each citizen. The party also promised the expansion of scientific and technical education and linking up of employment opportunities with educational facilities. The party would, side by side, continue to make vigorous

118. *Building a New India-Education* published by All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1967, p. 1.

119. These priorities are (i) transformation of education, (ii) qualitative improvement of education and (iii) quantitative improvement. The Education Commission has listed these in order of preference.

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efforts for adult education and wipe out illiteracy. For the first time, the party realized that the teachers should be cared and given adequate incentives, if the educational system was to deliver the goods. The manifesto emphasised this and assured that "the coming years should see a deliberate orientation of resources for the betterment of teachers."¹²⁰

The Swatantra party, "in order to arrest the prevailing disintegration and the unfortunate spirit of cynicism and disorder that is sweeping the ranks of students," was committed to introduce a "spiritual element" in education so that adequate background of human values could be provided. It would encourage voluntary agencies to impart moral and religious instruction to the young to inculcate a sense of discipline among the students. The party, among other things, promised to improve the quality of education and to raise the status and remuneration of the teaching profession. It would protect the autonomy of the universities and educational institutions, strive to introduce technical training from the middle school and high school stages and reorient education to meet the needs of agriculture and industry. This, the party felt, would solve the problem of unemployment among the educated. One glaring omission in the party's manifesto was that it did not commit itself to compulsory and free education.

The Jana Sangh promised to make education compulsory as laid down in the Directive Principles. The party would respect the autonomy of universities and raise the minimum salary of teachers to Rs. 150/- per month. The Jana Sangh felt that "there is urgent need of modernization and Indianization of our educational system."¹²¹ To achieve this, the party would "correlate education with national culture and values of life." The party also insisted that "the study of *Rashtrabhasha*, Sanskrit should be compulsory."¹²² As for the medium of instruction, regional languages were recommended upto the highest class. The party accepted the three language formula, but wanted Hindi and Sanskrit as mother-tongue.

120. n. 16, p. 9.

121. n. 42, p. 22.

122. n. 42, p. 23.

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English, according to Jana Sangh, could be permitted as an optional subject.

The PSP's educational programme was very similar to that of the Congress. It stood for "free and compulsory primary education in the shortest span of time; revision of syllabus; improvement in student-teacher ratio; improvement in the terms and conditions of service of all teachers, besides promising to make education science-oriented and provide more avenues for technical and vocational courses. The party would ensure uniformity in the condition of all schools. What was unique of the PSP programme of education was its emphasis on "correspondence courses" and the use of All India Radio for that purpose.

The SSP was convinced that "education has now been reduced to the securing of certificates,"¹²³ "and, therefore, it wanted radical changes within six months of the party's coming to power. The radical reforms would be : "complete equality in primary education in terms of standards, expenditure and the like." The party will liberalise admission rules so that "ordinary students are not denied admission on grounds of low marks." The SSP will also raise the percentage of passes in examination. The strangest promise characteristic of a party like SSP, was "maximum possible equality will be brought about in the salaries of the teachers and managers in primary, secondary and higher education."

The CPI blamed the Congress for the present state of affairs in the educational system of the country which it maintained had to be "reoriented and radically changed to meet the needs of a developing India."¹²⁵ The party, therefore, promised to "reorganize the entire educational system." But the various steps suggested by it for reorganization were not very much different from the system prevalent in the country at present. The ban on the entry of police into educational institutions and on the interference by executive in their affairs would be sufficient in the party's view to bring about the desired change.

123. n. 31, p. 199.

124. *Ibid.*

125. n. 26, para 20.

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The CPI (Marxist) devoted much attention to the shortcomings in the educational policy pursued by the Congress government so far and proposed many changes which were not very different from those advocated by other parties. It stood for "raising the quality of education," but did not say a word in its manifesto about the steps it would like to take in this regard.

The Hindu Mahasabha manifesto made no special reference to the educational policy of the party. It simply stood for compulsory study of Sanskrit, which according to it would be more than enough to solve many of the problems of education and might even root out student indiscipline.

The foregoing survey would show that even education in India had not been kept above party politics. The various reforms put forward by political parties did not in any way suggest an agreed programme on a vital issue like education. The commissions and committees continue to recommend reforms and the political parties, except a few, turn a deaf ear towards such recommendation and insist on their own remedies to resolve the educational malady.

VII

Closely connected with education is the question of official language. The question assumed serious proportions during the inter-election years and at times threatened the essential unity of India. The manifestoes of some political parties did not refer to the question at all; perhaps on the assumption that the *status-quo* should be maintained or the parties did not have anything new to add to their known stand. The Congress, the Swatantra party, the PSP and the SSP did not have anything new to add on the issue. The CPI stood for "introduction of Hindi as an official language only in a gradual manner, based upon the consent of the non-Hindi speaking states."¹²⁶ The CPI (Marxist) made a similar promise on this score. It is the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha which had different views on the subject. Jana Sangh would "emancipate the nation from the shackles of the English language and introduce Hindi at the central level and provincial languages at

126. *Ibid.*, para 15.

the provincial level.”¹²⁷ It would declare Sanskrit as India’s “national language.” However, its advocacy of regional languages as media of examination of the UPSC appeared to be in conflict with the stand taken by the party for Hindi as the language of the union. The Hindu Mahasabha “wants that Sanskrit, as the fountain-head of Indian languages, should be assigned a definite place as a union language.” The party, however, advocated the three-language formula and wanted to balance the importance of Hindi and Sanskrit. The party would like that Hindi be used “for the purpose of inter-provincial communications and for all-India purposes,” while Sanskrit be used “on certain specific purposes of fundamental importance.” Thus on the question of official language all political parties had similar views with differences of emphasis and not of substance.

VIII

The foregoing survey of the party manifestoes on domestic and foreign issues unfolds the promise that the various national political parties held out to the electorate on the eve of fourth general elections. How far the party programmes were seriously projected to the voters and how far the promise thus held out was a deterministic factor in the voting behaviour of the electorate is anybody’s guess. The general impression, however, is that as far as the lay millions are concerned the issuing of manifestoes is an important ritual which, no doubt, is a righteous exercise with the party intellectuals, on the basis of which the elites in society formulate the party images and differentiate one party from another.



PART TWO
THE CHOICE OF CANDIDATES

RAMASHRAY ROY

POLITICS OF IMMOBILISME—
SELECTING CONGRESS CANDIDATES
IN BIHAR

IN 1961 the Pradesh Election Committee (PEC) of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC) played a very vital role in the selection of candidates preparatory to the third general elections. It is true that rivalry between the two sub-coalitions for political control did much to detract from the importance of the PEC as a crucial decision-making organ. However, it performed, to the extent that it could, its legitimate functions, such as, consideration of applications, weighing and evaluating merits of different choices and making its own recommendations to the Central Election Committee (CEC). It did not, in other words, abrogate its responsibilities. In contradistinction to this, the PEC in 1966 gave up the task of making its recommendations to the CEC even without seriously initiating the discussion pertaining to selection of candidates. It was, thus, completely immobilized and was also prevented from discharging its legitimate functions. What happened during the intervening five years that paralyzed the PEC ?

This paper analyzes the factors leading to a virtual deadlock in the PEC. We take up, first, procedures adopted for selecting candidates in 1966, particularly the crucial role assigned to the PEC in this vitally important organizational function. Next, we examine the factors that cumulatively led to the abrogation of PEC's proper functions, especially the nature of sub-coalitional interaction in the Bihar Congress and identify factors that encouraged a struggling relationship rather than a bargaining one between the competing sub-coalitions. The lack of accommodative spirit and aggressive pursuit of sub-coalitional interests are, as would be seen, the main factors that can be said to have a paralyzing effect on the PEC. Finally, we discuss the 1966 selection process in the Bihar Congress order in order to highlight power distribution in the party.

II

The procedures set down for candidates' selection in 1966 differed in one vital respect from those adopted in 1961.¹ Procedures adopted in 1966 reversed the trend of democratization of the decision-making process in regard to selection of candidates. In 1961, for instance, the Mandal Congress Committees (MCCs), the organization at the grass roots, were permitted to participate in the selection process by recording their opinion for or against aspirants for Congress ticket. In other words, this symbolized, although in a controlled way, an extension of democratic principle to an area much more vulnerable to conflicting partisan and parochial claims. This also symbolized involvement of the rank and file of the party in a matter of much more importance to the organization and reflected the democratization of decision-making process in the party. This was in a way also an act of acquiescence on the part of the Congress High Command to the constant clamouring of the rank and file for a meaningful share in decision-making. The 1961 procedure, then, was a serious attempt to give opportunity to activists at the base to express their own preferences about applicants for Congress tickets.

The 1966 procedure, however, put an end to tendency towards democratization. The PEC was assigned the crucial role of receiving applications from intending candidates directly and making recommendations to the CEC. The selection procedures provided that the PEC should consult the District Congress Committees (DCC's) regarding selection of candidates, but the methods of consultation and screening of the applications were to be determined by the PEC itself. Further, the new procedural arrangement did not contemplate consulting the party organization at the base as was the case in 1961. It is thus evident that the 1966 procedures did not intend to carry on democratic experience in selecting candidates. The deliberate decision not to extend consultation process down to the organization at the base was taken in order to avoid "unseemly controversies during which all sorts of claims were put forward."²

1. For details see author's, "Selection of Congress Candidates", *The Economic and Political Weekly*, December 31, 1966.

2. *The Hindustan Times*, July 19, 1966.

It is true that the party is confronted, during the selection process, with a plethora of claims and counter-claims from party members as well as socio-economic groups for preferential treatment.³ The aggressive pursuit of particular interests often leads to conflict and the consequent aftermath of dissatisfaction, disaffection and alienation. It may, however, be argued that in a dominant party which the Congress was till very recently, composed of multiple socio-economic interests, selection process is bound to throw up underlying conflicts. In other words, conflicts cannot be eliminated or avoided; the utmost that can be done is to provide mechanisms for their orderly expression and restrict them without allowing them to move up and affect intra-organizational interactions at the higher levels. The 1961 procedures were functional in at least one respect : if they encouraged conflicts, they also provided mechanisms for their resolution and safeguarded the higher echelons of the party from being affected by conflicts originating at lower levels of the party. The 1966 procedures, on the other hand, encouraged all conflicts to move up by denying lower echelons of the party the opportunity to make their own contribution to conflict-resolution. As a result, the PEC was overwhelmed by conflicting claims and counter-claims and failed to resolve these conflicts.

The PEC, as seen earlier, was obliged to consult the DCCs. For this purpose, the executive committee of the DCC functioned as the election committee with responsibility to recommend names to the PEC. The recommendation of the District Congress Election Committee (DCEC) were, however, greatly influenced by the nature of sub-coalitional structure existing in a particular district. We can broadly classify the districts into three categories.⁴ First, the five districts which referred all names to the PEC without making any recommendations of their own. This points to one of the two situations. Either the ruling group at the district was so dominant and cohesive and competition for Congress tickets so intense that making specific recommendations was considered

3. For details see author's, "Selection of Congress Candidates—II' : Claims and Counter-claims", *The Economic and Political Weekly*, January 14, 1967.

4. Data presented in this section refer to only 16 out of 17 districts in Bihar. Information on one district, Dhanbad, is not available.

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detrimental to group cohesion;⁵ or, the competing sub-coalitions were so well-matched in strength that the DCEC could not come to any agreement and, as a result, referred all names to the PEC. It has not been possible to ascertain the prevailing sub-coalitional structures in these districts. However, the inability of the DCEC in these districts to make its own recommendations does indicate the existence of one of the two situations. In the second category come five districts⁶ where the DCEC unanimously agreed to authorize the President of the DCC to recommend the names of applicants to the PEC for selection as official Congress candidates.⁷ It should, however, be pointed out that since the selection process tends to bring to the surface all the conflicting forces which lie dormant under the influence of a dominant leader, an effort is made to insulate the group from discussing issues which may arouse widespread conflict of opinion and controversy. In such a situation, the expedient of avoiding discussion and debate is sought by resolution or agreement to authorize the dominant leader or his representative to take decisions on behalf of the group. In other words, free discussion and open dissent, if likely to affect group solidarity, is sought to be silenced. This expedient, however, could not succeed in suppressing dissent; from each of these districts, except Muzaffarpur, alternate lists were submitted to the PEC. Lastly, in the remaining six districts two clear sub-coalitions existed with the strength of the opposing sub-coalition varying from insignificant to almost equal to the ruling group strength. In all these districts the majority

5. The growing competition for Congress tickets in the five districts in this category can be ascertained from the fact that there was tremendous increase in the number of applicants in 1966 over that of 1961 :

		<i>No. of Applicants</i>	
		<i>1961</i>	<i>1966</i>
Saharsa	..	78	118
Bhagalpur	..	92	149
Hazaribagh	..	68	125
Singhbhum	..	53	78
Ranchi	..	58	112

6. Purnea, Champaran, Saran, Muzaffarpur and Monghyr fall into this category.
7. In Muzaffarpur, however, not the district President but M.P. Sinha was authorized to do so.

sub-coalition authorized the District President to recommend names to the PEC with the opposing faction submitting its own list.

It would thus appear that the existence of different configuration of factional forces at the district level affected the way recommendations were made to the PEC. One noteworthy feature is the endeavour to suppress dissent. In order to avoid discussion and expression of disagreement one of the two expedients were adopted: the DCEC either referred all the names to the PEC without making any recommendation, or decided-unanimously or by a majority vote, to authorize one person to recommend names on behalf of the group. Both of these expedients served to de-emphasize one of the legitimate functions of the DCEC, that is, free and frank discussion of issues involved and exploration of consensus, if disagreement and dissent characterized such a discussion. In other words, by declining to grapple with the task of resolving conflict and re-establishing consensus, the DCEC allowed the conflict to persist and simmer gradually to a boiling point when the PEC became seized of the problem.

One explanation for the failure of DCECs to face squarely the interplay of conflicting claims and evolve a consensus lies in the fact that there is so little commitment to the democratic principle of taking decisions by a majority vote. This, in turn, reflects a particular kind of sub-coalitional interaction, characterized by intense mutual distrust and lack of a spirit of accommodation. Not infrequently, a majority decision is violated by the minority either through its persistent flouting of the majority decision or through partisan intervention of higher echelon of the party organization. Moreover, to maintain the intricate balance of sub-coalitional forces, recourse is taken, more often than not, to extra-democratic methods of conflict-resolution, which, in turn, prevent legitimation of democratic principles of decision-making and conflict-resolution. Conflict-resolution is often equated with conflict avoidance. All that notwithstanding, conflict pervades all the levels of the party organization. The failure of the DCECs to grapple with conflicts and resolve them at the level where they rose, made the task of the PEC more difficult.

III

The enormity of the task confronting the PEC can well be appreciated when we consider the fact that the number of applicants for Congress ticket in Bihar rose from 2,050 in 1961 to about 3,000 in 1966—an increase of about 150%.⁸ The average number of applicants for each Congress seat for 1956, 1961 and 1966 was, respectively, 5·7, 6·5 and 9·4. This increase in the number of applicants is symptomatic of two inter-related phenomena. First, it indicates the importance of the party as an instrument of satisfying power as well as status mobility aspirations. This, in turn, reflects the political dominance of the Congress; secondly, this also indicates growing competition among Congress activists themselves for capturing the prize of party nomination. This means that the rank of Congress activists has gradually been swelling leading to more competitive intra-party interactions.

The consequent impact on the selection process in the PEC is very clear. Selection process assumes greater importance for individual mobility, for the party, and for the different socio-economic interests that the party represents. For individual members of the party, party nomination is not only a reward in recognition of his past services to the party but also an opportunity for advancement on the leadership scale. For the party itself, the selection constitutes a characteristic piece of business as satisfactory selection of candidates ensures better chances at the polls. Similarly, for the diverse socio-economic interests, groping for political recognition, articulation and control, selection process offers a suitable opportunity to satisfy their political aspiration. In view of these factors, it is natural that selection process must be characterized by intense competition and the PEC has to take into account competing claims, accommodate conflicting view-points, and take decisions which, as far as possible, satisfy various interests. If it fails to adjust and reduce the intensity of conflicting claims, the party will go to the polls bruised and battered, with saboteurs and rebels active in its rear and on its flanks.

8. The exact figure for 16 districts, excluding Dhanbad, stands at 2,818.

According to the CEC decision, the State units were expected to send their lists by October 15, 1966.⁹ By October 30, however, PEC met thrice without deciding anything. Meeting on 28 October, it decided to postpone selection of candidates, ostensibly

with a view to enabling members to concentrate their energies and time on putting on even keel the drought relief machinery in the affected areas before concentrating their attention on finalization of the list of candidates for the general election.¹⁰

Undoubtedly, the serious situation created severe drought in various parts of the State was creating anxiety for the people, the party and the government. It is also true that "a virtual crisis in administration of the State" paralyzed, or at least, made ineffective the implementation of the proposed massive relief-work measures. But the postponement might also be attributed to the deeper maladies pertaining to shifting group alignments in the PEC and the insecure position of the Chief Minister's group.

It became quite obvious, when the PEC met in November, that the Chief Minister's group was in a minority; a little later, it became apparent that all moves to unite the rival groups and evolve an agreed list of names would fail to bear fruit. In other words, the PEC was immobilized from performing its legitimate function, not because it was incompetent to do so but because the nature of sub-coalitional interaction made it impossible for it to function in a proper way. Clearly, this indicates the underlying structure of rancorous conflict between competing sub-coalitions which prevents them from entering into a bargaining and accommodative relationship. This also reflects the absence of "a consensus among the groups not to wipe out one another at times of superiority and to give each group its due voice according to its size, in the formation of the policy of the whole organization."¹¹

9. *The Hindustan Times*, July 19, 1966.

10. *Ibid.*, October 30, 1966.

11. Peter H. Merskl, "Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 3 (September, 1962), p. 633.

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It should, however, be noted that the manifestation of unyielding and un-compromising posture in sub-coalitional interaction has its roots in the manner in which sub-coalitional struggle in the Bihar Congress has developed over the years. In order to fully appreciate the circumstances surrounding the virtual deadlock in the PEC, it is necessary to go back and trace, broadly, the history of factional feuds in the Bihar Congress.¹² What interests us here is the fact that the sub-coalitional structure in the Bihar Congress has been marked by a tendency towards fragmentation. As early as 1937, the Congress formed the first popular ministry in the State. Thereafter, the State Congress leadership split into two under the unremitting pressures from below for aggressive pursuit of sub-coalitional demand. Even in the selection of candidates, for elections to the provincial legislature in 1937, there was strong display of divergent interests but the restraining influences of Rajendra Prasad and a strong current of fellow-feeling amongst senior leaders prevented a major catastrophe. It was only after the formation of the ministry that cracks appeared in the leadership and two groups, composed of various caste groups, emerged as strong contenders for political control.

However, certain factors intervened to change the social bases of the competing factions on the one hand, and to encourage the tendency toward proliferation of factions, on the other. Certain actions of S. K. Sinha (then Chief Minister), such as, grooming of K.B. Sahay as his successor and inclusion of M.P. Sinha, a casteman and close associate of the Chief Minister, in the cabinet in 1952, filled his non-Bhumihar lieutenants with apprehension that their legitimate claims for a place in the cabinet will not be honoured by the Chief Minister. Further, M. P. Sinha's entry into the cabinet served as a threat to Sahay's rise to power. As a result, rivalry between Sinha and Sahay transformed composite factions of different caste groups into unitary caste factions inasmuch as in their bid to capture power the rival leaders tended to purge their groups of unreliable elements, usually those who belonged to other castes.

12. For greater details see author's, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress", *Asian Survey*, Vol. VI, No. 12 (December, 1966), pp. 706-15.

Another consequence of this was the proliferation of factions. It is to be noted in this connection that political competition in Bihar first started among the upper castes and slowly spread to other caste groups. When threatened with the numerical strength of the Bhumihars, the Kayasthas formed an alliance with the Rajputs. The need to build winning sub-coalition led the rival groups to coopt leaders from various other caste groups which, although instrumental in broadening political participation, tended at the same time to accentuate and intensify political competition and encourage proliferation of groups. The coopted leaders began clamouring, in due course, for more and more power and in order to make good their claim, created their own autonomous support structure receiving major or exclusive support from their own or similar status caste groups. Thus, bifactionalism in the Bihar Congress transformed itself into multi-factionalism over the years; composite factions formed of different caste groups came to be replaced by federated factions.

In 1953, almost all the non-*Bhumihar* supporters of the Chief-Minister left his camp and 'centrist group' came into being with the sole purpose of denigrating M. P. Sinha. Meanwhile, rivalry between Sinha and Sahay continued. In the selection of candidates in 1956, about 90 members of the centrist group were denied Congress ticket. As a result, they left the party and formed the short lived Jan Congress. But the grand *finale* came with the defeat at the polls of both Sinha and Sahay. The subsequent contest for leadership of the Congress legislative party in 1957 found two oldest leaders and companions for many years contending against each other. Sahay, who was formerly the group follower of S.K. Sinha openly supported A.N. Sinha. After the death of A.N. Sinha in July 1957, the Rajput dominated faction was later re-organized by his son, S.N. Sinha emerging chiefly as a unitary caste faction, while the non-Rajput elements formed another group under B.N. Jha, a Brahman.

Again, the death of S.K. Sinha in January 1960 changed the fortunes of different groups. The election of B.N. Jha as the Chief Minister, who headed a sub-coalition of almost all the caste groups reduced the Bhumihar dominated sub-coalition to a minority. But tension in the ruling sub-coalition appeared from the beginning

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and K.B. Sahay, a prominent member of the sub-coalition, defected four days before the PEC met to select candidates for the 1962 general elections and joined the M.P. Sinha group. As a result, the sub-coalition balance in the PEC was tipped against the Chief Minister's group by 4 to 6.¹³ In the very first meeting of the PEC, it appeared discussions in the PEC would bog down in sub-coalitional conflict. The search for consensus and unanimity in the PEC meandered through formal and informal discussions but was fruitless. At one point the PEC resolved :

In view of there being no agreement among the members of the PEC regarding the names of candidates...those who want to submit their list are likely to do so by 10 p.m. on October 14.¹⁴

However, under the goadings of CEC observers, informal attempts to prepare an agreed list of recommendations continued, but it soon appeared that complete unanimity was not possible. By 21 November, 1966, the PEC, after confirming the unanimous list, decided to send its recommendations in panel for the rest of the constituencies. The scene then shifted to Delhi and the CEC appointed T.R. Paliwal to continue efforts to achieve unanimity between two sub-coalitions. After a good deal of bargaining, 87 more names were unanimously agreed upon. By then all possibility of further unanimity was exhausted and Indra Gandhi was requested to arbitrate.

After the 1962 elections, Jha remained in saddle but his weakening hold on various groups in his sub-coalition became apparent when in April 1963 his nominees for some key positions in the Congress legislative party were defeated owing to the desertion of a number of his Rajput supporters. In order to maintain his position, Jha succeeded in the merger of Jharkhand party and the Congress. But he had to resign as Chief Minister in October 1963 under Kamaraj Plan, and a new alignment of factions—a sub-coalition of Bhumihars, Rajputs, Kayasthas and a majority of other caste and communal groups—came into being.

13 The PEC consisted of ten elected and two *ex-officio* members, that is, the resident of the BPCC and the Chief Minister.

14. Based on *Bihar Congress Records*, 1961.

The new sub-coalition under the tutelage of K.B. Sahay continued its existence for about three years. A threatening factor to Sahay's position was the merger of the erstwhile Janta Party of Raja of Ramgarh, a staunch political enemy of Sahay. The growing tension in the Sahay sub-coalition became visible when the formation of PEC in June 1966 revealed that M.P. Sinha had defected. However, Sahay was able to retain support of a section of the Bhumihaar group as S.S. Sinha, son of the former Chief Minister, S.K. Sinha, rebelled against the leadership of M.P. Sinha and joined Sahay. In the newly formed PEC, Sahay had a majority of 8 against 4. However, not long before, the position was reversed because of desertions. By November 1966, the position in the PEC was reversed; the Sahay group was reduced to a minority of 5.

The analysis above shows two characteristics of sub-coalitional structure in the Bihar Congress which stand out prominently : proliferation of groups and individual mobility from one group to another. The frequent mobility from one group to another indicates that politician is swayed more by self-interest than by group commitment. He is inclined to plan and make choices in terms of private advantage, and thus may assume and shed group commitments at will. All this leads to a situation where groups tend to be formed around a few personalities; however, instability becomes one of the basic characteristics of such a sub-coalitional system. Consequently, discipline in the party atrophies. The proliferation of groups would have been minimized had there been a consensus among the groups not to wipe out one another. This means the acceptance of traditions that will allow minority groups to retain consensual identification with the system as well as its procedures and induce them to work with the majority even if frustrated in their attempts to get the party to accept their viewpoint. As a matter of fact, however, the absence of such a tradition and the intensity of factional struggle in the Bihar Congress have created a situation in which each group attempts to eliminate others in order to enjoy undisputed authority and power.

In view of the fact that selection of candidates is key to the holding of dominant position in the government, the display of

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uncompromising attitude and rigid posture becomes all the more prominent in the selection process. What made the situation worse in 1966 was, first, the attempt of Sahay to rally backward-communities against leaders of the upper caste groups. The fact that backward communities are more numerous than the combined strength of the upper castes made their leaders apprehensive and hardened their feelings. Secondly, when group situation changed in the PEC, the majority faction initiated the move to oust Sahay as Chief Minister. Although the Congress High Command disapproved of this move,¹⁵ it however gave Sahay bitter experience and made any possibility of compromise and consensus unlikely.

When the PEC met on 15 November 1966, it could not transact any business except to decide upon a guideline for recommending candidates and expressing its wish to making it unanimous as far as possible¹⁶. But only four days later all hopes for unanimity were dashed because "the ministerialist group headed by Chief Minister K.B. Sahay (was) relegated to a position of minority".¹⁷ Informed discussion in the PEC on 19 November failed to bring either unanimity among the rival groups or fix a date for the next meeting of the PEC.¹⁸ The failure of the PEC to transact its business brought into motion informal channels of conflict resolution. S.N. Sinha became the medium of negotiations between the two realigned sub-coalitions but no agreement could be forged. Another effort at conciliation was made by Jagjivan Ram when he came to Patna in the last week of November.

Though he failed to bring about rapprochement between rival groups, he succeeded in persuading both the groups to form a 3-man committee to work out an agreed list of candidates. The committee, composed of the Chief Minister, A.S. Singh and K.K. Sinha, went ahead to explore areas of agreement. However, the meeting of the PEC scheduled on 22 November could not be held because the committee "had not been able to conclude their discussion about enlarging the area of agreement."¹⁹

15. *The Times of India*, November 22, 1966.

16. *The Hindustan Times*, November 17, 1966.

17. *Ibid.*, November 20, 1966.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *The Hindustan Times*, November 23, 1966.

Meanwhile, S.N. Sinha came to Delhi as an emissary of the majority sub-coalition to apprise the Congress President of the situation obtaining in the Bihar Congress, but was advised "to work for a stage-by-stage agreement with Chief Minister K.B. Sahay."²⁰ However, as one of the members of the committee reported, "there was no improvement so far in the situation,"²¹ and the groups occupied themselves in finalizing their separate lists. By 23 November, efforts at compromise had decidedly broken down. The PEC was scheduled to meet at 11 a.m. which was postponed till 4 p.m. in order to give enough time to the Chief Minister to make up his mind about the inclusion of members of the PSP, Janta party and Swatantra party who had recently joined the Congress. A.S. Singh, one of the members of the PEC stated to the press :

At 11.30 a.m. both Krishna Kant Singh and I met the Chief Minister as the latter said he wanted to take sometime to make up his mind in respect of members who joined the Congress from other parties. I again contacted the Chief Minister on phone at 3 p.m. and wanted to ascertain the position. The Chief Minister told me that he had not been able yet to decide his attitude about these members and wanted further time. He told me that the meeting at 4 p.m. would be postponed till 8 p.m.

In view of this assurance I told Mr. Sethi (CEC representative) that the PEC would meet at 8 p.m. Under this impression the four of us (Mr. Harinath Mishra, Mr. Krishna Kanta Singh, Mr. D.L. Baitha and Mr. Ambika Sharan Singh) did not attend the meeting at 4 p.m. We were pained and surprised to learn that Chief Minister did not take steps to postpone the meeting scheduled at 4 p.m.²²

In the meantime the PEC met at 4 p.m. for twenty minutes but failed to evolve an agreed list of candidates and left to the PEC members to submit lists to the CEC observer individually or jointly. The PEC also decided unanimously not to recommend any list on its behalf to the CEC and not to hold any formal meeting of the PEC again. However, as A.S. Singh stated, "we have asked for a formal meeting of the PEC at 11 a.m. tomorrow to consider the

20. *Ibid.*

21. *The Times of India*, November 23, 1966.

22. *Indian Nation*, November 24, 1966.

selection of candidates.”²³ The requisitioned meeting of the PEC took place on 24 November with M.P. Sinha in the chair and passed a resolution that the PEC should meet at Delhi at a date suitable to the AICC observer for finalizing the selection of candidates.²⁴ The BPCC President, as well as other members belonging to the Chief Minister’s group, did not attend the meeting. The same day, K.B. Sahay submitted, on behalf of his group, a list of candidates to P.C. Sethi.²⁵ Sometime later, the majority group also submitted its own list.

Under the pressure of the Congress High Command, the rival groups again started negotiations to explore the possibilities of an agreed list. K.B. Sahay and S.N. Sinha met on 7 December and are reported to have discussed some broad principles for evolving an agreed list. The main differences between the two groups pertained to the status of : (1) sitting members who had voted against the party in the Council of States elections; (2) sitting members charged with indiscipline; and (3) members of other parties who joined the Congress recently. Regarding the first, it was generally agreed that their names should not be recommended. As far as the third issue was concerned, the desirability of consulting former Janta party leader and tribal leaders in preparing the list was emphasized. It was in regard to the second issue that both the groups disagreed sharply.²⁶ The two leaders, however, continued their efforts at bringing unanimity. The PEC informally met on 9 December to take stock of the situation and seek agreement, and a note of optimism was struck when Sahay declared that “he was bent upon having an agreed list because he would like the Congress High Command to change its opinion that Bihar Congress leaders only quarrelled and could not come to any agreement.”²⁷ However, this note of optimism proved only a cry in the wilderness.

The scene then shifted to Delhi where the CEC was to begin its deliberations on the Bihar list on 18 December. A fresh bid to

23. *Ibid.*

24. *The Amrit Bazar Patrika*, November 25, 1966.

25. *The National Herald*, November 25, 1966.

26. *Indian Nation*, December 8, 1966.

27. *Ibid.*, December 19, 1966.

evolve an agreed list before the CEC met to consider Bihar list was made but "in spite of the efforts of the Central Ministers, Mr. Satyanarayan Sinha, Mr. Jagjiwan Ram and Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, the two groups could come to an agreement with regard to only 113 names."²⁸ With only a partial agreement emerging from both the formal and informal channels of consultation, the CEC had to intervene and finalize the Bihar list.

The discussion so far brings out several interesting aspects of decision-making process in the Bihar Congress. In the first place, proliferation of groups in the Bihar Congress has undermined the sanctity of formal institutions as crucial organs of decision-making. Inasmuch as the competing sub-coalitions represent alliances of various factions, group cohesion and achievement of group objective depend on the prevailing consensus among sub-coalition partners. Likewise, the realization of party objectives is dependent upon the kind of interaction between leaders of various sub-coalitions. This means that decision-making process involves two steps : first, each sub-coalition must define its own minimum objectives on which various sub-coalition partners have set their seal of approval and chalk out strategies for achieving these objectives; and secondly, the competing sub-coalitions must bargain among themselves to arrive at concrete decisions. This implies, then, that if the key leaders agree among themselves the formal decision-making body will function well. But in that case it will act as a body, ratifying decisions made elsewhere. This is amply illustrated by the answer Sahay gave to pressmen when asked whether or not the PEC was redundant in view of its failure to recommend an agreed list. Sahay said, "Why ? If there is an agreed list, it would meet to ratify it."²⁹ If, on the other hand, different faction leaders fail to agree among themselves, the formal decision-making body fails to function. In other words, the functioning of decision-making organs depend upon the underlying consensus among various faction leaders.

In the second place, as seen above, sub-coalitional interactions have increasingly been marked by unyielding and uncompromising

28. *The Hindustan Times*, December 19, 1966.

29. *Indian Nation*, November 24, 1966.

attitude. As a consequence, the emergence of consensus becomes a very protracted and time consuming process. Further, outside intervention frequently becomes necessary to restore harmony and re-establish consensus. In addition, the emphasis on unanimity, growing out of the conviction that it avoids conflict, becomes instrumental in prolonging conflictual relationship between the sub-coalitions. Even if consensus is finally re-established, a trial of dissatisfaction and disaffection is left behind. This is illustrated by the fact that 1966-67 witnessed the first massive defections of dissident Congressmen in Bihar as well as elsewhere.

All these factions taken together reduced the PEC to a helpless position preventing it from performing its legitimate functions.

Apart from undermining institutional legitimacy of the PEC, another victim of the sub-coalitional conflict is the majority rule. Inasmuch as decision by majority rule is supposed to be detrimental to retaining consensual identification with the party on the part of various factions, recourse is frequently taken to extra-democratic procedures of conflict-resolution which at best prove to be expedients to avoid conflict. This does not allow internalization of democratic norms with the result that the gap between institutional and traditional values is not bridged.

IV

Another aspect of selection process pertains to the locus of power in the organization. Samuel J. Eldersveld suggests that democratic parties are characterized by a general dilution of power through-out the structure and each stratum of the party accumulates power to itself at the expense of the higher echelon of the party.³⁰ However, the extent to which lower echelons enjoy autonomy and greater power depends on their cohesiveness and homogeneity.³¹ If a particular echelon of the party is badly divided and unable to take decisions by its own efforts, the higher echelon will wield greater power over the lower one. Recently, Stanley A.

30. *Political Parties : A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 9.

31. For a fuller discussion of this point see author's, "Selection of Congress candidates-V: Structure of Authority in the Congress", *The Economic and Political Weekly*, February 18, 1967.

Kochanek has argued that with division in the Congress High Command even those States which presented a split front before the CEC had their own way. In support, he cites the statement of Y.B. Chavan : "Where PEC nominations were unanimous, the CEC made slight changes, if at all. When they came up with divided lists, in most cases we let the *status quo* remain."³² He cites the cases of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where group conflict forced the CEC to accept the *status quo* as the only method of subduing group differences.³³

However, this conclusion is not supported by facts. In Bihar, for instance, out of 254 sitting members of the legislative assembly only 149 were given tickets, while 105 members were dropped. This means that about 41% of the sitting members were denied ticket. In this context a relevant comment needs attention :

The reason for such a large number of sitting MLAs being dropped in Bihar is that the CEC firmly maintained its decision not to entertain applications from 26 of the Congress legislators against whom disciplinary action had been taken for voting against the official Congress candidates in the Elections to the Rajya Sabha earlier this year (*sic*). The CEC also refused nominations to those candidates who in the last elections had left the Congress to fight on the Swatantra or the Janta Party platform and who subsequently rejoined the Congress as members of these parties.³⁴

In all, the number of new entrants stands in Bihar at 169. In other words, the proportion of the new entrants comes to about 53%.

Another way to look at the situation would be to analyze the pattern of CEC nominations in terms of their congruence or non-congruence with the recommendations of rival groups. Out of the total 310 nomination,³⁵ 121 nominations were derived from common names contained in both the rival lists. In the remaining 189 cases,

32. *The Times of India* (Bombay), January 9 1967, Quoted in Stanley A. Kochanek, "Political Recruitment in the Indian National Congress : The Fourth General Election". *Asian Survey*, Vol. VII, No.5, (May 1967), p.299.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 295.


34. *The Hindustan Times*, January 4, 1967.

35. This excludes 8 nominations for Dhanbad district.

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the CEC imposed its own decision in 38 cases and agreed with the recommendations of the majority group in 85 and with the minority group (*i.e.* Chief Minister's group) in 66 cases. This also contradicts the notion that the Congress High Command was forced to maintain *status quo* in Bihar. It also supports our contention that no matter how divided the Congress High Command may be, it finds its way to impose its own decision on a State group which is badly divided. In other words, rancorous conflict at the State level prevents the operation of the tendency towards downward deference.

To conclude, the selection procedures adopted in 1966 gave to the PEC a position of vital importance in the selection of candidates. But owing to the prevalence of rancorous conflict at the Pradesh level the PEC was unable to perform its role. The unyielding and uncompromising attitude adopted by various sub-coalitions, while aggressively pursuing their own particular interests, undermined the legitimacy of the PEC on the one hand, and sabotaged the working of democratic principles of conflict-resolution, on the other. Also, this makes the functioning of secular organizations difficult, inasmuch as the gap between values inherent in institutional arrangements and the traditional values remain unbridged. The inability of the PEC to evolve an agreed list of candidates, in turn, affected its autonomy and the High Command had to intervene in order to re-establish consensus and ensure organizational viability.



A. F. USMANI

THE CHOICE OF
A CANDIDATE*

THE suitability of a candidate for any election largely depends upon three major factors: (i) the image that he projects of the party or interest which he represents; (ii) his own image in the electorate as well as in his own party or interest group; and (iii) the infra-structural support which he can build or manipulate in his favour. The choice of a *suitable* candidate by itself is half the election. The Aligarh assembly constituency election is an excellent example of how a judicious choice of a candidate is a pre-requisite of a successful election strategy.

II

Aligarh is an important town in the western Uttar Pradesh. It is well known for the Muslim University and a number of medium and small scale industries which constitute its economic mainstay. It is the seat of district administration and is connected by rail and road with all important towns of the State and also with Delhi. Aligarh district is also known for political intrigues and pressures which, in some cases, even culminate in murders. The rivalry between various social groups is a peculiar phenomenon of the town. The historical role of the Aligarh Muslim University in the socio-political life of India has been a matter of great controversy which, at times, assumes dangerous proportions. This controversy is generated by a lack of proper perspective, and is mostly based on biased and exaggerated notions about the role of the University since its inception. It is, not infrequently motivated, by suspicions and deep seated prejudices.

The total population of the Aligarh city, according to the 1961 census is 1,85,020 which must have grown to about 2,00,000

A case study in Aligarh city constituency, Uttar Pradesh.

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by now. The total number of the electorate in 1962 was 79,205 which has increased by about 19% in the last 5 years and is 94,346 at present. Besides the Aligarh Muslim University, there are three degree colleges and as many as 18 intermediate colleges and a large number of primary and secondary schools in the town. But, with the exception of some caste groups, the rate of literacy is not even 25%. The social complex of the town is made of at least three major social groups—the caste Hindus, the Muslims and the scheduled castes. The Sikhs and the Christians constitute a very small minority. The three major groups are further divided into a number of castes, sub-castes and socio-ethnic and occupational groups. The main divisions are as follows:

(i) The caste Hindus, besides several non-scheduled lower castes, are divided into four main castes—the Brahmins, the Banias (Vaish), the Kayasthas and the Rajputs. The Brahmins are further divided into more than ten sub-castes of higher categories (*e.g.*, the Sharmas, the Shuklas, the Chaturvedis etc.) and the Maithel Brahmins (the lock manufacturers and carpenters). The Banias are also divided into several sub-castes of which three are most important. They are the Barahsenis, the Agarwals and the Maheshwaris. The Banias are mostly businessman, shop-keepers, financiers and industrialists. They dominate the economic system and enjoy great political power and social prestige in the town. The rivalry between the Barahsenis and the Agarwals is proverbial. The former are the known protagonists of the Jana Sangh whereas the latter are said to be the supporters of the Congress. The Barahsenis constitute the largest single group among the caste Hindus. The Banias have an elaborate caste organization with a network of social, educational and philanthropic institutions of their own. The Kayasthas and the Rajputs are smaller groups and they are also divided into several sub-castes. The voting strength of the Hindus is about 48,000 or a little over 50% of the total electorate.

(ii) Among the Muslims there is no caste system whatsoever. However, the main socio-ethnic or occupational groups distinguishable among the Muslims are the Quraishis, the Ansaris, the Bani Israilis and the Bisatis. Of these, the Quraishis constitute the largest single group with minimal political articulation. The rate of

literacy among the Muslims is far lower than the Hindus, and so is the case with the economic condition. The voting strength of the Muslims is over 25,000 or about 27% of the total electorate.

(iii) The scheduled castes are divided into four main sub-castes—the Jatavas, the Balmikis (or Harijans), the Yadavas and the Koris. Of these three, the Jatavas are the most important numerically, socio-economically and politically. There are several other sub-castes also like the Ahirs, the Dhanos etc. The voting strength of the scheduled castes is about 18,000 or over 19% of the total electorate.

The number of candidates for the Aligarh assembly constituency in February 1967 was twenty-one. They included the nominees of the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the PSP, the SSP and the Swatantra and as many as sixteen independents.

The PSP, the SSP and the Swatantra, with their meagre resources, and the Republican party, because of its sectarian approach, could not outweigh the Congress and the Jana Sangh. Similarly, among the prospective independent candidates none was of consequence. In the ultimate analysis, the contest was between the Congress and the Jana Sangh. Both of them, in the light of their past experience and the existing circumstances, had to be careful and judicious in the selection of their respective candidates.

The Pradesh Congress Committee, at the recommendation of the DCC, agreed to sponsor again Anant Ram Varma for the assembly constituency. Netra Pal Singh, a Rajput leader was selected for the Parliamentary seat. Varma, popularly known as *Masterji*, is one of the oldest member of the Congress in the district and has been the president of the City Congress Committee(CCC)for many years. He joined the party in 1924 and has loyally served the organization for about forty years. He is a bachelor and is in his late fifties. He has not been keeping good health for some time but his interest in the party has not at all diminished. In 1954, he was sponsored by the Congress for a by-election to the assembly but he lost. In the second general elections in 1957 he retrieved his position and got elected to the assembly. But in 1962 he lost to

the Republican party. Varma is an ambitious man and, therefore, notwithstanding his old age, ill-health and previous defeat, he applied for the assembly ticket which was granted to him at least at the State level. The PCC did not adhere this time to the tradition of giving a ticket to a Muslim for the Aligarh constituency. A reason for this may be that either a *suitable* Muslim candidate from within the party was not available in Aligarh or outside or that no such person applied for the ticket. In any case, the choice of Varma was undisputed.

The factional politics of the U. P. Congress is too well-known. It was with great difficulty and persuasion by the Congress High Command that the two factions of the organisation in U. P. could concur on a final list of candidates for the elections. There was hardly any thing to be altered when the list was presented to the High Command for approval because almost all nominations had already been informally discussed at the higher level of the party. However, the nominations for the Aligarh constituency (both for the assembly and the Parliament) were held over by the High Command. It was at this stage that some influential Muslim Congress-legislators of U.P. persuaded the High Command to follow the tradition of sponsoring a Muslim candidate from Aligarh. The High Command yielded to the pressure and, again, allegedly at the instance of the same legislators, decided to give the Aligarh assembly constituency ticket to Ravind† Yusuf Rahim Khwaja in place of Anant Ram Varma. These legislators were either relations of the Khwaja or friends of his family. Khwaja, on his part, had not applied for the ticket formally through proper channels nor could he apply for it because he had never been an ordinary member of the party. The decision of the High Command was a flagrant violation of all principles and tenets of party discipline and organization and naturally hurt the local Congress and especially Varma. This also estranged a considerable proportion of the traditional support from amongst the Hindus which created further imbalance in the Congress position. Varma, in utter disgust, resigned from the party along with some of his followers and pitted himself against

† In official records it is spelled as *Ravindra*.

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Ravind Khwaja. This completely shattered the party organization in the city and aggravated the situation against the Congress. Varma is also alleged to have persuaded Hafiz Mohammad Usman, a veteran Muslim Congressmen, to oppose Ravind Khwaja. Hafiz contested as an independent candidate.

Ravind Khwaja, a surgeon, is a lecturer in the Aligarh Muslim University. Apart from being highly cultured and sophisticated, he is a sincere, energetic and enthusiastic youngman possessing fine qualities of leadership. He belongs to a distinguished and well-connected Muslim family of Aligarh. His father, the late Abdul Majeed Khwaja, was an associate of Mahatma Gandhi and a personal friend of Pandit Nehru. His relations with the Nehru family were intimate and informal. He was a prominent freedom fighter. Ravind Khwaja's elder brother, Jamal Khwaja, a Reader in the University, was a member of the second Parliament. Several other persons connected with the family occupy places of position in services, in trade and industry and in public life. The Khwaja, as a student had organized the Nationalist Muslim Student's Federation and took part in social work. However, he never joined any political party till 1961. In that year he joined the Republican party to effect the defeat of the Congress in Aligarh. He worked hard to forge unity between the Muslims and the scheduled castes, which, in the end, resulted in the victory of the Republican party. He was elected president of the district republican party, the position which he *formally* held till October 1966 when he resigned from the party. However, he had actually ceased to work for the party for over two years.

Whatever the merits or motives of the choice or the personal abilities of the Khwaja, the decision of the High Command was far from being politically sound. It created wide cracks in the ranks of the party, raised doubts among the traditional Hindu supporters of the Congress, isolated the scheduled castes and did not subdue of misgivings and doubts among the Muslims. Moreover, the decision came a bit too late and in the mean time, all interested parties had carefully planned their strategy—the strategy of social fragmentation. From the Muslim group there were three party candidates including the Khwaja (others being of the SSP and the

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Swatantra); from the scheduled castes side there were three independents; whereas from the caste-Hindu group there was only one party nominee and that also of the Jana Sangh. The Khwaja was made to fight against many odds and, in spite of his best efforts and abilities, he could not counteract various forces working against the Congress. He succeeded to a large extent to woo Muslim support but the popularity of the Jana Sangh among the Hindu out-weighed his success. He was not able to turn the tide. The Muslim electorate was, still divided between the SSP, the Swatantra, the Mushawarat-supported PSP and the four independents of the group. This substantially reduced the support of the Muslim group to the Congress. The scheduled castes largely supported the three independent candidates of their own group which rendered them ineffective. The caste Hindus largely rallied behind the Jana Sangh and the remaining ones were carefully isolated from the Congress by the nine independents of that group. The margin of support to the Congress from the Hindu group was thus, greatly narrowed down. The result of all these manipulations was not far to seek. The Congress was trounced by the Jana Sangh.

The Jana Sangh, unlike the Congress, was more realistic, careful and calculative. It had seen clearly in the past that the Muslims and the scheduled castes would not *generally* support it and because of caste rivalries and traditional political alliances among various sections of the Hindus it could not muster *total* support of that group. The chances of its victory would, therefore, largely depend upon three factors : first, that its opponents among the Hindus as also the Muslims and the scheduled castes should not support the *same* candidate; secondly, that any misgivings or apprehensions against the Jana Sangh in any section of the society, especially among the Hindus, should be avoided as far as possible and that its candidate should be acceptable to cross-sections of the Hindus; and thirdly, that the tempo of anti-Congress feelings should be kept as high as possible.

The Jana Sangh, keeping in view all the pros and cons of the situation, decided to sponsor Inder Pal Singh for the Vidhan Sabha and declared unconditional support to Shiv Kumar Shastri, an independent candidate for the Parliament. The choice of Inder Pal

Singh was made by the Jana Sangh without concurrence of its chief supporting group, the Barahsenis. They felt indignant for violating the tradition and a young businessman of the group Mahendra Pal contested the election as an independent candidate. However, the Jana Sangh did not yield to the pressure and went ahead with its plan. It preferred to subordinate group interest to party interest.

Inder Pal Singh, a middle aged member of the Rajput group and owner of a medium size *Bidi* factory, is sincere, enthusiastic and level headed. He wields respect in various sections of the society and even those who opposed him did not say any thing against his personal integrity.

Inder Pal Singh claims to have joined the Congress in 1940 but left it to join the Forward Bloc. However, his activities were mostly confined to social work. He is known for his services in restoring the lost children in the city. He was elected to the local municipal board about five years ago as an independent candidate. In the local body he exposed the ruling party—the Congress, and ceaselessly worked for its downfall. A case of mismanagement and abuse of power by the ruling party was instituted in the court of law and ultimately the Board was superceded, within a year or so. It was probably for his anti-Congress activities that Inder Pal Singh was wooed by the Jana Sangh which he willingly joined. He further consolidated his position by associating himself with certain local trade unions like the Bank Employees Union, the Government Press Employees' Union and the Post Men's Union. The choice of Inder Pal Singh had the following four major advantages :

(1) He was widely known for his anti-Congress activities and also for his role in toppling the Congress in the municipal board. He was popular in a cross-section of the society and, at least, there were no strong feelings against his character and integrity. He is a good speaker and received applauses for his straight forward and argumentative speeches during his election campaign. He attracted a larger audience at his election meetings and won over a good number of his listeners. He impressed more than any one of his rivals.

(2) A major factor in Inder Pal's effectiveness as a candidate was that the Rajputs in spite of their smaller number, have had

great influence over local politics. The Congress has always sought the support of this group. This time also the Congress chose Netra Pal Singh, a member of the group for the parliamentary seat as against Shri Chand Singhal, a veteran Congressman and a member of the first Parliament. The choice of Inder Pal Singh could effectively outbalance the Congress support in the Rajput group. It is, however, interesting to note that the Congress choice of Netra Pal Singh was announced long after the Jana Sangh nomination of Inder Pal Singh. This shows that both the Congress and the Jana Sangh wanted to woo the Rajputs.

(3) The choice of Inder Pal Singh from out-side any of the Bania sub-groups was to counter or at least minimise any allegation of 'patronage' by the Jana Sangh to any particular section. This greatly consolidated the Jana Sangh position among the Banias as well as the entire Hindu group. The Barahseni dissatisfaction, however, continued for some time. The controversy was, in the end, resolved amicably when Atal Behari Vajpai visited Aligarh. Mahendra Pal, the Barahseni candidate, who had spent a lot on his campaign suddenly stopped canvassing without giving any reasons.

(4) Inder Pal Singh, as compared to the Congress candidate, had been more involved in local politics and had, therefore, a better understanding of the problems of different groups and sections. Khwaja, as pointed out earlier, had ceased to be active in politics for some time whereas Inder Pal Singh was constantly in touch with the masses. This was a great asset to him. The local papers also came out in his support.

It is clear from the above that, apart from the favourable circumstances and political manoeuvring, Inder Pal Singh himself was a *suitable* candidate. His position, under the existing conditions, was stronger than any one of his rivals. This is also interesting to note that no unhappy incident whatsoever happened in Aligarh during the elections and no bitterness or tension prevailed afterwards.

III

It is worthwhile to note at this stage certain other factors which not only influenced the socio-political life of the town, but

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also determined to a considerable extent the electoral and party behaviour. One important factor was that the charges of maladministration, corruption, nepotism, rising prices, faulty planning, half-baked socialism, *zulum* (cruel treatment) over the government employees and the students, bungling in regard to the language policy and cow slaughter, failure of the foreign policy, unimaginative industrialization, failure of crops and defective food policy, protection of the capitalist interests and a host of other charges were being placed squarely at the door of the Congress. To crown all this was the fact that the Congress itself was faction-ridden and could not effectively repudiate these allegations at the political level. The impact of the anti-Congress propaganda was uniformly sharp on all the sections of the society. Even those sections which were known to be pro-Congress became shaky. These sections and their individual members in the past used to argue for the Congress ideology with their co-professionists, neighbours, friends and others to vindicate the Congress position and served as 'shock-absorbers'. The process stopped for fear of intense opposition and the Congress image remained smeared largely because of its own inertia.

Secondly apart from the general discontent, the Muslims have developed certain misgivings against the Congress during the last twenty years. These misgivings concern mainly the failure of the Congress governments in the States to take effective precautions against the outbreak of communal riots and the loss of Muslim lives and property—in some cases at a large scale. Further, they complain of not getting their appropriate share in services, and of facing discrimination in other spheres. They are also not happy over the Congress policy towards the Urdu language, the contemplated amendment of the Muslim personal law and precipitate action taken in regard to the Aligarh Muslim University. This indeed became one of the important factors determining the Muslim electoral behaviour.

It is a peculiar, rather a strange phenomenon, that a few months before the general elections some trivial issues involving the Muslim University are made a pretext for maligning the University and its staff and thereby creating a commotion in the political life

of the country. It has all the potentialities of turning into communal riots in which the Muslims are the main sufferers. In 1951 there were riots which were repeated in 1956 and 1961. In 1965 an unfortunate incident in the University became a pretext for a great national controversy and fantastic charges were levelled against the University and several other persons without any inquiry or justification whatsoever. Armed constabulary was posted in the University campus which was not withdrawn till after elections in February 1967. Such a long stay of police in any educational institution is unprecedented in the history of Indian education. This was sufficient to irritate the Muslims and their reaction, under the circumstances, was not favourable to the Congress.

In the wake of communal riots at Jabalpur, Rourkhela and other places, an organization of the Muslims was formed at the initiative of a veteran Muslim Congressman and freedom fighter, Dr. Syed Mahmood, to look after the grievances of the Muslims and present them to the government. The organization—the Muslim Majlis-e Mushawarat was non-political in the sense that it decided not to contest elections to legislatures or to any other political body. The U.P. branch of the Mushawarat, however, directed its followers and sympathisers to register their disappointment with the Congress by opposing it in the elections and to support any party or independent candidate who could sympathise with the programme of the Mushawarat. The Aligarh unit of the Mushawarat decided to support Amar Singh, a Sikh leader, sponsored by the PSP for the legislative assembly and for the Parliament it extended its support to Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh (independent), a veteran revolutionary of the pre-independence era even against the PSP candidate, R.K. Maheshwari. The logic of the decision is certainly strange.

The Congress has always maintained the tradition of giving its ticket for the Aligarh constituency to a Muslim either for the assembly or the Parliament. In 1952 Nafisul Hasan, a former speaker of the U.P. legislative assembly was returned from Aligarh;¹ in 1957 Ahmad Jamal Yusuf Khwaja was elected to the Parliament;² and in 1962 Jarrar Haider, an advocate was given the ticket

1. His running-mate for the Parliament Shri Chand Singhal was also elected.

2. His running-mate for the assembly Anant Ram Varma was also elected.

for the parliamentary seat but he lost to B.P. Maurya (Republican) mainly because the Muslims did not support the Congress and rallied behind the Republican party. The Republican party sponsored Abdul Basir Khan for the assembly who also won against the Congress nominee, Anant Ram Varma.

The growing antipathy of the Aligarh Muslims to the Congress needs a little explanation. In October 1961 there had been a scuffle between two groups of the students of the Muslim University over the union election. The anti-social elements in the city exaggerated the matter and spread concocted stories of a highly inflammatory and provocative nature which led to communal riots, killing and arson in the city and the neighbouring towns. Some local Congress leaders, instead of rising to the occasion and contradicting the rumours and work for communal harmony, indulged in character assassination of the late Prof. Abdul Basir Khan, head of the department of zoology and then proctor of the University and placed the blame on him. Prof. Khan was an old member of the Congress and besides his academic eminence he was very popular both in the city and the University. He was likely to be offered the Congress ticket for the election which the local leaders could not afford for their personal reasons. Prof. Khan was offended and indignant as every attempt was made to humiliate him. B.P. Maurya, a scheduled caste leader and an outspoken critic of the Congress persuaded Prof. Khan to vindicate his position and justify his popularity by opposing the Congress candidate in the election to which he agreed. The plan of Maurya was that the scheduled castes—the chief supporters of the Republican party—would vote for a Muslim (Prof. Khan) and the Muslims who had suffered during the riots and were not happy with the Congress would, in return, vote for a scheduled caste candidate (Maurya himself). The scheme worked well and the Congress lost both the parliamentary and the assembly seats. One of the chief organizers of the campaign for the Republican party was Ravind Khwaja.

Thirdly, as pointed out earlier, the Barahseni Banias constitute a formidable single unit in the social complex of the town backed by economic ascendancy and political influence. In the last three elections either a member of the group itself or a person acceptable

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to it was nominated by the Jana Sangh for the Aligarh constituency. The party lost on all the three occasions—twice to the Congress and once to the Republican party. The Jana Sangh had to act more prudently in order to win this time.

Fourthly, the political importance of the scheduled caste group cannot be underestimated. However, the impact of this importance is enhanced only when they unite with some other group and it is reduced to cipher if they go alone. In 1952 and 1957 they allied with other groups to affect the victory of the Congress. But in 1962, at the initiative of B.P. Maurya, they forged unity with the Muslims to support the Republican party. Both the main contenders, the Congress and the Jana Sangh, were badly defeated.

The scheduled-castes-Muslim alliance, however, could not be sustained for long after the elections. Neither it formally broke off nor was it carefully nursed. The main reason for this inactivity was a lack of communication and liaison between the two groups. It also suffered a great set back because one of its chief architects, Ravind Khwaja, the president of the district Republican party cold-shouldered it and finally severed his relation with the party. Khwaja accepted the Congress ticket for the assembly which further aggravated the position and alienated the scheduled castes from the Congress. Moreover, the scheduled castes could not forge unity with the Jana Sangh because of its known traditionalism and the age-old taboos and social antipathy. To the caste-Hindus they are as untouchables even now as ever before. Yet another factor was that the Republican party itself was divided into two factions—the Rahat Maulai group and the Maurya group. The result was that three persons—Misri Lal, Mohan Lal and Kamal Singh—belonging to the scheduled castes filed their nomination papers for the assembly constituency claiming to be official candidates of the Republican party. But none of them could convince the Returning Officer and, therefore, none was given the official party symbol (an elephant). They contested the election as independents. The scheduled castes group of the town was, under the circumstances, divided into three camps without any support or alliance from any quarters of the society and this completely blocked the chance of the Republican party victory in 1967 elections.

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Fifthly the organizational set up of a party plays a vital role in any election and equally so in the selection of a candidate. The better the organization the more effective the manoeuvring. The standard of organization, popularity and sphere of activity of various parties working in Aligarh widely differs from one another. The PSP is popular among the *elite* but has no mass support; the circle of the SSP is still narrower; the CPI has no popular base and has never contested an election; the Republican party is sectarian in the sense that it is confined to the scheduled castes only and is devoted mainly to champion their cause. The Swatantra party has a skeleton organization with no support from any quarters. All these parties suffer from lack of charismatic leadership and dedicated band of workers. On the other hand, both the Jana Sangh and the Congress have elaborate organization and bases in different sections of the society. However, the Congress is suffering from old age, inertia and complacency. Its rank and file is manned by veterans who have lost contact with the masses and live merely on the 'good will' of the party. The 'youth wing' of the Congress is practically non-existent and fresh recruitment in the party is neither sought nor welcome. The workers have no enthusiasm and even courage to face the masses. The party, under the circumstances, could not possibly plan its election strategy objectively or recommend a *suitable* candidate. The Jana Sangh, on the other hand, is effervescent with youthful vigour, enthusiasm and sense of purpose. It is more popular among the youngman than the old. Its organization is excellent and its workers dedicated. This has been a great asset of the party. The party carefully selected its candidate.

Sixthly, the SSP and the Swatantra betrayed lack of political insight by over estimating the position of the Muslim electorate and selecting their candidates from that group. The motives and reasons for the choice are known only to the decision makers of the parties. However, the purpose served by such choice was that it reduced the Congress support among the Muslims which, in the ultimate analysis, enhanced the chances of the Jana Sangh victory.

Finally, it is common experience that a visit to a constituency by a popular leader during the elections makes a salutary effect upon the electorate and shows the interest of the party concerned in the

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constituency. It also boosts the morale of the workers and also establishes the position of the candidate in the party echelon. The Congress showed disinterestedness or at least half-hearted interest in the constituency by not arranging a visit to Aligarh by any leader of repute from the Centre or the State. The Jana Sangh, on the other hand, took an edge over the Congress on this score. It carefully and cleverly managed the visit of a Jana Sangh stalwart, Atal Behari Vajpai just a few hours before the time for campaign and canvassing was to expire. Vajpai addressed a mammoth public meeting which had its desired impact.

IV

The position that ultimately emerged can be analysed as follows :

(1) Anti-Congress feelings were most carefully kept up under various pretexts and reasons through different agencies and parties.

(2) There was one independent candidate from almost every important group among caste-Hindus who checked any anti-Jana Sangh element of the group from going over to the Congress. It cannot be ignored that, in spite of its weaknesses, the Congress has had a *traditional* impact upon the popular mind and has a long established all India status which no other party can claim. The Jana Sangh most cleverly checked the Congress from exploiting its 'good will'.

(3) The Congress defectionists also played a similar role in those groups in which the pro-Congress feelings were in no way lower than the anti-Jana Sangh sentiment. Being old Congressmen themselves, they enticed the traditional Congress supporters in their respective circles.

(4) The Muslims—the traditional Congress supporters—were divided because of the Mushawarat lobby, the *Bradri* considerations and the disproportionately large number of independents from the group.

(5) The scheduled castes were divided because of the utter confusion in the Republican party.

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The atmosphere was thus quite favourable for the Jana Sangh. Inder Pal Singh raised the popularity of his party from its all time record of 13.53% in 1957 to 38.01%. The Jana Sangh succeeded over the Congress with a margin of 7,351 votes. The total polling in the constituency was 58,815 i.e., 62.3% of the total electorate. The Jana Sangh polled 22,357 votes against 15,006 of the Congress. All other candidates lost their security deposits. Table I and II below give the overall picture about the poll verdict :

TABLE I

Percentage of votes polled by various political parties since 1952

The Cong- ress	J.S.	The PSP (KMPP in 1952)	The SSP	The Swa.	The Repb.	Inde- pendents
1952 : 59.44%	9.7%	1.7%		29.7%
1957 : 50.09%	13.53%	6.88%	29.5%
1962 : 31.5%	6.37%	1.7%	..	0.6%	42.7%	17.8%
1967 : 25.51%	38.01%	10.90%	2.99%	0.33%		22.26%

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TABLE II

Statement of voting in the Aligarh assembly constituency, 1967

Total No. of Electorate : 94,346

Total No. of votes polled : 62,434 (Valid : 58,815, Invalid : 3,619)

S.No.	Candidate	Party	Votes polled	%
1.	Mr. Amar Singh	PSP	6,412	10.9
2.	Mr. Inder Pal Singh	J. S.	22,357	38.0
3.	Mr. Khan Iqbal Khan	Swat.	195	0.3
4.	Mr. Ravind Yusuf Rashim Khawaja	Cong.	15,006	25.5
5.	Mr. Hafizur Rehman Dosi	SSP	1,756	3.0
6.	Mr. Anant Ram Varma	Indep.	768	1.3
7.	Mr. L. N. Mathur		359	0.6
8.	Mr. Ganga Saran	..	64	0.1
9.	Mr. Dev Dant Kalanki	..	674	1.1
10.	Mr. Brijeshwar Dayal	..	458	0.8
11.	Mr. Bhoj Raj	..	2,510	4.3
12.	Mr. Mahendra Pal	..	369	0.6
13.	Mr. Vansh Gopal Jhingaran	..	993	1.7
14.	Mr. Shyam Vir Singh	..	199	0.3
15.	Mr. Abdul Majeed Quraishi	..	251	0.4
16.	Mr. Naim Quraishi	..	219	0.4
17.	Mr. Shabbir Hasan	..	136	0.2
18.	Mr. Hafiz Mohammed Usman	..	142	0.2
19.	Mr. Kamal Singh	..	173	0.3
20.	Mr. Misri Lal	..	338	0.6
21.	Mr. Mohan Lal Azad	..	5,436	9.2

It needs no further evidence that the most important factor in the victory of the Jana Sangh was its candidate—so judiciously chosen. The Congress, on the other hand, suffered its defeat largely because of its wrong assessment of the situation and wrong decision at wrong moment under wrong advice. The Jana Sangh supported candidate for the Parliament, Shiv Kumar Shastri was also elected. He defeated the Congress by a margin of 12,422 votes in Aligarh city alone.

NARINDER S. KAPUR

ON SELECTION OF
CONGRESS CANDIDATES*

GENERAL elections begin with the selection of candidates by political parties both at the national and State level. A political party prescribes its rules of procedure for the selection of candidates which reflect the conditions that exist in a society and the criteria employed by it reveal the intention of party leaders to allot party ticket to the best qualified candidates behind all types of political pulls and pressures at various levels within the party structure. An attempt is made in the succeeding pages to describe the criteria laid and procedures adopted by the Congress party for selecting its candidates in the four general elections held in India, and the departure made from those rules in each successive election.

It was at the Bombay session of the Indian National Congress held in April 1948 that for the first time provisions relating to the composition of a Central Election Committee (CEC) entrusted with the task of "conducting election campaign" and "making final selection of candidates for the provincial and central legislatures" were introduced under Article XXVII of its constitution. Prior to it, the Central Parliamentary Board of the Congress party was known to be finally responsible for the selection of candidates.

The CEC¹ which met on July 7, 1951 laid down the following procedure for the nomination of Congress candidates for the first general election in the country :

* The author is extremely grateful to Professor W. H. Morris-Jones for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper which was read in a seminar on general elections conducted by him in the Department of Political Science of the University of Delhi. Although he has immensely benefitted from the observations made by Professor Morris-Jones, the author alone is responsible for any shortcomings in it.

1. Proceedings of the meeting of the CEC held at Bangalore, *Congress Bulletin*, July-August 1951.

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The applications from the candidates were to be invited by the PCCs and they determined the procedure for ascertaining local opinion regarding the applicants in accordance with the general directions issued by the CEC. Wherever necessary, the CEC or the PEC were authorised to seek the advice of the individuals or organisations such as the Indian National Trade Union Congress for the selection of candidates.

There after the CEC met on August 12, 1951 and fixed the time-table for applying for the ticket, scrutiny by the PEC, raising of objections etc., appeal to the CEC and for the final selection of the candidates by the CEC. The period assigned for these various stages of the selection of candidates was spread over two months thus, giving enough time to all concerned for maneuvring and persuasions. The CEC also instructed that every applicant should pay to the PEC a sum of not more than Rs. 100/- along with the application, for election to the State legislature and not more than Rs. 250/- for the Parliament which was not to be refunded in any case.² It was left to the option of the PEC to grant exemption to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

Every PEC was required to make its own rules so as to facilitate its process of consultation with any DCC or subordinate Congress committees before it recommended candidates for the constituencies within the jurisdiction of the respective DCCs.

It was left open to the PEC to request any person to stand on the Congress ticket but all information regarding such a person was required to be furnished to the CEC. The PEC could as well recommend a person not even a primary member of the party for selection although the CEC specifically held the view that this should be in exceptional cases and that too in recognition of the person's outstanding ability, eminence, technical knowledge or contribution to the national cause. Such a person was, however, required to sign the party pledge and if elected, agree to abide by the legislative party rules and obligations.

2. "The CEC decided that the PEC should remit to the AICC office 20% of the application fees collected from the intending candidates." *Congress Bulletin*, August 14, 1951.

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The PEC was also directed to report to the CEC in details the grounds on which the PECs selected the candidates. In doing so, the PEC was asked to discuss the comparative merits of the applicants for each constituency and give its remarks which were not supposed to be cursory but as much in details as possible.

The PECs were further requested to collect information about the candidates in the following form. This was to be forwarded to the CEC along with its recommendations before the specific date :

Information form to be filled in by candidates

Candidate for.....Constituency.

- I 1. Name.
- 2. Father's name.
- 3. Date of Birth.
- 4. Religion.
- 5. Native Place, District and Province.

II Occupation and Profession.

- 1. Occupation and Profession.
- 2. Education.
- 3. (a) Language known.

I.I Public and National Service.

Kind of national service, participated in social service, co-operation, education, religion, etc. A detailed account of responsible positions if any, held in such national service institutions, like Presidentships, Secretaryships.

IV Political Work.

Participation in freedom movements with details of previous experience as (a) Member of Legislature, (b) Member of Municipal Council, Local Board, or Village Panchayat, (c) Member of any other Committee, Council.

The CEC advised the PCCs to give special consideration to the claims of minorities such as Muslims, Christians and others while recommending candidates. The same consideration was to be shown to women. Claims of refugees in those areas where they were rehabilitated in large numbers was also required to receive proper consideration.

In September 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru, as President of Indian National Congress, issued a circular³ to the presidents of all PCCs pointing out that the election work be divided into three parts :

3. *Congress Bulletin*, Circular CEC-6/3151, September 1951.

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- (i) General propoganda of Congress principles, manifesto etc.
- (ii) Choice of candidates.
- (iii) Arrangements for the actual polling.

“The future,” Nehru said, “not only of the Congress but of the country depends upon the quality of persons elected to Parliament and to the State Assemblies..... We must choose persons who can represent worthily Congress principles and ideals... I am quite sure it is better for us to lose a few seats than to try to win them by compromising with any of the principles and standards.”

He asked the presidents of the PCCs to bear in mind the following factors in selecting candidates, because it was on this basis that the CEC were asked to proceed and it was considered desirable that their approach should be the same.

(i) That any person connected with any anti-social practice, such as black-marketing, should not be given party ticket. Similarly any person whose past record was considered to be bad from the Congress point of view should not be selected, even though he might be regarded locally to have chances of winning the elections.

(ii) That the selected candidates must represent fully the non-communal character and approach of the Congress party.

(iii) That persons representing large vested interests were seldom likely to have a progressive social outlook, hence care should be taken not to put forward as Congress candidates persons who were likely to represent a reactionary economic policy.

(iv) That in every State a list of persons should be made who by virtue of their experience and ability might be required to assume responsibility of government later on. A special effort be made to get these persons elected.

(v) That some candidates might be reserved for the Upper House (Council of States) while selecting candidates for the Lower House* (House of People).

(vi) “Since separate electorates and reservations have been given up, it is therefore a matter of great political importance that

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representative of the minority communities are put up in adequate numbers. If we fail to discharge this responsibility, critics will be entitled to say that Joint Electorates have failed and that we cannot adequately protect the interests of minorities... We have to make special efforts to put up good Muslim candidates, even taking the risk of the loss of a seat or two." He also laid stress on women being made Congress candidates and considered it a man-made reason that suitable women candidates were rare.

Nehru thought that some of the best Congressmen would hesitate to put forward their names, and therefore, he urged upon the PECs to think of such persons and directly invite them to stand even if they did not send in their applications. He cautioned election committees against choosing candidates on group lines or cliques.

The CEC received nearly 25000 applications for about 4000 seats.⁴ Almost a lakh of complaints and appeals followed these applications which were nearly four on an average against each applicant. For the sake of convenience, the whole country was divided into five zones, each comprising the area under the control of senior Congressman.⁵ A process of screening of the applications of every prospective candidate was taken up at the zonal level. Subsequently these 'filtered' applications were scrutinised during long sessions of the CEC which made final selections.

Such an elaborate and exhaustive machinery adopted by the Congress to screen applicants and hear complaints was not employed in the subsequent general elections. Some changes in the rules of procedure were made for the second general elections of 1957, with a view to receive the general approval of the organisation at almost

4. N. V. Rajkumar, "*The Pilgrimage and After*" (the A.I.C.C. Publication).

5. The North Zone was made up of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Pepsu, Rajasthan and Delhi (Convenor Shri G. L. Nanda); the Central Zone of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh and Bhopal (Convenor (Miss) Padmaja Naidu); the West Zone of Bombay, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Nagpur, Vidarbha and Mahakoshal (Convenor Shri H K. Mahtab); The South Zone of Hyderabad, Andhra, Tamilnad, Mysore, Kerala and Karnataka (Convenor Shri S. K. Patil), and the East Zone of Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Utkal (Convenor Shri Sri Prakasa).

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all levels. A CEC constituted on June 21, 1956 made inquiries regarding the suitability of prospective candidates on the following lines. (1) Whether the candidate was an active member of the Congress (2) His social, economic, political and cultural contribution, and also as regards his social outlook, (3) his honesty and integrity, (4) his participation in constructive work, (5) any fruitful activity in a local body or Parliament (6) Disciplined behaviour in the party (7) and if a sitting member, the nature of the contact with the constituency. The CEC then adopted the following procedure for the selection of candidates :⁶

(1) The PEC was required to receive suggestions from the District Congress Committee with regard to the candidates to be put in various constituencies in each district. (2) Each member of the DCC might propose one name (3) Representatives of the PEC chosen in consultation with the representative of CEC should visit different areas for ascertaining local opinion. (4) The PEC representative would arrange a meeting of the DCC executive and hold discussions with the members regarding their suggestions and thus find out the consensus among the members of the executive. Afterwards he was required to invite members of the DCC who were not in the executive. He was also required to meet other persons in order to assess public opinion. After completing these formalities, he was required to submit to the PEC a panel of names not exceeding five in each constituency. Candidates whose names were included in the panel were required to deposit Rs. 50/- each for election to the State legislature and Rs. 100/- for the Parliamentary seat. However, when final selection was made by the CEC, each candidate was to pay Rs. 50/- and Rs. 100/- for election to the State legislature and the Parliament respectively. The PEC, in the presence of the representative of the CEC, considered the panel for each constituency sent by its representatives, and made its own recommendations to the CEC along with the panel of names, giving reasons for the selection made. Where the recommendations were not unanimous, views of the dissenters were also required to be sent. Besides, the

6. Proceedings of the CEC meeting held on June 21, 1956. *Congress Bulletin* No. 7, July 1956.

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CEC was authorised to include names not recommended or even considered by the PEC. Thus, the final selection rested with the CEC. The aggrieved candidates were allowed to make representations to the PEC and AICC representatives, or through them to the CEC. The PEC representative concerned was invited to attend CEC meetings when the name of candidates from the particular district were being considered.

Rules for the selection of candidates also provided the fixation of the proportion in regard to women, minorities and fresh blood which was not clearly laid down in the selection rules of 1952 elections. A circular⁷ issued by the Secretary, Parliamentary Department of the AICC to all presidents of the PCC said (1) that 15% of the Congress seats in the legislature be given to women (2) that the proportion of seats for minorities be in accordance with their population ratio in the State. (3) All efforts be made to replace 1/3 of the sitting Congressmen by new members in the legislature.

Thus the procedure laid down for selection, resulted in setting up of only 239 former Lok Sabha members out of a total of 468 which was evi- tent of the infusion of new blood in the Parliament. As regards women and minorities the following figures were revealed. In the Lok Sabha out of a total of 494 seats 27 (including 2 women) were given to Muslims, 28 seats were allotted to women (including 2 Muslims and 1 Christian). To Sikhs 11 and to the Christians 9 (including one woman) were allotted. On the other hand the total number of seats in legislative assemblies which Congress contested was 2906. Out of this, the number of Muslim candidates nominated was 212 (including 7 women); women were 268 (including 7 Muslims, 2 Sikhs, 1 Christian); Sikhs were 62 (including 2 women). The Christian candidates nominated were 25 (including one woman) and there were four Parsees.

The year 1962 experienced the addition of new rules for nomination of candidates which made a departure from the procedure adopted in the previous two elections. This was now the

7. *Congress Bulletin*, January-February, 1957. Circular CEC, 3/37-5797 December, 19, 1956.

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third general election and the Congress touched the lowest rung of the party ladder in the process of selecting candidates. The criteria laid down by the CEC⁸ asked among other things for the first time, if a sitting member had submitted the statement of his assets and income. As regards the procedure followed for recommending candidates, a beginning was to be made from the Mandal Congress Committees (MCC) in each constituency whose view-points were to be ascertained in their meetings to be attended by the DCC president or an office-bearer of the DCC and PEC observer. Discussion over the personal conduct of the candidates was specifically forbidden in the MCC meetings although its members could individually give their opinions to the DCC president or an office-bearer of the DCC and PEC observer. Besides, members of the panchayat samitis owing allegiance to the Congress party were also expected to give their views to the DCC president and PEC observer. Both the DCC president and PEC observer submitted reports to the PEC containing their reactions to the suggestions of the Mandal Congress members. In case there was no unanimity over one name in a constituency, they were required to note down the different names proposed. All the recommendations from the constituencies were to be considered by the executive of the DCC wherein the PEC observer was also required to be present. The DCC, then communicated its opinion with regard to all the names to the PEC. In case there was a difference of opinion between the DCC executive and the recommendations received from the constituency, a panel of names was to be submitted to the PEC with its own observations. However, in regard to constituency, if there was any difference of opinion in the PEC itself, the PEC would forward to the CEC a panel of names.

Another departure made from the previous rules of selection was that in the case of State legislature, five members of the concerned DCC or ten active members from the same district recommended each name while in the case of Parliament, ten members of the DCC or the DCCs or twenty active members from the district or districts

8. Procedure as adopted by the Working Committee in its meeting held on February 18, 1961 and modified subsequently by the CEC in its meeting of 29 April, 1961.

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within which the parliamentary constituency was situated, recommended the name. The application fee was also raised to Rs. 200/- although the PCC was authorised to reduce the amount. Members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes were required to pay half of this amount. Moreover, in addition to this application fee, each applicant was required to deposit Rs. 500/- for election to the State legislature and Rs. 1250/- in regard to parliamentary election.⁹ As for sitting members¹⁰ (including those of scheduled castes and scheduled Tribes) they were required to deposit Rs. 1000/- in the case of State legislature and Rs. 2500/- in the case of Parliament. However, if an applicant was not selected, the deposit was to be refunded. Adequate representation to minorities and women was to be given.

The CEC specifically mentioned that a minister belonging to the Upper House should preferably contest for a seat in the Lower House in a subsequent general election. This was intended to enable such a minister to seek a popular verdict at the polls. The CEC alone was competent to consider and decide each case of such ministers both at the centre and in the States.

The procedure adopted for the 1967 elections shows that the Congress had gone back to the rules prescribed by it at the time of the first general election held in 1952. The CEC¹¹ announced that the PEC would invite applications from the intending candidates and that the PEC should consult the DCC executive concerned in recommending candidates. This represented a departure from the previous rules followed in the third general election when a beginning

9. 25% of the collections made in each State were to go to the AICC.
10. According to the CEC every Congress sitting legislator whether M.P. M.L.A. or M.L.C. shall be recognised as a sitting member and shall have to deposit the prescribed amount that had been fixed by the Working Committee varying in case of State legislature from that of the Parliament. To illustrate—a member of the State legislature if filing his candidature for the Parliament shall have to deposit Rs. 2500/-. While a member of Parliament, offering his candidature for the State legislature shall have to deposit Rs. 1000/- only). See procedure adopted by the AICC Working Committee on February 18, 1961.
11. Circular No. CEC 3/1/8204 dated 22, 1966.

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was to be made from the MCC. It was then considered obligatory to ascertain the views of MCCs in each constituency. This has been interpreted to mean that there is now less democracy in the selection of candidates than in earlier elections when MCCs could even recommend candidates whatever the ultimate fate their recommendation might have met.¹² Similarly rules pertaining to the fixation of deposit by the CEC which each candidate was required to pay were different from those prescribed at the time of the second and third general elections. Now it was left to the PEC and not to the CEC to fix the monetary contribution which a candidate was supposed to pay along with his application. It was also open to the PEC to decide what part of it was refundable and what was not. The CEC as in the past was authorised to make any changes in the list of recommended candidates submitted by the PEC or select persons who did not even apply. Once again, emphasis was laid on infusing new blood by retiring as far as possible 1/3 of the sitting members¹³ of the Congress party in the State and Central legislatures. Adequate representation to minorities and women was also assured.

12. "What the CEC has done is to leave the Pradesh Election Committee to decide the procedure. It is in a way a step towards decentralisation." Editorial, Selection of Congress Candidates by Sadiq Ali *A.I.C.C. Economic Review*, August 1, 1966.
13. For the Lok Sabha about 65 per cent of the 366 sitting members were renominated except in the case of Madhya Pradesh, Bengal, Madras and Maharashtra where more than 50 per cent of the nominees were new. In Gujarat 20 of the 25 nominees were also new entrants. *The Tribune*, January 10, 1967.

PART THREE
THE CAMPAIGN

B. MAHESHWARI

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES
AND ORGANIZATION*

STUDY of the election campaign is significant because it brings out the salient features of the political process. Whether the campaign determines the outcome may be a debatable proposition but it can be confidently asserted that a study of the strategy, tactics and logistics¹ of the election campaign does promote sound understanding of the functional side of the political system. Such a study can be designed to include several issues concerning the functional organisation and techniques of support mobilization at the level of politics where interaction between the masses and elites takes place with great intensity and in a highly competitive atmosphere. When proper questions are asked and efficient methods followed such a study has the potential to elucidate some of the important aspects of political behaviour, such as the nature of cooperation and conflict, the style and levels of leadership and the variety of the means of communication and mobilization.

This paper aims to highlight some of the important issues of 1967 election campaign. It is based on an intensive study of an urban constituency in Rajasthan and hence some of its conclusions may have only limited validity. The author was assisted by one full time and two part-time research assistants during the campaign

An analysis in the specific context of an urban constituency in Rajasthan.

1. These are military terms which can be used in politics since there are many similarities between an election campaign and a military campaign. Strategy is "the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by political policy." Tactics is obviously the art of using weapons in such a way that they make the maximum impact, and logistics is the science of supply and movement. A.A. Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy*, London, Faber and Faber, 1965, p. 22.

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period.² The methods of study followed by us included observation, coverage of all the major public meetings, and some of the closed meetings of the party workers, interviews with candidates and campaign workers, and continuous liaison with the campaign offices. In addition, the author spent a full day each with the two "serious candidates."

Duration

Theoretically, the election campaign begins after the completion of the nomination process and ends several hours before the commencement of polling. In practice, the campaign is a continuous process and the imminence of an election only intensifies it. We can assert that the campaign for the fourth general election was already at a high pitch during the last sessions of the Parliament and the State legislatures. Long before even the selection of candidates, different parties were busy formulating their strategy, designing tactics and accumulating arsenal with which to knock down the rivals. In the autumn session of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, the opposition leaders levelled charges of corruption against members of the Sukhadia cabinet. Earlier, they had also presented the memorandum to the President detailing the alleged charges against the Chief Minister. Many speeches in the Assembly were directed at galleries and were intended to influence the large numbers of voters outside the Assembly premises. The ruling party was also using its position to formulate and implement such policies as might prove beneficial at the polls. Intensification of famine relief work in selected areas and declaration of several measures of welfare at this time should be regarded as ingredients of the campaign for the coming contest. Defections from the dominant party and the plans and talks of new alignments had increased tension in the political community even before the formal process for the election commenced.

However, the formal campaigns by different parties and candidates were supposed to begin only after the withdrawals were over

2. The author expresses appreciation of the support of Dr. S.P. Varma and Dr. Iqbal Narain and thanks to Harish Chandra Sharma, Vinay Kumar Gupta and Hari Shankar Sharma for their assistance.

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and the picture about the candidates in the field was clear.³ On January 23, the Jana Sangh held a public meeting at Manak Chopar to symbolize the beginning of the campaign. The same evening, the Jaipur City Congress organized a public meeting which was addressed by the Congress President, Kamaraj. The candidates and their workers started public meetings and personal contacts around this time. Campaign tempo increased about two weeks before the polling day. On and about February 1, more posters and banners appeared in the streets and the candidates, along with their leading supporters, were seen knocking at the doors of prospective voters. Small indoor meetings and outdoor street corner meetings began to be organized and all sorts of vehicles equipped with loudspeakers began to move around. As the polling day drew nearer, campaign activity became more hectic. This continued until the end of the polling time.

Thus the election campaign can be divided into a number of stage which are not mutually exclusive :

- (1) Preparatory stage;
- (2) Formal inauguration;
- (3) Large public meetings stage;
- (4) Small ward meetings and personal contact stage; and
- (5) Drawing out of the potential supporters on the polling day.

II

The organisational pattern

Effectiveness of the campaign depends on the effectiveness of the formal as well as functional organizations. The effectiveness of the campaign organization is determined by several factors including the coordination between the various levels of organization, programme planning, campaign finances and dedication of the campaign workers. We found that the independent candidates, in Jaipur city at least, had no organization. They depended on personal contacts and their campaign was very casual. Of the

3. It should be mentioned here that in many constituencies where the selection of major candidates had been finalized earlier, the campaign, even formally, was launched before this date. It is significant that some of the out-of-State leaders of all the parties had already completed their tours of the State.

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three major parties involved in the contest, the organization of the Swatantra party was very poor although it enjoyed the benefit of the charisma as well as the financial resources of Maharani Gayatri Devi.⁴ The Congress organization was broad-based but it suffered from the lack of dedicated workers and conflicting loyalties of the partymen.⁵ Jana Sangh, by far, had the best organization. It not only had the services of a cadre of devoted volunteers but also had a plan of action which was implemented with efficiency and thoroughness.

Formal campaign organization

Attempt has been made here to prepare a chart of the formal campaign organization. There were important differences in the functioning of this organization in different parties and even in different constituencies. However, this chart will help us in identifying the actual functional organization at different levels.

CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

National Party Organization



State Party Committee



District or City Committee

Assembly Constituency
Campaign Office



Sub-divisional units
(Chokaries or clusters of villages)



Wards or panchayat circles



Small units consisting of about
100 to 500 voters or a village

Parliamentary Constituency
Campaign Office

4. Lack of organization also marked the party at the national level. Mr. Masani admitted : "While the Swatantra party has made good progress politically, I am not satisfied with the progress made on the organizational front. We have excellent policies and an excellent manifesto, but we still lack the organizational efficiency that should accompany this." *Hindustan Times*, February 13, 1967.
5. For example, the Jaipur City Congress office was responsible for all the four assembly constituencies in the city. In practice, however, the city

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The national campaign office of a party issued directions to the State units, coordinated tour programmes of important party leaders and supplied some campaign material such as a number of posters and pamphlets. The State unit of the party was responsible for overall coordination of campaign of the party candidates in the State, supplied some campaign material to the candidates⁶ and coordinated the speaking schedules of the State party leaders from outside as well as important leaders of the party from within the State. Depending on the requirements of the campaign strategy, the State was divided in a number of sectors—each sector being under a party leader for intensive campaign.⁷

The district or city party units were expected to coordinate party campaigns at that level. They made arrangements for the public meetings addressed by important party leaders.⁸ However, the main burden of the campaign fell on the candidates themselves. Each candidate had separate campaign organization with a campaign manager, a central office and several branch offices. The candidate's campaign office prepared his programme, arranged ward meeting and processions, recruited volunteers or paid workers and took care of numerous sundry things connected with the campaign work. The candidates for the Lok Sabha also had

office neglected three city constituencies and concentrated on one city constituency—Johari Bazar—and a rural constituency nearby. This was motivated by personal interests of the office-bearers who wanted to strengthen their own position in Johari Bazar and to gain favours of the dominant group in the PCC by supporting PCC Chief in Chomu constituency.

6. For example, the Rajasthan PCC campaign office supplied to the DCCs the posters with the Congress symbol and the legend "Vote for Congress." The candidates had to bear the expenses of printing their names on these posters. The Rajasthan Jana Sangh office printed State level posters for distribution to the party candidates. The State Jana Sangh also bought one jeep for each parliamentary constituency.
7. For example, the Jana Sangh divided the State of Rajasthan into five sectors in 1967. Each sector consisted of a number of Lok Sabha constituencies and was assigned to a State-level leader who acted as coordinator of the campaign.
8. The Jaipur City Congress, for example, made arrangements for seven public meetings, addressed by Morarji Desai, Indira Gandhi, Kamaraj, Jagjivan Ram, Y. B. Chavan, Atulya Ghosh, Sadiq Ali and Mohan Lal Sukhadia.

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their separate central campaign office and a number of branch offices but the vastness of the constituencies compelled them to rely on their Assembly colleagues and the district and State level party organizations. It was not feasible for the Lok Sabha candidates to have separate organizations at ward or village level, or to engage in door-step contacts, although some of them tried to do so in selected parts of their constituencies.

A brief description of the constituency level campaign organization as obtained in the Johari Bazar (Jaipur) constituency in 1967 is given here by way of illustration. The Congress and the Jana Sangh were the main contenders here and their formal organization was identical. This was an urban constituency consisting of four chowkaries. There was "branch office" at this level. Each chowkari consisted of a number of wards and there was a ward office. Now, the electoral list for a ward was divided into several parts, each part consisting of 700 to 1,200 voters. The Congress aimed to assign each part to two or three workers, thus making a campaign worker responsible for 250 to 400 voters. The Jana Sangh was rich in terms of campaign workers and, therefore, each worker was assigned only about 100 to 150 voters. This worker contacted voters, prepared poll slips and ensured that the supporters turned up on the polling day. If this worker came from the same locality and was motivated to do his utmost for the party or the candidate, he could be a great asset in mobilizing support. Otherwise, the formal organization would be found to be inoperative and ineffective.⁹

9. People in the Congress campaign office complained that they did not have reliable workers, and that their organization had been penetrated by the spies from the rival camp. Some of the workers interviewed by us indicated that they were working for the Congress candidate only because of good wages. The Swatantra Party was perhaps worse in this respect. It had no viable organization at the mass level. Its ward offices were generally locked. A visit to the Johari Bazar office of the Swatantra Party revealed this utter lack of adequate organization. The two-room office was crowded with many young men, mostly in their teens or early twenties. The lack of discipline and any semblance of organized work was very much obvious there.

Coordination

A campaign study should aim to probe into the process of coordination between different levels of the campaign organization. Not much attention has been paid in Indian studies to this issue as concerns the candidates for Lok Sabha and the State legislative assemblies whose election is held simultaneously, who have overlapping jurisdictions and who campaign among common set of voters. There are three typologies : of such situations first, where candidates for both the constituencies belong to the same party, secondly where the Lok Sabha and the assembly candidates belong to two different parties which may have entered into no-contest agreement such as the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh in 1967, and thirdly, where these candidates are standing as independents or as nominees of minor parties and have arrived at limited agreement to extend support to each other.

The first situation existed among the Congress candidates except in one Lok Sabha and two assembly constituencies in Rajasthan in 1967. This situation also applied to other parties in several constituencies. The second situation assumed greater significance in 1967 in view of the no-contest pacts between the like-minded parties. Thus, in Rajasthan there were two different party combinations Swatantra-Jana Sangh coalition and the SSP-PSP-CPI coalition.

The Swatantra-Jana Sangh coalition in 1967 was viewed with great interest by the practitioners as well as the students of Indian politics because, in the long term, it raised the possibility of polarization of political parties and in the short run, it encouraged hopes (or fears) of electoral success of the coalition. In Rajasthan, this coalition was of special significance because it could be the welding of two powerful factors *i.e.*, financial resources and personal prestige of the Swatantra leaders and the manpower resources and organization of the Jana Sangh. This coalition certainly made some difference in the campaign strategy but it did not work as effectively as expected or desired. The main reason for its ineffectiveness was that it was an agreement among the leaders and the rank and file of the two parties were not sufficiently reconciled to the emergent situation.

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In December, the Swatantra party chief, Laxman Singh disclosed that there were plans for a joint State manifesto of the Swatantra and Jana Sangh parties and that attempts would be made to have common campaign organization. Both of these developments did not take place subsequently. However, there were reports of common campaign between the candidates of the two parties from several constituencies. Besides, personal relationships between the leaders and workers of these parties at the local levels, the element of mutual need played an important role in determining the degree of coordination. Thus, if a Jana Sangh candidate in a given constituency was convinced that emphasis on the existence of the electoral pact would help him because of the influence of the Swatantra party among some of his electors, he would try to use this to his advantage by public display of mutual harmony and solidarity in spite of private complaints about non-cooperation from the other side.¹⁰ Some leaders of the two parties campaigned for the candidates of the other party¹¹ but both the parties maintained separate campaign organizations and, by and large, fought their own battle separately.¹² Thus, the Swatantra-Jana Sangh

10. An example of such a situation obtained in the Jana Sangh camp in Johari Bazar constituency. It was obvious that the local workers of both the parties had not forgotten the bitter fights they fought only two years ago in the municipal election. As a result, most of the influential men of the Swatantra party in this area were opposed to extending their support to the Jana Sangh candidate. The Jana Sangh workers also expressed their disenchantment with the electoral pact. But the Jana Sangh candidate was aware of the tremendous influence of the Swatantra candidate for Lok Sabha among certain sections of his constituency—especially among the Muslims and the Scheduled castes—which were also the strongholds of the Congress. Therefore, he wanted to be seen wearing the Swatantra Star along with the Jana Sangh's lamp. He asked his leading workers to do the same. He issued a poster which also mentioned the candidature of the Maharani for Lok Sabha. Besides, he used a stencil which sought votes for both the parties in order to defeat Congress and raised a slogan which emphasized this solidarity.
11. For example, Maharani Gayatri Devi asked for support for the Jana Sangh candidates in Jaipur city and went to Udaipur for the same purpose. Similarly, Bhairon Singh and Satish Chandra Agrawal addressed public meetings in support of the Swatantra candidates in Chomu, Malpura and other places. *Rashtrdoot*, February 11 & 13, 1967.
12. Reports from three parliamentary constituencies—Pali, Dausa and Jalore however indicated that common campaigns were conducted more effectively. *Rashtrdoot*, December 28, 1966, February 4 and 11, 1967.

pact was limited to the allocation of seats and did not result in a well-coordinated campaign. The post-election dissensions had roots in the pre-election atmosphere of mutual distrust and disharmony and the electoral pact only proved to be a short-lived camouflage.

In Alwar Lok Sabha constituency, we found an interesting case highlighting the problems of the campaign coordination between the SSP nominee for Lok Sabha and the CPI and SSP nominees for the assembly constituencies. This particular Lok Sabha candidate had been elected to the Lok Sabha in 1952 as an independent. In spite of the SSP cloak this time, he tried to retain his original sources of support. As a result, he was extending financial support to some of the non-party candidates in the assembly constituencies. The CPI nominee from the city constituency and this Lok Sabha candidate maintained a working relationship because of the considerations of mutual benefit. Still the first common public meeting of the two was not held until February 9, only a week before the polling day.

A detailed investigation into the first kind of situation should provide significant data about the nature of intra-party relationships. The Lok Sabha candidate cannot conduct the kind of intensive campaign as an assembly candidate can do and, hence, he must depend on the support of his assembly colleagues. Whether the assembly candidates will support their party's nominee for Lok Sabha depends on several factors such as their group affiliation in the party and considerations of mutual benefit. In the face of a strong and powerful candidate of the rival party for the other seat, these candidates will prefer to promote their own cause. Thus the advice to the voters to cast "one vote for me and one for the Maharani" is not uncommon.¹³ Similarly, when their party nominee

13. The Jaipur urban constituency under our close observation indicated this pattern. The Congress party's nominee for the assembly complained that there was no cooperation from his Lok Sabha colleague. Some of the local Congress workers were also unhappy because the High Command had selected this particular person for Lok Sabha even when he had no record of identification with the party. The result was predictable. Although, there were some posters bearing the names and pictures of both the candidates,

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for the Lok Sabha is strong and popular, the assembly candidates will try to ride on his or her coat-tails.

Strategy

What is the strategy of the candidates and parties in the campaign ? This question is of great significance because knowledge of the over-all strategy helps the investigator to understand the orientation and direction of the campaign. On the basis of our study, we arrived at two conclusions.

(i) The dominant party gave more attention to weak spots since it was fighting a battle to retain its dominant position. Hence, greater re-inforcements were sent to difficult places. On the other hand, opposition party such as Jana Sangh, small but well organized and ambitious, was very keen on retaining the pockets of strength, while extending its influence in other areas. Thus, it concentrated its efforts in the few strong pockets. The same method also operated at the constituency level. Thus, in assembly constituency which had returned the Jana Sangh nominee during the last two elections, the Jana Sangh in 1967 was sure of its known supporters and the major thrust of its campaign was directed towards cultivating its support in the weaker sectors. The Congress which was underdog in this context, on the other hand, concentrated its efforts among those sectors of the electorate which were its traditional supporters.

(ii) At the constituency level, at least, the campaign is community-oriented and the issues play little role. Thus the community affiliation becomes an important determinant of a candidate's campaign in relation to a particular group. That this community affiliation element is very important in the calculations of campaign managers becomes obvious even in casual talk with them. We found in a particular urban constituency that both the major candidates had divided the total electorate into such groups

we found that many of the cars and auto-rickshaws carried banners for only one of them and the campaign workers made appeals for only one of them. Once in a while, the assembly candidate mentioned his Lok Sabha-colleague's name in the corner meetings but without any particular emphasis.

as Muslims,¹⁴ Scheduled castes, Jains, Agrawals, Sindhis, Brahmins, etc. Having done this, attempt was made to enlist the support of some of the leading members of these different communities, issues were formulated, separate slogans were coined and signed appeals and campaign literature of specialized interest were circulated¹⁵ to cater to the particular prejudices and preferences of these communities. Vital national and/or local issues then took the inconspicuous back seat and were articulated only through some slogans and hackneyed phrases.

In a well-organized campaign each candidate's staff prepares three lists of the voters. One list contains the names of supporters. These supporters are of two kinds : (1) traditional supporters of this party and (2) personal supporters of this particular candidate. This group provides the base for mobilization and extension of support resulting in victory on the polling day. This list is also the source of potential campaign workers. The emphasis in this case is : "get them out on the polling day." The second list contains the known and potential opponents. The campaign managers are aware that it is no use spending energy on them although they should be contacted. There is always a possibility of change of affiliation. The third list consists of the doubtfuls—those who are not committed to any candidate or party and who could be influenced. This group is the source of the floating vote

14. The Muslims were objects of special attention in this constituency because they accounted for more than one-fourth of the total electorate, there was no Muslim candidate this time and the major confrontation was between the Congress and the Jana Sangh, which traditionally have held opposite views concerning the Muslims. The Congress tried to maintain solid support of the Muslims while the Jana Sangh wanted to infiltrate and wean the Muslims away from the Congress. The Jana Sangh candidate told them that their solid affiliation with one party was not in their interest.
15. The Congress party circulated Urdu pamphlets among Muslims. The titles of these pamphlets were : (1) *Musalman aur election*; (2) *Jana Sanghyon Ki Jahar-Afasani* (Venom of the Jana Sangh) (3) *Swatantra Party Ki Asalyat* (Reality of the S.P.) (4) *Dumdar sitara* (The star with the tail). Another pamphlet contained the explanation by one Muhammad Abidali Fayyaz as to why he left the Swatantra party. The Congress party also circulated among the scheduled castes a Hindi pamphlet entitled *Harijan aur Jana Sangh*.

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which decides the election outcome in marginal constituencies. The campaign managers pay special attention to them. Information about particular neighbourhoods and even families is obtained with a view to converting as many of them as possible. Any visitor to a busy campaign office would hear detailed analyses of some important individuals in this category. If this voter-classification on the basis of expected behaviour is properly done, the campaign workers would be able to know friends, enemies and potential friends and this knowledge should make the campaign effort more meaningful.

Local leaders

Since the election campaign is a process of communication and support-mobilization, it involves important role by the agents of communication. The candidate and his leading campaign workers attempt to make face-to-face contacts with several voters but such contacts are only of limited duration and hence require preparatory as well as follow-up action so as to yield desired results. Thus the local leaders assume significant place in the campaign. If a campaign study is an attempt at the analysis of the functional political system, the investigator should identify these local leaders, observe their operational techniques and evaluate their effectiveness. Some work has been done in India to identify the local leaders in rural areas, especially those occupying formal leadership positions in the panchayati raj institutions but a great deal of research is needed about the political role of the local leaders in the urban communities.

Our study of an urban constituency indicated the existence and importance of local leaders in the urban setting. Since the campaign was community-oriented, most of these leaders were important persons in their communities. We did not find any pattern about their backgrounds or working methods, although they all possessed a common characteristic, *i.e.*, influence among neighbours. A person may assume this role because of the family tradition, or education or wealth or just personal skill or a combination of two or more of these factors. The political parties must identify these persons and enlist their support.

It is suggested that these local leaders have only limited importance among the educated middle classes and high caste Hindus although displeasure of a rich businessman with large family connections in the constituency can create a small crisis in the camp of the concerned candidate. Local leaders were found to be more important among the Muslims and the scheduled castes. Some of them also occupied the positions of formal leadership in the community or the ward.

These local leaders need not be active party workers. The candidates woo them because of their personal influence. They act as agents between local people and the candidates. They communicate the candidate's appeals and arguments to the voters and also convey the people's demands to the candidate. They also act as agents in the distribution of rewards among the supporters of the candidate.¹⁶ After the election, they also act as service agents in the community. The campaign managers describe them as "Hawa-banane-wale" (those who make atmosphere) and "Hawa-bigarne-wale" (those who spoil the atmosphere), depending on whose side they are working. In the social science terminology, they are the opinion-makers, the agents of support-mobilization. Stories are current of many of these local leaders who try to act as contractors of votes or vote-sellers.¹⁷

Most of these local leaders are utilized by the candidates in issuing public appeals. Sometimes, a candidate distributes a printed public appeal directed to influence a particular community in the constituency but very often the candidates issue one or more appeals containing the names of all the leading supporters. This is done to show that so many of these influential persons are on "our" side and to create band-wagon effect.

16. In a closed door meeting of Congress supporters in the house of local Muslim leader on February 5, 1967, a couple of persons complained that some of these Mohalla leaders (whom they mentioned by name) had taken money from the Congress candidate in 1962 in the name of workers and that this money was not distributed.
17. *The Hindustan Times* on February 14, 1967 reported that the vote-sellers had disappeared from the Punjab scene. It said : "A new feature, which is fairly marked, is that there are no prominent men who can "sell" candidates "vote-packets." The "chaudhris" have lost their hold on the voters."

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The dominant party (in a given constituency) can more easily rope in the local leaders to its side because they want to be on the winning side. The rival party thus tries to encourage defections. Sometimes, defection of a few important local leaders can reverse the balance. However, it was found that a party desiring to establish a sound organization attempts to create a new cadre of leaders who favour this party and to secure that community's support through these new leaders.¹⁸

III

Tools

Thus far, we have dealt with the organizational aspects of the campaign. Tools and techniques of the campaign are also very important not only because they are used to implement the plan but also because they are visible and conspicuous. The kind of tools used depends on the level of technology and the given socio-economic and political environment. Thus, whereas television and radio have come to play very significant role in the campaigns in the United States and some of the European countries, in India these media are outside the campaign kit except for the implied and indirect slant of the radio broadcasts in favour of the ruling party. Similarly, political pamphlets can be effective in a literate community where most of the voters cannot read. Thus at the present stage of development in India, the tools of campaign more commonly used are the ones which involve mass contact, are spectacular and are capable of creating visual impact, such as public meetings, processions, display of symbols and slogans.

Public Meetings

Public meeting remains by far the most conspicuous campaign tool in India. Frequently, popularity of a political leader is determined by the number of the people attending his or her public

18. Thus, in one constituency, the local leaders of a particular community were on the side of the Jana Sangh in 1957. In 1962, the Congress won over the loyalty of most of them. Thus in 1967, the Jana Sangh found itself without much influence in this community. The Jana Sangh then adopted a two-pronged policy of discrediting the existing leaders (pro-Congress) and projecting its own men—some of them were R.S.S. workers and others were bought—as leaders of the community. We found that the Jana Sangh was successful in this effort.

speeches. Although public meetings are generally orderly in India and, unlike in Britain, no heckling or interruptions are permitted, these meetings, to some extent, act as means of two-way communication. The speakers present their views and argument and the audience sits silently indicating acquiescence. But when a large section of the audience desires to display its disagreement with the speaker, it tends to become unruly and agitative. A very conspicuous feature of the 1967 campaign was that the Congress meetings were disturbed all over India.¹⁹ There was hardly a Congress leader who did not have the unpleasant experience of facing unfriendly audiences. Many Congress leaders had to cut short their speeches and run away for shelter.²¹ Pro-Congress commentators argued that these disturbances were organized by the opposition parties. No evidence of this was made public but even if this allegation is true, it suggests that disenchantment with the Congress had reached such proportions as to enable some of these opposition parties to organize "successful" disruptions on a rather massive scale.

We can classify these public meetings into three types : (1) those addressed by important out-of-State leaders; (2) those addressed by the important party leaders from within the State; and (3) those addressed by the candidate and/or his local supporters. We find that all the political parties invited out-of-State leaders to promote their campaign. These leaders visited several constituencies during their trips. In Rajasthan, the Congress invited several important national leaders and hoped to turn the tide in its favour.² They spent a total of thirteen campaign days in the State and generally addressed meetings in more than one constituency. All of them also visited the State capital. An analysis of the itinerary of these leaders suggests that their stops were arranged in such a way that the dominant faction within the party could reap greater benefits.

19. "Stones and Shoes in Place of Arguments," *The Hindustan Times*. February 16, 1967.
20. In Jaipur, all but two of the meetings addressed by the out-of State Congress leaders were disrupted. The Rajasthan Chief Minister also encountered black flag demonstrations and hostile crowds during his campaign trips to different parts of the State.
21. In order of their arrival, they were Morarji Desai, Indira Gandhi, Kamaraj, Jagjiwan Ram, Y.B. Chavan, Atulya Ghosh and Sadiq Ali.

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It is also interesting that at least one of these out-of-State leaders was called to plug in the support of a minority community in one particular assembly constituency.

The opposition parties also obtained the services of their out-of-State leaders but not to the same extent as the Congress. The Swatantra party held the party convention in Jaipur in January. This convention was attended by several leading personalities of the party. Later, the Swatantra party brought one Prabhawati Raje, member of a small princely family in Madhya Pradesh for an extended programme of public speeches. She was a very fine orator and could keep her audiences spell-bound but at the same time, she created many controversies and might have lost several votes for the party because of her sharp tongue.

Three out-of State Jana Sangh leaders toured parts of Rajasthan in December and January. The State unit of the party managed with its own manpower resources during the last stages of the campaign. One interesting guest speaker was Anwar Ali Dahlavi who was called from Delhi to mobilize support for the Jana Sangh among the Muslims of Jaipur.

The other opposition parties also invited out-of-State leaders for public engagements but their resources were limited and so were their stakes. The SSP leaders; Dr. Lohia and Ram Sevak Yadav, toured only eastern parts of the State where SSP had greater following. CPI (Marxist) leader Ranadive spent some time in the State but his main target was the CPI (Right). Dange and Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali visited the State capital in support of the CPI candidate in one of the local constituencies.

We observed a great deal of activity in the second category of public meetings, *i.e.* those addressed by important party leaders from within the State but we did not attempt to collect details about this aspect. It may, however, be mentioned that an analysis of the speaking engagements by the leaders of different parties can be a useful tool of understanding the intensity of the inter-party competition as well as intra-party alignments. The researcher can also

identify leaders of different parties by examining their itinerary during campaign.²²

Ward meetings

Whereas the large public meeting addressed by important political leaders is a significant tool of creating and spreading favourable images of the party concerned, it is in the small meetings held at street corners or at village *chopals* and addressed by the candidate and his supporters that face-to-face encounters take place and the voters get an opportunity to question the candidates. Thus these street corner meetings play an important role in the processes of mass communication and support mobilization.

On the basis of our observations in an urban constituency, we found that all the candidates in the assembly constituency attempted to organize a number of such local meetings. These meetings were held indoors or outdoors, or depending upon the weather and availability of a meeting place. The location of a meeting was determined by different factors. Sometimes, a candidate held such a meeting in a particular locality because he wanted to demonstrate to the rival that this was his stronghold or that he had successfully infiltrated a locality in the rival's domain. These ward meetings were characterized by small attendance (anywhere between 20 to 200), informal procedures, active role by local leaders, audience-participation and emphasis on purely local or neighbourhood problems. Thus a typical ward meeting was addressed by several local people who pledged their support to the candidate. Some members of the audience asked questions and presented demands concerning local matters. Then the candidate made special efforts to identify himself with that particular locality and to assure that, if elected, he would do his best to take care of all those problems. If the candidate happened to be a sitting MLA, he emphasized the

22. Five individuals thus emerged as the leading spokesmen of their parties in Rajasthan in 1967. They were : Mohan Lal Sukhadia (Congress), Kumbha Ram Arya (Janata), Maharani Gayatri Devi (Swatantra), Bhairon Singh (Jana Sangh) and Satish Chandra Agrawal (Jana Sangh).

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services he had performed to the residents of this particular locality or community.²³

In the United States, participation by the major candidates in a TV or radio debate has become an accepted norm of the political campaign. But in India, these public meetings are separately organized by the party offices and the voters do not get the opportunity to hear rival candidates from the same platform.²⁴ However, attempts were made at some places in 1967 to organize such debates from common platforms.²⁵ With a few exceptions, these attempts were not successful. Some of the candidates were shy of such debates even if a non-partisan body like the Voters' Council organized them.²⁶ It is possible that the common platform approach will receive more prominence in future campaigns. This arrangement will be economical and will certainly enable the voters to evaluate the relative worth of the different party programmes and the ability of different candidates.

23. A Jana Sangh candidate, who had represented this same constituency for ten years in the State assembly, held several ward meetings in the predominantly Muslim areas of his constituency. His main emphasis was on his record of personal services to his Muslim constituents. He gave names and figures about the scholarships recommended and passport applications signed by him. He used to dramatize a particular incident in which he defended a particular member of this community in the court.
24. In this system, campaign audiences tend to become segmented and "the rival candidates may be real competitors for victory at the polls, but they are not competitors for the favour of individual voters. Voting blocs confront each other on election day; alternative views do not confront each other in the voter's mind." Stanely Kelley, Jr. *Political Campaigning*, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1960, p. 26.
25. The Junior Chambers of Commerce in several cities organized a series of talks by political leaders representing different viewpoints. However, these speakers were invited on different dates and the people's response was not very encouraging (as judged by the size and participation by the audience) in most places.
26. One successful common platform debate was organized in Jodhpur but in Jaipur, a similar attempt by the Jaipur Voters' Council turned out to be a fiasco. The Congress candidate refused to participate and the Jana Sangh used its volunteers to convert the meeting into an anti-Congress show.

Processions

Procession by the supporters of the candidate is another conspicuous tool of the election campaign. It is aimed at mobilizing the existing sentiment in favour of the candidate and his party and the organizers also hope to create new favourable sentiment by means of the band-wagon effect. Processions are different from public meetings and, perhaps, more effective also. Public meetings are held at fixed places and the interested persons must take initiative to go there, but a procession comes to the door-step of the voter with all the colour and fanfare. Besides, women voters, who do not attend public meetings, can also receive the impact of the procession. Procession thus promotes greater voter exposure to the candidate's personality. A large procession, with banners aloft and the slogans rending the air, generates confidence among the friends and fear in the ranks of the foes. This is taken as an evidence of the candidate's manpower resources and his support potential. We found that large processions were more common in the urban areas than in the villages. These processions were more frequent during the last week of the campaign. When a candidate's campaign was well organized, adequate arrangements were made for the reception of the candidate by his leading supporters in different localities. A demonstration of spontaneous reception would be effective in creating the desired impact.²⁷

Poster war

Display of posters, flags and bill-boards is an important ingredient of the election campaign in most of the democratic systems. The rival candidates and parties compete for the attention of the voters by these displays. In India, this device assumes greater importance because of widespread illiteracy among the electorate. Campaign managers, therefore, strive to create a favourable impact by display of colourful flags, party symbols and eye-catching wall posters. The campaign investigator should thus try to analyze the variety, contents and the timing of this display material.

27. Two days before the polling day, I accompanied a Jana Sangh procession through the streets of an urban constituency. A group of teenagers shouting slogans and making fast steps in rock'n roll style was the object of attraction. The slogans were designed to appeal to the sentiments of the locality.

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Stencils with candidates' names, party affiliation and election symbol are the first to arrive in the market. They announce the imminence of the election and set the stage for the campaign. When a political party has nominated candidates for both the Lok Sabha and the assembly constituencies, these stencils contain names of both the candidates. Even independent and minor party candidates, with little hope of victory, imprint these stencils on the wall to announce their presence.

Printed wall posters come next. They are designed to communicate the message of the party and/or candidate and are posted at strategic points to attract attention of the voters. These wall posters can be classified into three types :

(1) Some posters seek general support for a particular party. They are prepared and distributed by the national and/or State party office. It is customary for these posters to carry pictures of the important party leaders as well as the election symbol of the party.²⁸

(2) The second type of posters contain the names and pictures of both the Lok Sabha and the assembly candidates of the party (or parties in case of a no-contest pact). They expect the voters to support this particular ticket.

(3) In addition to these two types of posters, the assembly and Lok Sabha candidates also prepare their own posters which generally carry the candidate's picture and the election symbol, some slogans, biographical details about the candidate and legend that the voters should support him or her.

Thus, in Muslim areas, the procession chanted "Hindu Muslim Bhai Bhai." The candidate, heavily garlanded, walked smiling benevolently, nodding approvingly and adding personal touch to each greeting. At one point, a brassband was ready to welcome the procession. It appeared that this well-organized procession was leaving a trail of massive support behind it.

28. During the 1967 campaign, the Congress displayed two posters—one each with the picture of Kamaraj and Indira Gandhi. No poster with the State Chief Minister's picture was seen in the streets. The Jana Sangh did not use picture of any national or State level leader and the Swatantra party in Rajasthan used the picture of Maharani Gayatri Devi.

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES AND ORGANIZATION

We collected several posters of the first category. An analysis of the contents of the posters of three political parties—Congress, Swatantra and the Jana Sangh—suggests that they made use of similar techniques and, with a few exceptions, emphasized similar points. Besides the posters with the pictures of Kamaraj and Indira Gandhi, the Congress in Rajasthan also displayed six 19" x 4" posters with the party's symbol and the appeal to vote for Congress for a definite purpose. These posters carried the following statements :

- (1) A word to the wise : vote for Congress.
- (2) Call of the time : vote for Congress.
- (3) In your interest and general interest, vote for Congress.
- (4) Congress deserves your vote.
- (5) Congress victory is your victory.
- (6) For unity and prosperity, vote for Congress.

We did not find any Congress posters which dealt with specific issues or mentioned special problems of the State. However, a large poster under the name of some anti-feudal organization talked of fighting the evil forces of feudalism and capitalism but it did not appeal for votes for the Congress candidates, nor did it bear the Congress election symbol.

The Swatantra party did not have many posters originating at the national and State level. A significant exception was a 14" x 3" slip entitled "Twenty Years of Socialism." With the help of cartoons, this tried to convey the sense of increasing tax burden under the Congress rule. From the state headquarters of the party, appeals in the name of Maharani Gayatri Devi were issued which asked for voters' support for the Swatantra party.

The Jana Sangh posters, on the other hand, were numerous, were well designed and widely distributed. We found four large posters prepared by national office of the Jana Sangh which carried the party's symbol and appealed for support. The message in these posters was :

- (1) For freedom of agriculture and business, vote for Jana Sangh.

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(2) For efficient and honest administration, vote for Jana Sangh.

(3) Give your vote to the Jana Sangh. Put stamp on "deepak."

(4) For unity and security of the country; for removing Sino-Pak aggression; for reducing taxes and foreign debts; for ending inflation, unemployment and corruption; for freedom of agriculture and business; and for the protection of farmers; vote for the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.

The Rajasthan Jana Sangh also issued two general posters. One, a very large (40" × 30") poster in chaste Hindi, criticized the Congress "misrule" and appealed for votes. The other carried the legend : "Defeat Congress and Save the Country. Vote for Jana Sangh."

Besides these wall posters, different candidates also distributed and displayed many different kinds of printed materials such as paper slips with the candidate's name, picture and election symbol, printed appeals from the candidate, ballot slips, small cards with the party symbol, etc. The Swatantra party in Jaipur displayed big boards at strategic points. These blue boards carried the banner: "Vote for the Swatantra party." The Jana Sangh also had an impressive board on display. Half of the board was painted black and described corruption and general hopelessness, under the Congress. Then there was a question: "Will there be light in our lives"? and the answer was provided by the brighter part of the board which depicted a powerful lamp (the party symbol) and carried the legend "if you support Jana Sangh." This board was displayed at strategic points in the two city constituencies where the Jana Sangh candidates were contesting, and it succeeded in attracting large crowds of viewers.

The last few days of the campaign presented a great spectacle of colour particularly in the main streets of towns and cities. The war of posters, loudspeakers and flags thus was an important part of the attempts to attract the voter's attention. We found that a week before the polling day, yellow, blue and tricolour flags and buntings began to appear in the shop windows and the housetops.

This was perhaps a device whereby the shopowners and the residents of these houses sought to publicize their commitment to a particular candidate or party,²⁹ and a warning to the rival candidate to keep off. This also signified the intensity of competition in parts of the constituency. Some of the areas looked like war zones divided in different sectors under occupation by the rival forces.

Slogans

Campaign slogans are important because they try to concentrate on some specific points and catch the attention of the people.³⁰ Slogans tend to sharpen the focus and the meaning of the message communicated by the campaign organizers. Thus the history of American campaigns is replete with numerous catchy phrases and statements such as "stay cool with Coolidge," "I like Ike," "Get America moving again," and "In your heart, you know he is right." In India, slogans, perhaps, create a greater impact because campaign workers recite them in public meetings and processions and even the little children chant them in their playful activities.

We found that various slogans of the opposition parties in Rajasthan emphasized the need for and desirability of changing the government and the Congress camp retorted that this was not an easy task. The Jana Sangh and the Swatantra party also used some slogans to emphasize their unity whereas the Congress workers pointed out the disunity among the opposition ranks. The Jana Sangh raised the slogan: *Deepak Tara mel hai. Sarakar hadalna khel hai* (There is cooperation between the lamp-Jana-Sangh-and the

29. However, some campaign workers reported to the author that several persons displayed the flag of a particular party for considerations other than commitment and that they may not even vote for that party.
30. An interesting example of a slogan directed against a particular candidate was found in the Nasirabad constituency in Rajasthan. The Congress candidate, Balkrishna Kaul, was a cabinet minister and was well-known for his extra-marital romances. The leading women of his constituency asserted that they were not safe as long as Kaul occupied positions of power. They raised the slogan : *Abala Ko bachao Kaul ko harao*. (Protect the woman, Defeat Kaul). This theme dominated the campaign and in spite of tremendous political and financial resources, Kaul suffered an overwhelming defeat.

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star-Swatantra—and it is easy to change the government). The Congress camp retorted: "*Is deepak mein tel nahin hai. Sarakar badalna khel nahin hai.* (There is no oil in this lamp and it is not easy to change the government.) The Congress also stressed that a government of such diverse elements, as represented in the anti-Congress combinations would create political and administrative instability. They shouted: *Ek myan mein do talawar. Nahin chalegi yah Sarakar.* (Two swords in one sheath. Such a government will not last.) The combined opposition strove to project the image that the Congress was losing its ground because of the rising opposition of the people. A current slogan on this theme was: *Janata jagi Congress bhagi* (The people have awakened and the Congress is on the run.) The Congress party, on the other hand, emphasized that the feudal forces were reasserting their position in the name of popular revolt. They pointed out that feudalism of the Swatantra and vandalism of the Jana Sangh would not be allowed to continue: *Yah raja shahi nahin chalegi. Yah gundagardi nahin chalegi.*

Press

The press, as an objective non-partisan institution, is of great importance in the functioning of a political system. Although, printed matter occupies lesser position in illiterate societies, it continues to influence the minds of the elites and, therefore, all the leading contenders for political power try to extend their control over segments of the press. A favourable press is a valuable asset indeed.

It will be interesting to conduct intensive research in the people—press—elite relationship in India. An Attempt should be made to evaluate as to how and to what extent do the newspapers reflect the current sentiment among the people and to what extent do they help to promote and intensify this. We did not attempt an adequate study of the role of the press in the election campaign but observed a few interesting situations which may be helpful in understanding this role.

It can be said that the Indian newspapers in 1967 election were by and large reflecting the predominant anti-Congress sentiment. The national as well as the regional newspapers were full of

stories of the anticipated defeat of the Congress candidates in different parts of the country. A couple of days before the polling commenced, a Jaipur daily³¹ came out with a long article on the front page giving details of the Congress in distress. The headlines of this item read : "Reduction of the Congress strength in Rajasthan to half of 110 will be no surprise. All forts of 1962 breached. All the ministers in trouble. Possibility of the opposition parties securing twice the number of votes." It is difficult to find out if such stories had the bandwagon impact or created the reverse effect by mobilizing the Congress faithfuls on the polling day.

It is common knowledge that a number of newspapers mushroom during the election season. These newspapers are financed by the parties and/or candidates and, we found that, most of the news items appearing in their columns originate in the campaign offices. No body should be surprised to find out that the high level observer cited in an "analytical" article is none other than the campaign manager or the candidate. These campaign newspapers have a short life and small circulation. Few people look upon them as means of news but they certainly circulate various kinds of rumours.

We also found that the Swatantra party in 1967 purchased space in newspapers in different parts of the country for a number of political advertisements. These advertisements emphasized the problems of food, inflation and unemployment. One of these advertisements bore the headline: "Will there be enough food for your children five years from now ?" and pointed out that the food prices had risen 200% during the last five years. Another advertisement dramatized the threat of continuing price inflation. It said : "Will a match box cost 25 paise five years hence ?" and went on to explain the party's economic programme. Two of these advertisements stressed that the Congress was not a people's party now and defections from Congress should be encouraged. One of these contained a statement of Mahatma Gandhi suggesting that the Congress should not attempt to exploit the people's confidence.

31. *Rajasthan Patrika*, February 13, 1967. Also see, M.K. Dhar, "Congress Rule Unlikely in Rajasthan this Time", *Hindustan Times*, January 31, 1967.

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The other advertisements said that Mahatma Gandhi had left the Congress in 1934, and asked : "When are you leaving ?" It also posed a question whether the Congress was a party of the people. After listing the "anti-people achievements" of the Congress, it announced that the Swatantra party was the people's party and deserved "your" support.

Campaign themes

An election campaign is an exercise in communication as well as competition. Even if ideology plays a limited role in the campaign and the issue-orientation lags behind the community-orientation, a campaign represents a phenomenon where the competing organizations try to mobilize public support on the basis of different programmes. A comparative analysis of the election manifestoes of the major political parties thus is a useful exercise. More important, however, is the investigation of the dominant campaign themes as represented in public speeches as well as private discussions. These campaign themes determine the direction and substance of the campaign and help the voters in making choices between the rival candidates and the competing party organizations. These campaign themes also provide an index to the political dialogue going on in the country.

The fourth general election in India came after twenty years of independence during which period the Congress had been the dominant political organization all over the country. Thus Congress became the most important issue in the 1967 campaign. The opposition parties accepted anti-Congressism as a dominant political theme and stressed the need for defeat of the Congress as an important element in the strength of the democratic system in India. The process of defections and resulting disintegration of the Congress party had set in even before the campaign began and the anti-Congress forces were asserting that the doom's day for the Congress was around the corner. It is not surprising that after two decades of power, the Congress leaders were jittery in face of the threat of defeat in the election. Their appeals, therefore, were made in the name of stability. They argued that defeat of Congress at this stage of Indian development would jeopardize the survival and vitality of the political system because the fall of Congress would

result in the emergence of diverse political forces which could not provide stable administration.

During the twenty years of rule, the Congress had accumulated a substantial record of mistakes, malpractices and failures which sometimes looked more conspicuous than its achievements. At the time of this campaign, the country was experiencing particular strains and hardships on the economic front. Rising prices, increasing unemployment, continuing food scarcity and proven evidence of corruption in the administration provided the opposition with an arsenal of critical issues with which to wage its fight against the Congress. The opposition speakers all over the land emphasized these issues and the situation was such that the Congress was "left" without convincing answers. Maharani Gayatri Devi declared in a public meeting at Jaipur that she would quit politics if it could be established that even a single Congress minister in Rajasthan was not corrupt! This was a challenge to the Congress leadership to demonstrate that it was capable of providing an honest and efficient administration but they did not answer. Under the circumstances, citizens were left to draw their own conclusions.

It can be said that the Congress emphasized the negative aspects of the campaign issues. They pointed out that the opposition ranks were conspicuous by the lack of unity and harmony and that the concerted effort to dislodge the ruling party was the manifestation of the deep seated frustrations of the have-nots. During the three previous elections, the plan document proved to be an important asset for the Congress who could swear by the promises contained therein and could take the credit for the achievements listed there. Unfortunately for Congress, the fourth plan was not available at the time of the fourth election.

In some States, like Rajasthan, where the major challenge to the Congress came from the rightist parties, the Congress leaders emphasized their anti-feudal socialistic character. The threat of feudal capitalist combination was used as a stick to herd the people into the "progressive" camp of the Congress. A powerful member of the Congress High Command, Atulya Ghosh, availed of this

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opportunity in a public meeting at Jaipur on February 4, to demand abolition of the privy purses, and the Prime Minister accused the capitalists of being ungrateful.³² At least, she was candid in confessing that many of these capitalists had thrived under the Congress rule.

IV

RESEARCH FRONTIERS

To sum up, it can be said that the election campaign in India is a many-faceted phenomenon of great significance to the practising politicians, the people and the social scientists. There is a lot of colour and fanfare for the people in the campaign which provides them an opportunity not only for political participation but also for free entertainment. Politicians can learn from their mistakes and perfect the techniques of communication and mobilization for use at a later date. The election campaign also highlights the points of strength and weaknesses of the political system under strain. Similarly, the social scientists can avail of this opportunity for solid research. This is the time for them to test their theories, to gain insight into the areas of practical politics and to evaluate the functional system in the context of statutory structure and socio-economic environment.

We are woefully aware that the Indian social scientists, the political scientists in particular, have not made full use of these opportunities in the past. There are many areas of research during an election campaign which can keep most of us busy. A handsome amount of work has been done in the Western countries about the role of communications in political development.³³ Campaign time is the best time to test some of these hypotheses in the Indian context. Election campaign should be studied as an element of overall political development because some of the techniques of campaign are also the techniques of nation-building. There is great need for the analysis of the techniques of support-mobilization because their significance goes much beyond the campaign time.

32. See, *Hindustan Times*, January 20, 1967.

33. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye. *Communications and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1963.

Similarly, we should attempt to identify local leaders—the agents of communication and mobilization—in different communities and evaluate their importance. Informal groupings play a vital role in the organizational behaviour and depth studies of these informal leaders will be useful in the understanding of human behaviour in the political context. There are many other items on the research frontiers, such as the elite-mass relationship, people-press-elite relationship, competition-cooperation and the techniques of conflict-resolution, etc., which can be effectively handled in well planned and systematic campaign studies.



PART FOURTH
SELECT STATE-WISE SURVEYS

V. VENKATA RAO

GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN ASSAM

BOUNDED by Tripura and East Pakistan, Assam occupies a characteristic geographical position. It comprises the Valley of Brahmaputra with mountain ranges on either side, as far as the frontiers of Bhutan and Tibet on the North and of Burma in the South-East. In 1961, the population of Assam was 11·9 million. It is significant that this State has the largest percentage of tribal population. Assam became a British protectorate after the first Burmese war in 1826. In 1832, Cachar was annexed. In 1835, Jaintia Hills were included in the East India Company's dominions and in 1839 Upper Assam was annexed to the province of Bengal. In 1874, Assam was separated from Bengal and constituted into a Chief Commissioner's province. In 1905, a large portion of Bengal was added to the province of Assam and a new province known as East Bengal and Assam was constituted. There was a widespread agitation against this measure and although it was then pronounced 'a settled fact', it was unsettled in 1912 when the old province of Assam was reconstituted. In 1947, a large portion of Sylhet went over to Pakistan.

Neither parliamentary institutions nor practices are new to Assam. After the reconstitution of Assam into a Chief Commissioner's province, a legislative council was established. Under the Government of India Act, 1919, a very substantial number of members of the legislative council was elected. But elections were not based on universal adult franchise. It was limited in the sense that only those who owned certain amount of property or who paid certain amount of tax were enfranchised. As a consequence, the bulk of the population was excluded from participation in elections. It was in 1952 that adult franchise was introduced.

II

The total voting population in Assam was 40·66 lakhs in 1952.

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It increased to 57 lakhs in 1957. Male voters far out number female voters, the latter counting to about 8 lakhs.

In accordance with statutory provisions, Assam has been allotted seats to the Lok Sabha on the basis of one seat for every 7·2 lakhs of estimated population and one assembly seat for every 72,000 population.

The Election Commissioner in consultation with the State Advisory Committee fixed the boundaries of the parliamentary and assembly constituencies. By and large, existing administrative units were retained and seats were allotted to districts in proportion to their population.

Assam's quota is 14 members to the Lok Sabha and six to the Rajya Sabha. The former are elected from single member constituencies, one of the seats being reserved for scheduled castes, one for scheduled tribes (Plains) and one for scheduled tribes (Hills).

Assam has a unicameral legislative assembly of 126 members. The State is divided into as many single-member constituencies. The reservations are : 25 seats for scheduled tribes (both Plains and Hills) and 8 for scheduled castes.

Political Parties

In the 1967 elections, eleven political parties contested elections. Eight of them, recognised by the Election Commission, were: The Indian National Congress, CPI, CPI (M), PSP, SSP, Swatantra and Jana Sangh; in addition to these national parties, the All Party Hill Leaders' Conference (APHLC), a local one, was also in the field. There were other parties, not recognized by the Election Commission: Revolutionary CPI, Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Cachar Progressive Party (CPP), Assam Labour Party (ALP) and Jana Congress (JC). Their candidates contested elections as independents.

Election Schedule

As in the previous general elections, in 1967 also, elections were held on two days. In 1952, however, polling was spread over 21 days and it took about a month to finalize elections. In 1967,

it was obvious how much and far advanced the election machinery had become, to have accomplished in only two days what took almost a month earlier. It might be possible to concentrate the election to just a day in 1972.

Role of the Press

The State has four prominent dailies – two each in English and the vernacular. Amongst prominent weeklies are: *Assam Batori*, *Assam Bani*, *Janam Bhumi*, *Shillong Observer* and *Shillong Times*. Of the English dailies. *The Frontier Times*, published from the capital, has only a limited circulation, most of it confined to Shillong town. All these papers claim a non-partisan interest in the politics of the State and other public affairs. It might be well worth examining the position, nevertheless.

Not based on first hand information, owing to lingua difficulties, the analysis hereafter is based upon sources otherwise available. For instance, *Nutan Assamiya* an important newspaper, is taken to be hostile towards the CPI in the opinion of Gauri Shankar Bhattacharjee, former leader of that party in the legislative assembly. This view was confirmed by Sarat Chandra Goswami, Principal of the Handique Girls' College. In the opinion of the chairman of the State unit of the PSP and general secretary of the SSP, that newspaper is a mouthpiece of the Congress. The editor of the paper, however, refutes these assertions and claims that his paper is independent. Chief Minister Bimala Prasad Chaliha says that the editor of the paper has progressive ideas and opines on issues on merit. The fact cannot be denied, however, that the paper gives considerable coverage to the Congress and assigns an insignificant place to news of other parties.

The Assam Tribune is, by no means, neutral. It is true that before 1952, it had a neutral outlook but thereafter it drifted to a pro-Congress stance. Of course, it has no soft corner for leftist parties, like the CPI (M), CPI and the SSP. It is indifferent towards the PSP and ignores rightist parties like the Swatantra and Jana Sangh. Another paper, *Dhainik Assam* is a replica of the *Assam Tribune*. *Assam Batori* occupies a peculiar position. It does not attempt to mould public opinion and seems to be led by public

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opinion. Chandra Prasad Saikia, a former editor of the paper does not agree with this view. He asserts that as long as he was editor, he tried to mould public opinion by focussing public opinion on particular issues. He, however, admits that the paper is anti-Communist. The same thing may be said of *Assam Bani*. It is apparent that the press exercised little influence over the electorate, because for about five million voters there were only four dailies and four weeklies, with a total circulation of 50,000.

III

Different political parties adopted different procedure for selection of candidates. The two CPIs, did not invite applications. The district committee selected candidates and forwarded its recommendation to the State committee which, in turn, forwarded the list to the central committee. Individual members might suggest their names for a seat in the legislature but applications were not invited. All other parties invited applications from prospective candidates.

The Congress invited applications from intending candidates. Each candidate was required to give certain personal details—such as age, educational qualifications, occupation, public service rendered and parliamentary experience. Applications were required to be submitted to the prescribed authority in accordance with specifications of date and application fee. Each candidate had to sign a pledge that he would abide by the decision of the party and would remain faithful to it. After the receipt of applications, they were referred to the district committee for its opinion. In case of the PSP and SSP, further consultations with the constituency *Kisan Panchayat* or the trade union affiliated to it were also held.

Comparatively, the Congress received a larger number of applications than any other party. It received 57 applications for the 14 Lok Sabha seats and 531 for 110 seats in the legislative assembly. There were no applications for the seats reserved for the scheduled tribes in the Garo, Khasi and Jaintia Hills. The number of applications received for the reserved seats in the Mikir, North Cachar Hill and Mizo Hills was equal to the number of seats available for contest.

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The PEC sat in two sessions for selection of candidates. The first session was held from October 4-8, 1966 and the second from November 4-7, 1966. In the first session, the candidates appeared before the PEC. The Committee interviewed about 580 candidates. On the first day of the second session, representatives of various organizations, call them pressure groups, were interviewed to consider their claims for representation in the legislature. In the next three days, applications of candidates were considered district-wise and decisions were arrived at on each application after consulting the president of the DCC concerned.

The PEC recommended, by a unanimous vote, 102 candidates, for the assembly seats and 9 for the Lok Sabha seats. Some applications for the assembly seats were referred to the CEC. They were Hajo, Kokrajahar East and Goalpara West. For the Hajo seat the applicant was a former Governor of Madras, Bishnu Ram Medhi. For Kokrajahar East, there were four candidates. The PEC recommended Sarat Chandra Sinha who had not applied. Sinha declined the offer. On the other hand, he suggested Rani Manjula Devi for the seat. For Goalpara West, Nazmul Haque was the applicant but he was detained under the Preventive Detention Act during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. That, naturally, led to the poser whether such a candidate was eligible to be recommended.

The PEC did not take any decision in respect of five seats reserved for scheduled tribes in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills. Nor did it consider the candidate to be set up for the Lok Sabha seat, reserved for scheduled tribes. Again, no decision was taken in respect of the Haflong reserved seat because Jayabhadra Hagjer expressed his unwillingness to contest election. No decision was taken in regard to the Bagmara reserved seat because no suitable candidate was available to contest against Capt. Williamson Sangma. But the PEC decided to set up its candidates to contest all the three assembly seats in the Mizo Hills, not with a view to win them but to improve the party position in that area. In the final analysis, the PEC recommended 116 candidates for the legislative assembly and 13 for the Lok Sabha and referred three cases relating to the assembly to the CEC.

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It seems as if the selection was made in such a manner as to satisfy the three candidates for the leadership of the parliamentary party viz. Bimala Prasad Chaliha, Dev Kant Barua and Mahendra Mohan Choudhury. All the three secured 40 nominations each for their supporters

The PEC was required to select men of integrity and merit. It was also required to give due representation to minorities and representative organizations. But a perusal of the records in the several Congress offices indicates that these factors were assigned secondary position. At all times the PEC was dominated by one factor—chances of success. If integrity had been insisted upon, some of the candidates should not have been selected. It is true that such factors as popularity of the candidate, his service to the country and to the party, belief in Gandhism, championship of minority and labour interests and backing of pressure groups received due consideration. It is also true that certain persons were selected, although they were dark horses, just to placate a particular community, or because an applicant happened to be close or related to a prominent Congressman. Very often the PEC selected persons who did not apply for the seat. Sometimes it shifted a candidate from a parliamentary seat to an assembly seat and *vice versa*. And sometimes it shifted a candidate from one parliamentary seat to another, just to accommodate another. Thus, several factors were taken into account in the selection of candidates.

The tables hereunder show the age-group, academic qualifications and professional background of the Congress candidates :

Table I

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Candidates for the Assembly</i>	<i>Candidates for the Lok Sabha</i>
25 to 35	16	3
36 to 45	44	5
46 to 55	41	6
56 to 65	19	3
Above 65	6	1
Total	126	18

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Table II

<i>Academic Qualifications</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Lok Sabha</i>
Post-Graduate	39	12
Graduate	23	2
Under-Graduate	26	3
Matriculate	15	—
Under-Matriculate	24	1

Table III

<i>Professional Qualifications</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Lok Sabha</i>
Lawyers	34	7
Agriculturists	32	3
Social Workers	15	2
Teachers	14	1
Trade Unionists	12	1
Tea Planters	4	1
Medical Practitioners	3	—
Industry & Trade	10	1
Writers	2	1
Journalists	1	—

It must be said that the selection of candidates was not free and fair because the selection committee consisted of rival candidates making a bid for party leadership. Each of them tried to consolidate his position by a search for a numerical affirmation of support base. In this struggle for power, party interests were sacrificed. The quality of the candidates was assigned a secondary place; suitability or unsuitability, popularity, integrity or otherwise of the candidates, were inconsequential. The only basis of selection was loyalty to the leader.

The recommendations of the PEC were forwarded to the CEC. The latter followed three principles in approving selections made by the former : first, ordinarily, preference to be given to the sitting members unless there were serious charges against them; second, the CEC would enquire into cases of complaints against candidates; and finally, no candidate would be recommended if he had been found to have violated party discipline.

In the final outcome, the CEC made certain alterations in the list submitted by the PEC. First, Jyotsna Chanda had been allotted

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an assembly seat by the PEC. The CEC reversed the recommendation and allotted her a candidature to the Lok Sabha. That was unfortunate because there were better candidates in the field. Asoka Chanda, former Auditor and Accountant General, had applied for the same seat. His vast administrative experience and knowledge of finance would have been of immense help to the Lok Sabha in general and to the party in particular. There was nothing distinctive about Jyotsna Chanda except that she was a widow of Arun Kumar Chanda, a former Congressman. On grounds of merit alone, Asok Kumar Chanda should have been preferred. Second, the PEC recommended Dharnidhar Das and Dinesh Chandra Goswami for the Gauhati parliamentary seat. The CEC selected Dharnidhar Das and shifted him to Mangaldai to contest against Hem Barua of the PSP. Renuka Debi Barkataki was shifted from Mangaldai to Gauhati only to be defeated by a Communist, Dhireswar Kalita. Third, the PEC recommended Azizur Rahman and Durga Dutta Lohia for the Dibrugarh parliamentary seat. The CEC selected Jogendranath Hazarika, a sitting member.

As regards assembly seats, the CEC made similar changes. First, the PEC recommended Suranjan Nandy, a supporter of Moinul Huq Choudhury and Dev Kant Barua for the Ratabari seat. The CEC set aside this recommendation and selected Biswanath Upadhyaya, a supporter of Kamakhya Prasad Tripathi and a loyal friend of Bimala Prasad Chaliha. It might be remembered that Upadhyaya was an active member of the PSP in the previous assembly. He joined the Congress along with Asoka Mehta. Second, the PEC selected, by a unanimous vote, Umaruddin for the Dhubri assembly seat. But the CEC rejected the recommendation at the intervention of Bimala Prasad Chaliha and selected Ahmed Ali. It was alleged that Umaruddin was involved in suspicious activities during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Opponents of Chaliha alleged that he made use of the police reports against Umaruddin and got rid of him. We have no evidence to support this contention. However, it must be said that Umaruddin was an active member of the group consisting of Moinul Huq Choudhury and Dev Kant Barua and, therefore, an opponent of Bimala Prasad Chaliha. It seems, Chaliha exercised his influence and got rid of this thorn in

his flesh. Third, for the Titabar Assembly seat the PEC selected two candidates—Bijoy Krishna Handiqui and Bhuban Chandra Handiqui. But the CEC, at the instance of Bimala Prasad Chaliha, selected Debeswar Sarma. It might be remembered that Sarma was a member of the Chaliha cabinet in 1958 and was dropped for anti-party activities against his bitter rival Dev Kant Barua. Now that Dev Kant Barua aspired for leadership of the legislative party, Debeswar Sarma would not wish him to succeed in his efforts. Chaliha took advantage of this situation and secured nomination for Sarma for the Titabar seat though he did not apply for it.

As regards Hajo seat for which Bishnu Ram Medhi was applicant, the Congress President was not at first inclined to entertain the application on the ground that it would not be appropriate for a former Governor of a State to seek membership of a legislative assembly—a contention which was not in accordance with actual facts. In the past, Harekrushna Mahatab had resigned Governorship of Bombay and became a member of the Orissa legislative assembly. Ultimately the CEC yielded to local pressures and allotted him the Hajo seat. Whatever may be the arguments in favour of Bishnu Ram Medhi, it was improper for a former Governor who completed his term of office to seek membership of a legislative assembly. Here again, Chaliha seems to have influenced the CEC to give nomination to Medhi because the latter was considered a helpful supporter.

Although the changes made by the CEC were not many, they were vital. They strengthened the position of Bimala Prasad Chaliha and seriously affected the chances of Dev Kant Barua for the leadership contest of the legislature party. It appears, Bimala Prasad Chaliha and Mahendra Mohan Choudhury entered into an understanding on the issue of leadership and, therefore, the changes effected by the CEC also received approval of Choudhury.

However, selections made by the CEC were not acceptable to several Congressmen. Therefore, they left the organization and formed the Jana Congress; several others sought election as independent candidates. Perhaps, some aspirants became desperate for their legitimate claims were brushed aside. But when they applied

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for Congress nomination, they gave an undertaking that they would not contest elections even if they were not selected. In 1967, twenty prominent Congressmen were expelled from the Congress for six years for contesting elections as independent candidates. These defaulters included two sitting MLAs. Of course, such instances of indiscipline were not confined to the Congress alone. In case of the Jana Sangh and the SSP also, similar instances were available.

The number of candidates set up by different political parties was as follows :

<i>Party</i>	<i>Number of candidates set up for Lok Sabha</i>	<i>Assembly</i>
Congress	14-13	120
PSP	4	35
CPI	4	22
CPI (M)	-	14
SSP	2	17
Jana Sangh	3	20
APHLC	1	12
Swatantra	1	13
Independents	18	239

Uncontested Returns

In 1967 there were five uncontested returns. Two of them belonged to the APHLC and three to the Congress. It must, however, be stated that actually there were only four uncontested returns, because one of the Congress candidates was returned uncontested from two constituencies and he resigned one of them. There were no uncontested returns to the Lok Sabha.

Electoral Alliances

Fourth election alliances might be divided into local ones and of State level. Let us consider the first. The opposition parties did not take advantage of the interna' squabbles of the Congress. They took too much time over negotiations and ultimately agreed only with regard to 63 of the 126 assembly seats and 8 of the 14 Lok Sabha seats.

The parties that entered an alliance were : the CPI (M), CPI, SSP, RCPI and RSP. The PSP was not a party to the alliance. As

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a result, the 8 Lok Sabha seats and 63 legislative assembly seats were distributed as follows :

1. SSP : 1 Lok Sabha and 18 assembly seats;
2. CPI : 3 Lok Sabha and 17 assembly seats;
3. CPI (M) : 2 Lok Sabha and 11 assembly seats;
4. RCPI : 1 Lok Sabha and 11 assembly seats.

Although the PSP did not join the United Left Alliance, it seems to have agreed to avoid clashes with the Alliance, as far as possible. Accordingly, the CPI did not set up its candidate against chairman of the State PSP, although the former had considerable following in the Mangaldai parliamentary constituency. Again, the CPI at the request of two independent candidates, withdrew its nominees from two assembly constituencies with a view to present a united front against the Congress.

We turn to local alliances : In the Cachar district, a united opposition front was formed with a view to defeating the Congress. The constituents of the front were Janta party, Cachar Progressive party, CPI, CPI (M) and the Socialist Union Council.

As it turned out, the United Left Alliance was responsible for the defeat of several Congress candidates.

Election Symbols

In the first two general elections, the number of symbols was 13. Of those, three were symbols recognized at the national level, and called 'Recognised Symbols'. They were allotted to all India political parties. The remaining ten symbols were unrecognised. They were allotted to local parties. Two of the ten symbols, *Lamp* and *Flaming Torch* were not chosen by any candidate. In the allotment of symbols no difficulty was experienced. All the three recognised political parties utilised the symbols reserved for them excepting in one case, Katlichera assembly constituency, where the PSP candidate was allotted one of the free symbols instead of the party symbol because the party failed to intimate in time the name of its official candidate to the returning officer.

In 1967, the Election Commission prescribed 23 symbols, 16 of them were reserved and the remaining seven were free symbols.

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The Commission classified political parties into two—recognised and others. The recognised political parties were further classified into two—multi-State and State political parties. A recognised multi-State political party was one which contested elections in more than one State and polled more than four percent of the total votes cast in the country in the previous general elections. Each recognised party was allotted a reserved symbol. All the candidates sponsored by it in the country were allotted the same symbol. Besides the multi-State recognised political parties, there were recognised State parties. The recognised State parties were those which secured more than 14 percent of the total votes cast in the State in the previous election. 9 symbols were reserved for them. In Assam, the APHLC was a State recognised party and its election symbol was 'flower'.

The Contest

Contested elections may be classified into several categories : straight contest, three-cornered contest and so on. In 1967, there was straight contest for Lok Sabha seats in three constituencies—in the autonomous districts, Barpeta and Tezpur. For the assembly seats, there was straight contest in 17 constituencies. There were three-cornered contests in 3 Lok Sabha constituencies and in 31 assembly constituencies. There were 4 candidates in 5 Lok Sabha constituencies and 37 assembly constituencies. In all other constituencies there were 5 or more candidates. From the above, it is evident that in a vast majority of constituencies, there was no straight contest. As a consequence several candidates were elected by a minority vote.

V

EDUCATION OF THE VOTERS

Since 80% of the voters in the State are illiterate, political education of the voter assumes greater importance. While this was left entirely to political parties, the government had undertaken the responsibility of educating voters with regard to rights and obligations and issues in the elections. The Films Division of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India produced two films, *Rights and Responsibilities* and *Democracy in Action*, dealing mainly with the mechanics of the general elections.

In addition, the government issued a number of handbills instructing voters as to how they should exercise their franchise.

The Campaign

As regards political education of the voter by political parties, it appears not much was done in that regard. The vital principles—that no political party should indulge in any activity which would aggravate the existing differences or create mutual hatred or cause tension between different castes, communities, religions or linguistic groups; criticism of other political parties would be confined to policies and programmes, past record and work done; meetings and processions organized by political parties would not be disturbed, were not only not abided by but openly and consistently violated by several candidates. In this connection a prominent Congressman was arrested in 1967 in Jorhat for publishing a novel. The charge against the publisher of this so-called novel, running into 218 pages was not one of defamation but of publication and distribution of obscene literature. This novel was published in the midst of 1967 general election. It is believed to be responsible for the defeat of the Congress candidate. In another constituency the services of an unmarried mother were enlisted by a political party to tell the voters that X (the candidate) was responsible for the birth of her child. In another constituency, the same political party put up objectionable public hoardings. In several constituencies, the Prime Minister was shown to be dancing to the tune of American capitalists. In several other cases, campaigning tactics were done in utter bad taste. Also, money flowed like water to woo voters.

Again, almost all the candidates appealed to parochial feelings of voters. Brahmin vote, Kalita vote and Kayastha vote was common talk. In constituencies where the Jana Sangh contested against Muslim candidates, the appeal was openly communal. In the predominantly Bengali area, the appeal was to racial feelings. By and large, elections were fought on issues other than ideological. Every ethnic, linguistic and religious group set up its own candidates. The atmosphere was not congenial for discussion of matters of economic and political importance, and all the political

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parties were responsible for such a state of affairs. They did very little to educate the electorate on secular principles. The Congress, professing to establish a socialist society, was equally guilty. On the other hand, the principal leaders of the Congress spent their waking hours in factional fights. The DCCs and MCCs consisted of half-baked politicians who spent most of their time in securing permits and licences for their kith and kin. The leading left parties had no mass base. Owing to fluid financial resources they could not achieve startling results for their party. Further, they were riven by feuds and concerned themselves with issuing of statements periodically or with the formation of *Andolan Samitis*, if only to show that they existed.

From all this we should not jump to the conclusion that the political parties did not speak at all of political and economic matters. The PSP was the first to launch the election campaign. It publicized that the Congress government instead of promoting the prosperity of the country crippled its economy. It held that the economic policies of the Congress were responsible for inflation, unbearable taxation, decline in production and spiralling of the prices of the essential commodities. While people were starving for want of food, foodgrain was rotting in government godowns due to the inefficiency of officers and apathy of the Congress government. It accused Congressmen of corruption. Dealing with the failures of the Congress government, the PSP also accused that party for failure to preserve the integrity of the State and aggravating the problem of the Hill Areas.

The CPI said that the Congress was a party of capitalists, a familiar line of accusation. The Congress muzzled freedom of expression; promoted casteism communalism, corruption and nepotism; ruined the lot of the common man and aggravated the already volatile law and order situation by provocations. Speaking of land reforms, the CPI accused the Congress that no radical reforms were introduced; the tillers of the soil were not made its owners; improved methods of cultivation were not introduced; land legislation, in keeping with the *Adhir Act*, was not introduced; the Land Ceiling Act was put into the waste-paper basket. Attacking

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Congressmen, in general, the CPI levelled several charges of corrupting public life and appealed to the electorate to oust the Congress.

The CPI (M), similarly charged the Congress with promoting anti-social practices, as no more than an agent of the capitalist-imperialists. It was vehemently critical of Congress policies *vis-a-vis* industrialists and industrialization; preventive detention and wanton use of force to crush agitations; policies with regard to Vietnam and the general flux in national life.

Dealing with domestic issues, the CPI (M) said that the Congress neglected Assam. It facilitated the flight of capital to the extent of 900 crores of rupees every year. Instead of establishing cement, paper and textile mills and a full-fledged oil refinery, the Congress leaders spent their waking hours in quest for power. It also accused the Congress of giving out the idea of the federal plan for Assam, which, it alleged, was threatening integrity of the State.

The campaign of the SSP was on similar lines. It also promised to nationalise tea gardens and oil industry. The APHLC promised to get rid of the domination of the Assamese by the establishment of a Hill State. It also promised equal opportunities to all.

The Congress, on the other hand, did not indulge in polemics. It demonstrated its achievements by facts and figures. It indicated the lines of progress of the State made possible under Congress rule and promised to solve all other problems like the problem of infiltration of Pakistanis and the problem of Hill State.

Suspension of Poll

In 1967, there was suspension of poll in three places. Polling was suspended at a polling Station for 30 minutes in Sarukhetri assembly constituency on account of a clash between two rival groups. Similarly, polling was suspended for 55 minutes at a polling station in the Golakganj Assembly constituency in the Goalpara district owing to the appointment of a lady as a presiding officer. Polling was suspended in a polling station in the Bilasipara constituency for about five minutes. in one of the polling stations of the Gauhati-West constituency there was no suspension but there was slight disturbance.

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VI

ELECTION RESULTS

The results indicate that there was a great deal of wastage of votes. The main reason for that seems to be that political parties did not adequately educate the electorate. In some constituencies, the wastage was about 10% of the total number of votes polled.

There was contest for 120 assembly seats. The Congress did not set up candidates in three constituencies. So the Congress actually contested 117 seats and won 70, which rose to 72 with two uncontested returns. The distribution of seat party-wise was : independents-25, Two CPIs-7, APHLC-9, PSP-5, SSP-4 and Swatantra-2. Of the 120 seats contested, 58 were elected by a minority vote, Of the 58 as many as 36 belonged to the Congress, 11 were independents, 3 went to CPI, 2 to Swatantra and 4 to SSP. In terms of percentage, all the successful candidates of the Swatantra party, 80% of the PSP, 50% of the CPI and of the SSP, 44% of independents and 50% of the Congress, were elected by a minority vote. Each of the parties had their share of such candidates, and therefore, the allegation of the United-Leftist Front that the Congress alone enjoyed that doubtful privilege is not true. However, it must be admitted that the Congress did not poll an absolute majority of the votes polled but it captured a majority of the seats, though the majority was not substantial.

Forefeiture of Deposits

In order to discourage frivolous candidacy, the election law laid down that every candidate should deposit Rs. 500 as security. Any candidate who did not poll one-sixth of the total number of votes polled would forfeit his deposit. A substantial number of candidates lost their deposits. In 1967, comparatively their number was larger than that in 1957 and in '62. The number of candidates that lost their deposit was 223.

The results indicate that the performance of the Congress was not particularly impressive, especially in view of the fact that it has a mass base, sound financial position, wide organization, and a tradition of service. It may be argued that the poor performance

of the Congress was due to faulty selection of candidates. If the selection had been objective, without the question of leadership looming large on the horizon, better candidates could have been selected and several of them would have been elected. Unfortunately, it set up candidates whose integrity was questionable and whose ability for legislative work was doubtful. This argument is true to a limited extent. There were some Congressmen whose defeat is inexplicable. Their service to the community was beyond criticism; their integrity was unimpeachable; their political experience was vast; their loyalty to the party and devotion to public service was recognized; their ability for legislative work was sound; and yet, they lost.

It is also said that the cause for Congress defeat was the deteriorating economic condition. This was attributed to the inefficiency of the Congress government. This is not wholly true. While the prices of essential commodities spiralled, actually there was no shortage. Almost everything was available in the open (or black) market. Let us take rice. Most people did not feel the shortage of rice even in the urban areas. As regards the economic condition of the people, it was the salaried employees, who were adversely affected. The farmer and the merchant lost nothing even by the price-rise. The Chief Minister attributed the poor performance of the Congress to the late publication of the list of the Congress candidates. This is not true. It was the Congress that published its list first. Other political parties followed much later. It was said that complacency on the part of candidates and of their supporters was responsible for the defeat of several Congress candidates. This is true. The Congress believed that since the opposition was disorganized, it would rest on its oars; what it had to do was only to inform the people who the Congress candidates were. The Congressmen did not appeal to nor displayed any appreciable understanding of mass psychology. A substantial number of voters did not know the past record of the Congress. They did not witness the battle of Indian independence and the part played by the Congress in it. The generation that habitually supported the Congress is passing off. The generation that was born in the forties of the present century is not emotionally attached to the Congress. The

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Congress failed to appeal to this class of voters. The *Gandhi cap* and *Khaddar kurta* which were at one time respected and venerated have become the objects of ridicule and sarcasm. The Congress failed to see that.

The main cause for the defeat of several Congressmen was tactics of sabotage. It was openly said that several Congressmen secretly helped the election of Hem Barua to the Lok Sabha so that he may voice the popular disapproval of the state of affairs in Assam, which Congressmen would not, or could not, do. It was alleged that a prominent member of the Congress supplied confidential information to Hem Barua for use against the Chief Minister. In another case, a prominent Congressman supplied men and material to an independent candidate to contest against the Chief Minister. The case of the obscene novel, referred earlier, also involved another Congressman. Another factor responsible for the defeat of several Congress candidates was the widely publicized feud between Chief Minister Bimala Prasad Chaliha and his colleague the Education Minister. That was not a worthy example.

The announcement of the federal plan for the reorganization of Assam fomented further hostility toward the Congress. The federal plan is not, after all, a bad solution for the reorganization of the State. But the opposition played upon the emotions of the people. The opposition said that the federal plan would lower the status of the State. The unexplained silence of the Congress for a long time on the merits of the plan only helped the opposition. The fact remains however that the Congress performance was not impressive.

VII

FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT

In the elections, all the three persons who aspired for the leadership of the legislative party were badly mauled. Dev Kant Barua was the worst sufferer. So Chaliha and Mahendra Mohan Choudhury entered into an understanding to isolate Dev Kant Barua. Bishnu Ram Medhi supported the candidacy of Chaliha. Thus, Chaliha was elected for a third consecutive term as the leader of the Congress legislature party. Since 1937 no one held

the office of Chief Minister for a decade in Assam. At present Chaliha happens to be doyen of Chief Ministers.

In forming his government, Chaliha had to move with strategy. The political situation in the State was such that he had to adopt various means to consolidate his position. First, he must reward those who stood by him under all circumstances. Secondly, he had to lure some from the clique opposed to him and thereby weaken the strength of Dev Kant Barua. Thirdly, he must deal effectively with potential trouble makers. The result of all these moves was expansion of the ministry to 23, an unprecedented number.

Academically, it may be argued that Chaliha had a splendid opportunity to form a strong cabinet consisting of capable persons, who were available in the party. On that score the entire opposition could pride in only Gauri Shanker Bhattacharjee as anywhere near some of the Congress stalwarts. It may also be said that Chaliha could have adopted a magnanimous attitude by taking Moinul Huq Choudhury and Dev Kant Barua. Chaliha, of course, must have his reasons. However, the cabinet formed by Chaliha is a cabinet of dark horses.

The opposition

The notable feature of the election result of 1967 was that the opposition emerged numerically much stronger. But it is hopelessly disorganised. It consists of the APHLC, SSP, PSP, CPI, CPI (M), Swatantra and a large number of independents. The opposition hoped that all the 18 legislators who supported Dev Kant Barua, would defect. But that has not so far happened, and it might not, because Chaliha had lured away some from Dev Kant Barua group and some from Moinul Huq Choudhury group and thereby demoralised the potential clique in the Congress opposed to his leadership.

Some Interesting Aspects

Every election has certain interesting aspects, though not all of them are reported. The author noted some interesting incidents. In

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one instance a presiding officer arrived in a bullock cart. The local people objected to this on the ground that by travelling in bullock cart the presiding officer was canvassing for the Congress whose symbol the vehicle was. At another place, a voter took out a rupee note and inscribed on it *Bandemataram* and *Congress Zindabad*, deposited it in the ballot box and left the place. In some other places ignorant voters did not know where to affix the mark. So they affixed the mark on their *chaddars*. At a polling station, a lady voter, after exercising her franchise, approached the agent of a candidate and asked him, 'When will you pay the balance'.

CHETKAR JHA

**ELECTION PANORAMA
IN BIHAR**

THE politics in Bihar were unstable and disturbed owing to frequent shifts and new group alignments in almost all the political parties on the eve of the fourth general elections. The split in the PSP, merger of a section of the PSP with the Socialist party and another with the Congress and third continuing as PSP, the emergence of the SSP, complete disintegration of the Swatantra party which was the single biggest opposition party with a strength of 50 in the Bihar Legislative Assembly, merger of the Jharkhand party with the Congress and split in the CPI giving birth to two Communist parties—CPI & CPI(M), all these developments unsettled the internal politics of each political party and generated forces which sought new balance in the power structure in each individual party. The biggest party, the Indian National Congress, experienced a very major disturbance because of the adoption of the Kamaraj plan. This plan was the product of a panicky mind and a rather illogical reading of the situation, which, in turn, was due to the Congress reverses in three bye-elections to Lok Sabha in which Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Acharya J.B. Kripalani and Minoo Masani had defeated the Congress candidates. The Bihar Congress became pre-occupied with finding of new balance of power within itself following the major re-shuffle in the wake of the Kamaraj plan and the merger of the Jharkhand party with it in 1963. This happened at a time when the Congress politics was becoming stable and smooth after political dust had settled down after the third general elections in 1962 and the formation of the government. Later, following the disintegration of the Swatantra party in Bihar, the erstwhile Swatantra members sought entry into the Congress, but owing to factional politics the matter lingered on for several months. First, the Bihar Chief Minister, K.B. Sahay supported by the Bihar PCC president,

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recommended the admission of 11 members of the defunct Swatantra party. Either to prevent their entry into the Congress or to counteract it, 37 other members of the defunct Swatantra group led by Raja of Ramgarh applied for admission into the Congress. The Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB) authorised the Congress president, Kamaraj to take a decision on the matter of admission of these members into the Congress after having decided in principle to admit them. The Bihar Chief Minister and Bihar PCC president opposed the admission of all the 37 members of the group led by Raja of Ramgarh. Kamaraj was not able to make up his mind for months. This delayed the stabilization of the balance of power in the internal structure of the State Congress party for a period long enough to cause incalculable damage to the interest of the Congress party as a whole. On the other hand the opposition parties and later a group of the Congress itself continued to charge the K.B. Sahay ministry of grave administrative irregularities and corruption. The opposition parties formally presented a memorandum of charges to the President of India, but nothing happened. People were told that there was no *prima facie* case for setting up an enquiry commission to go into the charges. The requisite number of members of the Congress legislature party demanded a meeting of the legislature party in order to discuss the desirability or otherwise for a change in the Congress leadership in Bihar. The Congress High Command stood in the way and the meeting did not materialise. All this gave an impression to the people that the Congress High Command was solidly behind the Bihar Chief Minister and had choked the democratic channels of political action within the Congress. This created frustration giving rise to bitterness among all those who did not see eye to eye with the Chief Minister of Bihar as well as with the important members of the Congress High Command including Kamaraj. The K.B. Sahay faction in Bihar Congress and Bihar ministry, assured of the blind support of the so-called syndicate of the Congress High Command, felt confident of its political strength and became more and more unresponsive to the needs of common man. Ministers devoted their entire time and energy to the work of building up their individual political strength and neglected administration. The civil service became demoralised as a result of which some attached themselves to the ministers of their own castes and others became indifferent.

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The factional politics within the Congress continued to be more and more bitter resulting in new alignment of forces which came to the fore at the time of elections to the Bihar PEC. This election showed that the Chief Minister was in a minority. The bitterness of factional politics increased to such an extent that the PEC could not hold meetings in order to recommend an agreed list of prospective candidates to the CEC. The CEC did not fare better. It cleared almost three names per minute. It, of course, associated a leader of majority group with its deliberations, but more surprisingly, the minority group had two representatives associated with the CEC whereas the majority group had only one. The people in Bihar got the impression that Kamaraj was all out in support of the Bihar Chief Minister who was in a minority in the Bihar Congress and treated him as though he was the leader of the majority group. The careless manner in which the Congress candidates were ultimately selected by the CEC further added to the frustration of those who had already been losing confidence in the impartiality of the Congress president. This impression was further confirmed by disclosures made by Mahamaya Prasad Sinha that the Prime Minister of India, Indra Gandhi wanted to remove K.B. Sahay from chief ministership of Bihar but was prevented from doing so by Kamaraj. Mahamaya Prasad Sinha along with a number of members of the Bihar Congress legislature party had levelled a series of charges of corruption against the Bihar ministry and had sought the intervention of the Prime Minister and the Congress High Command. But his efforts failed and he felt compelled to leave the Congress. In the meantime, thoroughly dissatisfied by the selection of Congress candidates, Raja of Ramgarh along with the members of his group also left the Congress and they formed a group called Jankranti Dal.

Police firings upon students in Muzaffarpur in December 1966 and in Patna in the first week of January 1967 added to the prevailing dissatisfaction and frustration of the younger generation including the students and teachers. In the Muzaffarpur firing a student and a young lecturer of a local College died as a result of the police firing within the College compound. This firing was condemned by all sections of the people who demanded a judicial enquiry. But K.B. Sahay, the Bihar Chief Minister, would not

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agree to it. Then came the fateful January 5, 1967 when the students and others staged a massive demonstration in Patna and when some miscreants indulged in arson and violence. But it was when the situation was returning to normal that the police started firing indiscriminately. The story of alleged brutality perpetrated on those who were hit by bullet spread round and was published in the newspapers which added to the anger of the people against the Congress government. But what shocked the moral sense of the people terribly was the news published in the local dailies that dead bodies of the persons who died of the police firing were taken to the burning *ghat* naked and were cremated in haste during the night. On the January 8, 1967, a largely attended convention of University teachers and students held at Muzaffarpur decided to mobilize the University teachers and students against the Congress in the ensuing elections. The Secondary School Teachers' Association which had already been under the influence of the Communist party joined hands with the forces opposed to the Congress. Several opposition parties formed an electoral alliance in selected constituencies in order to fight the Congress. Thus the Congress found itself confronted with a formidable array of the opposition forces.

II

Caste, money and students played very important role during the election campaign. The role of the students and the teachers was a negative one. They had only decided that they would oppose the Congress candidates and it was left to individuals to decide whom they would support in individual constituencies and consequently they were sometimes used on the basis of caste also. In the district of Muzaffarpur where the teachers and students had decided to oppose the Congress all over the State of Bihar, the Congress fared best which could partly be explained by the fact that their caste feeling were exploited by the Congress leadership. Another result of the negative policy adopted by the Muzaffarpur convention was that energies were frittered away in several constituencies because in the matter of supporting candidates they got hopelessly divided and consequently became much weaker. Money played, as usual, a very important role. But what struck one was the fact that candidates of opposition parties in many cases had stronger finan

cial backing than the Congress candidates. The Congress leadership did not treat all the candidates equally. Those who were allied with the ruling faction were given larger funds and transport. As a matter of fact each group leader in the Congress helped candidates of his group and, since the financial capacity of the group leaders varied, the financial support received by a candidate varied from others allied to other group leaders. It is also alleged that these Congress group leaders gave financial assistance to opposition candidates in the constituencies where Congress candidates were not to their liking. Thus, according to the allegations made, the Congress leaders partly financed the election campaign of opposition candidates in several constituencies.

Caste has always been the bane of Bihar politics. Caste prejudices were fully exploited during the election campaign. In addition to rivalries between particular castes, there was some sort of polarization of upper and backward caste forces also. There was an impression in the minds of the people that Kamaraj favoured the Sahay faction because it was a backward caste-oriented leadership. It was whispered that K.B. Sahay was championing the political interests of the backward castes and other leaders of the Congress were opposed to him on this ground. This was given as an explanation for the breaking away of Mahesh Prasad Sinha, a Bhumihar by caste and Satyendra Narayan Sinha, a Rajput. These two leaders along with their followers mostly belonging to their own castes had supported K.B. Sahay in the election for party leadership in 1963 in opposition to late B.C. Patel who came from a backward caste. These leaders had perhaps supported K.B. Sahay not merely to prevent the election of late B.C. Patel, a backward caste candidate, but also to prevent each other from gaining an upper hand. They broke away from K.B. Sahay when they found that another backward caste leader, Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav, came to have greater hold over K.B. Sahay than themselves. The caste prejudices of these leaders found reflection in the election campaign. All Bhumihars, Rajputs and Brahmins worked against K.B. Sahay and other backward caste candidates allied to him but they also worked against one another in individual constituencies. It appeared that each leader was more concerned with reducing the strength of his rival in the Congress than with the defeat of those who were opposing

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Congress candidates. As a result, caste forces and formal political forces joined hands. One faction of the Congress aroused caste prejudices on the basis of upper and backward castes, and this force received additional impetus from other political parties. The SSP which has always made a special appeal to the backward castes on the ground that in Indian society castes and classes coincide, added to the forces of caste polarization and created a situation of tribal upsurge.

The general dissatisfaction of the people coupled with the entry of students and teachers made it extremely difficult for the Congress leaders to hold election meetings. Almost all of them in the initial stage of the campaign were greeted with black flags and brick-bats by the crowd of young people. Even top leaders like Kamaraj and Morarji Desai were unable at places to hold meetings. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the solitary Congress leader who addressed a peaceful and huge gathering at Patna by scrupulously avoiding canvassing for the Congress candidates. K.B. Sahay, the Congress Chief Minister would not move about canvassing for votes without a heavy armed police escort. The Congress organisation completely broke down and its presence was not felt anywhere. It was seen that a Congress candidate for the Lok Sabha sought adjustment with candidates of different parties in different Assembly constituencies. In one particular Parliamentary constituency the Congress candidate for the Lok Sabha made adjustment with a Communist and Jana Sangh candidate in one Assembly Constituency, with an independent Muslim in another and with SSP candidate in still another. The Congress this time did not have the advantage of well organised party. By and large the electoral contest was among independents with party labels which meant different things to different sections of the people ¹

1, The author was a participant observer and spent 5 weeks moving about in 5 contiguous constituencies in the district of Dharbhanga.

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TABLE 1

Votes Polled by Parties Through Four General Elections

Name of Parties	% of Votes Polled 1952	% of Votes Polled 1957	% of Votes Polled 1962	% of Votes Polled 1967	Seats Secured		
					1957	1962	1967
Congress	42.1	41.9	41.3	33.1	210	184	128
P.S.P.	21.9	16.2	14.2	7.0	31	29	18
C.P.I.	1.1	5.2	6	6.9	7	12	24
C.P.I. (Marxist)				2.3			4
Socialist				S.S.P.			S.S.P.
Jana Sangh	1.2	3	5	17.6	1	7	68
Jharkhand	8.4	1	3	10.4		4	26
Janta		7	4		32	20	
			Swatantra	Swatantra	Janta	Swatantra	
	3.3	8.2	17.2	2.3	23	50	3
Independents	22	17.5	9.3	21.4	14	12	46+1 (R.P.I.)

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The table clearly indicates that there has been a sharp decline in the percentage of votes polled by the Congress, the PSP and the Swatantra party. The CPI along with its left faction has registered a minor improvement in the percentage of votes secured. The SSP, with the added strength lent to it by the merger of a section of PSP has jumped from 5% to 17.6% of total votes polled. The Jana Sangh is the other party which has considerably improved its position by trebling its percentage. The independents who were showing a decline have reversed the trend, and they in terms of electoral support come next to the Congress which continued to be by far the biggest party in Bihar. The increase in the percentage of votes secured by independents is partly explained by the fact that over 700 of them were contesting and partly by the fact that the groups of the Raja of Ramgarh and of Mahamaya Prasad Sinha who left the Congress in the last week of December 1966 were included in the category of independents.

In terms of number of seats secured the most spectacular performance has been that of the SSP which has increased its strength 10 times in the legislative assembly. There has been an increase of over 6 times in the strength of the Jana Sangh. The Communist party also doubled its strength in the assembly. The independents have nearly trebled their strength.

The traditional forces have gained most. The loss of the Congress and the PSP has been the gain of the SSP and the Jana Sangh. These two represent the traditional forces in Bihar society. The SSP leaders think in terms of upper and lower castes. The caste orientation of the SSP leadership is so pronounced that it lends support more to casteism than anything else. Castes and classes do not coincide in the Indian society either in economic terms or in terms of the political power enjoyed. The Yadavas and the Kurmis in Bihar are economically better off than Brahmans. Even in terms of political power, the Brahmans have been no better than backward castes. In the government formed after the first general elections there was one Yadav and one Brahman in the cabinet. In the government formed after the second general elections there were two Brahmans and two representatives of the

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backward classes including a Harijan in the cabinet. There were also two belonging to the lower caste category in the government formed in 1961 though they were 7 out of a total of 23 ministers and deputy ministers whereas there were only 3 Brahmans. The determination of backwardness on the basis of caste instead of on the basis of economic and political criteria is a notion associated with a traditional society. In a modern society such a notion is considered reactionary. The SSP continues to think in terms of upper and backward castes even in the matter of selecting persons for appointment as ministers. The SSP, therefore, is put here along with the Jana Sangh. The group led by the Raja of Ramgarh, also, could not be considered modern and would go along with the traditional forces.

Thus it is clear that traditional forces have become stronger. A survey of the 1962 elections conducted by the Times of India in the different zones of the country showed a rightist upheaval in the whole of what it called the Hindi region, comprising Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan and the Punjab. The trend continued to gain strength as it is reflected in the number of votes polled and seats secured by the parties and independents who represent the traditional forces. The CPI which increased its strength nearly five-fold between 1952 and 1957 has been moving up very gradually in terms of percent of votes polled but has been doubling its strength in the assembly from one general election to another.

We may now have a look at the district-wise relative strength of different parties :

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Table II
District-wise Distribution of Electoral Strength

Parties	Year	Darbhanga	Muzaffarpur	Santhal Pargana	Bhagalpur	Gaya	Ranchi	Patna	Saran	Shahbad	Champaran	Saharsa	Purnea	Hazarilagh	Palamau	Mongher	Singhbhum	Dhanbad
Congress	1962	22	18	6	10	16	2	15	18	17	15	6	10	4	1	18	2	4
Congress	1967	10	16	4	3	11	9	8	9	12	6	5	11	4	6	2	7	3
S.S.P.	1962		2					1				2				2		
S.S.P.	1967	13	8		2	5		2	7	7	1	5		1	1	14	1	
P.S.P.	1962	5	5	1		2		2	3	3	1	2	4			1		
P.S.P.	1967	1			1	2			1		5	1	5			2		
Jana Sangh	1962					1		1	1							1		
Jana Sangh	1967		1	5	4	1	2		2		2	1	1	1	1		3	
C.P.I.	1962	3		1					1	1	2					1	3	
C.P.I.	1967	5	1	2	3	3			1	1	3		1	1		2		
C.P.I. (M)	1962																	
C.P.I. (M)	1967								1		1					1		
Swatantra	1962	1		3	2	5	6	1	3		3	1	2	12	7		1	1
Swatantra	1967	1		2													1	3
Independents	1962		4			1		1									3	
Independents	1967		3	4		2	3	1	4	2	3	2	2	10		1	3	4

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While the Congress has gained in Singhbhum, Ranchi and Palamau, and maintained its strength in Hazaribagh, it has lost in other areas. Singhbhum, Ranchi, Palamu and Hazaribagh constitute the tribal belt and is being industrialised fast. In Dhanbad, which is the mining area, the loss of Congress was a minor one. The other areas of Bihar which are principally agricultural and economically backward, and which were the strong holds of Congress influence in the past, did not support the Congress during the last elections. The Congress losses have been spectacular in Monghyr, Darbhanga, Bhagalpur, Patna, Saran, Shahabad and Champaran. The Congress could secure only 2 seats out of 23 in Monghyr. Madhu Limaye sought election to the Lok Sabha from Monghyr. The impact of his personality was a factor accounting for the SSPs success, which won as many as 15 seats from Monghyr. The district of Darbhanga which is the heart of Mithila, rather a stronghold of traditional learning and culture, curiously enough has not sent a single Jana Sangh member to the assembly. The SSP secured 13 out of 31 seats. The PSP had secured 5 seats in the third general elections in this district. The increase in the strength of the SSP in the Darbhanga district is partly owing to the fact that thousands of upper caste voters who had been traditional supporters of the Congress did not vote for those Congress candidates who were supposed to be allied to the anti-Brahman Congress factions. The Congress gains in Chotanagpur, particularly in Ranchi and Singhbhum, are mostly due to the merger of the Jharkand party led by Jaipal Singh, the unquestioned leader of the Adivasis.

The picture in respect of elections to the Lok Sabha is indicated below:

Table No. 3
LOK SABHA

Name of Parties	Seats Secured		
	1957	1962	1967
Congress	41	39	34
S.S.P.	1	1	7
P.S.P.	2	2	1
C.P.I.		1	5
C.P.I. (Marxist)			
Jana Sangh	-	-	1
Swatantra			
	3	7	-
Independents	1	-	5

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The Congress has been able to retain 34 seats. The CPI and the SSP have increased their strength; the Jana Sangh has for the first time sent one member to the Lok Sabha from Bihar. The loss suffered by the Congress is not as great as in the case of election to the State legislative assembly. Careless selection of candidates by the Congress is largely responsible for the loss of some seats. The State government was the chief target of attack by the opposition during the election campaign. The bigger issues, other than that of the ban on cow-slaughter, were hardly debated. The indiscriminate police-firings upon the students, and the alleged charges of corruption against the Bihar Congress ministry were the constant themes of speeches of opposition leaders. The Congress losses of some Lok Sabha seats were more due to acts of omission and commission by the State government and internal quarrels of the Congress than due to dissatisfaction over the working of the Union government.

IV

In conclusion, one may be tempted to observe that the apparent change, the ousting of the Congress from power and the formation of the united front government is hardly a matter of satisfaction to those who believe in healthy development of democracy. The elections were fought in a mood of anger, hatred and bitterness. Deep caste and religious prejudices were aroused, emotions of young students were unscrupulously used, generous use of money was made and bogus voting on a considerable scale (it has been so alleged by several persons) was resorted to. The voters were not allowed to retain a sober and saner frame of mind. The whole political climate was surcharged with a high degree of excitement of an unhealthy nature. The political leaders forgot that excitement had never been considered a virtue in democratic politics.

The results of elections have shown that traditional forces generated by deep seated caste and religious prejudices have gained strength. Bihar which is already a backward State in terms of economic and social development has further slid backward. Caste-based politics has been responsible for the very poor performance of Bihar in the field of economic development. The results of the last general elections provide no ray of hope that the new

leadership in Bihar will be work-achievement oriented. The new leadership is likely to function within the same kind of communal and caste frame-work and continue the tradition of the Congress leadership in essence.

Yet here are incidental benefits. What has happened is likely to do good to all concerned, political parties and the people. Those who have been ousted from power would now have an opportunity to look at things from the angle of an opposition party, those who had been excluded from power would now be holding the reins of power and be in a better position to appreciate the difficulties of administration. At the same time they would have an opportunity to vindicate their claim that they can give better administration to the people. The people, also, would now be in a better position to assess the points of strength as well as of weakness of the leadership of each political party. The change, therefore, has great portent for democratic growth, if the opportunity is availed both by the government and the opposition earnestly. Whether they would do so is anybody's guess.



M. M. SANKHDHER
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN
DELHI

THE Union Territory of Delhi with its 1.7 million electorate went to the polls on February 19 to elect 7 members to the Lok Sabha, 56 to Metropolitan Council and 100 to the Municipal Corporation. There were 46 candidates in the field for the Lok Sabha, 256 for the Metropolitan Council and 500 for the Municipal Corporation. The elections to all the three were held simultaneously.

From all counts polling was heavy. Official estimate of the turnout was between 60 and 70%. However, in some areas as many as 80% of the voters exercised franchise. In the 1962 election the percentage of electors who voted in the Union Territory was 68.75, whereas in the neighbouring state of UP, Rajasthan and Punjab, it was 51, 52 and 65% respectively. The percentage of rejected ballot papers was lower in Delhi than in many other areas as the figures show : Delhi 3.3 , UP 4.24, Rajasthan 5, and Punjab 4.20. Delhi's quota of invalid votes in 1967 was 5%. It can be explained by the confusion caused by three ballot-papers to be put in different boxes. Compared to 1962 elections, the proportion of votes cast by women voters also improved in 1967. As against 7,79,655 male voters the number of females on the electoral rolls was 5,65,705 in the earlier election. More than 5 lakhs out of a total women electorate of 7.3 lakhs cast their vote this time. The percentage of women being 70 was highest in India. In the last general election, the contest in the capital for the parliamentary seats was confined to the Congress and the Jana Sangh candidates. The Congress had captured all the five seats in all the five constituencies while the JanaSangh came out second best. In the 1967 elections also the electoral battle was waged mainly between the Congress and the Jana Sangh candidates, and with the addition of two more seats for the Lok Sabha, the character of the contest did not change.

TABLE I
DELHI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS :
A CUMULATIVE REVIEW
Party-wise Position in Elections, 1957-67

Party	Seats		Contestants		Seats won		Votes Polled		% of Total Poll		
	57	62 / 67	57	62 / 67	57	62 / 67	57	62 / 67	57	62	67
1. Congress	5	5 7	5	5 7	5	5 1	171,591	453,174	4,34,937	47.30	50 38.8
2. Swatantra	5	5 7	-	2 -	-	- -	-	-	-	-	-
3. Communist	5	5 7	1	1 -	-	- -	38,236	19,135	-	4.71	2.14 -
4. Jana Sangh	5	5 7	5	5 7	-	- 6	150,907	292,016	5,23,850	19.72	32.6 46.7
5. PSP	5	5 7	1	1 -	-	- -	28,656	1,048	-	3.53	0.12 -
6. Independents & Other Parties	5	5 7	18	15 32	-	- -	143,770	100,704	-	17.72	11.26 14.8

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

In terms of analysis of the results, the political behaviour of Delhi electorate largely falls into the all-India pattern. Nevertheless, there were some notable features. Nobody could have predicted with any certainty a complete Congress rout in a city like Delhi, with its affluence and having an important sequent of electorates directly or indirectly benefitted by the Congress. Surely, one could sense change in the mood of the voters backed up by a growing disenchantment with the Congress, but the ultimate results came as a surprise to many. A rude shock was destined for the complacent indolence in the Congress camp. Referring to the party's election prospects Brahm Perkash, DPCC president said on 18 February : "There was a swing in favour of the Congress because of its accent on democracy, socialism and secularism." "The ballot box", he added, "may have a few surprises, but by and large the verdict of the people of Delhi will not be different from what it was in 1962". Such a pronouncement was in line with what K. Kamaraj had, a month earlier, proclaimed with optimism : "In the ensuing general elections, the Congress would be successful in forming governments in all the States with heavy majority". The Union Territory of Delhi was considered by the entire Congress leadership as its own child which will not go into the lap of a foster mother. One of the Congress contestants boasted before the voters : "Whether you vote for me or not, I will win." The enlightened electorate of Delhi, however, willed otherwise. And the Congress for long (with a temporary setback in 1957) in command of Delhi politics abruptly found itself in a sorry plight. Of course, Brahm Perkash had defeated his Jana Sangh rival—Mir Singh, but his was the lone parliamentary victory for the Congress. The Congressmen had little consolation in the fact that it was a negative rather than a positive vote for the Congress.

Was the severe mauling of the Congress by the Delhi electorate a part of the country-wide anti-Congress trend, or, was there something special about the people of Delhi voting as they did ? Popular discontent being an all-India phenomenon, it is difficult to say how much of it—more or less—did Delhi share, say, as compared to Madhya Pradesh which had then returned the Congress to power ! It could not be a basic factor; at best, it was contributory.

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN DELHI

Popular discontent, cumulatively over the years, expressed itself in all forms of protests and violent demonstrations in the capital. In fact, Delhi, since Indira Gandhi's assumption of office had been witness to more disorder and unruly mass behaviour than at any normal period in the past. The psychology of agitation had been very much in evidence. But the major causes for dissatisfaction with the existing system were the bureaucratic functioning of the administration, the price spiral and the increasing cost of living. Agitation on the issue of cow slaughter which was timed to coincide with elections, the language issue, the Muslim grievance over Urdu and local difficulties of the people such as *jhuggi* dwellers, plot-holders in unauthorized colonies, complaints about bus transport and roads *etc.*, helped create an anti-Congress climate. The clique in the Pradesh Congress proved suicidal for the party in power.

The rout of the Congress in Delhi, the metropolis, took even the opposition by surprise for nobody could have imagined the strongly-entrenched Congress facing a somersault. The Delhi Congress expected not only to retain its stronghold on the corporation, besides capturing most of the parliamentary seats, but also to establish its hegemony on the newly created Metropolitan Council for which elections were to be held for the first time. Indeed, some observers suspected that Congress initiative in instituting this new body was motivated by the desire to feedback the Metropolitan Council by its strong majority in the corporation. It was generally surmised that whoever would control the Corporation would also control the Council, for the voters in the two cases were not be different. That is why the JanaSangh in the beginning was not very enthusiastic over the founding of the Council. The 1962 election had created the hope in Congress circles that with 80% of the Corporation seats and all the 5 parliamentary seats the result in 1967 would not be very different. But the Congress found itself in a soup. It got only 1 out of 7 Lok Sabha seats, 19 out of 56 Metropolitan Council seats and 42 out of the 100 Municipal Corporation seats. The Jana Sangh gained all along at the cost of the Congress.

Yet the Congress could have done better if its hands were not weakened by the operation of certain adverse forces. The previous chief executive councillor, Mustaq Ahmed, had written in

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December 1966 to Kamaraj and S.K. Patil advising that the selection of candidates for the seats in all the three bodies in Delhi should not be left to the DPCC which was presently managed by a clique : "The clique might claim a majority. But that is neither here nor there. I have always fought this kind of a majority because I know it is generally not right". Mushtaq Ahmed's disagreement with Brahm Perkash was not a matter of compromise because the former cared "more for principles than for office". He was himself, eventually, nominated by the DPCC. Since the last date for filing applications for the Council and Corporation seats were December 22 and 25 respectively, he wished the CEC of the Congress to take over the responsibility of selection of candidates as early as possible. But there was considerable opposition to the move among the Councillors, 22 of whom wrote a joint disagreement to Mushtaq Ahmed's proposal. The rift in Delhi Congress leadership made dissidence inevitable. The DPCC suspended 31 rebel Congressmen, including C. K. Nair and Khub Ram Jajoria, who contested the *Lok Sabha* seats from Delhi as independents. In the final DPCC list of nominees for the *Lok Sabha*, the names of Mehr Chand Khanna (then Union Minister of Works and Housing) and Sham Nath, Deputy Railway Minister, were dropped and those of L.C. Jain and Miss Surinder Saini, were included from Chandni Chowk and New Delhi constituencies respectively. These two seats aroused controversy for in the meantime the Khanna-Sham Nath group prepared a separate list of 7 Congress candidates for *Lok Sabha* seats. The minority group also demanded that selection of candidates for the Council and Corporation seats be made by the CEC. The dissension invited intervention of the Congress president who, in consultation with the Prime Minister and after a good deal of deliberation, announced the candidature of Khanna and Sham Nath because the two were sitting members. The controversy was resolved by the CEC which took upon itself the task of finalizing nominations for the Council. It was an obvious slap in the face of the DPCC and the scar remained to affect the poll results adversely. For, in these two constituencies, the Pradesh Congress leaders instead of joining forces were running down their own opponents in the party. Brahm Perkash seemed to have reconciled to the situation by stating that he was sure Khanna and Sham Nath would win.

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Another factor against the Congress was the notoriety acquired by administration ever since 1956 when the popular ministry was dissolved here. A gulf existed between the people and the irresponsible bureaucracy in the absence of any representative body to air and listen to the grievances of the people who felt harassed even in petty matters. A widespread feeling of anger at the insidious ways of corruption and nepotism gradually grew. And since the Congress was ruling Delhi through the Centre and had a majority in the corporation, it was natural for the people to turn their wrath on that party. The argument put up by Congressmen that in Delhi they did not have adequate powers to solve problems did not convince many. More discredit came to the organization in the wake of the faulty implementation of the master-plan, resulting in obstruction to construction and development, arbitrary acquisition of land and inadequate compensation to those affected. The sympathy of a large section of the population, both rural and urban, was alienated on account of the authorities dealing with the housing problem. 70% of the people had a vested interest in the housing policy that the government was supposed to evolve. In addition, a month before the election, the administration, the corporation and the DDA issued notices on most people, and a week before the poll, large-scale demolition operation was carried out which irritated about 10 lakhs of the people in three parliamentary constituencies.

1966 was for Delhi a year of unrest and irritation. Organized indiscipline and mob violence were the rule. The police had a hard time. Those who engineered these acts of hooliganism in the form of *bandhs* or strikes or work-to-rule campaigns or defied the law were not the customary workers or students or opportunist politicians, but the saffron-robed *Sadhus*, central government employees, telegraphists, policemen, doctors, traders, teachers, nurses, goldsmiths, hawkers, shanty-dwellers and their supporters. The issues that sparked agitations ranged from mundane subjects to economic and political issues—food shortage, high prices, low salaries, cow-slaughter, gold control order, US bombing in Vietnam devaluation *etc.*

If the official figures are any guide, Delhi led the rest of the country in holding the largest number of demonstrations, proces-

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sions and public meetings. Being the capital, it was the venue of many meetings having something to do with problems that really belonged to regions other than Delhi. Delhi in fact had its own quota of problems. Thus, local, regional and national problems found a platform in Delhi resulting in chaotic agitations. There were 1225 demonstrations, 2,223 public meetings and 208 processions. The figures surpassed previous records, despite the fact that after the November 7 incident, a ban was imposed. According to the police, there was firing on one occasion, November 7, when eight persons were killed. On two occasions, the police used tear gas and resorted to *lathi*-charge to disperse violent crowds. Though there has been no official confirmation of the figures of arrested persons, unofficial sources put 30,000 as the number of people arrested during cow slaughter agitation alone in a period of 8 months preceeding election. It is again estimated that 2,000 goldsmiths courted arrest during their agitation to get the Gold Control Order rescinded. Some traders of old Delhi responded to a call for *bandh* as a protest against higher sales tax.

There is some truth in the Congress government's explanation of the agitations being politically motivated as the election drew nearer. The almost complete suspension of the cow agitation immediately after the election is a good evidence of this contention as the timing of the agitation was made to coincide with the rising election tempo. Yet the cow agitation was symbolic of the orthodox people's discontent with the Congress on other counts, for instance, the Congress secular policy as a camouflage to woo Muslim votes. Most people reacted sympathetically to cow agitators not for its obscurantism but because it was a matter of sentiment for the majority community—a sentiment which ought to be respected in a democracy.

It was a curious phenomenon that all demonstrations were against the government. The image of the government was greatly tarred by the impression of weakness in the face of violence that it produced. A common view was that the government understands only one language, that of force, and that force is the only way to get even fantastic demands conceded. Hence, an atmosphere of coercing the authority prevailed. And the authority in turn coerced

the agitators. For the first time Delhi policemen organized themselves into a trade union, shouted slogans and refused salaries. For the first time the police failed in its duty to restore order on November 7 and also on the Republic Day. The police found itself helpless on February 20 when the workers in a textile mill roited; it did not appear on the scene in time during the Sikh agitation in *Chandni Chowk* and during the Delhi University students' incendiary activities. To the man in the street, a virtual collapse of law and order seemed ominous. The gravity of the situation can be understood by the deployment of about 4,000 policemen from adjoining States to augment Delhi's 16,000 strong police force. No doubt the general slackness in the maintenance of order gave impetus to criminals who were comparatively more active than in previous years.

More than all that, what weighed heavily against Congress prospects was the uncontrollable price-rise, high cost of living, shortage and scarcity of essential commodities, high rents, taxes on consumer goods, non-availability for months together of good-quality indigenous wheat *etc.* For the middle classes, balancing the budget was a crucial problem. Even rationed articles became costlier, sugar, *maida*, *suji* and kerosene, besides wheat and rice. The government contributed to the price rise by, what was alleged to be, increased taxes. There was a rise of 5 to 10% in the prices of all goods under sales tax. The Delhi Milk Scheme, sponsored by the government, could not keep the prices of milk constant. The Municipal Corporation revised bus fares, water and electricity rates, only at the expense of the common man. The prices in the white elephant – the super market – were not very different from the general market in the city. No doubt Mrs. Indira Gandhi was to admit later that the economic hardship for Delhiites, as for others generally in the country, was one of the important causes of Congress reverses. Figures speak for themselves : the consumer had to pay 20% more in 1967 than in the beginning of 1966 for his purchases. The incomes did not rise correspondingly and thus a person was relatively poor within a year.

The Municipal Corporation was in a chaotic state. Not a day passed when the Corporators did not show their fists and fight.

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They seemed to be oblivious of their responsibilities to the citizens who had elected them to the civic body. Mostly, moves to improve roads, colonies, transport, water supply, power and other amenities were shelved by the Congress for paucity of funds. On one occasion civic employees did not get their salaries in time. Committees stopped work when members belonging to one Congress faction resigned. The dissensions brought work to a standstill at one stage. Indeed, the mismanagement of the Corporation was proverbial and became talk of the town. The interim Metropolitan Council which had come into existence in October-November looked more apathetic than the Corporation. The civic life of Delhi in early 1967 was nobody's responsibility.

The performance of the Congress did not match with its promises during the long spell it had been in office. The people were impatient. The Jana Sangh was waiting in the wings, delighting in the irony that the Congress which talked of socialism from house-tops could not resolve hardships, which the poor and middle classes faced in making two ends meet. The common man was aghast at the rampant callousness at various levels of administration, made worse by the apparent connivance of obliging politicians. Clearly, the situation called for a radical change in the economic programmes and policies relating to production and distribution of wealth, ensuring social justice and provision of at least a minimum standard of respectable life. Many enlightened people believed the Congress was not socialistic enough, whereas many others thought the Congress would do well by abandoning the ideological dogma. In the process, however, the common man's faith in Congress slogan-mongering had evaporated. Coupled with all that, natural calamities—such as drought in Bihar, disturbed all thinking people, who began enquiring into another neglected aspect of the issue : how far were these calamities aggravated by the inactivity and apathy of administration ?

The agitation for cow protection was launched by the *Bharat Gosewak Samaj*. It set up a committee to canvass votes for such candidates as were known supporters of a total ban on cow slaughter all over India. But the *Sarvadaliya Goraksha Mahabhiyan Samiti*,

presided over by the fasting Prabhudatta Brahmchari, disapproved of the move to influence the election. A rift thus developed in the movement. Swami Karpatri, who wanted cow to be a poll issue, was asked to renounce his official position in the *Samiti* after his release from the jail. Brahmchari, whose condition was causing concern, had accepted the Union government's suggestion for appointing a high-powered committee to go into the question provided the terms of reference included the principle of the demand for a total ban on cow slaughter of cow and its progeny. S.K. Patil, (then Railway Minister) with a view to save the life of 58-day-fasting Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri and also to make a political capital, pledged himself to bring about a total ban on cow slaughter; "otherwise I will not be in politics", he declared. But the negotiations between the *Samiti* and the government reached a deadlock. The difference was that whereas the subject was within the jurisdiction of the states, the *Samiti* wanted the Union government to issue a uniform directive to all states to enforce legislation to effect cow-protection. There were differences on another point. Radhakrishna Bajaj, an emissary of the *Samiti*, who met the union Home Minister, pleaded that the ban be extended to non-working bulls who formed hardly 7% of the total population of the bovine species. The government would not accept this. The Prime Minister appealed to the people to exercise patience and wait till the elections were over.

The *Samiti* officially denied reports that it might independently or in alliance with other parties contest the general elections. It claimed itself to be a non-political organization. Some of its leaders were thought to be venerable religious figures who had neither political ambitions nor would they like their names to be besmirched by such activity. The *Samiti*, however, had no objection if individual members contested the election.

But, whether the *Samiti* liked it or not, and in spite of Muni Sushil Kumar's disclaimer, the Jana Sangh in Delhi made cow protection an election issue. It may be surmised that the followers of the *Goraksha* movement should have voted for Jana Sangh candidates. In one case, especially that of Ram Gopal Shalwale (Jana

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Sangh candidate from Chandni Chowk (scene of daily arrests of agitators for cow protection), himself a staunch cow-protectionist, the vote (Hindu largely) must have gone in his favour. It is possible, that the Sadhus' indulgence in what was so apparently a political activity & was tantamount to political blackmail, earned little support of the thinking people, who, after all, are so few. Tied up with emotion and legend, the issue had several lures for the commonman. Deen Dayal Upadhyay, Jana Sangh General Secretary, made an offer to the Congress to select the one constituency anywhere—even if it were the Prime Minister's own, where the election could be fought on anti-cow slaughter issue alone. Whether or not the confidence was justified, the Jana Sangh knew that the issue was worth exploiting in terms of votes. Though the *Samiti* had failed in getting its objective fulfilled, the Jana Sangh succeeded in the political objectives.

In the Congress debacle, the vote of the Central government employees appeared to be decisive. The Federation of the Central Secretariat and Allied offices' Employees, numbering about 50,000 belonging to 10 associations of central government employees—ranging from class II to class IV, launched an "intensive programme of continuous agitations's" including hunger strike and fasting, unless their Federation was given a recognition and measures taken against retrenchment. They, however, made it clear that they would not do anything which might upset the election work in Delhi. Though evidence is lacking, it is alleged that they indirectly helped the opposition when many of them acted as polling officers and on other election duties. On February 15, they organized a 'mass fast'. Besides, the employees had demanded 'a need-based minimum wage' as proposed by the 15 Indian Labour Conference (1957) and also a merger of dearness allowance with pay.

Though the government was considering all these demands the employees found elections a suitable time to pressurize the government. Regarding the need-based minimum wage, it was strongly urged on behalf of the employees that the minimum emoluments, then admissible to them, were far below those given to personnel working in organized private industry. For example, the difference varied between Rs. 32 in Madras and 48 in Bombay. This difference excluded annual bonus and other fringe benefits of

a textile worker. Whatever be the logic of the demand, the employees forgot the lower output of work in their case when compared to the output of those in private industry. However, the government rightly explained that the Second Pay Commission had examined the matter at length and had made specific recommendations regarding the revision in wages. The terms of reference of the Gajendragadkar Commission were wide enough and ought to have satisfied the employees. But the matter of recognition of their union became the linchpin of the grievances against the government. Since the government employee in the capital is taken to belong to a privileged class of citizens in terms of emoluments and influence, his voting behaviour can be explained in terms of some other causes. Perhaps, the immediate impact of M.L. Sondhi's address to government employees during a lunch break; their personal dislike for Congress bosses, which they had come to develop from inside; their growing stresses and strains in every day life—were important factors that influenced their political verdict. But it would be wrong to assume that all government employees had gone anti-Congress. In fact, it may be safely imagined that class IV-employees, class I employees and those in higher technical jobs would have voted for the Congress. Here, again, the vote might have got split on account of the large middle-class segment having an anti-Congress disposition.

In private conversation with government employees, it was discovered that mostly they were not inclined to favour Jana Sangh as such, but they certainly wanted to strengthen the democratic fibre by voting the Congress out of power. If their vote went to Jana Sangh that was purely incidental, for there was no other alternative available. The urge for demolishing the monopoly of Congress rule was shared by them with many others in different parts of India. But a notable aspect was that employees gave an enthusiastic response to the call of the opposition.

One of the most baffling phenomenon in the Delhi elections was the attitude of the Muslims. Normally, indeed, during Nehru's spell of secularism, Indian Muslims generally, and Delhi Muslims particularly, found the Congress as its only saviour. The image of Jana Sangh during the earlier electoral battles in 1957 and 1962

was one of a communal organisation—the word communal having pejorative complexions. But this time Muslims showed a sense of disillusionment with the Congress and many of them joined the Jana Sangh whose image had now considerably improved in their eyes. What had happened? There was nothing instinctive in their positive response to the Jana Sangh appeal. There must have been a rational disposition on their part, for, otherwise, their behaviour is inexplicable. This is not to suggest that the Muslims voted *enbloc* for the Jana Sangh, or that they did not vote at all for the Congress. Such a view has no verification. But, in Jama Masjid area where the Muslim population is concentrated, the Congress game of appeasement of Muslims by renting high-sounding slogans was fairly exposed. In this also, as in other cases, the Jana Sangh was favoured by them partly for what was Hobson's choice after they had decided to disown the Congress. Master Nuruddin claimed that it had become a hackneyed Congress slogan that the Jana Sangh was a communal party. According to Master Nuruddin "the Jana Sangh was not communalist, but actually a strong nationalist party." A new Muslims body, *Majlis-e-Mushavarat*, was formed in UP in December with A. J. Faridi of Lucknow as its president and it laid claim to a measure of popularity among Muslims in the north. Faridi hastened to proclaim that the organization was not to be a front for the revival of Muslim communal politics nor was it a political party for nominating candidates. Like the *Goraksha Samiti*, it wanted to maintain a persuasive complex. It drew up a 9 point manifesto which included a demand for proportional representation for Muslims in legislatures, and also a demand for a moratorium on the reform of the Muslim personal law. Its president had called upon Muslims to give their vote to non-Congress candidates who supported the *Majlis* manifesto. No doubt the *Majlis* became popular by exploiting Muslim grievances, some real and some parochial, its appeal to Delhi Muslims was immense. The *Mushavarat* justified itself by pointing out that the Muslims who constituted the largest minority community had been living under considerable mental and physical strain in view of the insecurity that continued ever since partition. Frequent communal riots, indiscriminate arrests, false suspicions, the un-Islamic and anti-Muslim text books and step-motherly

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treatment meted out to Urdu and to the Aligarh Muslim University, were only few glaring examples of alleged injustice.

No longer could the Congress take the Muslim vote for granted. Such electoral behaviour was not the result of a conscious choice that made them vote Congress in the past : it was more in the nature of a conditional reflex to the horrors of partition. With partition relapsing into history, the community was able to rediscover a new political realism and a new free will. This new realization was compelled by the need of survival in the changed context, its impact was fairly well demonstrated in the Chandni Chowk constituency, having about 50,000 Muslim inhabitants, of whom 2,000 were members of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh.

How did the Muslims reconcile to the Jana Sangh ? Ideologically, it seemed to be an impossible exercise. Six months before elections in a mass public meeting at the Jama Masjid four prominent Muslims were formally inducted into the Jana Sangh. About a month before elections, 3 Muslim leaders were nominated by the Jana Sangh as candidates for important seats. Master Nuruddin opposed the Congress nominee, chief executive councilor, Mir Mushtaq Ahmed. Nuruddin admitted "Muslims who join the Jana Sangh are anti-Congress". He complained that in spite of Muslim support for the Congress in the last 20 years, their lot had not improved. Anwar Dehlvi accused the Congress of bluffing the people. He advocated ban on cow slaughter for ensuring communal harmony. The Jana Sangh, they held, was not communal because it had helped in the maintenance of peace during the dark days of 1947.

The efficiency and strength of the Jana Sangh organization were impressive as could be seen during the Indo-Pak war. No Muslims were harassed by Jana Sangh volunteers. Their 500 volunteers manned the Delhi traffic with efficiency. Similarly, the spontaneity with which their workers donated blood or ensured personal safety of Muslim citizens in Delhi was admirable. These are plausible reasons for the sizable Muslim membership of the party in Delhi.

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The Jana Sangh was not entirely motivated by political considerations to woo Muslim voters. Their honesty and sincerity lay in integrating the Muslims emotionally with Hindus. But, *the Organizer*, the Jana Sangh mouthpiece, had a different version to advance : "It takes a good deal of political courage for a Muslim to oppose the Congress. A Muslim looks to the Congress and sees Hindus : he looks to the Jana Sangh and sees more Hindus. But he is better off with the Jana Sangh, because at least the Jana Sangh members were honest about their Hinduism. The Congress would renounce Hinduism just to appease the Muslims." The Muslims found the Congress conduct a hypocrisy.

The politically enlightened sections amongst Muslims were joining the Jana Sangh, and as they provided the leadership, the uneducated Muslims, as if by instinct, followed them. In the 20 odd public meetings held during the last two years, a common theme had been to refute the charge of communalism laid at the doors of the Jana Sangh. The Congress had alleged that Jana Sangh instigated communal riots. But it was pointed out that riots had occurred in States like Orissa and West Bengal where there was virtually no Jana Sangh. "If the Jana Sangh was responsible for communal rioting, then it is only the Jana Sangh that can protect you", and the issue was clinched. Besides, Balraj Madhok and other leaders, gave the impression of responsible talk and restraint. They gave the word Hindu a wider connotation implying that it had no religious connection; Hindu was identifiable with Indian. Many Muslims, however, were not prepared to accept such explanation, nor were they happy with Jana Sangh's non-reconciliation to the existence of Pakistan. But, on the whole, they preferred it to the Congress which to them represented a lost cause.

The Jana Sangh did not thrive on Muslim support alone. Its appeal had grown amongst Hindi-speaking people in the capital, as much as among migrants from Pakistan, who had a grateful memory of Jana Sangh. From insignificant beginnings in 1953 of the political arm of the RSS, it emerged in the sixties as a major opposition party in the north, with an organizational nucleus of great potential. Though financially not sound, its organization today was stronger &

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more well-knit than that of any other party. This has led one of the leading opinion poll surveys to conclude that the Congress might suffer in the coming elections in the Hindi belt in the north. The following figures will show the progress of the party since its birth :

Table 2

Year	Lok Sabha Seats		Assembly Seats	
	Contested	Won	Contested	Won
1952	93	3	715	34
1957	130	4	578	46
1962	196	14	1144	116
1967	250	50	2000	—

The Jana Sangh has more than doubled its membership from 6,00,000 in 1962 to 13,00,000 in 1967. It has a large cadre of young, efficient and dedicated workers. Its performance in 1952 was poor : it contested a total of 93 parliamentary seats and got only 3. This time it has an impressive performance not only in Delhi where it leads in all the three bodies, it has also improved its position in several State Assemblies, UP., MP., Rajasthan being outstanding. It was a participant in non-Congress governments in UP., Bihar and Haryana.

What could be the secret of its spectacular success in Delhi at the cost of the Congress ? On interviewing a fairly wide cross-section of Delhi people, taxi drivers, government servants, traders and migrants from Pakistan, belonging to middle class, it was apparent that they were, by and large, favourably inclined towards the Jana Sangh. Workers, students and the high society were generally indifferent, if not critical, of the Jana Sangh. But the major contributory factor in Jana Sangh's success is the large middle class whose loyalty it commands. The reaction of the intellectuals seemed evasive : there was no love lost between them and the Congress; yet, openly, they would not confess their support for Jana Sangh.

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The party attracts younger people, businessmen, white-collar workers, old and orthodox people, and agriculturists. Curiously, the Jana Sangh appeal is more in the urban than in the rural areas. The following table is a breakdown of the composition of the delegates who attended the General Council meeting of the party in Nagpur on November 3, 1966.

TABLE 3

Businessmen	..	129
Agriculturists	..	76
Services	..	31
Professions	..	83

In sum the reason for Jana Singh success in Delhi is implicit in the composition of the party.



PRAVIN N. SHETH

**ELECTIONS IN GUJARAT :
THE EMERGING PATTERN***

As in the other parts of the country, Gujarat also witnessed a highly competitive situation on the eve of the fourth general elections. The degree of acuteness of electoral competition was as high as the inponderability of its outcome; uncertainty of victory attended with high pitch of election campaign excited the people of the State with great interest and curiosity. Wild expectations of the impending "change" and high claims of the rival sides reached climacteric scale till the last vote was cast. And lastly, the unprecedented turnout of voters quietly thronging at the polling booths remained true for Gujarat as also for the rest of the country.

Distinctness of Gujarat Election

And yet the pattern of electoral outcome in Gujarat departs from the general pattern which has emerged in the most parts of India. In most of the States a sort of wide-spread political vacuum is created with the melting of the Congress dominance and political stability of the erstwhile Congress system giving way to the new state of political transition through instability and uncertainty. But Gujarat seems to have escaped such a stage of transition. While in most of the States, the election has given

- * In this study, an account is given of the setting and the background in which pre-election political processes took shape and an attempt is also made at statistical analysis of the results of elections in Gujarat. A resume is also given of the trends and processes which are either generated or accelerated by the election and also of the latent ones which are brought on the surface by it. An Attempt has also been made to gauge the shape and style of politics which have emerged as a result of election. As the detailed analysis of the results and interpretation of number of facts and empirically collected data are still under discussion and verification only broad generalisations are attempted at the end of this paper.

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rather uncertain answer to the challenge of giving a clear-cut alternative to the Congress rule, the election in Gujarat has answered this question not only convincingly but with confidence.

In many States the alliances or multiparty united fronts played important part in diminishing the strength of Congress. In Gujarat similar result was achieved in absence of such fronts or rather in spite of them. Also in many States the fourth general elections gave a new lease of life to splinter groups and also to the phenomenon of independents. In Gujarat they are eclipsed before the stormy force of polarisation. Also, unlike in many other States, the Gujarat Congress had not to undergo surgery within its body-politic before the general elections of 1967. As it will be observed in the last section of this study, the elections in Gujarat in terms of their outcome depart at many points from the mainstream of Indian elections.

POLL OF 1962

With no serious challenge to its dominance, the Congress returned to power in the general elections of 1962.

The Congress party fielded its candidates for all the 154 assembly seats and 22 Lok Sabha seats. It won a comfortable majority in the assembly by winning 113 seats. It captured 16 Lok Sabha seats. It won 70% of seats, but its polling strength declined from 56.92% in 1957 to 50.77%. The following table throws useful light on the poll results of 1962 :

TABLE 1
Performance of Congress

	1952*		1957*		1962		1967	
	V.S.	L.S.	V.S.	L.S.	V.S.	L.S.	V.S.	L.S.
Total Seats	157	22	132	22	154	22	168	24
Congress Seats	141	20	99	17	113	17	93	11
% of seats	89.81	90	75	77.17	73.38	72.72	55	45.8
Comparative gains or losses	-	-	+14.81	-12.73	-1.72	-4.45	-18.38	-31.92
% of votes	56.29	56.26	56.92	54.49	50.77	52.36	45.2	-
Comparative gains or losses	-	-	+ .63	- 1.82	- 6.15	- 2.08	5.57	-

* As part of the erstwhile Bombay State
V.S.—Vidhan Sabha; L.S.—Lok Sabha

ELECTIONS IN GUJARAT

The Swatantra party, a new entrant in the field, contested 106 assembly seats and 14 Lok Sabha seats. It secured 26 assembly seats and 4 Lok Sabha seats thus coming second to the Congress but far lagging behind the latter. It had won 16.1% of seats but notably polled 24.6% votes. However, its large percentage of votes was mainly due to the large number (106) of candidates put up the party.

The PSP had set up candidates for 53 assembly seats and 6 Lok Sabha seats. Its 7 assembly candidates and one Lok Sabha candidate were returned. It polled 7.7% votes.

Without the rightist and the PSP elements who had left the Janata Parishad with the formation of Gujarat State in 1960, the defunct Janata Parishad's strength declined from 27(1957) to one in 1962. It won one Lok Sabha seat mainly because of the personal popularity of its president Indulal Yagnik. The independents captured 8 seats.

The Jana Sangh proved too ambitious. It drew blank in the election although it fought for 22 assembly seats and 5 Lok Sabha seats. Its polling strength was 1.6%.

However, in terms of polling and legislative strength and areawise presence the erosion of Congress strength had started and the rightist forces had a definite edge over the leftist ones.'

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT : 1962-1966

Bye-Elections

The left communist leader Dinker Mehta had refused to accept the rise of the Swatantra Star as of any enduring significance in the election of 1962. He thought that "it...may be the last opportunity for the rightists, the dark hour before the dawn"

But the bye-elections which were held during the two years after the third elections indicated the growing strength of the Swatantra party. The table 2 on bye-elections shows that this party retained its seats in Kutch and Dohad and extended its dominance where it was defeated in February 1962. In the bye-election of Mandvi (Kutch) held in April 1962, it defeated an ex-Minister

1. Pathak, D.N., Parekh M.G. and Desai, K.D. : *Three General Elections in Gujarat*, Ch. IX.

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and a big gun of Congress in Kutch. In the bye-election for the Dohar parliamentary seat, the Swatantra retained the seat with a much increased margin over the Congress. The Rajkot bye-election of

TABLE 2
Bye-Elections (1962-1964)

Constituency	Date	1962		Bye-elections	
		Winning Party	Difference	Winning Party	Difference
1. Mandvi (V.S.)	April '62	Swatantra	+13604	Swatantra	+ 8027
2. Mahuva (V.S.)	" "	P.S.P.	+ 9495	P S.P.	+ 8891
3. Dohad (L.S.)	April '63	Swatantra	+ 4413	Swatantra	+14065
4. Rajkot (L.S.)	May '63	Congress	+41033	Swatantra	+14151
5. Shihor (V.S.)	May '63	Congress	+ 8041	Congress	+18108
6. Chikhli (V.S.)	Feb. '64	Congress	+ 2217	Congress	+ 4093
7. Amreli (V.S.)	Feb. '64	Congress	+ 7305	P S.P.	+ 828

May 1963 proved to be historic. It enabled the Swatantra to make an inroad into the Congress stronghold. The parliamentary bye-election was won by Minoo Masani "an outsider" and that also belonging to a minority and where the Swatantra party had no organisational roots. It was considered to be more impressive than the contemporary victories of Acharya Kriplani and Dr. Lohia over Congress.² As it was fought not on personalities but over issues like rising prices, heavy taxes and gold Control, it was considered to be "essentially the victory of the party".³ The Indian Express evaluated it as "one more nail in the Congress coffin".⁴ The bye-election brought the variegated elements like the Jashdan prince, Khedut Mandal and the Jana Sangh nearer the Swatantra party and were to form the support structures of this party in the Saurashtra region. It thus opened the gateway of Saurashtra to the Swatantra party.

But soon after when the Swatantra lost sight of reality and tried to fight the PSP as well as Congress in the bye-election for the Amreli assembly seat vacated by Jivraj Mehta on his assumption

2. *The Times of India*, 30 May 1963.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Indian Express*, 29 May 1963.

of the post of the High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, it ignominiously lost to the PSP. But the 1965 victory of Swatantra's nominee against the formidable Congress nominee Trikamlal Patel (president of Ahmedabad City Congress) in a Rajya Sabha election revealed the subtle fissure in the Congress rank and boosted the morale of its chief contender. The Congress retained its two seats of Chikli and Shinor in the bye-elections. The Mahuwa seat was retained by the PSP. Shihor sent in Balwantrao Mehta to the Vidhan Sabha and many saw in it the coming crisis in the Congress government.

Bye-elections may not be precise indication of the political situation but they were to prove the index of popular opinion and suggest the shape of things to come.

The Jivraj Episode

After the Shihor elections, things moved fast within the Congress party and 10 years' controversy which had ended in a compromise now assumed a new form and a new proportion. The bosses of the Pradesh Congress who were lying low because of their rejection at the hands of the electorate in 1962 shrewdly outmanoeuvred the Jivraj group and ousted it from power. Some political observers saw in it a sort of revenge, which the Gujarat PCC took as an answer to Nehru's use of the Kamaraj plan against Morarji Desai. No wonder the ousting of Jivraj ministry created nationwide interest and the pro-Nehru leftist journals like *Link*, *Blitz*, *Century* and *Mainstream* bitterly criticised the action taken by the Gujarat PCC. The "*Sandesh*", a Gujarat daily of the State capital, largely reflected the popular resentment against the way the whole political operation was carried out.

Panchayat Elections

Meanwhile, with the ushering in of the panchayati raj in Gujarat in 1963, the Congress got some consolation for its losses in the bye-elections of Rajkot and Amreli. The Congress won 593 seats out of 727, capturing all the district panchayats including those of Kaira, Kutch, Panchmahal, Rajkot and Amreli where the opposition had successfully challenged it in the constituency politics.

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However, it may be noted that the "Jivraj Affair" did cast its shadow in the elections of the jilla panchayats of Rajkot, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Amreli, Surendranagar and Baroda where the official Congress nominees were defeated by nominees of dissident faction of the Congress. It significantly suggested that factionalism had now made its appearance within the generally unified structure of the State Congress.

Ahmedabad Civic Election

Another event of merit was the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election of April 1965 in which the Congress and its support-base Majoor Mahajan were given a crushing blow by the Janata Parishad. The capturing of the civic body in the State capital by a leftist party was noted by the Bombay and even Delhi papers like the *Statesman* and *Patriot*. But the Parishad's frantic move to repeat its triumphant performance in the ensuing civic elections all over Gujarat was disowned by most of the towns, big and small. However, the Corporation election in the State capital did establish that the dominance of the Congress could not be taken for granted.

Involvement of the Elites

On the electoral front one more episode is worth mentioning. The various Gujarat University bodies were considered till the fall of the year 1966 to be in the safe possession of some eminent Congress leaders. But the election of the dean of the faculty of arts and afterwards that of its Vice-Chancellor marked the decline of the Congress. The interest of the public and involvement of the intellectuals were evoked on an unprecedented scale and the press also significantly took bold and independent attitude to this problem. The victory of the leading non-Congress educationist and scholar and the favourable reaction of the press all over Gujarat to his victory symbolised the ushering of a new political climate in the thinking section of Gujarat population.

Bipolar Political Absorption

The period preceding the elections is always marked with the events of floor crossing and joining of some party by non-committed

groups and persons. Such events also show the political capacity of a party to absorb the various political elements. Most of them are normal and natural but some deserve especial mention. The merger of some top PSP leaders with the Congress in 1965 is such an event. At a mammoth Kisan rally in Pardi, Ishvarbhai C. Desai and other PSP leaders joined the Congress party with more than 14,000 followers. Their return to their mother institution strengthened the Congress in Bhavnagar and South Gujarat. Meanwhile the Swatantra was trying to widen its mass-base by bringing into its fold the interest-groups like Saurashtra Khedut Sangh, dominated by the Patidar peasantry, princely elements and Girasdar Sangh dominated by numerous Kathi communities of Saurashtra. By the middle of 1966 all these elements joined the Swatantra. The programme of the Swatantra was most acceptable to those conservative sections of the Gujarat society and it afforded, particularly to the princes, a political platform which could bring them in the mainstream of Gujarat politics. The princes of Bhavnagar, Vankaner, Jashdan and afterwards of Dhrol joined the rightist party. The Swatantra was benefitted by the natural organisational bases provided to it in the ex-princely areas. In May 1966 joining of the civil servants like H.M. Patel and C.C. Desai, veteran Congressman and industrialist like Vadilal Mehta and Cooperative worker like Prabhudas Patel boosted the morale of the Swatantra party and the party began claiming 90 seats⁵ in ensuing general elections. The largely attended Swatantra convention (October 1966) held in Ahmedabad, weak-spot of Swatantra party, seemed to have confirmed their hopes for expansion. On the other hand, in September, 1966 Brahmakumar Bhatt of the PSP joined the ruling party with his colleagues amidst much fanfare. This, if anything, reduced Bhatt's status and appeal among the people. But it was Narendrasinhji Mahida (Kshatriya Sabha leader) whose return to the Congress was to prove a great asset to the ruling party.

The overall significance of these phenomena of political absorption and inter-party migration is that the two main parties had monopolised benefits. Before their merger, those who merged with either party tried their best to retain their own

5. *The Times of India*, 7 May, 1966.

identity. But the powerful pull of polarisation forced the princes and leaders of Khedut Sanghs to merge their independent Pragatik groups into the coming surge of the Swatantra. Even individualists like H.M.Patel and Prof R.K. Amin had to prefer party identification to their own identity. Vadilal Mehta had to give up his project of formation of pressure group of commercial interests. And the PSP leaders one time purists had to merge with the Congress, their nearest ideological partners in India's political life and thus gave momentum to the growing ideological polarisation in Gujarat. The electoral processes began against the backdrop of such polarisation.

SELECTION STRATEGIES

The previous elections had educated the political parties in the art of designing their election strategies. This time the situation was also competitive. Thus most of the parties got awakened to the need of an early and planned preparation for the ensuing fight. The Congress and the Swatantra organisations had, therefore, grasped the importance of grooming of their candidates and nursing of the constituencies quite in advance.

It is very difficult to draw a clear picture of the main elements of the selection policy of various parties. The process is shrouded in darkness and exceptions to principles of selection sometimes turn out to be the rule. However, broad configuration of the bases of selection politics of various parties can be worked out. Generally, the elections in Gujarat were considered to be over with the selection of the candidates by the Congress. But this could not be repeated in the later half of 1966. Political observers and politicians this time took seriously the selection strategy of the Swatantra party.

Swatantra Strategy

To make sure that the bulk of the growing protest votes against the ruling party should go to it, the Swatantra had created its image as a psychological and ideological alternative to the ruling party. In its strategy also it, therefore, gave priority to the project of shaping such an image which would give momentum to the political polarisation in the State. The Swatantra wanted to introduce itself to the electorate as an alternative and not merely as an

opposition. It, therefore, adopted *the contest policy of universal confrontation as a principle and selective confrontation as an exception*, the latter to accommodate others where it was extremely weak.

The Swatantra party seemed to consider elections more as a strategy than as conflict of policies and ideologies. It launched a powerful offensive by releasing the first list of its parliamentary candidates as early as in September 1966. But it faced many difficulties in selecting candidates for the assembly out of about 1000 aspirants. It also wanted to avail itself of the possible defections from the Congress which might be caused after the final selection of the candidates by the Congress PEC.

The main criteria of selection was that the candidate must have at least one qualification—the ability to win. Its selection strategy was, therefore, three-fold :

(1) Its Parliamentary Board kept an eye on some leading personages of a given constituency and tried to bring local influential group leaders around him. In its search for such candidates like the Thakore of Chuda, Devan, Vadhvan and Gangad, the Board even ruthlessly ignored the claims of the party's senior and sincere workers, who had built up the party's local units against the heavy odds that it faced during the early sixties.

(2) Apart from this clique politics, the Board selected the candidates on the basis of their communal strength. The president of the party has gone on record stating that his party will distribute among the Kshatriyas and the Patidars (who together constituted about 60% of the population of Gujarat) about 66% of seats out of the total seats to be contested by his party.

(3) The third aspect of its selection strategy was to bring in its fold as many princely elements as possible. The Swatantra hoped to break open the hitherto closed region of Saurashtra through the princes of Vankaber, Jashdan, Bhavnagar, Dhrol and Surendranagar. Thus this time it successfully wooed the princely elements even at the cost of alienating its trusted lieutenants in Banaskantha, Surendranagar, Jamnagar and Panchmahal districts. This shows how ruthlessly pragmatic the Swatantra strategy was in

the IV general elections. As a result in the Panchmahal and Broach district many workers departed from the party and independently fought elections under the hurriedly created "Khedut Sanghs" and the like.

Congress Strategy

The PEC of the Congress looked composed against the Swatantra offensive. It was natural that contest policy hardly figured as an important element in its election strategy for it assumed its dominance and state-wide presence as traditional. However, while selecting its candidates, the Congress was conscious of the fact that it was posed with a very serious challenge of a formidable strength. It, therefore, kept in view the political record and party experience of the aspirants to its tickets but also waived conditions regarding sustained organisational loyalty as in Banaskantha and Kaira districts.

With all their statements about winning more than 115 to 125 seats made for public consumption, the Congress leaders in the State this time assessed that their party would be returned to power only with a thin majority. They could see that in such a state of small majority politics, it was necessary that the new Congress legislature party should be coherent and be composed of members having more or less political uniformity and discipline. The PEC, therefore, avoided giving tickets to the dissident group led by Rasiklal Parikh and Ratubhai Adani. For the same reason candidatures of some of the ex-PSP workers who had serged in the Congress but had retained their political identity including the wife of widely respected late Ishwerbhai Desai were rejected because their emotional identification with the party was found lacking. Thus the selectors of the ruling party chose as a policy only those who were close to Gujarat PCC and they did not mind even the risk of encouraging defections from the party by the discontented and this actually happened in Jambusar, Surendranagar, Junagadh and Rajkot. For the same reason the claims of the redoubtable and influential pressure groups of the Khedut Mandals in the Banaskantha and Sabarkantha district were ignored. It may also be noted that, unlike in the third general elections, this time the

DCCs were not allowed effective say in the final decision made by the PEC.

The Congress generally selected its candidates on the basis of following factors :

- (1) Due representation to minorities and weaker sections of the society;
- (2) Infusion of "fresh blood";
- (3) Principle of change and rotation; and
- (4) A definite qualitative improvement⁶ in composition of the new Congress legislative membership.

The party was also governed by such factors as

- (5) Local origin and local contacts of the candidates;
- (6) Socio-political background and economic well-being, and
- (7) Socio-economic infrastructure of the respective constituencies.

But at many points it deviated from this line of selection. If the Swatantra gave tickets to the dissident Congress workers in Baroda (ru al), Bulsar and Bhavnagar, the Congress also absorbed some ex-Swatantrites by selecting them for some seats of Kalol, Banaskantha and Bulsar. The Congress also did not lag behind the Swatantra in selecting its candidates mainly on communal basis particularly in the Kaira (Kshatriya and Patidars) and Rajkot (Kunbis) districts. At times and only at times it ignored the services of its old members and selected rich persons for the parliamentary seats to use their resources as sinews of war for the assembly constituencies. But the Swatantra's fondness for such candidates would easily eclipse such efforts on the part of the Congress.

On the whole, it can be said that the ruling party was more liberal in selection of its candidates. It adopted criteria other than purely the winning-potentiality of candidates. About 50% of the candidates (110 out of 168) fielded by the Congress were new comers or "new blood." While the chief political contenders to the ruling party could not select a single female candidate (it did

6. Note of Gujarat PCC to CEC of the Congress (unpublished).

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not risk any chance to lose a single seat), the latter gave tickets to as many as 14 female aspirants. It was also more progressive in selecting candidates from minority communities even when such choice was not considered to be politically prudent at the time of selection. The Congress showed remarkable confidence in meeting the challenge posed by the offensive selection strategy of the Swatantra party. The latter released the lists of its candidates by instalments and in stages; the ruling party gave a good account of its hold on the political situation by selecting all its candidates at a stretch and through a single list on 2 November, 1966.

ELECTORAL ALLIANCES

In the beginning all the opposition parties, barring the PSP were more or less eager to adopt contest-avoidance policy so as to prevent the fragmentation of the anti-Congress or protest votes between them which would otherwise benefit the ruling party. Although exact nature of the negotiations and points and issues invoked in them is difficult to discern because of its secret complexion, some reliable guess can be made on the basis of hostile propaganda shrewdly made in the local newspapers by the groups and parties concerned and also by individual interviews with the politicians who mattered.

Rightist Parties

The Swatantra party from the very beginning had adopted big brotherly attitude and wanted to field as many candidates against the Congress as possible without consulting other opposition parties. However, against the perspective of proposed rightist (Swatantra-Jana Sangh) alliance at the national level, the regional unit of the party had to consider the demands of the local Jana Sangh for some electoral understanding. It is also possible that the latter indulged in some sort of political blackmailing by taking a posture that without their support Minoo Masani would find it difficult to retain his Rajkot parliamentary seat, an area of Jana Sangh influence.

However, the Swatantra party would not like to form joint alliance or coalition. It carefully avoided the suggestions of opposition leaders to sit together with all the opposition parties in order

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to forge a sort of united front as in other States like Kerala, West Bengal and Madras. It, therefore, took initiative in shaping the nature of anti-Congress alliance based on two fronts only. It wanted to explore the possibility of forging bilateral agreements or understanding one by one with various opposition parties and that also on a limited basis. Such a bilateral agreement was rather smoothly made with the Republican party and it had limited regional application. The next bilateral agreement or understanding was between the two Rightist parties—Jana Sangh and the Swatantra. The Jana Sangh conceded 15 seats to the Swatantra. But the agreement did not bind either to help the candidates of the other. It was clearly an agreement or adjustment and not an electoral alliance. The second implication of this agreement was that even the area like Amreli, Khadia (Ahmedabad) Una (Junagadh) and Sayaji Ganj (Baroda) which were PSP's sphere of influence (the first two had sent PSP candidates to the assembly in 1962) and Mahavadar (Junagadh) conceded to Republican party by a previous agreement were written away by the Swatantra to its rightist partner. It, therefore, invited very sharp reaction from the PSP. It said that the Swatantra did not care to take into its view the claims and interest of other brethren (opposition) parties, and it was out to squeeze the PSP out of Gujarat politics.⁷ The Swatantra strategists, however, justified its policy by saying in private that the multilateral alliances give useless lease of life to splinter parties in the elections and obstruct the growing process of polarisation. There was logic behind the Swatantra's ruthless alliance strategy.

The Swatantra–Jana Sangh understanding was forged after a series of interrupted negotiations clouded in air of mistrust. It seems the regional leadership had to concede to the pressure of the national wing of the party on this point.⁸ The bilateral "alliance", therefore, remained limping behind its objective. Much doubts were cast and charges levied by the Jana Sangh about the Swatantra *bonafides* even after the announcement of their understanding. And although there was evidence⁹ that both these rightist parties

7. *Jana Satta*, 16 May, 1967.

8. *Jana Satta*, 16 May, 1967.

9. Joint Statement by both the parties thanking their supporters in *Jai Hind Rajkot*, 25 March, 1967; *Lok Satta*, Baroda, 25 March, 1967.

showed spirit of co-operation to get the Swatantra candidates elected in Junagadh and Baroda. Bhailalbhai Patel's open admission in May 1967 that it was a blunder¹⁰ which harmed the interest of his party speaks eloquently about its utility to the partner.

The rightist alliance woke up the leftist parties like the PSP and the Janata Parishad. The former even shed its loudly announced purist policy¹¹ of 'go it alone' and anti-intra-oppositional alliance. The Swatantra willy-nilly negotiated with the PSP but both violently differed in their assessment of relative strength of each other in such areas as Godhra (Panch Mahals), Savli and Savarkundla. The break up of the negotiation resulted in hostile and bitter press statements and vituperative counter statements.

The Janata Parishad like the PSP also talked of the pooling of organization and political resources by the opposition, prevention of pushing in each other's strongholds, avoiding splitting of votes and supporting other party's candidate where he was in weak position—all this "to end the evil Congress rule"—but no formal electoral pact of significance and statewide impact could be recorded in spite of a lot of informal talks between the opposition.

A note may also be taken of informal understanding between dissident Congress and the Swatantra about pooling of resources and manpower and fusion of political influence in the districts of Junagadh, Surendranagar, Mehsana and Banaskantha.¹²

Leftist Parties

With the merger of its leading group with the ruling party, the PSP was left with some islands of influence scattered over a small number of constituencies. Also being drained in resources and personnel, it tried to conserve its energy and resources and concentrated its effort for only those seats and areas where, according to its assessment, the party had best chances of defeating the opponent.

10. *Jana Satta*, 16 May, 1967.

11. *Gujarat Samachar*, 24 May, 1967.

12. Congressmen's representations to various Inquiry Committees appointed by the Gujarat PCC.

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The morale of the Janata Parishad was boosted by the Corporation elections (1965) in the State capital but its effective organizational coverage was confined only to certain urban areas in Ahmedabad and Broach districts and other strongholds in parts of Saurashtra. It also had to adopt the strategy of selective opposition. It could complete its list of candidates only in December 1966 as it was paralysed by internal conflict between its three warring groups. The Jana Sangh had lost all the constituencies where it fought in 1962 but it wanted to widen its base in areas where it had put up some work and so decided to contest on a somewhat ambitious scale not commensurate with political reality.

For all these parties, it was the Congress which formed the point of reference for comparison in most of the cases. Table No. 3 indicates the effort made in terms of number of candidates by different parties to fight the electoral battle :

TABLE 3
Party-wise Candidates 1967 (Assembly)

<i>Party</i>	<i>No. of Candidates</i>
Congress	167
Swatantra	145 + 2
Janata Parishad	36
P.S.P.	37
Jana Sangh	16
S.S.P.	14
Republican	4
Independents	192
TOTAL	613

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES

During the fourth general elections Congress and the Swatantra became aware of the need to organise special election unit at Taluka panchayat level but the Congress could more successfully make *ad hoc* arrangements at the local levels because of its hold over the newly emerging power-centres in rural Gujarat. It particularly benefitted by the dynamic leadership provided by panchayat leaders in such districts as Kaira where the villagers sometimes knew the jilla

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panchayat more than the candidates. Apart from the two main parties, the Jana Sangh this time made more rigorous drive to contact the people by door-to door canvassing. Its small street processions largely succeeded in familiarising its symbol of the lamp. The Swatantra party this time resorted to large scale distribution of party flags, imaginative posters, plastic and steel badges and other miniature insignia as well as starred kites and big lighted paper-stars. These can be described as the 'contact' type propaganda technique. The Congress this time did not resort to large mass meetings with the help of their star leaders but relied on holding ward or street meetings and utilising of conventional contact channels which included family talks and caste influence. The Swatantra, Janata Parishad, the PSP and the Jana Sangh also frequently arranged street corner meetings. The Swatantra and the Jana Sangh particularly used traditional communication-channels like caste influence and religious mandate. While the PSP undertook door-to-door canvassing, the Jana Sangh hoped to benefit mainly from the issues of anti-cow-slaughter.

At candidates-level the technique of propaganda differed from candidate to candidate. But many of them took care to emphasize their election symbol (as in Godhra, Jamalpur and Baroda). In key-constituencies or highly competitive areas like Nadiad, Sankheda, Jamalpur, Dariapur-Kazipur, Patan and Junagadh, a mental image of the same in the public mind was constantly sought to be evoked. It is natural that the vast mass of the electorate being rural and illiterate, election symbol facilitate the task of the voter than the personal names and political labels of the candidates and the parties. The issues and manifestoes play much less, nay, negligible role in the campaign. But the candidates and the parties saw that their symbols were endowed with favourable connotations and pleasant associations, while the rival symbols with unfavourable connotations, ridicule and bad associations. In this respect the *Congress Patrika*, the official weekly of the Gujarat Pradesh Congress was most articulate, resourceful and imaginative. It is rather difficult for a party in power for two decades to explain many embarrassing issues which have come up during its rule but it refused to remain on the defensive and launched a power propa-

ganda offensive by skillfully utilising various forms of cartoons, articles and dialogues.

The Swatantra party started its mouth-piece, the *Swatantra Sandesh*. It tried to give answers to the propaganda of the *Congress Patrika* and unnecessarily remained on the defensive. It also devoted itself to creating a growth-image of itself by marshalling district and political trends that would indicate expansion of its support-bases. But on the whole, it looked dry and dis-interesting as it lacked in grasping the opportunities of scathing criticism on various issues which naturally comes so handy to opposition parties. The PSP weekly *Sangharsh* was impragmatically discussing ideological issues, while Janata Parishad's *Janata Raj* could not come out from its Congress-bating pursued in a hackneyed way.

The marked feature of the propaganda pattern in this election was the battle fought by the two parties on the pages of the leading local newspapers in all the important cities of Gujarat. The Congress this time displayed propaganda stripes in the newspapers long before the election date. It tried to project the Swatantra party as the union of princes and landlords and answered the Swatantra promise of abolition of land revenue by explaining that 100% land revenue collected by the government were to be returned to the panchayats to spend them for the rural masses at their door steps. It also did not spare the leftist Janata Parishad which it desc ibed as the conglomeration of the Communists "with affiliations abroad" and other warring and disjointed groups. The Swatantra, however, outsmarted the Congress on the pages of the newspapers. Adequately financed it utilised the newspapers space in all the big cities and it proved imaginative, and effective. It was more elegant in its format also. The battle of the two parties in monopolising Gandhiji's views by quoting him in one's own favour from the same source evoked much popular interest and the Swatantra stole a march over its rival on this point.

The conventional propaganda literature of folders, leaflets, booklets and the posters circulated by the Congress was dry and unimaginative, while those circulated by the Swatantra appeared to

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have been brought out after thoughtful consideration. Particularly worth-mentioning is the new form of its two-colour cartoon strips which brought into sharp focus the Congress failure over its promises, evils of the administration, "illusions of socialism" and economic agonies of the people. They all ended with the repetition of the theme "You (Congress) get out !" expressed by a common man vigorously kicking out the man with the white cap.

The Swatantra star also was popularised through the medium of screen. Even helicopters were used in the last phase of the propaganda campaign by a Swatantra industrialist. On the whole, it can be said that the Swatantra propaganda technique was more imaginative and modern. Perhaps, the young cell of intellectuals including some professors whose advice was carried through by the Swatantra strategists was responsible for this. However, it is difficult precisely to assess the impact of the rigorous propaganda drive which took place on an unprecedented scale. It is rather safe to agree with Butler that the election campaign might not have made any difference between victory and defeat but it probably has influenced the size of the Congress government. However, its overall impact in terms of public education and growth of popular awareness cannot be underestimated. The voter got awakened and familiarised as never before with the public issues, claims and counter-claims of different sides. And to that extent the propaganda campaign accelerated the process of politicisation of the masses in Gujarat.

An election that was so lively on the platforms, pamphlets, posters and party papers could not escape being reflected in the press. Since the press provides the raw material for much that is said on the hustings and then itself uses as food much that happens on the hustings, it could substantially build up the climax of the election. The leading regional papers were never as thorough, systematic and well proportioned in their reportage and features. Some of the newspapers especially brought out interesting features concerning the important issues, party politics and personalities as well as developing trends in electoral politics.

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VOTING BEHAVIOUR

The percentage of votes polled has generally gone up both for the Lok Sabha as well as assembly elections in Gujarat from 1952 to 1957. But this time the turn-out of the voters was as high as the intensity of the pre-poll campaigns. 67.46 lacs of the voters exercised their franchise in Gujarat which means an all time high of 63.66%. Polling trend such as this reveals both a rise in the level of participation as well as a certain uniformity in behaviour of the voters. Though it cannot be said that they voted with sufficient knowledge of comparative programmes of the parties it seems they did express negatively their discontent with the present state of affairs under the Congress rule.

Political mobilisation was higher in the rural than in the urban areas. Peasant castes and the Kshatriyas who generally live in villages have become aware of the importance of politics and have entered the political arena.

The voters' attitude towards the sitting member of the assembly is also revealing. About 50% of the Congress contestants who were sitting legislators were rejected at the poll. Similarly more than 60% of the Swatantra contestants who were sitting legislators were defeated at the polls. Among those defeated at the polls were two ministers and three deputy ministers and some Swatantra stalwarts. As a result the proportion of members newly elected has risen considerably. Over 60% of the legislators are new entrants. The voters' desire for "change" in the legislative composition as well as personalities was thus fairly reflected in the election.

POLL RESULTS*

Lok Sabha Results

The interesting feature of the result of the parliamentary election is that the Congress seats have for the first time gone down below 50% and the Swatantra has got a slight edge over it on this point. The Congress has secured 11 out of 24 seats,¹³ the Swatantra 12 (2 of them being "Independent" but having contested on the

* Figures and tables used in this article are prepared by the Department of Political Science, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.

13. The Congress has retained the Lok Sabha seat of Bhavnagar in bye-election held on 23-4-1967.

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Swatantra symbol) and one (Ahmedabad) was retained by Janata Parishad. The Congress has lost five seats, while the Swatantra has trebled its strength. In terms of regional presence and polling strength also the Swatantra gained at the cost of the ruling party. Though the Swatantra could not break open the Congress stronghold of South Gujarat, it has penetrated in Saurashtra by capturing the parliamentary seats of Surendranagar, Junagadh and Jamnagar and retained Rajkot which it won in a previous bye-election in 1963. In North Gujarat also, the Swatantra snatched 7 out of 8 seats from the Congress. Central Gujarat was evenly divided between the two parties. But neither of these two parties has unexceptionally got the second place in all the constituencies which it contested and lost. Polarisation between these two parties is, therefore, clearly discernible in the parliamentary elections. Most of the independents have lost their deposits. The PSP and SSP have lost one deposit each while the Republican party and Hindu Mahasabha each lost two. If we consider the seats won with 50% or more votes as safe seat (indicating the strength of the victor and decisiveness of the result) for the winning party, 11 seats were won in this way. Out of them one was secured by Janata Parishad, while the remaining 10 were equally shared by the Congress and the Swatantra. The remaining 13 seats remain wide open for both the chief political contenders and their competitive character is evident.

Assembly Elections

The Congress won 93 seats out of the total 168 seats thus retaining its majority with much reduced strength. For the first time it has failed to secure more than 50% of votes. Its polling strength declined from 50.77% to 45.2%.

In the third general election, it had increased its votes in two districts while lost in the remaining 14 districts. In the fourth one, it has increased its votes in 4 districts out of 17 and lost votes in 13 districts. In 15 out of the seventeen districts it has, however, failed to gain 50% of the votes cast. The decline of the ruling party-State-wise and district-wise, and the degree of its loss is remarkable.

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On the other side the polling strength of the PSP has gone down from 7.7% to 3.1% and the independents have stepped down from 10.28% to 7.0.

It is the rightist parties who have gained. The Jana Sangh, although an insignificant force in Gujarat politics has increased its polling strength from 1.3% to 2.1%. However, in the event of the generally stagnant opposition position, the Swatantra has considerably increased its polling strength from 24.33% to 37.5%. In terms of regional distribution of power also, this party has increased its strength in 15 districts and lost in two. Regionally speaking, the Swatantra has scored over the Congress in North Gujarat, shared almost evenly with it the legislative and polling strength in Kutch Saurashtra as well as Central Gujarat, while it failed effectively to challenge the ruling party in South Gujarat. In all, more than 83% of votes cast by Gujarat electorate are divided between these two parties.

Thus the process of polarisation between the two parties has made the difference between their political dominance narrow and marginal.

Seats-Votes Co-relationship

In 1962 the Congress won 73.33% of seats on the strength of 50.77 votes, while the Swatantra got 16.28% seats on 24.38% of votes. This time the co-relation between the seats and votes has somewhat reduced the disparities. The Congress has gained 55% seats with about 46% votes. While the Swatantra has gained 40% seats with 37.5% votes. The Swatantra has gained 23 more seats at the cost of the Congress which lost 18 seats and other parties which lost 5 seats. The Congress emerged with 92 seats, the Swatantra with 66, PSP with 3, Janata Parishad with 2 and the Jana Sangh made its debut with one seat. Thus 95% of seats are divided between the two main political contenders in Gujarat.¹⁵

15. The final tally is—Congress 93, the position of other parties remaining the same. An uncontested seat of Jetpur was won by the Congress on 12 March, 1967. The Dhrangadhra seat vacated by a Swatantra legislator was retained in bye-election (23 April, 1967) by the Swatantra.

Regional Distribution of Power

The regional pattern of the party position also follows the pattern of parliamentary elections. The Congress has lost all the seats to the Swatantra in the two districts of Sabarkantha and Surendranagar but gained in Kutch, Bhavnagar, Kaira, Bulsar and Amreli. The Swatantra lost its claims of superiority in the Kutch and Kaira districts. It did not get a single seat in Bulsar and Amreli districts. But on the final tally it has almost doubled the area of its legislative strength. In the Saurashtra region which was closed to it, the Swatantra has made a forceful entry. In North Gujarat where its strength was peripheral it has overwhelmed the Congress. The notable improvement of its position in North Gujarat from 4 out of 43 seats in 1962 to 24 out of 47 seats in 1967 becomes meaningful from the view point of future political developments in the region. In Saurashtra and Central Gujarat both the main parties of Gujarat are approximately even. But the South Gujarat is the weakest link for the Swatantra party in terms of its strategy and performance. The Congress victory of 25 seats out of the total 28 seats in the region has exposed the weakness of the opposition parties in this area and it has proved the Achilles heel for the Swatantra. However, elsewhere the political situation as indicated by the electoral results is highly competitive.

Though the resultant outcome of the above picture based on the seats-votes relationship has frustrated the Swatantra ambition to capture power in Gujarat, it has proved that its claim to form the government was realistic and rationally calculated. The Congress also proved its claim but with its strength deflated. It is forced to change from the era of "big majority politics" to that of "small majority politics."

Second Place

Another device of getting insight into the future trends of polarisation is the assessment of relative "second place" in constituencies where they have lost. The Congress has secured 93 seats and secured second place in 71 out of the remaining 75 seats, where as the Swatantra has got 66 seats and secured second place in 70 seats out of the remaining 102 seats. Thus the people gave first or

second preference to the Congress in as many as 164 seats, whereas they likewise treated the Swatantra in as many as 136 places. Thus more than 78% of the constituencies are polarised between the two main political parties in Gujarat. It may also be noted that the Swatantra got first or second place in Amreli, Bhavnagar and Bulsar districts by removing the PSP, at the cost of the Janata Parishad in the Broach district; and in the Rajkot and Junagadh districts and Surat city by knocking out the independents from their second places which they had got in the elections of 1962.

Majority—Minority Seats

Out of the 93 seats that it won, the Congress has gained 53 seats on the majority votes while the Swatantra has gained 47 of its 66 seats on the majority votes. Out of the said 53 seats the Congress has won 45 seats with a margin of more than 5000 votes, while the other party has won 34 out of its 47 majority seats with the same margin. The average calculated on the basis of counting safe seats on the above mentioned two-fold criteria leads one to believe that 51 seats of Congress and 41 seats of the Swatantra may be considered as safe seats. On the same basis, both the seats of the Janata Parishad and one seat of the PSP can be placed in the category of safe seats. In this way as many as 95 (60%) out of 168 seats in the Gujarat assembly are safe or indicate secure and strong position of their respective incumbent parties. It leads one to hypothesise that the general elections of 1967 have thrown out a rather stable and perhaps enduring political pattern of bipartism in Gujarat.

Straight Fights

In the elections of 1967 straight contests took place for 35 seats out of which in 34 constituencies Congress was challenged by the Swatantra, while in one it faced the Jana Sangh. It is generally believed that in the multi-Cornered fights, the Congress benefits as the majority anti-congress votes get divided between the opposition parties, while in straight fight the opposition has a better chance to win. But in the elections of 1967 out of the total 37 seats for which direct contests took place, the Congress had won as many as 24 seats while the remaining 13 went to the Swatantra. In the

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parliamentary election of 1967 also, the Congress won 4 seats and the Swatantra won one seat in straight contests. In the elections of 1967, the Congress defeated its only rival Jana Sangh in Sidhpur, while it defeated the Swatantra in 16 contests. The Swatantra won 18 seats in direct fight against the Congress. For the parliamentary seats, out of the total 6 straight contests, the Congress won 4 seats and conceded the remaining two to its only rival Swatantra. Thus the "near-certainty of Congress defeat in straight fights" is a political myth. No generalisation about the outcome of straight fight can be made on the basis of the results.

EMERGING TRENDS

Growing Polarisation

The process of polarisation of popular preference in Gujarat was at its speediest rate of all other States in India. Even in Madras DMK as the only opposition party in India, has been able to form the government on its own, through its electoral adjustment with most of the non-Congress. In many other States the anti-Congress fronts gave fresh dose to the small parties and independents for their survival. But the fourth general election in Gujarat has decisively weeded out all the splinter groups and mushroom forces in favour of the two main parties. This is abundantly borne out by the following analysis :

(1) In the Panch Mahal district, the Khedut Sangh "of small farmers and the Baraiyas" (a Kshatriya caste group) formed by the dissident old workers who defected from the Swatantra was ignored by the voters who confined their preference either for the Congress or the Swatantra.

(2) In Jamalpur Constituency of Ahmedabad city area an independent candidate who won the last Corporation elections with highest number of votes was ignored and the real fight took place between the Congress and the Swatantra which was completely a new entrant in the area.

(3) Out of 178 independents who fought the elections as many as 162 candidates lost their deposits. Even independent candidates of Jamalpur and Dariapur-Kazipur constituencies who

were very successful in their performance in the Corporation elections lost deposit.¹⁵

(4) The Kshatriyas, the largest caste-group in Gujarat, are formidable candidates in the politics of numbers. But when some ambitious Kshatriyas stood as independent candidates in the Kshatriya areas, they suffered defeat. In Sabarkantha, Kaira and Mehsana districts they were dragged away by the pull of polarisation.

(5) Other parties are also pushed away in the powerful polarising currents. As against the large number of seats they contested, their success was indeed negligible and they have now small, and a limited number of pockets or islands of influence. Out of the 168 candidates of the Congress only 2 lost their deposits and out of 146 Swatantra only 5 candidates lost their deposits. Other parties lost deposits considerably.

Thus the distribution of seats and votes, capacity to maintain second place, and direct contest and weakness of the other parties underline the process of political polarisation which has taken place between the Congress and the Swatantra.

Social Basis of the New Legislators

The vast bulk of the Kshatriyas and the Patidars who dominate the demographic statistics of Gujarat have acquired a major share in the legislative strength of Gujarat assembly. There are 34 members who describe themselves as Patels (Kunbi Patidar, Chaudhari Patel or Koli Patel) and 45 Kshatriyas (belonging to different sub-groups of varying social levels). Out of them 22 Patels belong to the Congress and 12 to the Swatantra. 21 Kshatriya members belong to the Congress, while 24 belong to the Swatantra. In the last assembly the total strength of these two communities was 44 out of which 30 were Patels and 14 were the Kshatriyas. Thus the 34:45 ratio as against 30:14 shows that the balance is clearly tilted in favour of the Kshatriyas. Another point which may be noted is that in the former assembly out of 30 Patel members 21 belonged to the Congress, while only 8 belonged to the

15. Also all the independents who contested the bye-elections of Bhavnagar (Lok Sabha) and Dhrangadhra (Assembly) lost deposit.

Swatantra and one to the independent Pragatik Group. Out of the 14 Kshatriyas only three belonged to the Congress. This time the Congress has widened its social base. Its structure has thus become more composite and well-proportioned.

Performance of the Princes

The performance of the princely elements in Gujarat is worth noticing. More than 200 States and principalities of the Gujarat region were merged in the erstwhile Bombay State in 1950. Their role in the first two general elections was insignificant. In 1962 these feudal and conservative elements found their natural spokesman in the newly born Swatantra party which gave ideological and interest articulation to their needs. Some of them, therefore, fought the elections of 1962 under the star and all but one of them (Maharaja of Santrampur) won. The Maharaja of Kutch won both the seats he contested—assembly and parliamentary. Those who stood as independents (Rajkot, Mangarol and Bhavnagar) also won. But in 1967, their performance was not equally impressive. The Maharaja of Santrampur got defeated again, this time in his own former State-area. The Maharaja of Kutch was defeated in both the assembly and the parliamentary constituencies. Three of his other nominees in the Kutch also got defeated. The Yuvraj of Bhavnagar who contested this time with the star got elected to the assembly but lost the Lok Sabha constituency to the service-minded Congress candidate Jashwant Mehta, who is holding now the portfolio of finance and industry in the government of Gujarat. The Maharaja of Baroda who as a Congress candidate polled the highest number of votes (73%) in the parliamentary elections of 1962 and helped to obtain 7 assembly seats for his party, won this time. But he got much less votes even for the assembly seat against a comparatively insignificant opposition offered by the Jana Sangh and could not render much help to his Congress colleagues to win seats in the Baroda city. Thus the people could not be taken for granted by those princes who lost contact with the people. Their glamour has faded and they have lost irrespective of the parties they represented. The triumph of democratic forces over the princely order is a sign of progressive trend in voting behaviour of the Gujarat people.

Secularisation

The political behaviour of the two major communities that constitute the social infrastructure of Gujarat is also interesting. In 1952 and 1957 the Congress had maintained its dominance in Kaira and other districts with the help of the Kshatriya Sabha. But in 1962 the two-year old (rather young) Swatantra party made a powerful entry by winning over these two communities on its side. In the fourth general elections, the Kshatriya votes seem to have been divided between the Swatantra "Kshatriya Sabha" and the new "Seva Samaj" founded by the Congress for political purpose, on the eve of 1967 elections. The Kshatriya sentiment as a community played significant role in sending to Lok Sabha a Kshatriya candidate of the Swatantra party against a rich Patel candidate of the Congress. In the Anant assembly and parliamentary elections a very capable candidate in H.M. Patel was defeated by his Kshatriya opponent whom the Congress fielded on communal consideration. In the same way in the Kshatriya-majority areas wherever the non-Kshatriyas stood against the Kshatriyas (as in Umreth, Balashinor, Anand, Mahudha, Sanand, Prantij and other constituencies) the latter got elected irrespective of their party labels (except in stray cases like Thasara in Anand taluka). In the same way, the victory of all the three Kunbi (Patidar) candidates in the Rajkot district justified the earlier consideration of the Congress. And yet such behaviour on communal basis might not have adversely affected politics. It is correct that both the major parties of Gujarat carefully considered the communal element in their arithmetic of electoral politics and yet, unlike the first three general elections, the fourth general elections create a new possibility so far as the Kshatriya votes are concerned. The political affiliations of the community of Gujarat in the election of 1967 seem to have been divided between the two main parties and if we review their different attitudes in four general elections in Gujarat we can conclude that this large social group has not uniformly remained "closed" to one single political party at the cost of the other party. In the same way the number of the Patidar legislators belonging to the two parties was very much uneven in the last assembly but now it has got considerably distributed between the Congress and the Swatantra, thereby showing that their political affiliations also are

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not monopolised by a single political party. The political strength of both the social groups is divided between the two parties, so that no single politically effective community has its allegiance to a single party nor a single party depends upon a single large community. Thus it is difficult for any single party to capture power by relying on a single major community which otherwise may give rise to communal politics. The Maharaja of Kutch who won all the assembly and parliamentary seats in 1962 frustrated this time the non-Rajput candidates of his party in getting the Swatantra ticket. As a result the social base of the Swatantra party in the Kutch district got contracted and it was one of the important reasons for the fact that the Maharaja sustained defeat in this Swatantra stronghold. Thus the election of 1967 in Gujarat has accelerated the process of secularisation¹⁶ by emphasising the political need of the large social forces to seek alliance with smaller social forces to win the elections. Other illustrations also may be noted here which help to sustain this hypothesis.

Thus even the constituencies which seemed definitely set for voting on one-way communal basis contributed (of course, along with other factors) to the victory of candidates having very limited social base in these areas. The facts and figures given above are not discussed in complete perspective and their implications are not fully assessed in more intensive way, nor are they empirically verified. But they lead one to project the hypothesis that in the elections of 1967 the process of secularisation has been strengthened more than communal politics. The elections have amply demonstrated that no single party can depend merely on a single large and effective social group. This trend, perhaps, will find parallel in Madras where the DMK had evolved in 1966 a composite social

16 In Anand city, a predominantly Patidar area, H.M.Patel secured less votes than his Kshatriya rival. In Baroda (East) a Muslim area, Muslim candidate of the Congress and the ex-Speaker got less votes than what he secured in 1962. Another Muslim candidate lost deposit, while the Hindu candidate of the Swatantra won. The Hindu candidate of the Congress in Jambusar got 1329 votes and the Muslim candidate of the Swatantra polled only 33 votes in Kavi village, a Muslim area. In Jamalpur the Hindu areas largely voted for the Muslim candidate of the Swatantra as against 2 Hindu independent candidates.

structure by inviting the Brahmins whom it so far detested and fought, and in Maharashtra where the Maratha-dominated Congress has tried to associate with itself a large section of the Harijans and other scheduled groups through the Republicans (Gaekwar group). This has prevented the dominant communities from capturing power by exclusive association with a single major political party.

Socialisation of Minorities

Another socio-political aspect of the electoral process is also worth noticing. The minorities, hitherto traditionally loyal to the Congress, seem to have started shifting loyalties to other parties. With greater drive and articulation they have begun supporting non-Congress parties. Thus they have now shed their traditional political insulation and inaction and have started mingling in the mainstream of national politics processed by elections. Thus socialisation of the hitherto insulated minorities is precipitated in these elections with greater clarity than before.

Like the religious minorities the princely elements have also given away their cautious posture and entered into the political fray. For this they had to shed their palatial air and had to go deep into the distant villages and the poorest hamlets. As in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh a sort of democratisation of these elements, although on a limited scale, was clearly marked during the political campaigns of the election. In the same way the hitherto dormant caste groups having large social membership have become articulate in the elections. The tenor of campaign speeches wooing these groups and very large number of their candidates make it abundantly clear that politicisation of these otherwise backward caste groups has taken place on an unprecedented scale. They have demanded their shares commensurate with their number in the power and other patronage centres. Myron Weiner's description of "participation-crisis" could not have been more graphically and substantially proved than by the elections of 1967.

Thus the elections of 1967 have forced the princely elements to become more responsive to the people, sent the traditional dominant groups and the capitalists (Vadilal Mehta, Piloo Mody, Dharmasingh Desai, Purushottamdas Japi, Virendra Gandhi,

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Manubhai Munshi) before the people for winning political support, activated the bureaucrats (H.M. Patel, N. Dandekar, C.C. Desai) to project a favourable public image, socialised the minorities, politicised the majority communities and perhaps brought a secular impact on politics through communal groups. This whole phenomenon may be characterised as democratisation.

Big Money Enters

This year the rich houses actively participated in the elections as never before. Hitherto most of the commercial and industrial houses financially helped the ruling party almost exclusively and then nursed their interest by working as a pressure-group from within the Congress party. As in Rajasthan, in the elections of 1957 many capitalists have now openly come out, some under the Congress banner but most of them under the Swatantra banner. Their appearance in open arena gave a tremendous boost to the evil practice of heavy expenditure after elections. No doubt, with better finances they could evolve better, more effective and sophisticated communication media to reach thousands of voters. The fact that those candidates who entered the election contest in the last few weeks (Junagadh) or those who were outsiders (Godhra and Jamnagar) with no service record to the area of their contest also won, speaks volumes for the effective role of money and the election machinery.

Role of Panchayati Raj

This time the opposition, particularly the Swatantra party broke open the hitherto closed distant parts of rural Gujarat. The panchayati raj machinery became useful in the propaganda campaigns. Many elective panchayat office bearers acquired tremendous importance for the candidates to reach the rural masses for propaganda. The villagers got exposed to the competing ideas and issues and thus could not now be taken for granted. This has created a new possibility, the village areas acquiring increased importance. The centre of political gravitation can hardly now remain stable in urban Gujarat.

ELECTIONS IN GUJARAT

DEVELOPING PATTERN

Two-Party System

Elections not only give momentum to forces already at work but they also give rise to new forces. They give shape to political system and party relationships. In these elections two party system has emerged and nowhere perhaps it is so convincingly set as in Gujarat. On the counts of (a) seats secured, (b) votes polled, (c) narrow margin between the main contending parties, (d) propensity of these parties to project their ideological and psychological image as an alternative of each other, (e) width of regional mass base, (f) the poor performance put up by other parties and independents, (g) spread of organisational net work and (h) socio-economic base, the two political parties have become close rivals of each other. And the emergence of the Swatantra alternative tends to be enduring. The growth of the rightist forces in Gujarat can be traced back as early as in 1952. In all the elections, they have fared better than the leftist parties. The liberal mind of an average Gujarati, socio-economic infrastructure of Gujarat politics, existence of a fairly large self-sustaining peasantry and not so much left-oriented working class—all these elements have given it constancy in development and endurance in existence. Thus unlike the Janata Parishad which put up a good show in 1957 only on emotional and temporary issue of Maha Gujarat, the Swatantra has emerged as a real alternative to the Congress in Gujarat. And therefore bipartism has a reasonable chance to survive and develop. Geopolitically also it reminds one of England where the two party system has come to stay. The large sea-shore that opens doors to new ideas, commercial temperament which welcomes peaceful change of government and avoiding revolutionary changes, and the large middle class which absorbs the shocks of conflicts arising out of socio-economic distances of classes—all these features are also seen in Gujarat. Thus this election may probably go down in history of Indian politics as one that gave rise to two party system in Gujarat. There are also possibilities that this process of bringing change without affecting parliamentary stability will receive popular legitimisation in the elections to come.

Small Majority Politics

If elections decide the way in which the party system is to work, its importance as means to shape the nature, technique and

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style of politics also cannot be ignored. The last poll has returned the Congress to power with much less reduced and vaneer-thin majority. Gujarat has now, therefore, to adjust from big majority politics to small majority politics. This will necessitate on the one hand the need for greater cohesion and cooperation between the organisational and ministerial wings of the ruling party and stress, on the other hand, the need for unity and uniformity within its legislative wing, to guard its narrow majority. In the new situation the capacity of the discontented faction within the party to press for gain before the ruling group will be increased, for, defections from its fold would mean loss of power for the ruling group. The ruling group in the government, therefore, cannot remain, as before, nonchalant or complacent about its relation with the rival faction. Its style of politics is bound to differ now. If the elections of 1967 would thus considerably affect the intra-party politics it would also influence the inter-party politics. The government would have to be more responsive and considerate towards the opposition parties also. It would have to take siesmographic note of the changing tactics of the opposition and changing needs of the people. And amongst the almost equally balanced political forces of the emerging bipartism even small splinter groups may become important in a crisis-situation which can erupt at any moment in the new system of small majority politics.

Thus the stable and peaceful politics in Gujarat promises to be dynamic and continuously fluid and, therefore, of abiding interest to the political scientists.

B. B. SINHA

THE FOURTH GENERAL
ELECTION IN HARIYANA

HARIYANA went to the polls for the first time during the IV general election. When the election was over, the swing of the pendulum, as expected, was towards the Congress. But now there is the government of the United Front with Rao Birendra Singh, an ex-Congressman, as the leader. The political map of the State has changed beyond the expectations of the beneficiaries of change. The arithmetic of the election is unable to tell the whole story of the change brought about in the political scene of the State. This was the most dramatic change-over of power which the new State staged.

Before discussing the IV general election and its aftermath, a short study of Hariyana's political, social and economic structure is very essential. It came into existence on 1 November 1966 in accordance with the Punjab-Reorganisation Bill passed by the Indian Parliament on September 10, 1966. Its area is about 16,835 sq. miles and its population is 76,10,700.¹ There are only seven districts in Hariyana : Gurgaon, Mahendragarh, Rohtak, Hissar, Karnal, some parts of the Sangrur (now Jind) and Ambala.²

The Hariyana people speak many dialects of Western and Rajasthani Hindi, the most important of which are the Mewati, Ahirawati, and Bangru. The Mewati is spoken in some parts of Gurgaon district and that is why this region is called Mewat. The people of the districts of Gurgaon and some other parts of Mahendragarh and Rohtak speak Ahirawati.³ The most important of

1. *The Spokesman*, Vol. XV, July 25, 1966.

2. Government of India, *The Punjab Boundary Commission Report*, May 31, 1966, para 136.

3. K.C. Yadav, *Ahirwal Ka Itihas*, chapter 11, pp. 49-51.

all the dialects of this region—the Bangru—is spoken in the districts of Rohtak, Hissar, Jind, Mahendragarh and Karnal.⁴

There are many communities in Hariyana. According to 1961 Census, 67.5 lakhs people in this State are Hindus, 5 lakhs Sikhs, 3 lakhs Muslims, 26 thousand Jains, 85 hundred Christians, and 7 hundred Buddhists.⁵ These different communities live together peacefully. In spite of strained relations between Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab or in some other part of the country, these two communities are very much friendly. If at all there is any conflict that is purely economic and not religious.

Every religion is further divided into castes. By caste stratification is usually understood the division of the society into hierarchially ranked, hereditary, occupational groups. There are tribes and sub-castes within castes, as well as great deal of differentiation within each of these divisions. The important castes among Hindus are Ahirs, Jats, Brahmins, Bishnois, Gujars, Khatri, Malis, Rajputs, Rohrs and Harijans. The Sikhs are also divided into many sub-castes, *i.e.* Jats, Khatri, Aroras, Tarkhans and Harijans. The majority of the Muslims is Meos (216800) and other castes such as Rangraj, Lohars etc. number only a few thousand. The refugees from West Pakistan are a separate caste into themselves, subdivided by the districts from which they migrated.

Hariyanvi Hindus are by no means a united group. There are several divisions among them. First, there are the Hindu refugees from Pakistan, who are generally more sympathetic to the interest of the Hindu community in the Punjabi Suba. This is natural also. They are the people speaking the same language, cradled in their infancy with the same maternal songs and inspired by the same memories, the same source of literary genius. They differ socially and culturally from the local population of Hariyana. Secondly, there are Harijans. They have been opposed to the Hindu Jats, as before independence, the Jats dominated the area not

4. S.C. Yadav, *Hariyana Paksh Ka Lok Sahitya*, pp. 66.

5. *n.* 2, pp. 103-36.

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only economically and socially but also politically through a system of weighted franchise. The movement for Hariyana State has been opposed by the Harijans and the refugees in this region. Apart from the Harijans and refugees there prevail many factional divisions among the Hindus of this region. The general social structure of Hariyana is very much like that of Bihar—a caste dominated society

One aspect of caste in Hariyana with important political implications is the basic conflict in the rural areas between the high caste landowning agriculturists class and the scheduled castes along with other backward classes. A rough estimate based on 1951 statistics would place them at about 17% in this State.⁶

Hariyanvi people are primarily agriculturists. Their per capita income is Rs. 540 compared to Rs. 637 in Punjab.⁷ The Hindu Jats form the bulk of the agriculturist communities in Hariyana and are predominant in the districts of Rohtak, Hissar and Mohindergarh.⁸ Business is primarily in the hands of the Banias and refugees. Harijans provide agricultural and menial labour.

The people of Hariyana have remained economically and culturally backward. It was none of their fault. A perusal of the history of Hariyana tract for a few decades after its annexation with Punjab after 1857 shows that the region on account of its people's vigorous participation in the uprising of 1857 were held in great contempt by the Punjab authorities. All the benefits of British rule were denied to them. No educational facilities were given; no means of irrigation were provided; the doors of the government services were closed for them; means of communication were neglected badly. In fact the people of Hariyana were reduced to the hewers of wood and drawers of water.⁹ This grave injustice

6. Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 21.

7. *Link*, 30 October, 1966.

8. M.S. Randhava and Prem Nath, *Farmers of India (Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir)* New Delhi ; Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 1959, p. 120.

9. For all round backwardness of the region see *The Report of the Hariyana Development Committee*, Chandigarh, 1966.

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done to them gave birth to the demand for the detachment from Punjab and formation of a separate State.

A study of the political behaviour of the people of Hariyana is very interesting. The most interesting feature to be noted is that the Hindu leaders of this region have found it possible from time to time to co-operate and combine with political groups which the Hindus of the rest of Punjab considered inimical to the general interests of the Hindu community. Before the partition the support of the Hindus for the Unionist party, which was branded as anti-nationalist and pro-Muslim, came from Hariyana. After independence the Hindu leaders of Hariyana at times, directly or indirectly, supported the claims of certain sections of the Sikh community, which the Hindus of Punjab region felt, were injurious to the interests of the Hindu community. Again with the Congress party, the change-over of governmental leadership from a Hindu Chief Minister to Sikh one in 1956 was accomplished largely with the help of Congress leaders of Hariyana. This phenomenon suggests that sectional loyalties can cut across loyalty to a single religion.

Of considerable political significance in Hariyana even now is the division between the rural and urban areas. In the pre-partition Punjab, the Unionist party, a party of notables organised around the landowning interest, dominated the politics of the State. Nonetheless, the rural bloc within the Congress party exercises considerable political power. In fact, the replacement of Bhimsen Sachchar in 1956 by Pratap Singh Kairon as Chief Minister represented the over-throw of the urban-oriented leadership through a coalition of the rural delegates of the legislative wing of the party. So it is very difficult to ignore the agriculturist class in the politics of the State.

Politically the new State has virtually started with a clean slate. It has inherited none of the Punjab's problems. It is free from intractable and difficult political parties; with no Akali politics to contend with, no language problem and no Communist pockets as in the Punjab. The leftist movement in the State is very weak. The SSP has some influence in Hissar. The CPI has only pockets

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of influence in the industrial town of Faridabad and in some peasant areas. The last general elections in this region bear testimony to the fact :

TABLE I
The results of the Third General Elections in Punjab¹⁰
(Hindi-Speaking region)

<i>Party</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Seats</i>
1. Congress	1136792	40.9	39
2. Akali Dal	9820	0.4	—
3. CPI	82253	2.9	—
4. Jana Sangh	353030	12.7	4
5. Republican	53599	1.2	—
6. Swatantra	167792	6.0	3
7. PSP	32159	1.2	—
8. Independents	731867	2.3	12
9. Others	233942	8.4	7
Total	2781254	100.0	65

In the State, except for the Jana Sangh, there seems to be really no organised opposition to the Congress. In the last general elections it polled 8.40 lakh votes in the districts of Hissar, Gurgaon, Karnal, Rohtak and Mohindergarh against 5.48 lakh votes polled by the independents.¹¹ The Congress could have done even better in 1962 elections, but for its failure to accommodate Congress leaders of the region who had either been squeezed out from the party or had bolted it. Loyalties in Hariyana tend to be more candidate-oriented than issue-oriented or party-oriented. The Congress had suffered for the tactical mistakes of the incumbent leadership. The opposition to Congress candidates, who were mostly new-comers to the party, came from the former stalwarts of the Congress like Sri Ram Sharma, Chaudhary Devi Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and their followers. Chaudhary Devi Lal and his group, in fact, bolted the Congress not many weeks before the 1962 general elections over dissatisfaction with the allocation of tickets,

10. Source : *Indian Election Commission's Report on The Third General Elections in India, 1962* (New Delhi; Election Commission's 11, statistical) pp. 326-46.

11. n. 7.

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which had been so allocated as to keep in check a prospective rival to the existing leadership of the Congress party in Punjab.¹²

A regional party—Hariyana Lok Samiti—was also formed by the dissatisfied Congressmen. It contested the 1962 general elections and won one parliamentary and three assembly seats. Prof. Sher Singh contested against Bhagwat Dayal Sharma, but lost. Later on this party merged into the Congress.

II

In the IV general elections there were mainly two parties in the field—Congress and Jana Sangh. Besides, Swatantra and the Republican were also in the field. An attempt was made to revive the Hariyana Lok Samiti, political party which was dissolved last year. R.K. Hooda was elected its convener.¹³

The Congress was confident of coming into power. The Jana Sangh and Swatantra aligned themselves with independent factions to give it a tough fight.¹⁴ They expected a breach between the Jat group and ministerial group in the Congress. But the Chief Minister showed shrewdness both in the field of public propaganda and organisational methods. He included in the ten-member election committee Rao Birendra Singh who, according to the press reports, was likely to leave the Congress on the eve of the general elections. He also sought to capitalise on the sentiment of the people for rapid economic development of their State.

The Congress was sure to contest all the seats. The Jana Sangh also in a meeting held at Ambala on November 27, 1966, decided to contest all assembly and parliamentary seats in the State in the general elections subject to local electoral adjustments with other national and democratic opposition parties. Mukhtiar Singh Chaudhari announced the constitution of a seven member State Jana Sangh Parliamentary Board. The board comprised of Mukhtiar Singh, Dr. Mangal Sain, Krishna Lal Sharma, Hansraj Sharma, Yudhvair Singh, Fateh Chand Vij and Raghubir Saran Sharma. It

12. n. 6, p. 279.

13. *The Statesman*, 2 December, 1965.

14. n. 7.

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was decided that candidates should submit their applications to their respective district unit by December 5, 1966.¹⁵

The Hariyana PCC reduced to one half the fee and security from Harijan applicants seeking the Congress tickets from reserved constituencies. This concession was not given to Harijans contesting from the general constituencies. The normal fees for the applicants seeking Congress ticket was fixed at Rs. 200 (assembly) and Rs 500 (parliament).¹⁶

The opposition parties were keenly aware of their political and organisational deficiencies. The Congress party could easily decide to set up its candidates on all the vacant seats. But on the other hand opposition parties had to discuss and debate the question fully and each ultimately put up candidates only on a selected number of seats. Hence the Congress had no difficulty in making up its mind with regard to the 'contest policy', the other parties had to burn midnight oil in taking decision with regard to their selective confrontation. This shows that for other parties this 'contest policy' is the key to their election strategy.

A few months before the general elections all the parties finalised their 'selection' and 'allocation' policies. All the parties have their own machinery and procedure for screening and final selection of their candidates. No authentic information is available about this phase of the election strategy. The only source of information is the accusations of rival candidates who are denied party-tickets.

The selection process of all the parties is very much alike. But only the Congress has got a well-defined procedure for the selection of the candidates. The process starts from the bottom-level from Mandal Congress Committee to the AICC and its Working Committee through the Hariyana PCC. Nothing concrete can be said about the main elements of the selection policy. As is clear from some generalisations, caste and personal rivalry played an important part. In the allocation of Congress tickets, the Jats,

15. *The Tribune*, 28 November, 1966.

16. *The Statesman*, 27 November, 1966.

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Ahirs, Gujars and Rajputs, constituting about 34% of the population, were given 36 seats, while the Banias and Jains, who constitute about 4% of the population, were nominated for 13 seats, the Brahmins for 9 and the Harijans for 15¹⁷

III

After nomination papers were filed and election strategy was finalised by different parties, all turned their attention to election issues and election campaigns.

The only major election issue in Hariyana was the protection of cow. Despite the total ban on cow-slaughter in the State, the issue agitates the people of the region. Hariyanvi people are very much religious minded and they sent the largest contingent of Satyagrahis to Delhi during the November cow agitation. Congress as well as opposition parties were fully conscious of the issue and they tried to champion the cause.

Besides this, economic problems were there. Prospects on the food front were very grim and frightening. The continuous rise in prices suggested almost the non-existence of any government in the economic field and largely neutralised the gains in per capita income. In fact, the economy was virtually grinding to a halt. The government employees were in battledress for increased dearness allowances. But unlike rest of India, the student community was very peaceful in the State. The schools and colleges in Hariyana remained open.

These were the main issues which were to guide the course of action of various parties in their election campaign. Actually the main aim of the election campaign is to create a public impression either in favour or against a particular candidate. Each party put up its State level organisation and leaders in the over all charge of the election campaign and further organised different units at district or village level to conduct election campaigns.

In Hariyana the major 'conviction' type campaign-techniques were adopted by almost all the parties. All of them organised

17. *Link*, 27 February, 1967, p. 29.

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mass public meetings which were addressed by distinguished leaders. Gulzari Lal Nanda was the only national Congress leader who addressed Congress meetings from place to place. He himself was contesting from the Kaithal parliamentary constituency. The different opposition parties which had made electoral alliances, used to call combined public meetings. Besides these, street corner meetings and door to door canvassing were usual.

Among other campaign-techniques applied by various parties and candidates, was the distribution of collateral material such as miniature symbols, election badges etc., which were displayed by children in every locality. No enthusiasm was witnessed on the part of campaigners to emphasize the candidate's election symbol physically. There were few cases of campaigning and counter-campaigning in terms of election symbols.

The election-campaign was sometimes very colourful and interesting. In Jagadhari, Rattan Anmol Singh, a former chief of the Buria, was the Swatantra candidate in the field. A novel feature of his election campaign was the song and mimic party engaged by him at a considerable cost. This party went about the countryside caricaturing the Congress and lampooning its leaders and thus raising many a laugh in the bargain to the annoyance of the ruling party. But it is difficult to say how many voters were actually carried away by such tactics since the party had little to say in support of its own candidate.

In Pakasman, a village 20 miles from Rohtak, a remarkable election rally was taken out in support of the Jana Sangh candidates both for parliamentary and assembly seats. Both the candidates belonged to the same family. An improvised ballad commended them to voters on the strength of the good work done by the family in the past three generations. The grandfather, the ballad said, devoted himself to public service from the age of 40. One service mentioned at length was that he went around with a pitcher on his head during the hot months to slake the thirst of peasants in the fields. Another stanza recounted how the father had been killed in a village feud, while returning with collections he had made for a home for cows. Anecdotes about the

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candidate followed, one recalling how Ram Sarup had helped lead the Jats of the area to fight the menace of a Muslim gipsy tribe. A tirade against Hindu Code Bill came next. The Congress, it was charged, had alienated brother from sister by giving the latter a share in property.

In Gulzari Lal Nanda's constituency, a leaflet was issued to his constituents which emphasised that he accepted the cow as 'an important symbol of the Indian culture and way of life'. It also suggested that he resigned from the government to press his views in favour of a complete ban on cow-slaughter. In another leaflet issued at the end of the Shankaracharya's fast, it was suggested that the misdeeds of the 7 November were handi-work of 'external' elements which were out to discredit the friends of cow. Besides, in a public meeting at Pehowa, 23 miles from Kaithal, Chandram, the deputy chief minister of Hariyana, told his audience that the new State needed a great deal of help from the Centre. Nanda could help it secure canals, factories and so much else because of his 'pull' in New Delhi. His two terms as caretaker Prime Minister were mentioned in evidence of his 'pull'.

Thus the election propaganda in Hariyana was of the most scurrilous kind and had much less to do with the policies and programmes of the ruling party or the alternatives offered by the opposition. Electioneering has now become nearly 'non-political'; national issues no longer form a vital part of it.

IV

All election arrangements were completed by 18 February, 1967. There were 81 assembly and 9 parliamentary seats in Hariyana. It had 4,741 polling stations.¹⁸ The polling started at 8 a.m. on 19 February and ended at 5 p.m. But in those polling stations where all the voters present could not cast their votes by 5 p.m., it continued till late in the night. The presiding officers issued authority slips to those voters. Polling was peaceful.

Complete calm prevailed on election eve, the hectic and noisy election campaign having ended a day before. But house to

18. *The Statesman*, 20 February, 1967.

house canvassing and indoor group meetings continued. The outlook in Hariyana on the eve of election was definitely pro-Congress. When the polls were over in the evening of 19 February, both the Congress and the Jana Sangh were very much optimistic. Not even the pessimists in the Hariyana Congress could imagine that their party would do so badly. It had no doubt won absolute majority in the new assembly, but as compared to 1962 it had lost much ground to the opposition, mainly to the Jana Sangh. Perhaps the creation of Hariyana State was the only factor that went in favour of the Congress. The Jana Sangh was opposed to linguistic reorganisation of the Punjab and fanned such deadly fire that during the anti-Suba agitation three Congress leaders were burnt alive in Panipat. But strangely it is in Panipat and Bhiwani, storm centres of the anti-reorganisation movement, that the Congress nominees were defeated.

The Jana Sangh won mostly urban seats where the bulk of the displaced persons from West Pakistan have been settled. The election results also show that the Jana Sangh influence is penetrating into different sections of the population, particularly the Jats. The anti-Congress sentiment among the Jats pushed them towards the Jana Sangh rather than Swatantra. The Jana Sangh fully capitalized on caste conflicts in the State to make its election symbol popular.

An analysis of the IV general election in Hariyana reveals that 283 contestants to the assembly, including the independents, lost their security deposits. Out of 43,87,980 electors as many as 31,87,946 exercised their franchise. One lakh fifty-eight thousand and fourteen votes, or, 4.96% of the total votes polled, were rejected. The poll percentage in this State was 72.65, the highest in Pundri (Karnal) at 81.73%, and the lowest in Rai at 58.23%. The maximum rejection of votes was in Rajaund (3,643) and the lowest in Barwala (632).

The Congress contested 81 seats, won 48, secured 12,50,468 votes or 41.40% of the valid votes polled. The Jana Sangh contested 48 seats, won 12 and polled 4,36,130 votes, or 14.44%. The Swatantra party contested twelve seats. It won three and secured 96,416 votes or 3.19% of valid votes. The two Communist parties put up

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20 candidates—13 CPI and 7 CPI (M) and polled 80,295 and the 13,322 votes respectively but won no seat. The SSP contested 23 seats, polled 104796 votes 3.47% but won no seat. The PSP contested 3 seats and secured 6,477 votes but won no seat. The Republican party contested 25 seats, won 2 though the party secured 88,231 votes or 2.92% of the total valid votes. There were 259 independent candidates for 78 seats. Among themselves they polled 9,93,988 votes or 32.92% and won 16 seats.

No Congress candidate out of 81 lost his security deposit, 22 Jana Sangh, 21 RPI, 18 SSP, 12 CPI, 8 CPI (M), 7 Swatantra and 3 PSP candidates lost their security deposits.

The district party-wise break up of results is as follows :

Table I
District party-wise breakup of poll results

<i>District</i>	<i>Total seats</i>	<i>Congress</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>Swat.</i>	<i>RPI</i>	<i>Indep.</i>
Ambala	9	5	2	—	1	1
Karnal	16	10	4	1	—	1
Jind	5	3	—	1	1	—
Rohtak	15	9	2	—	—	4
Gurgaon	13	5	1	1	—	6
Mahendragarh	6	2	1	—	—	3
Hissar	17	14	2	—	—	1
Total	81	48	12	3	2	16

49 candidates for the Lok Sabha lost their security deposits, including 34 independents. Only 2 of the 86 independents could save their security deposits. 3 candidates of the CPI, 2 of the CPI (M), 1 of PSP, 4 of the SSP, 2 of the Republican party, 1 of the Swatantra and 2 of the Jana Sangh lost their security deposits.

The number of the rejected votes for election to the Lok Sabha was less by 22,777 than for the assembly. The highest poll was in Kaithal parliamentary constituency because Nanda was contesting from there. There about 77.8% votes were polled. The

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lowest polling was in Mahendragarh parliamentary constituency (68.2%). The largest number of votes rejected was in Gurgaon (18,902) and the lowest in Jhajhar (11,566). It is indicative of the political consciousness of the people of these areas.

The Congress party polled 44.06% of the valid votes with 9 candidates. The Jana Sangh contested 7 seats and it got 19.84% of the valid votes. 36 independents for 8 parliamentary seats secured 19.79% of the valid votes. The Swatantra party on 2 seats polled 5.60% of votes, the SSP on 5 seats 5.30%, the RPI on two seats 2.32%. The CPI fielded three candidates who got only 1.70% of votes and the two nominees of the CPI (M) only .83%. Of the 9 seats, 7 were won by the Congress, one by an independent and one by the Jana Sangh ¹⁹

The Congress, Jana Sangh and the Republican candidates were distributed all over the State. The independents were in the field in all the seven districts being the most numerous in Hissar, Rohtak, Karnal and Gurgaon districts. Rest of the parties contested all the districts according to their convenience. 3 constituencies out of 81 were spared by the independents. There was no constituency which returned a candidate unopposed.

The largest number of the independents was successful in Gurgaon district where they won 6 seats out of 13. In Mahendragarh also they captured 3 out of 6 seats. The main reason of the victory of the independents has been the internal split in the Congress party. Moreover, people had been almost bored to death by the prolonged monotony of faces, they had got sick of hearing the same ideas, same arguments and same platitudes. Consequently the elements of passion and romance had steadily disappeared from the pattern of relationship between the ruling elite and the masses. So they were possessed by a desire for change and a sense of adventure. They preferred able and effective candidates, to the old and ineffective candidates put up by the Congress.

19. *The Tribune*, 27 February, 1967.

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The right in Hariyana seems to have surged forward and the 'middle' represented by the Congress and the PSP has slumped badly. The economic leftism which should include Sant Akali Dal and is affecting the Jana Sangh as well, has gained a clear and decisive ascendancy. This is a factor which has brought about a revolutionary change.

The general elections have seen the revolt of the people against the *status quo* and those who seemed to uphold it. Chamars were usually selected for reserved constituencies by Congress. The reason has been that they were politically more conscious. But this time the situation was much changed. Dhanakas and Balmikis etc. also contested from reserved constituencies as independents with the help of the agriculturist class and defeated the Congress candidates. This is a revolutionary change in the sense that for the first time the Harijans and the agriculturist high classes worked together. The reason has been that they were interested in the defeat of the Congress candidates.

Poor and deserving candidates were helped and financed by the villagers, as happened in the case of Prof. Sher Singh and Prof. Maha Singh. The ex-servicemen also organised themselves and fought election with the help of the people. They proved a great force.

In the last general elections, constituencies with more candidates were helpful to the Congress. But this time it was not so.

The most interesting feature of this election was that names of a fairly large number of voters, who had voted in the last election, were missing. In Atal village of Hasangarh constituency, B.S. Mallick's family was not in the list though they were enrolled in the last general elections. Similarly in Jatuwara—Babepur village J.R. Siwach's family found to their surprise that they were not voters this time. Not only this. The climax was reached when the villagers of Titrikhera of Maham constituency as a whole were denied their voting right. This was a Jat village and there were about 3000 voters. It might be the failure of the election machinery. But those people alleged that the non-Jat group of the Congress party did it

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intentionally.²⁰

There was significant margin of the Hariyana voters who can be cited as cases of split voting. It is characteristic of the electorates all over India. This point is clear from the fact that the Congress popular vote for the Centre was higher than the total Congress vote for the State. Moreover, the Congress 'Multiplier' for the Centre was substantially higher than the average for the State. It was 1.76 for the Centre and 1.47 for the State. This was more noticeable in that part of the electorate which voted at the State level for the independents.

The IV general elections made apparently clear Hariyana's feudal politics. Each area in the State had its leading families putting themselves forward for political office from one generation to the next as a matter of right. A nephew of Sir Chhoturam, the man who tried before the partition to form a pan-Jat alliance between Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Jats, was a Congress nominee. There were many other families in the field also. The feudal aspect of Hariyana's politics is very much like that of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. It exists at the national level also.

V

The tables given below²¹ are indicative of age, sex, education and occupation of the 81 legislators elected to the Hariyana assembly during the IV general election.

Table No. 2-1 (Age)

Sl No.	Age-group	Name of the parties					Total
		Cong	JS	Swat.	RPI	Ind.	
1.	25 - 35	7	1	-	-	3	11
2.	35 - 45	10	7	2	2	6	27
3.	45 - above	29	4	1	-	6	40
4.	Not known	2	-	-	-	1	3
Total		48	12	3	2	16	81

20. This observation is based upon the information received from the people of that area.

21. *Source* : Interview of persons.

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Table No. 2-2 (Sex)

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Name of the parties</i>					<i>Total</i>
		<i>Cong.</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>Swat.</i>	<i>RPI</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	
1.	Male	43	12	5	2	16	76
2.	Female	5	—	—	—	—	5
Total		48	12	3	2	16	81

Table 2-3 (Education)

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Name of the parties</i>					<i>Total</i>
		<i>Cong.</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>Swat.</i>	<i>RPI</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	
1.	Post-graduate (including LLB & BT)	20	4	—	2	6	32
2.	Graduate (including Ayurvedacharya ,Shastri and Prabhakar)	13	6	1	—	3	23
3.	Matriculate	6	1	—	—	4	11
4.	Literate	6	1	2	—	—	9
5.	Illiterate	1	—	—	—	2	3
6.	Not known	2	—	—	—	1	3
Total		48	12	3	2	16	81

Table 2-4 (Occupation)

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Name of the parties</i>					<i>Total</i>
		<i>Cong.</i>	<i>JS</i>	<i>Swat.</i>	<i>RPI</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	
1.	Agriculture	7	2	1	—	—	10
2.	Jagirdars	2	—	—	—	—	2
3.	Business	4	3	1	—	2	10
4.	Teaching	3	—	—	—	2	4
5.	Legal Practice	15	4	—	2	4	25
6.	Govt. Service	2	—	—	—	1	3
7.	Vaidya	1	1	—	—	—	2
8.	Social Service	12	2	1	—	6	21
9.	Not known	2	—	—	—	1	3
Total		48	12	3	2	16	81

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The table 2 : 1 shows that out of 81 candidates whose age-data was available nearly 18.5% belonged to the age-group of 25-35 and nearly 88.5% belonged to the range of 35-45. The most interesting feature of the table is that it clearly shows the comparatively young age-group of the opposition members. Both the members of RPI are below 45. Only 1/3 members of the Jana Sangh and Swatantra fall in the category of 45 and above, but half the members of Congress party fall in this range.

Table 2 : 2 shows that there are only 5 women legislators in the assembly, all belonging to the Congress party. This indicates that the opposition parties are not able to woo the fair sex. The remaining 76 legislators are male belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Jain communities. One Muslim was elected on Jana Sangh ticket which shows that the Jana Sangh is tending to be secularised.

Table 2 : 3 shows the educational qualifications of the legislators. About 70% or 55 legislators are graduates out of whom 82 hold post-graduate degrees including LLB and BT. It also shows that 33 out of 48 (68.8%) of the Congress MLAs, 10 out of 12 (83%) of Jana Sangh legislators and both of RPI legislators and 1 out of 3 (33%) of Swatantra members are graduates. It is indicative of the fact that on the whole opposition members are better educated than the Congress members.

The table 2 : 4 shows that the largest number of MLAs are dependent upon legal practice and agriculture for their livelihood. Only Rao Birendra Singh and his sister Sumitra Devi belong to the Jagirdar family. Social service is the primary occupation of as many as 21 legislators. This as a profession is not a regularly paid employment. Two students were also elected.

VI

Now a few words about some of the key-constituencies will not be out of place here.

A spectacular election battle was on in the Kuloi assembly constituency of Hariyana, where Ranbir Singh, a front-ranking minister for many years, faced Mahanth Shreo Nath (Ind) the

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religious preceptor of the 'nath panth', a sect of sadhus who pierce their ears and are known as 'kaan-phatta' sadhus. Nearly 400 of them, from all parts of India, had descended on Killoi to help the Mahanth. Ranbir Singh was handicaped by the deep undercurrent of opposition to him within the Congress organisation. Mahanth claimed the secret support of the Chief Minister, B.D. Sharma. A journal which declared itself as a special newspaper of the Hariyana PCC was distributed. It had a full page 'write-up' on Mahanth Shreo Nath and on another page an eulogy to Sharma. Ranbir Singh was hopeful of winning the election because he had supported the demand for a separate Hariyana prant. But he was defeated.

One of the toughest battles in the elections in Hariyana was in the Kaithal parliamentary constituency of Karnal district where Gulzarilal Nanda was being opposed by three candidates. They were Inder Singh, who had lost this seat to the Congress candidate D.D. Puri in 1962, Tarlok Nath and Tarlochan Singh (Ind). The Akali Dal (Master Group) and the Jana Sangh had lent their support to the Swatantra candidate. The Akali Dal (Sant group) had refused to extend its support to the Swatantra nominee. Later on Jana Sangh, which was backing the Swatantra nominee because of the electoral pact, became less enthusiastic as Nanda was a supporter of ban on cow-slaughter issue. The Congress victory in this constituency mainly depended on the Sikh voters of Ghula area. Their number was about 35,000.

The most surprising result of this election has been the defeat of Swami Rameshwaranand from Karnal parliamentary constituency by the Congress candidate. He was over confident of his victory and this was not without reasons. It is difficult to find out the cause of his defeat.

It would not be correct, however, to read any consistent and definite pattern in the verdict of the electorate. We seem to be in the midst of a great political pandemonium.

VII

In the election 'traditional' forces influenced the voting behaviour of the voters. Caste played an important role and so did religion. In Kaithal parliamentary constituency Sikh community

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was guided by both the groups of Akali Dal. But in marked contrast to the rest of Hariyana State, caste was not so dominant in the Yamunanagar area.²² Moreover, prominent Sikh leaders of the Jagadhari and Yamunanagar took serious exception to what they decried as 'interference' by Master Tara Singh in Hariyana's affairs. In a signed statement the Sikh leaders pointed out that Master Tara Singh should better refrain from polluting Sikh politics of Hariyana.²³

The choice among the candidates was made by a three step process of selection, of which, caste was the first. At the second level sub-castes played a part. At the third level, family affiliations came into play, ancestral feud among the village factions determining which way a man were to vote.

Some non-Brahmin Congress candidates, who were the supporters of the Chief Minister B D. Sharma (a Brahmin) exploited the caste feeling in a peculiar way. In Bhiwani constituency Sagar Ram Gupta (a Mahajan), a minister and a close adherent of Sharma, was opposed by the Jana Sangh candidate, Bhagwan Das Prabhakar a Brahmin by caste. Gupta argued, 'If the Brahmin's want to vote for a Brahmin, why shouldn't they vote for the 'bigger' Brahmin-Bhagwat Dayal Sharma ?'

This time village heads were not powerful enough to control the vote of the village. Electorates were conscious of their right to vote and they wanted that every candidate should meet and convince them personally. Previously, the candidates used to influence and bribe the village chief who in return guaranteed them the entire vote of the village.

The Congress was voted by many because it was in power. Ignorant electorate could not dare to vote against the ruling party.

Local problems proved an important determinant of voting behaviour. For example in Lukhi village in Thanesar constituency the urgent need was that of a road. And whosoever was to fulfil

22. *The Indian Express*, 7 February, 1967.

23. *Ibid.*, 9 February, 1967.

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that demand was sure to get the whole population of that village.²⁴ Similarly, ban on cow-slaughter issue was also very important. The supporters of cow protection were voted blindly by the people.

The voters were mostly 'candidate oriented'. In Ladwa and adjoining villages of Thanesar constituency, a fairly large number of the electorate were of the view that the Jana Sangh was a good party, but Om Prakash Garg a good man. So they would vote for the latter.

Women voters were guided by their husbands. About 50% of the voters in Thanesar itself were of the view that women should have no right to vote. But strangely enough in Lukhi a remote village inhabited by refugees, the majority was in favour of equal rights for women.

The youthful voters born during the world war II or in the beginning of the post-independence period seemed to be the main architect of revolution. These voters were not inclined to be influenced by the 'traditional' forces of the society.

To sum up, IV general elections in Hariyana added to the vigour and variety of its political life. The people have realised the power of their vote and the political parties its possibilities. The demagogue is at a discount. Public opinion is bound to become increasingly impatient with those politicians who resort to pressure tactics on the streets or inside the legislative chambers. The people insist more and more on performance. This is not to suggest that all this wisdom has dawned but the writing on the wall is clear for all to see and any faction or factional leader who refuses to open his eyes to it may be in for a rude shock before the next general elections come around.

24. This conclusion is drawn after interviewing the voters.

A. R. TYAGI

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN
HIMACHAL PRADESH
A CASE OF FEUDAL POLITICS

ELECTION is the process which gives legitimacy to government in a democracy. The 'normal' model of democracy assumes that there is alternation of governmental power in a constitutional way from one party to another in accordance with the changing mode and desire of the people. The normal way of ascertaining the mode and desire of the people is through elections held periodically in a peaceful and free atmosphere. This also implies that the election mechanism is capable of reflecting, more or less accurately all the important shades of views currently prevailing in the country. However, in a society with traditions markedly different from the normal democratic model but with a newly-acquired desire, expressed mostly through its constitutional and legal enactments, to become a 'modern' society, the political system is more a jumble of new forms and old values rather than any clear-cut model of the modern or traditional society and elections in such a society actually tend to conceal more than what they reveal.¹

I

It has become almost customary for this country to bring about a change in her political map on the eve of a general election. However, while the previous election years used to be periods of anxiety and uncertainty for this State, the IV general elections year was a period of fulfilment. For, not only was the tempora-

1. The object of this paper is to unweave some of the hidden webs of the political mechanism of Himachal Pradesh as revealed through the analysis of the elections and factual data derived from the IV general elections so far held in the State and the intensive field survey conducted by the writer in two assembly constituencies on the eve of the IV general elections.

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ness of the State ended once for all, but also all the mountaneous regions of north-western Himalayas, which were until then haphazardly divided between the erstwhile States of Panjab and Himachal Pradesh, were now integrated into a single State of Himachal Pradesh which came into existence on November 1, 1966. The day was celebrated by the government with much fanfare and the ruling Congress party fully capitalised upon this "glorious victory" of the Himachal Pradesh people—impliedly of the Congress party. One of the slogans shouted at the Himachal Day function held in Simla was, Himachal-Ka-Gandhi-Dr. Parmar.²

II

However, when the elections came in February, it was a routine affair—as tame as the previous ones were. Even the capital city, which was one of the newly integrated parts of the State and which represents one of the most urbanized centres of the State (in fact of India itself), there was hardly any election warmth until the end of January, although climatically it had only two mild snow-falls until then. Slightly made-up shows began to be presented on the streets of the town in January; but even these were done mostly by the 'independent' candidates. In the *mufassil* areas, with some marked exceptions (like Arki), electioneering activities appeared more like the "periodical markets"—so popular in this State—than as well as real election campaigns. Besides the election manifestoes of the all-India parties³ nothing of any substance or election value appeared in writing. Pamphleteering was profuse and indiscriminate, but hardly any issues political or economic—were systematically discussed or projected before the electorate. The sole burden of the non-Congress parties and election propaganda of candidates was unbridled criticism of the Congress government, while that of the Congress party was to ask votes for Indira Gandhi and Nehru. Election meetings were few and thinly attended. The chief method of electioneering was through personal contacts, not so much directly with the electorate as through the local 'Thakurs', 'Ranas'

2. Dr. Parmar is the Chief Minister of the State.

3. Even these were not discussed in election meetings by any party or candidate. Except for some local vernacular papers, there is no newspaper or periodical with State-wide circulation in the State.

'Mahajans', 'Orchardists' and the newly created potentates (*i.e.*, the sarpanchas and pradhans). In towns the contact men of the candidates were the inmates of the 'villas' and 'Kothis'. In Kalpa constituency, where population is entirely tribal and rural, personal contact with the electorate was almost negligible, while in Simla, the percentage of contact was sixtyfive with both the electors directly and with the intermediaries.⁴

The election campaign in the State brought one fact into sharp focus, namely, that party programmes or public issues were completely ignored, while personal, feudal and caste influences were fully exploited. In fact, most of the constituencies are the 'pocket boroughs' of some Thakur or Rana or Mahajan and once the names of the contestants in a constituency are officially finalised, the election results can be, more or less, accurately predicted.⁵ Even the candidates, whether contesting on party ticket or as independents, represent, with some exceptions, the ex-feudal class (Thakurs and Ranas). The quick shifts in the party loyalty of the prospective candidates during the nomination days largely depends upon the promises and prospects of support from the local potentates who are like 'vote banks' in their *ilaga* or locality.

To understand this unique phenomenon, we must go back to some of the peculiar features of the State which set it apart from the rest of India. It may be recalled that Himachal Pradesh came into existence on April 15, 1948 as a result of the integration of thirty odd feudal states of the Punjab and Simla Hills. The accession of these states into the Indian Union and their eventual integration into one administrative unit was forced by the coordinated agitations conducted by the Praja Mandals of the princely states. Yet, prior to independence, there was hardly any political activity worth the name in the region. Even after independence, the activities of the Praja Mandals were directed by 'outsiders' from outside

4. Based on personal observations. Kalpa is part of Kinnaur constituency and only this part of the constituency was surveyed.
5. Of course, the problem of prediction becomes difficult in those constituencies where a 'modern' leader is pitched against a traditional potentate or where the two forces are supporting opposing candidates.

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these states. As the social and political system of these states was mainly feudal and autocratic, the people living in the State remained until April 1948 outside the mainstream of the political life of the country. Even after integration of these states into a single State and the introduction of a certain measure of popular rule in 1952, the physical barriers of rugged terrain, high snowy peaks and dense forests have kept the people locked in their separate and, for the most part, inaccessible dales and alleys. Economically, the State is backward. Percentage of literacy is seventeen, of urbanisation five, and commerce and industry are practically negligible. Structurally, the society is cast into an iron-frame of caste hierarchy with innumerable taboos and dogmas. Besides, the percentage of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the population is quite large (29 and 8% respectively).

III

At the time of the first general elections, only Congress party had a modicum of organisational footing. With the strong support, both of money and personnel, of the central organ, the Congress was able to perform the most rudimentary electioneering functions.⁶ But outside the Congress there was hardly any organised political activity in the State. However, the introduction of universal franchise and the institution of elections as the only means of acquiring governmental power created in the hearts of the traditionally powerful sectors of the society a pressing urge to enter into the Congress and contested election as Congress candidates. But those who could not adjust to Congress politics (as in the Bilaspur district where the Raja put up his own candidates and got them elected) or who were not acceptable to the erstwhile Praja Mandal leaders who were incharge of the Congress tickets (as happened in the Mahasu district), they contested the elections as independents (Table No. 1). However, this sudden urge could not, at once, create the new style of politics and leadership which could be in accordance with the newly-established system of power legitimisation. But what is a bit more surprising is the fact that the traditional style of politics continues in tact even to this day.

6. In two of the constituencies, there was no contest for the assembly seats and they were filled in by the only candidates who filed their nomination papers, both of them belonging to the Congress party.

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN HIMACHAL PRADESH

TABLE No. 1
First General Election Results

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Security forfeited
Congress	34	24	1
Independents	50	8	31
K.M.P.P.	22	3	10
Sch. Caste Fed.	9	1	4
Jana Sangh	10	-	8
Hindu Mahasabha	3	-	3
Socialists	5	-	4
Total	133	36	61

Political apathy on the part of the common men, dominance of the feudal, bureaucratic and high caste elements, increasing influence of the communal parties, strong under-currents of regionalism, continuous weakness of organised party politics and corresponding increase in the strength and influence of the 'independents' and of 'factional' politics are some of the indicators of the political backwardness of the State. Table No. II will indicate the apathy of the voters.

TABLE No. 2
(Voters' Participation)

Year of Election	Electorate	Valid Votes Polled	Percentage of Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	Percentage of Invalid Votes
1952	5,32,018	1,79,783	33.85	7,195	4.1
1957	9,92,814	4,03,558	40.64	18,961	4.5
1962*	14,11,596	6,22,674	44.11	26,229	4.2
1967	15,82,103	7,66,119	48.42	44,234	5.5

In the first three elections majority of the successful candidates could secure only between 21% to 28% of the total votes. The percentage is a bit higher in the fourth elections. Highest percentage of votes polled by any candidate is 88.8 in Karsog in the first election. The Chief Minister has uniformly been polling a high percentage of votes.

* Figures for 1962 also include the figures of the newly merged areas which in 1962 formed part of the Punjab.

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As table No. 2 will show, there is unilinear advance from one election to another in the voters' participation. More and more voters are getting involved in the election process. Apparently, it is a sign of increased political interest among the people. But in reality, this involvement does not show any increased interest in public affairs or broadening of the political loyalties of the citizens. Most of the voters went for voting in order to discharge an obligation towards their 'chaudharies' or friends or caste elders. This time the percentage of votes cast is comparatively high than in the previous elections. This increase occurred owing to the anti-Congress feelings which arose partly due to the food scarcity and other problems being faced by the people and partly due to the virulent anti-Congress propaganda of the opposition parties and candidates. The increased votes went to the opposition candidates. The Congress did not seem to have gained anything out of the new votes. But also it did not lose its normal quota of votes. This, however, does not prove that there is a hard core of Congress votes in the State. It only shows that the Congress bosses managed their vote banks more carefully. Nevertheless, the bosses passed through tense times not only on account of the alliance with the opposition parties forged on the eve of elections but also owing to the politics of dissidence within the Congress party itself.

While the Congress is able to maintain its majority in the assembly, it has been gradually losing somewhat in absolute numbers. Not only has the Congress party been losing, but even the Socialist parties have been severally losing their position in the State politics. This loss of these, so-called, 'Centre' parties has uniformly been the gain of the communal parties and groups like the Jana Sangh and Scheduled Caste Federation and the rightist forces like Swatantra and the independents. In fact, the independents and the Jana Sangh now represent a formidable force in the assembly, as Table No. 3 will show. At one time in July last, they had posed a serious threat to the Congress majority and if the Hariyana brand of dissident politics could be adopted here, the Congress government would have fallen.⁷ The continuing influence

7. In the opinion of this writer, such a situation can happen in this State only if the leadership of the dissident group in the Congress falls into the hands of the traditional Rajput leaders. Right now, it is in the hands of the old-time Praja Mandal leaders who have greater commitment to the Congress.

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN HIMACHAL PRADESH

TABLE No. 3
Comparative Position of Political Parties

Parties	1952					1957					1962*					1967				
	Votes	% of	Seats	% of	Seats	Votes	% of	Seats	% of	Seats	Votes	% of	Seats	% of	Seats	Votes	% of	Seats	% of	Seats
Congress	85,079	47.4	24	56.66	24	1,94,732	48.26	21	51.24	3,20,705	51.50	43	79.63	3,23,247	42.19	34	56.67			
K.M.P.P./P.S.P.	26,471	14.7	3	8.34	3	15,012	3.72	1	2.43	9,142	1.47	283	00.04			
Socialist/S.S.P.	2,664	1.4	679	00.09			
C.P.I. (R)	1,967	00.48	38,651	6.21	1	1.85	22,173	2.89	2	3.32			
C.P.I. (Marxist)	3,019	00.39			
Republican			
Swatantra	32,925	5.29	4	7.41	14,767	1.93	1	1.66			
Sch. Caste Fed.	10,097	5.6	1	2.77	1	11,219	2.74	3	7.31	9,588	1.54	3,806	00.49			
Jana Sangh/H. Mahasabha/Ram Raja			
Parishad	..	4.5	10,629	2.63	30,001	4.82	1,06,261	13.87	7	11.68			
Independents	47,433	26.4	8	22.23	8	1,69,998	42.17	16	39.02	1,81,661	29.17	6	11.11	2,91,890	38.10	16	26.67			
Total	1,79,783	100	36	100	403,558	100	41	100	6,22,674	100	54	100	7,66,085	100	60	100				

* Figures for 1962 also include the data for those constituencies which in 1962 formed part of Punjab.

of the 'independent' politicians in the State politics is a symbol not only of political immaturity of the State but also of traditional-feudal ascendancy. It is only the superior organisation of political parties which can reduce the effectiveness of their personal influence. In a State where means of communication are still non-existent or very weak, the impact of political parties and ideologies in comparison to local traditional leaders and elders on the people is bound to be rather weak. To overcome this, not only strong party organisations would be needed, but image of party leadership would also have to be built. No such effort seems to have been made by any party in the State. To become an electoral asset, a leader should be known to larger number of people all over the State as the representative of their views and aspirations. The present practice of capturing political power with the help of local potentates, sometimes by even overlooking one's own party and by roping in the independents is detrimental to the development of a modern type of leadership and political party. No doubt, the lack of mass media and the existence of mass illiteracy are a great hinderance to the growth of State-wide leadership. In certain other States, with similar problems, opposition parties have been trying to resort to agitational politics which help them to project the reputation and personality of their leaders among the illiterate people. But here no such situation has so far arisen. Nor is there much chance of any such activity receiving the attention of the people. Hardly 5% of the people live in towns. The largest town in the State is Simla which has a permanent population of a little over 50,000. There is practically no large-scale industry in the State and the total industrial working force constitutes less than 1% of the State's population.⁸ Students are the other sector from which agitators can be easily drawn. But even of this class, there is no large-scale concentration in any town or locality. The largest strength of student population lies in Simla and even there they comprise hardly 8000, including students of the Higher Secondary and Public Schools.

An analysis of the class composition of the four legislative assemblies shows that, while the direct representation of the erst-while ruling families has shrunk from two in the second assembly

8. The total number of industrial workers in the State is approximately 2000.

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to nil in the present one, the dominance of the Rajput caste—the ex-feudal class—continues as before. Thus as Table No. 4 will show, they comprise 44·5%, 46·5%, 67·44%, 46·19% in the four assemblies respectively. The position of the caste is practically the same in all the parties, except in the Republican and the Scheduled Caste Federation. Their number is largest in the category of independent MLAs, who, in turn, represent quite a high percentage of the total strength of the four assemblies (Table 4). This clearly indicates the feudal influence in the elections, particularly the influence of the leading zamindar—Rana and Thakur—families who send these independents to the legislature.

TABLE No. 4*
Caste Composition of the Legislators

Caste	1952	1957	1962	1967
	1			
Rajput	16	20	29	29
Brahmin	8	3	2	15
Mahajan	4	7	2	-
Scheduled Castes	3	13	10	16
Total	36	43	43	63

Another fact that comes out of this analysis is that a large majority of the legislators has entered into politics in the post-independence period and that election after election, the new-comers have been pushing the old-timers out of politics (Table No. 5). This is necessary to maintain a personal type of leadership—the one which has developed in the State politics. Further, politics in the State is entirely the monopoly of the male sex. This, again, reflects the traditional feudal emphasis on male ascendancy. Only in the first and third elections, a female was elected to the assembly. In both these cases, the members elected belonged to the former ruling families of Bilaspur and Chamba. In the second and third assemblies a female member was also nominated. At present, the President of the PCC also is a lady who, on her paternal side, has a foreign parentage, and may, thus, not have sufficient influence or support

* Figures for the 1957, 1962 and 1967 also include nominated members, two, two and three respectively.

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among the indigenous female population.⁹ Outside the Congress party no other party has any female member of even local importance.

TABLE 5*
Age-wise Division of the Legislators

Age	1952	1957	1962	1967
25-30	2	1	—	1
31-40	13	19	22	17
41-50	16	18	15	17
51-60	5	5	6	12
Above 60	—	1	—	16
Total	36	43	43	63

Occupation-wise most of the legislators belong either to the zamindar class or they are ex-bureaucrats (Table No. 6). The liberal professions, though better represented in the fourth assembly, still occupy a position much lower than the one occupied by their class in the national politics. Moreover, most of the professionals are lawyers who are influential zamindars and orchardists and in the case of several of them, law practice is not the main occupation.

TABLE 6§
Occupational Background of the Legislators

Occupation	1952	1957	1962	1967
Agriculture	24	27	33	32
Business	3	5	1	2
Professional	4	7	7	15
Ruling Family	1	2	2	—
Service	4	2	—	14
Total	36	43	43	63

The data presented above clearly proves the dominance of the erstwhile feudal caste in the politics of the State. This means that

9. The same lady was the nominated M.L.A. in the Third Assembly.

* Figures for the 1957, 1962 and 1967 also include nominated members, two, two and three respectively.

§ Figures for the 1957, 1962 and 1967 also include nominated members, two, two and three respectively.

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traditionally entrenched sections in the society still retain the near monopoly of political power not only in the political parties but also in the government, with the result that radical policies of economic and social change are bound to be delayed. Congress party itself is in the hands of the agriculturists who prevent it from carrying on any measures of radical reforms. Even the land reforms measures, which were passed long ago, have failed in their objective because of the halty and protracted implementation. The profession of agriculture, in itself, breeds conservatism. In addition to the high percentage of this occupation in the legislature, the educational attainments of the legislators are low which means that the tenor of politics here is so low as to make it unattractive to the intellectuals. (Table No. 7). Only a politics based on clear-cut issues and ideologies can become an intellectually satisfying enterprise and only such politics can attract the socially-motivated and well-educated persons. An unprincipled and muddled politics hunts out scrupulous persons and makes the field safe for professional politicians who can, without any pinch of conscience, enter into alliances with the vested interests in order to secure their support in elections and within the party organisation.

TABLE 7
Educational Background of Legislators*

Educational Attainment	1952	1957	1962	1967
1. Primary	7	8	8	6
2. Under Matric	3	10	16	8
3. Matric	15	14	5	27
4. Graduate	9	9	12	19
5. Post Graduate	2	2	2	3

IV

Factionalism has become a bane of the Congress politics. While in other States, the dissidents had defected from the Congress before the elections and had fought elections under the own splinter 'Congress' or 'Janta' parties, in Himachal Pradesh they remained, with two or three individual exceptions, inside the

* Figures also include the nominated members.

Congress. But there continued, both at the time of distribution of tickets and at that of elections, much leg-pulling and sabotage against each other.

The dissident candidates were not given the same support of the party leadership at the State level which was available to the ministerialists. On the other side, it was seen that the dissident leaders were helped, covertly or overtly, by the opposition parties and independents.

However, the success of the dissident leaders in the elections and the constitution of a united front by the opposition parties created difficult time for the ministerialists. There was also a rift between the leaders of the newly-merged areas of Kangra and Kulu region and the old-time leaders. Out of the eleven MLAs of this region, only three were re-elected. The rest were defeated. Their defeat is attributed to internal sabotage. Even then, the dissidents posed a threat to the old leadership. At one time there was a fear of the Hariyana-type politics to be enacted here.

A look into the Congress affairs both during the elections as well as after them clearly shows that the party organisation has been rigged by the ministerialists with their own 'yes men' who are not always the best men available within the party. The leader of the party has built for himself a strong base in his own district and the lower Mahasu. These regions are being tendered with paternal care. The way of patronage and the method of building support within the party are not much different from those of the earlier rulers of the region. Thus, both the style of politics and the character of leadership are feudal rather than modern.

However, these techniques of maintaining leadership create sharp reaction and opposition within the ranks of the party. The authority of the leader was seriously challenged after the elections. Although the dissidents got severely defeated in the leadership contest, yet they more than made-up their lost prestige and position by hoodwinking with the opposition front. The happenings of Hariyana and U.P., where sizeable sections of the Congress MLAs had crossed the floor and had joined hands with the opposition to

defeat the Congress government in their respective States, encouraged the dissidents in Himachal also. The two groups were heading towards a head-long clash when the assembly was summoned for the budget session in July 1967. The clash was, however, averted when, at the behest of the Congress High Command, the Chief Minister was 'advised' to accommodate the dissidents in the cabinet. The advice of the High Command brought a 'gate-crash' in the ministerialist citadel and quickly entered three stalwarts of dissident group into the cabinet. Whether this dictated compromise will bring about a lasting unity within the party or would work merely to contain the factional quarrels within the closed doors of the cabinet is difficult to predict.

V

However, we can hazard certain guesses about the future. The State is drifting towards the right. To the extent the Jana Sangh and Lok Raj Samiti gain, the Congress would lose. The leftists will not be able to gain a foothold in the State until the agrarian system is radically reformed or industries are well developed. The lower castes do not yet have any say in the political or economic life of the State. Congress party has not so far been able to get the support of these classes. In fact, it has developed a vested interest in the *status quo* and it appears to be in the Congress interest to keep the State in the pay-roll of the central government.

The feudal nature of the politics will continue for some time more to come. Although the caste influence has been emphasized in the above analysis, yet caste politics in Himachal Pradesh does not mean the same thing as it means in Bihar and Rajasthan, where political parties are clearly organised along caste politics. Here there are no significant caste rivalries among the higher castes. There is only a problem of *higher castes vs lower castes* in certain rural areas. However, caste superiority has the advantage of superior educational, economic and occupational position and these, put together, help the Rajput caste to maintain its dominance. The traditional family prestige and the authority of the traditional elders and the system of social hierarchy between the caste groups help this caste to maintain its traditional superiority in the State.

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That is why the word, feudal and not caste, has been emphasized in this analysis.

What is claimed here is the emergence and growth of interest conscious identities around the traditional caste hierarchies. No doubt, there is a slight rise of the new loyalties and of norms and actions different from those based on birth. Yet the new norms coalesce with the old pattern of family and caste loyalties. The time has not yet come when the new loyalties or pattern of behaviour might seriously challenge the old established pattern.



R. R. PARIHAR

**FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR**

LIKE the rest of India, the fourth general election in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was held in February 1967, excepting the snow-bound region of Ladakh, the elections to the two assembly seats of which were held in June 1967.

Despite the fact that parts of this State came under the ominous impact of the Chinese and Pakistani aggressions successively in 1962 and 1965, the people were soon able to resume their usual tranquility and equanimity of mind and maintain a high degree of social solidarity, which contributed largely to a smooth fulfillment of the electoral processes.

It is noteworthy that since independence, a steady social change has been in progress in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as elsewhere in the country and the recent election reflects, in some ways, the dynamics of this phenomenon in a fairly distinct manner. Furthermore, whereas the electors enjoying adult franchise here had had three opportunities so far to elect representatives for the constituent assembly in 1951 and the legislative assembly in 1957 and 1962, it was for the first time in 1967 that they were called upon to directly elect a quota of six seats to the Lok Sabha. Hitherto the seats allotted for the Lok Sabha to the State were filled by persons elected by the State legislative assembly and formally nominated by the President of India. And what is more, it was the second time that a general election in the State was conducted under the supervision, direction and control of the Election Commission of India. The constitution of the State provides for a hundred-member legislative assembly. Out of these, 25 seats are reserved for areas under Pakistani occupation and in the very nature of things remain vacant. Of the remaining and effective 75 seats, Jammu has 31, the

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Kashmir valley 42 and Ladakh 2. Partywise the recent election has resulted in the overwhelming number of seats going to the Congress. 61 (including 22 uncontested returns) seats have been captured by the party, 8 by National Conference, 3 by Jana Sangh, and 3 by independents. The Democratic National Conference (DNC) failed to bag a single seat.

As regards parliamentary seats, Jammu has 2, Kashmir valley 3 and Ladakh 1. The Congress captured 5 (2 uncontested and 3 after contest) and the National Conference 1.

II

Four political parties, namely the Congress, the National Conference, Jana Sangh, and DNC received recognition from the Election Commission. The qualification laid down by the Commission for recognition as a national or State party was the securing of at least 4 per cent of the total valid votes polled at the preceding parliamentary or assembly general election.

For a proper understanding and interpretation of the results of 1967 election, a brief reference to the rise and growth of the parties and the recent conversion or merger of some of them such as that of Praja Parishad into Jana Sangh and National Conference into Congress appears to be necessary.

The early thirties of this century saw the beginnings of the popular dissatisfaction with the monarchic rule in the State, the rise of a communal body called the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference which professed to prepare the masses for a sustained political struggle against the government. In 1939 under the nationalist impulse coming from the Indian National Congress, the Muslim Conference was changed into National Conference, an insignificant section remaining aloof and continuing as a rump of the old party. The National Conference led the people to constitutional government preceded by an enthusiastic support it gave to the ruler for the State's accession to India in October 1947. It was under its leadership that the constituent assembly was convened in Jammu and Kashmir in 1951. The assembly completed the constitution-making in November 1957. The general elections of

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1957 and 1962 to the State legislative assembly under the new constitution were organised by the National Conference leadership. The party has throughout remained opposed to the two-nation theory, the concept of a theocratic State and an unflinching adherent to the State's accession to India with a good deal of internal autonomy. Throughout its career from 1939 to its recent merger in the Congress, the Conference received guidance and support from the Congress and there had been a close degree of similarity between the economic programmes of the two.

On January 4, 1965, the working committee of the National Conference made a historic decision to merge the party with the Congress. Pursuant to the decision and led by the State Chief Minister Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, the party delegation to the Congress session held in Durgapur in January 1965 made a spirited plea for the merger and the Congress working committee agreed to set up a Congress unit in the State on January 26, 1965, after a period of considerable deliberation, hesitation and initial reluctance.

The party reorganized itself well in time and gave a good account of itself in the fourth general election. The former premier Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and a handful of his supporters in the Conference could not persuade themselves to join the new party and decided to have a national conference of their own. One of the reasons for this decision appears to be the Bakshi's reluctance to play the second fiddle in the Congress and the apprehension that his followers might not get important positions in it.

The Praja Parishad was primarily a regional party, largely confined to Jammu and was organised sometime in 1947 to serve as a democratic opposition to the National Conference. It stood for the State's closer union with India, for one flag, one President and one Constitution and to this end it advocated the abolition of article 370 of the Union Constitution which is the sheet-anchor of the State's autonomy as a constituent of the Union. Just as the programme of the National Conference (now Congress), had a remarkable affinity to that of the National Congress, the programme of the Parishad had a strong resemblance to that of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, an all-India party. After prolonged deliberations, the

party's leadership decided sometime in October 1963 to merge the Parishad with the Jana Sangh. The well-established political parties in the State thus cast off their formal regional jacket and became all India parties, spelling a greater political integration with the country as a whole, and with the general current of its national life. The DNC came into existence sometime in October 1957 under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq. Notwithstanding the fact that the party now appears to have entered into a period of rapid decline and decay, it had a considerable significance in politics of the State in its heydays.

The progressive and liberal section of the National Conference represented by such persons as Syed Mir Qasim, Girdhari Lal Dogra and D.P. Dhar, all of whom were members of the Bakshi cabinet following the general elections of 1957 and earlier, felt that the Bakshi had developed monopolistic tendencies in the cabinet, the legislature and the party not to say in general administration and failed to give an efficient and clean administration to the State, to which the party stood long committed. It was also realised that so long as they remained in the cabinet and the party, they could not check Bakshi's dictatorial tendencies and alleged corrupt practices, which were considerably facilitated by the absence of a healthy and strong opposition both within and outside the legislature. Prompted by the desire to reform the party and the administration, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and his colleagues resigned from the cabinet and established the DNC to which progressive and younger elements of the National Conference began soon to gravitate. The DNC put emphasis on the finality of the State's accession to India, advocated the abolition of permit system governing the entry of persons into the State and a greater administrative and judicial integration with the Indian Union. Otherwise the DNC professed to pledge itself to the same programme as the National Conference except that it put accent on practice rather than theory and endeavoured to bridge the gulf between the two. After some years, and, a good time before the third general election, efforts of the central Congress leaders resulted in rapprochement between Bakshi and Sadiq and the consequent dissolution of the DNC and many of its members went back to the National Conference

excepting a microscopic minority represented by the extremists. It is this minority that continues to maintain the existence of the rump of the DNC which is weak in organisation, in the range of the membership and its ideological appeal to the electorate. This should serve sufficiently to explain its rapid post-rapprochement decline and decay. The party's significance today lies in the role it played in its short career before rapprochement and that it now gives extreme leftist elements a forum, however nominal, to function from.

III

An extremely important and early phase of the final electoral battle is the selection of suitable party candidates. Here, the stakes for the party as well as the individual politician seeking the party ticket are understandably very high, indeed, far higher than in case of selection of horses for a victory in the races.

The task of the selectors who have to reconcile various interests within the party besides tackling a variety of other difficulties is really far from easy. Loyalty to the party no less than—in fact more than—mere ability, popularity and influence with the electors has to be looked for in a prospective candidate.

A word regarding the procedure for selection adopted by the Congress seems to be called for here. In a circular letter issued in July 1966, the CEC adopted a procedure according to which the PEC was to invite applications for the party ticket and recommend an agreed list to the CEC for its final approval. The DCC concerned was required to be consulted by the PEC. The CEC, it was categorically stated in a circular, could modify the list and even select a person who did not apply at all so far or initially for the party ticket. The circular also put an emphasis on giving adequate representation to minorities and women, to the latter to the extent of 15 per cent of the total seats.

The PEC in this State consisted of seven members six of these being very important party leaders and one an octogenarian ex-soldier from Jammu, who appears to have been included in the Committee to give Dogra Rajputs a seat on it. The list of recommended candidates was reported to have been approved by the

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CEC without the slightest modification and the party did not send an observer here in connection with the preparation of the lists, as it did in case of other States.

In regard to the parliamentary seats from this State, the Congress selected, Inderjeet Malhotra, a sitting member and Brigadier Ghansara Singh from Jammu, the former getting in easily in view of the fact that no senior party leader was wishing to contest for the parliament from Jammu. The fact also facilitated the grant of the ticket to the Brigadier. The Head Lama of Ladakh, Kushak Bakula, who represented the constituency in the State assembly since 1957 and, earlier in the State constituent assembly, had no rival in the field. In the Kashmir valley, the party had to replace the two sitting MPs namely, Bakshi Abdul Rashid, the former General Secretary of the National Conference and Pandit Sham Lal Saraf as they had adhered to the Bakshi faction and not moved into the Congress on the merger of the former with the latter. One of the major considerations in the selection of candidates was to avoid as far as possible those persons who had stood loyal to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. It is suggested in some quarters that the policy of including new men, if not young blood in the party list this time, was inspired by the desire to get rid of these pro-Bakshi elements in the legislature. Some critics also strongly believed that the leadership dropped all the "conscious non-communists" and encouraged leftists in the matter of the party ticket.

Caste and religion also appear to have weighed considerably with the selectors whether Congress or others. This is not to suggest that the Congress leadership does not subscribe wholly to the democratic and secular values. It is widely known that some electors are generally considerate to the candidates from their own caste or religion and in an election strategy for victory this consideration has to be borne in mind.

In Jammu city (North), for example, the Congress selected a Brahmin to run against his Jana Sangh rival who too was Brahmin. The caste appears to have been taken into consideration especially in those constituencies where demographic composition was substantially divisible as between Brahmins and Rajputs or Rajputs and

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Mahajans. In the predominantly Muslim populated Poonch district the Congress party tickets were distributed among Muslim Rajputs, Gujjars and others, depending largely upon the consideration as to which section of population would support a particular caste candidate. It is notable however, that in predominantly Muslim populated Kashmir valley, the party nominated 3 Kashmiri Pandits and 1 Sikh as its assembly candidates.

As regards the National Conference and the Jana Sangh, both delayed their selection lists, largely because sometime was consumed in the fruitless efforts to patch up a joint election front in selected constituencies. The National Conference delay was also attributed to the view that its leader Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad wanted to accommodate some of those whose applications would be rejected by the Congress.

Both the National Conference and the Sangh displayed more or less similar attitude towards caste and religion of the selected candidate as the Congress. The National Conference in Kashmir, like the Congress, selected a few non-Muslim candidates for the predominantly Muslim-populated constituencies and one of its non-Muslim candidates—a Sikh, won by a margin of over 7,000 votes against his nearest Congress Muslim rival, in the Gulmarg assembly constituency. The DNC also followed a similar approach except that it contested a very few seats for the assembly and the Lok Sabha.

In the matter of selection for the party ticket, women received a raw deal, at the hands of all the parties under review. No woman was given a party ticket for 1957, 1962 and 1967 elections in the State for the ostensible reason that no woman asked for the same. The Congress party rules permit upto 15 percent of the seats going to women. In the 1951 election to the State constituent assembly two middle aged and very inadequately educated women were returned to the august body. This time there was one solitary woman candidate from the Chhamb constituency in Jammu, who unsuccessfully contested as an independent candidate. The main reason for the absence of women in the party lists appears to be their reluctance

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to participate in direct politics although they evince a fairly keen interest as voters.

In regard to the position of the scheduled castes it may also be noted that in the delimitation of seats preceding the 1967 election the number of their seats rose from 4 to 6 and the Congress contested and won all of them. The scheduled castes thus received due representation in the assembly but the fact remains that no party offered a scheduled caste person its ticket to contest from a general constituency. This too may show that the hold of caste on the electors is fairly strong and selectors can hardly afford to ignore it altogether.

It is not unusual for returning officers in a parliamentary democracy to reject the nomination papers of candidates on account of some technical defects or irregularities in their nomination papers. In 1967 election, a fairly large number of nomination papers of the opposition candidates were rejected on scrutiny, resulting in the uncontested return of 22 Congressmen to the legislative assembly—21 in the valley and 1 in Jammu. Of course there were almost in all such cases 2 persons each in the field, aiming at a straight contest between the National Conference and the Congress. Again out of 3 parliamentary seats in the valley, the one in Anantnag district was annexed by the Congress without "firing a shot" as the nomination papers of two opposition candidates were rejected on scrutiny. It has been estimated that out of 32 unopposed returns for all the legislative assemblies in the country and 5 such returns to the Lok Sabha, Kashmir's contribution accounted for 22 and 1 respectively. District-wise break-up for the State is given in the table below :

TABLE 1

Party	District	Unopposed returns to Assembly	Unopposed returns to Lok Sabha
Congress	Anantnag	12	1
	Srinagar	4	—
	Baramulla	5	—
	Poonch (in Jammu)	1	—
	Ladakh	—	1

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It is instructive to note that in 1957 elections, the National Conference (then the ruling party) bagged 41 uncontested seats out of 75 and in the 1962 elections the corresponding figure was 39. In contrast, therefore, the figures for 1967 elections are not so alarmingly high. However there is no denying the fact that out of total of 1,112,606 electors in the valley 552778 belonging to the constituencies of unopposed returns had no opportunity to exercise the franchise.

Some rejections were based on the ground that the candidates were government contractors with some contracts still continuing in their name at the time of scrutiny. Some were rejected because they were holding either an office of profit under the government or were public servants, while some had failed to attach to their nomination papers an attested copy of their inclusion in the electoral rolls. The main reason for rejection in a good many cases allegedly was that the candidates failed to take an oath of allegiance to the constitution in the manner as required by the electoral law.

The Chief Election Commissioner looked into the allegations of unjustified rejections and opined that on a prima facie view of records, the orders of returning officers were by and large, right. He also categorically stated that it would be beyond his competence to order a repoll or nullify the orders passed by the returning officers and that the only proper remedy available to the aggrieved parties lay in filing election petitions before the appropriate tribunals at the proper time.

Some commentators have referred to the hand book for returning officers, *General Election 1967* (an Election Commission publication) and pointed out that the rules unequivocally call upon the returning officers to give the benefit of doubt to the candidate when scrutinizing his papers. A part of the relevant rule reads : "Remember that whenever a candidate's nomination paper has been improperly rejected and he is prevented thereby from contesting the election, there is a legal presumption that the result of the election has been materially affected by such improper rejection and the election will therefore be set aside. There is no such legal presumption necessarily in the converse case when a candidate's nomination

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has been improperly accepted. It is always safer therefore to comparatively be more liberal than strict in your scrutiny of the nomination paper." As the petitions are already subjudice it is improper to go beyond these objective comments. In a brochure entitled *Free Poll in Jammu and Kashmir*, published by the Directorate of Information of the State government, the Congress position vis a-vis the rejection is graphically stated thus : "As regards Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's allegation about the rejection of opposition nominees, the Congress party has issued a written statement to the effect that out of the 22 uncontested returns there were 4 constituencies in which the National Conference nominees made withdrawals well before the day of scrutiny. In 6 other constituencies the National Conference had no substitute candidates with the result that the paper of a particular candidate in a constituency having been rejected on material grounds the field was left clear to the opposing Congress candidates." Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has not contradicted the seemingly factual statement. The Congress party's statement added that since the National Conference had no hope of winning in these constituencies, its strategy was to court rejections at the scrutiny stage in order to transfer blame for a certain failure in constituencies where its organisation was weak to the election authorities. Apart from their view-point regarding rejections of nominations, the opposition parties almost in a chorus complained of certain alleged mal-practices and malafide behaviour by or on behalf of the party in power. Without any claim to an exhaustive enumeration, these may be briefly listed below :

- (1) Advancing of election period in Kashmir from March to February, allegedly, to handicap the opposition.
- (2) Allegation of distribution of some duplicate ballot papers in Kashmir valley.
- (3) Kidnapping of a few opposition members with a view to coercing or tempting them not to file or withdraw their nomination papers.
- (4) Use of the official machinery for the electoral advantage of the party in power.
- (5) Police harassment such as obstruction in a few cases to opposition polling agents on their way to the place of duty.

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- (6) Eleventh hour opening of more pooling booths in some constituencies without sufficient prior notice or no notice to all the concerned.
- (7) Arrest of polling agents in some cases.
- (8) Marking of some ballots by polling officers themselves in some cases, in the absence of the voter.
- (9) Lavish use of money by the party in power.
- (10) Alleged use of or promise to issue letters of appointments to some prospective opposition nominees with the object of weaning them away from the opposition contest.
- (11) Beating of opposition party workers and disturbing or forcibly dispersing public meetings of opposition election campaigners and provoking election clashes between the Congress and National Conference workers.

Perhaps it also needs to be mentioned that in respect of the election tribunals the State government has recently brought its election law at par with the rest of the country and election petitions are now to be heard and disposed of by the State High Court. Opposition parties had asked for this change in the law, but on second thoughts, they appear to be unhappy about it. For instance, at a press conference addressed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, in Delhi, he alleged that the law had been amended to delay justice as according to his calculations it would be at least 30 years before all the 60 election petitions could be decided.

Needless to add that it is for the august tribunal now to look into the nature of these various allegations and decide the issues involved.

IV

Electoral behaviour has an inherent dynamism and variableness of its own and therefore generalisations in this sphere are sometimes really hazardous and unwarranted. Still a few things appear to be fairly clear as an outcome of the election battles.

The emergence of the National Conference in opposition to the Congress seems to mark the beginning of the end of one party domi-

nance in the State. But this looks like a mosquito bit on the skin of an elephant. It is no doubt true that the National Conference too has won 8 seats in the assembly and this figure has dropped to 6 with Bakshi's resigning his assembly seat and the election of another having been declared void by the election tribunal. A group of 6 legislator cannot obviously turn the tables on a government supported by a solid phalanx of 61 members. But, then the possibility of the National Conference increasing its numerical strength in the next general election cannot be ruled out. The Jana Sangh (formerly Praja Parishad) has not been able to capture more than 3 seats, the number that it also had in the 1962 election. It is a rightist party, primarily confined to the Jammu region, although in the 1967 election it contested a few seats in the Kashmir valley too. The National Conference has clearly pushed Jana Sangh to the third position. Judging from their relations with each other, it is quite possible that the National Conference, SSP and the Jana Sangh may get together in one group or an alliance, and Congress, DNC and the CPI moving into another resulting in a sort of loose, inchoate party polarization in the State.

Looking at the nature of the campaign and the programmes of the major parties—Congress, National Conference and Jana Sangh one may observe that there are hardly any fundamental issues which differentiate them from one another. Each party has irrevocably put its faith in the now 20 years old accession of the State to the Indian union. It no longer forms an issue as such for these major political rivals in the State politics. Among other things, they differ from one another in the degree to which they would like to carry further administrative and political integration with the union. Here, the Jana Sangh goes farthest of all in its advocacy for a very high degree of unification with India. The National Conference on the other hand wants to preserve the present area of autonomy of the State of which, as already pointed out, Article 370 of the union constitution is the main bed-rock. The State Congress in its turn does not take a static view of the union-State relations in respect of this State or other States. It subscribes to a process of progressive unification retaining the federal structure. In the course of 1967 election major plank of the Congress campaign was the abolition

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of the land revenue, and on return to power the party has carried it out for land holdings not exceeding an area of 9 Kanals each. In the National Conference programme, a minimum daily wage of five rupees for an unskilled worker and a basic salary of one hundred rupees per mensem to public servants and a D.A. tacked on to price index figured prominently. The State Jana Sangh does not appear to have any clear and graphic economic programme. In the seemingly emerging two-party system with its characteristic political stability, the real contest in the days to come would appear to be between the Congress and the National Conference.

V

How have electors reacted to the appeal of the candidates or their parties ? Has the Congress or any other party won in some constituencies with an overwhelming majority and if so, in how many cases ? Has the poll been heavy, moderate or low ? Have the parties done better this time than on the previous occasions ? The electors appear to have followed a pragmatic approach, giving varying margins of victory to the successful candidates—partymen or independents. The Congress appears on the whole to have done well but not so well as it (N.C.) did last time. The margin of its victory over the nearest rival has ranged between 66 and 23307 votes. The table given below indicates the entire position in respect of the margin of votes :

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TABLE 2

Analysis of Constituencies according to margin of votes in 1967

	1-500	500-1000	1000-1000	3000-5000	5000-10000	10000-20000	More
<i>Jammu</i>							
Congress	1	1	7	9	6	1	1
N. C.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
J. S.	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
Independents	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1	1	8	12	6	1	1
<i>Kashmir</i>							
Congress	1	-	6	2	2	-	-
N.C.	-	-	5	1	1	-	-
J. S.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Independents	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Total	1	-	12	3	5	-	-
<i>Ladakh</i>							
Congress	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Independents	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Grand Total	2	1	20	16	11	2	1

The Congress percentage of assembly votes has slumped from 66.46 in 1962 to 52.42, although it still retains a long lead against its rivals. Jana Sangh remains almost stationary around 17%. The National Conference has a slightly better edge over the Jana Sangh. The two tables given below show the position of the parties and independent candidates in terms of the votes polled by them in the last two general elections :

TABLE 3

Position of parties in terms of votes polled in 1962

Name of the party	No. of candidates		Total No. of votes polled	Percentage of votes polled
	contesting	elected		
N.C.	41	36	4,86,060	66.96
Praja Parishad	25	3	2,26,836	17.47
D.N.C.	20	-	31,445	4.33
Harijan ManJal	10	-	13,743	1.89
P.S.P.	6	-	13,879	1.92
Independents	38	2	53,892	7.43
Total	140	41	7 25,866	100.00

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TABLE 4

Position of parties in terms of votes polled in 1967

Name of the party	No. of candidates		Total No. of valid votes	Percentage of valid votes
	contested	elected		
Congress	53	39	4,23,922	53.02
N.C.	38	8	1,37,179	17.16
Jana Sangh	29	3	1,31,542	16.45
D.N.C.	20	—	26,390	3.30
P.S.P.	3	—	7,847	0.98
Independents	41	3	72,692	9.09
<i>Total</i>	184	53	7,99,572	100.00

In regard to votes polled for the parliamentary seats it might suffice to state that the Congress, National Conference, Jana Sangh, DNC and the independents received 50.47, 24.94, 20.35, 3.67 and 0.57 percentage respectively.

The secessionist elements in the State politics such as Plebiscite Front officially continued to boycott the elections. However, the liberal group associated with Maulana Masoodi supported 3 candidates in as many constituencies in Srinagar city, none however winning a seat. In the rural areas the front is believed to have lost its appeal to the masses, for despite its boycott policy, the former secretary of the Front, Ali Mohammad Naik, expelled by the Front for the advocacy to participate in the elections, received 12731 votes as against his Congress rival's 4935 votes in a straight contest in the Tral constituency, though perhaps the rejection of National Conference nominee there might also have contributed to the result.

In the 3 city contests the half-hearted boycott resulted in a low poll and helped to bring off the defeat of front supported candidates. It looks as though its membership might, through accretion, be absorbed by the Congress and the National Conference between them. It is opined by some that the poll has been low, particularly in the valley and they attribute this to cold weather. Others partly relate this to the confusion created in some constituencies because of the conflicting appeals made by the Front. In some constituencies

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in valley the poll however was as high as 76.79% (Tral) 70% (Bandipore) and about 60% (Rafiabad and Baramulla). Likewise in Jammu in Ghulab Garh, Bishna, Jasmergarh, Akhnoor, Chhamb, Ram Garh, Bilawar and Samba, to take a few examples, it was 88, 84, 87, 82, 82, 72, 71 and 76 percent respectively. The percentage of 59 for the State as a whole is far in excess of 43 in case of neighbouring and equally mountaneous State of Himachal Pradesh.

Finally, the 1967 election has enabled the State for the first time to have representation in the Union cabinet, the Union Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism hails from the State and so does the Union Deputy Minister for Commerce. The democratic participation of the State in the Union has thus taken another step forward and with the portents of a two-party system promising to take shape and the election having been held in an orderly manner, the democratic institutions may be said to strike their roots deeper in Jammu and Kashmir.



M. V. PYLEE AND N. C. JOHN

THE FOURTH GENERAL
ELECTIONS IN KERALA

THE results of the fourth general elections, so far as Kerala was concerned, were fairly clear much ahead of the election day. The defeat of the Congress in Kerala was generally expected. Congress leaders, like S. K. Patil and Morarji Desai, had given expression to such pronouncements earlier. Those who were in close touch with high-ups in Kerala PCC also knew that the Congress leaders in Kerala did not entertain optimism with regard to the final outcome, save that of the party coming out as the single largest group in the assembly. But they were quite emphatic in asserting that Congress performance would show improvement over that in the mid-term elections of 1965. Two leading, popular Malayalam daily newspapers of Kerala, *The Mathrubhumi* and *The Malayala Manorama*, with a fairly wide circulation, let loose such determined and consistent a campaign in favour of the Congress during the pre-election weeks that thousands of their regular readers were made to believe that the Congress was going to get at least 50 to 60 seats out of 133, if not a majority in the State assembly.

But the election results gave a shock to every one, not excluding E. M. S. Namboodiripad (Left Communist leader and now Chief Minister of Kerala), who masterminded the United Front of seven parties which scored the stunning victory. For, the Congress was not only decisively defeated but even disgraced as the final results amply showed. It secured a paltry nine seats, failing even to get into double figures. The pity of it is that the Congress has thus been reduced to no more than a party, fifth in order in the assembly, a position which is lower than that of the SSP and the Muslim League. All functionaries of the Kerala PCC, including its president, three secretaries and the treasurer, were defeated. The

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only significant survivor in this landslide was P. Govinda Menon (now Union Minister of Law), who only managed to scrape through. Out of a total of 133 seats in the State assembly, the United Front captured 117. The Congress could secure only nine, only one-fourth of what it won in the mid-term elections of 1965. There is no other State in India where the Congress fared so poorly and the defeat was so disastrous that the party has been denied the status of even an opposition party ! Why did this happen ? The answer is not easy to give.

II

An analysis of the results of the last general elections in the State is possible only in the context of its political history since independence which has, in fact, a good lesson for the whole country. Kerala has led the other States in India in many respects including literacy. Another significant first that goes to Kerala is that it was in the erstwhile Travancore State that general election in any native State in India was held on the basis of adult suffrage, way back in 1948. Consequently, in the 120 member legislative assembly, the State Congress, an affiliate of the Indian National Congress, secured 97 seats, Tamil Nad Congress 14, Muslim League 8 and one independent. The Communist Party of India fielded 17 candidates and the Kerala Socialist Party 8; but they failed to win even a single seat. And the one independent who got elected was among 32 who had contested. In that election the Muslim League supported the Congress.

The first constituent assembly in any native State in India, formed on the basis of adult franchise, sat in Trivandrum on Saturday, March 20, 1948, with A. J. John (who later became a Chief Minister of Travancore-Cochin and Governor of Madras) as its president. And the first democratic ministry in Travancore took office on March 24, 1948, with Pattom A. Thanu Pillai, (now Governor of Andhra Pradesh) as Chief Minister and T.M.Varughese and C. Kesavan as cabinet ministers.

The events that followed the formation of the Pattom ministry were to prove a sad forerunner of the dismal polarisation and the chronic instability that have bedevilled the later political scene in

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Kerala. Hardly had the Pattom ministry established itself securely on the saddle than serious divisions and dissensions began to manifest themselves within the Congress. The dolorous culmination of that grim drama was the sudden resignation of the ministry before the year ended. The (Parur) T.K. Narayana Pillai ministry which followed was reorganised soon after Travancore-Cochin was formed. The reorganised ministry, however, did not last long. By 1951, owing to internal squabbles again, the ministry fell and a new one formed under the leadership of the *Ezhava* leader C. Kesavan, who was earlier minister in the first Pattom ministry. It lasted for only a couple of months.

The Congress failed to secure an absolute majority in the erstwhile Travancore-Cochin State legislative assembly in the general elections of 1951-52. It was only with the support of the Tamil Nad Congress Party of South Travancore that A. J. John, a Syrian Christian leader, was able to form a ministry. Within two years, however, the ministry was defeated in the assembly, resulting in the dissolution of the assembly and mid-term elections of 1954.

The 1954 elections did not improve the political fortunes of the ruling Congress. The two significant groups which proved their strength were the Communists and the Praja Socialists. The Congress, in one of the crudest manoeuvres gave responsive support to the 18-member strong PSP to form a ministry which was led by the erstwhile veteran Congress leader, Pattom Thanu Pillai who had by now become the leader of the State PSP. The Pattom ministry lasted hardly a year when it was voted out of office by the Congress quietly withdrawing its support. Panampilly Govinda Menon formed the next ministry but within a year it also fell, this time owing to betrayal of party members' support. President's rule was proclaimed as a consequence, and it lasted until the second general elections of 1957.

In the meantime Travancore-Cochin (less the tamil-speaking southern tip of the State south of Trivandrum) and the old Malabar district of Madras were combined to form the present uni-lingual State of Kerala as a result of the reorganisation of States. The most dramatic aspect of the 1957 elections was the emergence of the

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Communist party as the leading party in the State assembly and their forming a government with the support of a few independents. The Communist ministry lasted only 28 months. The story of the dismissal of the Communist ministry by the President in 1959, at the peak of a "liberation struggle" by the combined action of all other parties in the State is recent history. In the ensuing mid-term elections of 1960, the Congress, in company with the PSP and Muslim League, scored an overwhelming victory over the Communists. The United Front, led by the Congress, won as many as 94 seats as against 29 by the Communists and their supporters in a total of 126 seats.

Again Thanu Pillai formed the ministry, this time a coalition, of which the major partner was the Congress. The Muslim League, which was with the Congress at the time of the election was not allowed to share power. In 1962 however, Pattom was made a Governor and left Kerala. Soon, the coalition broke up and the Congress formed its own ministry under R. Sankar, the *Ezhava* leader. Intra-party rivalry led to its downfall in September 1964, as 15 members of the party voted against their own leadership, when a no-confidence motion was moved in the assembly by the Communist opposition. President's rule was again proclaimed in Kerala and yet another mid-term election was held in 1965. In that election besides the old parties, a new party had come into being, the Kerala Congress, led by 15 rebel Congressmen who had earlier voted against the party. The 1965 elections were a most humiliating experience to the Congress. It secured only 36 seats out of a total of 133, whereas the rebel group, originally only 15 strong out of 63, secured as many as 24 seats. The Marxist Communists were the leading party in 1965 but had only 40 seats. On the ground that no single party nor a coalition supported by a majority in the assembly was forthcoming to form a government in the State, the assembly was dissolved even before it formally assembled, and President's rule was continued in Kerala with a fresh proclamation of emergency. If the 1967 election was the fourth at the all India level, in Kerala it was the eighth. The following tables give a cumulative picture elections held so far in Kerala.

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TABLE No. 1

Result of election to the Travancore legislative assembly, 1948

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes number	votes obtained percentage
Congress	112	97	*	*
Muslim League	*	8	*	*
Travancore Tamil Nad				
Congress (TTNC)	*	14	*	*
Communists	17	Nil	*	*
Kerala Socialist Party (KSP)	8	Nil	*	*
Independents	32	1	*	*
Total	169	124	*	*

Note :—Asterisk (*) stands for 'Not Available'.

TABLE No. 2

**Result of election to the Travancore-Cochin* legislative assembly,
1951-52**

(First General Elections)

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes number	votes obtained percentage
Congress	99	44	12,04,364	35.4
PSP	71	11	4,85,194	14.3
Communists	} 267	25	†	†
RSP		28	1,18,333	4.4
Other parties			4,38,747	12.0
Independents			11,51,555	33.9
Total	437	108	33,98,193	100.0

Note :— * The united State of Travancore-Cochin came into being on June 8, 1949, as a result of the integration of the two erstwhile princely States of Travancore and Cochin

† Included in 'Other Parties'.

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TABLE No. 3

Result of election to the Travancore-Cochin legislative assembly, 1954

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes obtained	
			number	percentage
Congress	115	45	17,58,283	46.2
Communists	35	23	6,29,791	16.1
PSP	38	19	5,89,140	15.2
TTNC*	16	1	2,43,568	6.5
RSP	18	9	2,09,831	5.6
KSP†	13	3	93,601	2.4
Jana Sangh	1	Nil	403	@
RCPI£	2	Nil	5,772	@
Independents	17	6	2,77,923	6.8
Total	255	117	38,08,309	100.0

Note :— * Travancore Tamil Nad Congress (vide Table No. 1)

† Kerala Socialist Party (vide Table No. 1)

£ Revolutionary Communist Party of India

@ Less than 1%

TABLE No. 4

Result of election to the Kerala* legislative assembly, 1957

(Second General Elections)

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes obtained	
			number	percentage
Congress	124	43	22,09,251	37.8
Communists	100	60	20,59,547	35.3
PSP	62	9	6,28,261	10.8
RSP	27	Nil	1,88,553	3.2
Muslim League	17	8	7,51,565	12.9
Independents	59	6		
Total	389	126	58,37,577	100.0

* The State of Kerala came into existence on November 1, 1956, as a result of the States' Reorganisation. The erstwhile Travancore-Cochin (minus the Kanyakumari district) and the Malabar district of Madras were included in the new State.

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TABLE No. 5

Result of election to the Kerala legislative assembly, 1960

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes obtained	
			Number	Percentage
Congress	80	63	27,91,294	34.4
PSP	33	20	11,46,029	14.2
Muslim League	12	11	3,99,925	5.0
Communists	102	26	29,75,259	36.7
Communist Independents	23	3	5,74,877	7.2
RSP	18	1	1,06,137	1.2
KSP	14	Nil	5,938	} 0.4
Socialist Party	4	Nil	21,297	
Jana Sangh	3	Nil	5,277	
Independents	19	2	77,725	0.9
Total	299	126	81,03,758	100.0

Note : While the percentage of votes polled in every election in Kerala has stood the highest in any State in the country, the 1960 mid-term election figures hold a record not only for India but, perhaps, for any democracy in the world, where voting in a general election is voluntary. The polling in 1960 in Kerala was as high as 90.10%.

TABLE No. 6

Result of the mid-term election to the Kerala legislative assembly, 1965

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes obtained	
			Number	Percentage
Congress	133	36	21,25,792	33.58
Communists (L)	73	40	12,57,869	19.88
Communists (R)	78	3	5,13,159	8.11
SSP	29	13	5,14,689	8.13
Muslim League	16	6	2,42,529	3.83
RSP	12	Nil	4,90,335	7.75
Karshaka Thozhilali Party (KTP)				
(—Workers' & Peasants' Party)	4	1	46,423	0.73
Kerala Congress	54	23	7,96,291	12.58
Jana Sangh	16	Nil	33,381	0.53
PSP	4	Nil	10,300	0.16
Swatantra Party	13	Nil	26,858	0.42
Republican Party	2	Nil	3,381	0.05
Independents	124	11	2,32,765	3.68
Total	558	133	62,93,772	100.00

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TABLE No. 7

Result of election to the Kerala legislative assembly, 1967

(Fourth General Elections)

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Popular votes obtained	
			Number	Percentage
1. Congress	133	9	22,25,026	35.43
2. Communists (L)	59	52	14,76,456	23.51
3. Communists (R)	22	19	5,38,004	8.57
4. SSP	21	19	5,27,662	8.40
5. Muslim League	15	14	4,24,159	6.76
6. RSP	6	6	1,70,498	2.72
7. KTP	3	2	68,954	1.12
8. KSP	1	1	32,974	0.52
9. Kerala Congress	61	5	4,75,172	7.56
10. Jana Sangh	24	Nil	55,584	0.88
11. PSP	7	Nil	13,991	0.22
12. Swatantra Party	6	Nil	13,105	0.21
13. Republican Party	3	Nil	2,176	0.05
14. Independents	62	6	2,53,556	4.05
<i>Total</i>	423	133	62,80,942	100.00

Note : The seven parties included under S.No. 2 to 8 formed the United Front.

III

The present strength of the Kerala legislative assembly is 134, including an Anglo-Indian nominee. Elections were held for the 133 Assembly seats as well as for 19 parliamentary seats on 20 February, 1967.

A peculiar feature of the last elections, never before observed in Kerala, was the United Front forged by an odd group of seven political parties belonging to both the left and the right, viz., CPI (Marxists), CPI, SSP, Muslim League, RSP, Workers' and Peasants Party (*Karshaka Thozilali Party*—KTP), and KLP. The obvious aim of the United Front was to present a combined opposition to the Congress. The latter had also to face another formidable adversary in the Kerala Congress, formed by dissidents from the ranks of the Congress, more than a couple of years ago, and had opposed the parent party and substantially weakened its position

in the infructuous 1965 State-elections as well. The antagonism between the Congress and Kerala Congress seemed so immense that in the 1967 elections there were allegations of Kerala Congress openly supporting the United Front candidates against the Congress wherever possible, and the Congress, in turn, doing the same with the rebels.

In sum, the tussle came to be one between the Congress on one hand and all the rest, on the other. Such a formidable opposition had never before been faced by the Congress in Kerala; nor anywhere else, for that matter. The usual feature of Indian elections hitherto, when the Congress—with a minority of votes polled in its favour, running off as winner owing to rest of the votes splitting amongst the mutually cancelling opposition parties, was this time reversed in Kerala. Little wonder then that though the Congress fielded 123 candidates to contest all the seats, that party was not able to win more than a mere digital number of 9 seats, while the United Front, and independents supported by them, opposed the Congress for all the seats and came out victorious in no less than 117 of them, of which 4 went to independents. The unprecedented victory achieved by the United Front has surprised even the shrewdest political *pundits*; however, the most surprised of all, consequent upon the election results, seemed to be the winners themselves. For, on the 22 February 1967, when the canvas of assembly election results was fully unfolded, the winner's position bore no small resemblance to that of Lord Byron who, as the saying goes, woke up one fine morning to find himself famous.

Apart from the seven parties of the United Front, the Congress and the Kerala Congress, other parties which contested elections included Bharatiya Jana Sangh, PSP, Swatantra, Republican and the All-Kerala Muslim League, newly formed Muslim splinter group. An interesting fact was that not only none of them won any seat, but all the candidates of all these parties lost their deposits. Comparatively only a few independents contested elections this time and the impact they made on the electorate was insignificant. The lowest number of votes polled by any candidate in any general election in Kerala seems to be that secured in the last election by the Jana Sangh candidate from

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Chengannur assembly constituency; the candidate polled only 63 votes !

IV

The dismal defeat of the Congress and an overwhelming victory of the United Front provide ample food for any number of debates and controversies by protagonists of either side. Academically speaking, these results reveal some significant points.

Some extremists view the present election as a perceptible swing to the left in Kerala. A close scrutiny of the results will look after that. Let us first take the case of the United Front victory. The seven United Front parties, as such, secured 113 seats out of the total of 133, i.e., 85%; but the total popular votes polled by them came to only about 52%. And it is not difficult to see that the most creditable achievement, among the 7 parties, has been that of the Muslim League, the so-called rightist of all rightist parties conceivable. The Muslim League fielded 15 candidates of whom 14 were elected, the one failing to get elected, lost by the narrowest margin in the whole of the elections, a mere 95 votes—to an independent supported by the *Karnataka Samiti* from Kasargode assembly constituency on the borders of Mysore, with a sizeable *Kannada* speaking electorate. Incidentally, the *Karnataka Samiti* stands for the merger of Kasargode Taluk with Mysore State.

Now let us have a look at the performance of the two wings of the CPI, which formed the largest constituent in the United Front. The Left Communists (Marxists) and the CPI (Right) fielded 81 Assembly candidates in all, of whom 71 were elected. Together they have polled about 32% of the total votes polled. These figures seem impressive indeed on paper, but a close look at them in the context of the performance of the CPI in previous elections, cannot fail to reveal the fact that the position of the CPI (Left and Right together) has not improved from what it was in 1957; nay it has worsened significantly. In the general elections to the assembly, held in 1957, the CPI polled 35.3% of the total votes; and they even secured 60 seats in the then 126-member

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assembly. The percentage of votes polled by them in 1967, hence, is about 3.3 less than what they polled ten years ago.

Another fact about the performance of the two Communist parties in 1967 deserves note. A close look at the election results will reveal that among the candidates that the United Front collectively fielded in the elections, the percentage of defeat was maximum in relation to those belonging to the two Communist parties. As has already been stated, 113 candidates were elected out of the total of 127 fielded by the United Front, the percentage of success works out to be $\frac{113 \times 100}{127} = 89$. And, even if we take into account the six independents, who contested with United Front support, and of whom four were elected, the corresponding percentage works out to be $\frac{117 \times 100}{133} = 88$. However, in the case of the two CPI groups combined, the percentage is only $\frac{71 \times 100}{81} = 87.65$. Thus, it is obvious that the percentage of success achieved by the two Communist parties in Kerala in the 1967 elections is less than the collective success achieved by the United Front. Considering that the Communists represent decidedly leftist views among all parties comprising the United Front, the above analysis of the outcome of elections (1967) shows that there is no significant leftist swing in the State.

Now we turn to the rout of the Congress. The fact is that the Congress captured a mere 9 out of 133 seats it contested. But there is more to the statistics than what it reveals. A careful analysis of the votes polled by the Congress will reveal that its hold on the Kerala electorate has not, in any way, weakened over the years. On the contrary, there has even been a strengthening in some regions, however unstable that might be. Fifteen years ago in the 1951-52 general elections, held for the erstwhile Travancore-Cochin legislative assembly, the Congress polled 35.4% of the total valid votes; now in 1967, if the corresponding percentage has not been improved upon; it has at least not gone down; surprisingly, 35.4 is the percentage figure for 1967 as well. And the situation in 1967 has to be reckoned with in the light of the

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distinct changes brought about in the political texture of the Congress in the State since 1951-52. Precisely: (1) there has come about a substantial weakening of the Congress in the Travancore-Cochin area as a result of the formation of the rebel Kerala Congress and (2) the decisive advantage which the opposition gained, as a result of the support of the Muslim League, which is pronounced all over Malabar area and cannot be lightly dismissed elsewhere in the State.

What led to the rout of the Congress in the 1967 elections in Kerala? There can be as many answers to this question as there are persons attempting to answer it. A keen observer of the Kerala scene pointedly remarked: "For the humiliating debacle of the Congress, no one is as greatly responsible as the party itself. It is one of those rare happenings when a political party hoodwinks itself by building false hopes of fantastic dimensions and then coming to grief at the time of reckoning." The Congress dismissed as base any political foresight to forge a fruitful alliance with like minded parties; and, it failed to favourably consider any sort of rapprochement with splinter groups. It wanted to go it alone and the consequences tell the story in a none too cheerful manner. Congress president Kamaraj also failed to assess the political realities in Kerala. Pronouncements by Congress leadership, from time to time, only caused considerable amusement amongst knowledgeable people; at times, there was perceptible sympathy for Congress unimaginative demeanour. There was, indeed, an exhibition of utter ignorance of the Congress, *vis-a-vis* the situation in Kerala. It seems local Congress leaders fed the top Congress leaders, including the Congress president, on false hopes, only to be fooled themselves at the polls!

In the 1965 assembly elections, the rebel Congress had contested 54 seats of which it won 24, polled 12.6% of the total valid votes. In 1967, it fielded 61 candidates and only 5 of them came out successful, and the percentage of votes it polled was slashed to almost half the previous figure, *i. e.*, 7.6. The Kerala Congress had not entertained high hopes this time as they had lost the support of the Muslim League as well as that of some Church dignitaries and Mannath Padmanabhan, the Nayar leader. In 1965

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they had the unqualified support of all these parties. All the former supporters of the Congress cried out to defeat the Congress, which bungled to lose a vital support base. Of course, the combined opposition of the seven united parties was too formidable a challenge for the Congress to cope with. However, it is a safe surmise that had there been an understanding between the two Congress groups, the picture could have been substantially different. Hypothetical though it might seem, such a reunited effort should have easily won 55-65 seats.

The split in the Congress also cost the party dearly in the contest for the Lok Sabha seats. Of the 19 Lok Sabha constituencies, the Congress just managed to win one seat; and there too the margin of votes polled by the successful Congress candidate, P. Govinda Menon, cannot give much room for consolation.

The two rightist parties, Swatantra and Jana Sangh did not count much in Kerala in the 1967 elections; nor had they any appreciable influence on the electorate previously. Swatantra contested only 6 seats for the assembly in 1967 as against 13 in 1965; however, though it failed to secure any seat, it showed slight improvement in 1967 over its position in 1965.

IV

An analysis of the Kerala political scene in the light of different elections that have taken place in the State since 1952 presents a number of interesting points. Among these, the most obvious is the more or less equal strength of the Congress and the Communists. It is important to note that both these parties were split only a few years ago. But, if one can imagine for a moment a united Congress and a united Communist party in Kerala, then, it would be clear that each would pull almost the same weight with the electorate. Together, they would account for a total of some 65 per cent of the State's voters. Such a situation does not exist in any other State in India, not even in West Bengal where the Communist position is very strong.

Of course, it is difficult to say whether the existing split in each party that has weakened both of them will continue in the same

form for long; or ways and means of re-establishing unity would be found. In the interest of sheer survival, the latter course seems to be the logical one and it may very well take place in due course. If there is an election in which every party fights the battle alone, the Congress and the Communists will each secure some 45 seats out of the total of 133 seats in the assembly. Thus, it is clear that neither can, on its own strength, form a ministry and give the State a stable government. Hence, if either of them aims to capture power, it is absolutely necessary to forge an alliance with one or more of the other smaller parties. That seems to be a political imperative in the Kerala situation today. A political party which ignores that would do so only to its own peril.

Another interesting feature is that among those who consistently support the Communists are the *Ezhavas* the largest single community in Kerala. No doubt, the Communists have a sizeable support from other communities as well, but comparatively speaking that support is only marginal. In contrast, the bulk of the Congress strength springs from the two economically most powerful communities, Christians and Nayars. This position is likely to continue for quite some time.

Next in importance to the Congress and the Communists is the Muslim League which has a well-knit, cohesive party machinery. The party has the support of more than 15 per cent of the electorate. Yet, in view of the more or less equal strength of the Congress and Communists, the League can tilt the balance decisively, depending on the party to which it lends support. It seems the top leadership in the Congress has not, obviously, learnt any lessons from this bitter truth; nor have they tried to repeat their political wisdom as evidenced way back in 1960 when in alliance with the League, the Congress reaped an enviable harvest at the elections.

The Muslim League in Kerala, in the present context of political polarisation, cannot be ignored. It is in a position to dictate terms to parties, for better, for worse. Further, it serves little political purpose to brand the League as reactionary, communal etc., and denounce and debunk it. There is an object lesson in the fact that even the Communists have readily grabbed the support of the

League, despite the distinctly variant constituents and character of the two as political units.

Malabar (north Kerala) is the real stronghold of Communists, and their alliance with the Muslim League there, has come to assume a strong and stable political reality. Similarly, central Kerala except the coastal belt is the stronghold of the Congress and it can successfully face any other party or even a combination of parties provided it has the support of the rebel Congress. But so long as the Congress is split in this area, neither of the Congress factions will be able to score victories except in isolated cases.

PSP as a party is practically devoid of any significant political place in Kerala. SSP, however, lingers on in a few pockets, mostly in the Malabar area and a few in the Trivandrum district. There does not seem to be much favourable chance for either of them, considering their political future in the State.

The two other all-India parties, Swatantra and Jana Sangh, which have significantly enhanced their popularity in recent years in many parts of India, as shown in the last election, have made no mark so far in Kerala. There are no indications of any appreciable increase of strength of these parties in the near future either. Judging from the pattern of voting in the 1965 and 1967 elections, one is inclined to forecast that neither the Swatantra nor the Jana Sangh will pull any weight in Kerala on their own strength. They may, however, influence the fate of a few constituencies by lending support to one or other of the dominant candidates in elections.

Of the three local minor parties, the RSP, KTP and KSP, the last one seems to have altogether lost its identity as a political group in spite of the fact that its leader, Mathai Manjooran, is Labour Minister in the present United Front government. The RSP has still some measure of strength in a few urban centres, like Quilon and Trivandrum. But even in these centres they cannot win a single seat on their own strength. Similarly, KTP's influence is confined to a few pockets of forest settlements in the high ranges of central and north Kerala. There is nevertheless, no immediate political hope for any one of these parties

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A factor that considerably influenced political campaigning in Kerala all these years has been the tremendous power of the religious and communal leadership on the electorate. The Congress has been systematically exploiting this situation, election after election. It seems other political parties have chosen to go further by cultivating the electorate favourably without circumscribing their efforts to be negatives of communal approach. For the first time the advantage was lost to the Congress in 1965 when the rebel Kerala Congress was firmly backed by most of the church dignitaries and the Nayar leader, Mannath Padmanabhan. In the 1967 elections, however, the Congress managed to regain somewhat the support of the same sources. But the determined campaign of the rebel Congress, as well as other parties, brought about a substantial change in the attitude of the electorate. Communal and religious leadership, from now onwards, will not be able to exert the same influence which they used to do in the past. This is, indeed an important development in Kerala's political life.

Kerala has often been called the problem State, primarily because of socio-political and economic considerations. But there is gradually emerging a striking relationship between the problems of Kerala and those of other States, and indeed of the country as a whole. Kerala's problems of today might be India's problems tomorrow. In any case, the recent political history of Kerala gives out some characteristic realities and it would be safe to surmise that in the days ahead they are going to be of immense importance to the national political scene as well.

R. RAMKRISHNAN NAIR

THE VERDICT OF THE KERALA ELECTORATE IN

THE general elections, held in February 1967 in Kerala to the State assembly and the Lok Sabha produced a few shocking surprises. Some of them may be listed here for ready reference. The United Front of seven parties captured 117 out of 133 seats in the State legislature and 18 out of 19 seats to the Lok Sabha.¹ The Indian National Congress contested all the 133 seats and captured only nine seats.² It managed to capture only one Lok Sabha seat.³ Further, all its top State leaders were defeated and four candidates forfeited their security deposits; while all the leaders of the United Front were elected and none of its candidates lost the deposit.⁴ The three-year old rebel Congress organisation, the Kerala Congress, captured only five out of the sixty-two seats it contested and lost deposits in thirty seven constituencies.⁵ The Swatantra party, Jana Sangh, PSP, Republican party, Samastha Kerala Muslim League and DMK, not only failed to secure a single seat, but, without exception all the candidates forfeited deposits in every constituency.⁶ Out of

1. Party-wise break-up of the results is given in Table I

2. The distribution of these 9 seats is : Kalliooppara (Alleppey district), Neyyattinkara and Parassala (Trivandrum district), Manalur, Chalakudy and Mala (Trichur district), Parur and Ernakulam (Ernakulam district) and Devicolum (Kottayam district). The party could capture no seats in Palghat, Cannanore, Kozhikode and Quilon districts.

3. The one Lok Sabha constituency where the Congress succeeded was the Mukundapuram in Trichur district. The Congress candidate was Panampalli Govinda Menon, the present Union Law Minister.

4. A candidate who secures less than 1/6 of the total votes polled forfeits his deposit money of Rs. 250 - for the assembly and Rs. 500 - for the Lok Sabha.

5. The five constituencies where the rebel Kerala Congress succeeded are : Akalakunnam, Poonjar, Palai, Kaduthuruthi (Kottayam district) and Thiruvella (Alleppey district).

6. See Table I

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the 49 non-party candidates, only 2 were returned and 46 of them forfeited their deposits.⁷ The United Front, led by its senior partner, CPI (Marxist), formed the government headed by the Left Communist leader E. M. Sankaran Namboodiripad, one of the founders of the Communist party in Kerala and chief minister of Communist-led ministry in the State in 1957-59.⁸

II

The most outstanding aspects of the results of the elections are the tremendous success of the United Front of seven heterogeneous parties and the colossal failure of other parties, especially that of the Congress. The Congress this time, unlike on the previous occasion, had the backing of the influential leader of the Nair community (also instrumental in the struggle against the Communist government in 1959) and also that of the powerful catholic church⁹. Among the minor parties, the failure of the Samastha Kerala Muslim League a newly formed rebel organisation, attracted attention as it was very much played up on the eve of the elections as a rival to the Muslim League.¹⁰ The failure of minor parties caused no big surprise, but it was revealing that their candidates lost deposits in every constituency.

The United Front was an alliance of seven parties : CPI (Marxist), CPI, SSP, Muslim League, Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Karshaka Thozhilali Party (KTP) and Kerala Socialist Party (KSP).¹¹ How these political parties differ in ideology, policy,

7. Six non-party candidates were supported by the UF.
8. The UF Ministry took up office on April 5, 1967.
9. In the 1965 elections, Mannath Padmanabhan, the NSS top leader actively campaigned for the Kerala Congress. A section of the catholic church also lent its moral support to the Kerala Congress.
10. Formed on 13 November 1966. Its President is Hasan Gani, a former member of the Executive Committee of the Muslim League, and who was not selected by the League this time for the election.
11. The UF was formally formed on 17 September 1965, at a meeting of representatives of seven parties at Ernakulam. The meeting adopted a policy statement outlining the most urgent administrative measures the government of the United Front would strive to bring about, if returned to power.

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programme, strength, resources, organisation, appeal and historical background, needs no elaboration. Their common denominators are only two—opposition to the Congress and quest for political power

The circumstances leading to an alliance of such a conglomeration of political parties need analysis. Continued President's rule in the State failed to satisfy the people.¹² It was looked upon, vicariously, as Congress rule from the centre. On the eve of elections, the Congress presented, to inquisitive, in decisive and floating political forces in the making, a picture of predominant political liabilities and waning assets or prospects. An uninspiring leadership, weak organisation, depleted finances and melting prestige, made all the difference in the final reckoning. The abortive 1965 elections indicated that political power was within easy reach of no party; in fact, far away from the Congress. It seemed obvious that only a coalition of parties could muster a majority to take up governance of the State, for long in a state of flux.¹³ In addition, *hartals* and demonstrations against food policy, organised at the call of the opposition, served as an encouraging index of the rising tide of growing disillusionment of the common man, a vital factor in favour of the opposition.¹⁴ The heterogeneous parties, therefore, combined, spurred by the lure of coalitional success, sinking their differences and presenting a forum of consolidation against the Congress, on the eve of elections.¹⁵

The explanation given above is inadequate inasmuch as it does not explain why the United Front was extended to include seven political parties. That was precisely the role played, successfully by E.M.S. Namboodiripad.¹⁶ If the Left Communists

12. Following a ministerial crisis, the President of India by a proclamation on 10 September 1964, dissolved the State assembly and took over the administration of the State. The 1965 elections showed that no party or coalition of parties could muster a majority and, hence, President's rule continued till 6 March 1967.

13. In the 1965 elections, the party-wise break-up in Kerala assembly was: out of the total 133 seats, Communist (Marxists) 40, Congress 36, Kerala Congress 23, SSP 13, Muslim League 6, Swatantra 1 and Independents 11.

14. Food agitation and *hartals* in January, October and November 1966.

15. See n. 11 above.

16. The determined efforts made by the Left Communist leader E.M.S. Namboodiripad, to forge an alliance of all non-Congress parties in Kerala,

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wanted to capture only a majority of seats, sufficient enough to form a ministry, they could very well have limited membership of the coalition to the Muslim League; or, if at all, to the SSP. What made them go for a comprehensive alliance was the fact that though it was clear they would be able to form a coalition ministry in Kerala, it was essential to avert the possibility of other parties joining the Congress in opposing their ministry, as had happened in 1959.¹⁷ They wanted to ensure whoever might be in opposition, they should not have a chance to claim counter support. By enlisting support of the Muslim League, they wanted to isolate the Congress to keep company with communal remnants in the State.

It is pertinent to enquire why the Left Communists wanted an alliance with the Muslim League which they called till recently reactionary; and why the latter agreed to do so with the so-called anti-Islamic 'devils'. The Muslim League is a strong force in about 8 to 12 constituencies in Malabar where they cannot be dislodged in the near future.¹⁸ Opposing the Muslim League in the stronghold would bring no immediate benefit to any party. The Muslim League is more a communal organisation than a political party. During 'the liberation struggle' against the Communist government in 1959, it was a leading force, and was a partner in the Congress-PSP-League alliance in the 1960 elections. But, thereafter, the League drifted away from the Congress and adopted an anti-Congress attitude. All these are stark realities well-known to the Communists, both left and right. The Left Communists realised that while they had no immediate gains in opposing the League, they

have received wide publicity. He was acting in accordance with the declared policy of the CPI (Marxist). The resolution on 'General Elections' adopted by the party at Tenali in June 1966 stated: "In the States, particularly where the Communist party is the leading opposition force and where there is a possibility of the Congress party being defeated, the party will strive for electoral alliances with all those parties that are willing to shed their anti-Communism and fight the Congress party jointly with the CPI."

17. In the 'liberation struggle' against the Communist government in 1959, all other political parties joined. It was a blow to the prestige of the Communist party, besides being fatal to its ministry.

18. The Muslim League captured 8 seats in 1957, 11 in 1960, 6 in 1965 and 14 in 1967, all in the Malabar region of Kerala.

could gain much by making an alliance with it.¹⁹ In addition together they could wipe off the Congress from Malabar. Second, the Communist strategy was to catch a chunk of Muslim support in those constituencies where no Muslim League candidates were put up, once it secured Muslim League's support. Third, in other parts of India, Left Communists could pose as friends of the Muslims as opposed to the Congress.²⁰ Fourth, the alliance would provide an occasion and an opportunity, otherwise not available to the Communists, to appeal directly to the Muslim masses in Kerala under the spell of the Muslim League, and also to make a favourable impression on them.

The Muslim League, on its part resolved to make an alliance with the Communist party, hitherto denounced as anti-religious and anti-Islamic, because it was clear to them that the Communist party was going to capture a majority in the assembly and form government alone or in company of others. By making an alliance with communists, the League would most certainly get a share in government, which, in no other circumstances, it could reasonably expect.²¹ A share in the ministry would be a fitting reply to the Congress which disappointed the League after the 1950 elections, by denying it its due in the council of ministers.²² Besides, it would bring credit, honour and benefit to the League.

19. The Right Communists were not in favour of including the Muslim League in the United Front. The inclusion of a communal organisation in a United Front, led by Communists, would amount to encouragement to a communal organisation which was contrary to the principles of the party. The CPI leader, C. Achutha Menon had given strong expression to this view.
20. The Congress leaders look upon the Muslim League with disfavour as it is communal and as successors of the Muslim League in India before independence which was responsible for the partition of India.
21. The League has no hope to capture a majority in the Kerala assembly and form government of its own, so long as the League continues to be a party of Muslims and the Muslims continue to be a minority in the State.
22. During the 'liberation' struggle in 1959, and during the elections in 1960, the Congress, the PSP and the Muslim League stood together. There was clear understanding that the League would be given representation in the Ministry, to be formed after the 1960 election. But at the time of ministry making, League was dropped unceremoniously, presumably at the orders of the Congress High Command. The League felt deceived.

Leaders of CPI (Rightists) were very particular to have the United Front formed. They have been advocating unity of all the leftist parties. They were happy to have a rapprochement with Left Communists. They had bitter experience of the split in the 1965 elections, in which they had been routed. Besides the two reasons common to all parties of the Front which have been mentioned already, there was a particular reason in the view of Right Communists. They wanted Left Communists to come to power in the State in the 1967 elections, alone if possible. It was absolutely certain to them that no government, whatever the political label, could solve the chronic problems of the State in the foreseeable future and get themselves honourably acquitted. If once Left Communists also get discredited in the struggle for power and supremacy between the two Communist parties, the Leftists would have no additional advantage over the Rightists.²³

It has already been stated why the Left Communists wanted alliance with other parties. Now it may be examined why the parties like the SSP, RSP, KTP and the KSP had decided to join hands with the Left Communists.²⁴ These parties had no illusions about the prospect of their capturing political power anywhere in the near future. They have all along been critics of the Congress. The position of the Congress did not warrant any reversal of the stand of these parties. The Left Communists had come out in the 1965 elections as the leading opposition party that would grab political power in spite of the individual dissociation of these parties with the former.²⁵ More than that, an alliance would avoid multicornered fight in the elections and also ensure the largest number of seats conceivable to each party. Further, there was a very good chance of getting at least one seat in the ministry which was otherwise an impossibility for minor parties like the RSP, KTP, KSP.

23. This is gathered from interviews with some of the top leaders of the CPI. They do not want their names to be disclosed.

24. The SSP is the latest stage of the metamorphosis of the Socialist party in India. As a result of a split in the PSP, one sizable section seceded and adopted the name SSP. In Kerala, the whole of the old PSP with the exception of a few minor leaders, converted to the SSP.

25. In the 1965 elections, the Left Communists came out as the single largest party with a strength of 40 out of 133 seats in the assembly.

The RSP might have learnt from its experience in the previous elections that participation in a United Front was always advantageous to it and a solo fight was disastrous.²⁶ The KTP is a Christian party under the patronage of a catholic priest, Father Vadakkan, one time leader of an anti-Communist front in the State. It was formed on 8 March 1964. It is known as the upholder of the rights of the Christian peasants, evicted from government lands by the Congress government in 1961 for illegal occupation and those evicted from Shimoga in Mysore by the Mysore government, almost on similar grounds.²⁷ The KTP and the Communist party came closer when the latter extended its active support to the above peasants for whom the former was fighting.²⁸ The KTP found no heresy in having truck with Communists for certain reasons. The Communists, on their part, could derive the satisfaction that they could create an in-road into the least vulnerable of all communities—the catholics.

What prompted the Communists to accept the KSP to the United Front fold is not very clear. The KSP is no party. Its leader, Mathai Manjooran, is an old colleague of most of the political leaders of Kerala. The inclusion of the KSP seems to be more on humanitarian grounds than on political or practical ones. The fact that Mathai Manjooran belongs to the catholic community might have been another reason in his favour.²⁹

The parties which did not join the alliance are the Kerala Congress, PSP, Swatantra, Jana Sangh, Republican party, Samastha Kerala Muslim League and DMK. The Kerala Congress is vociferously anti-Communist. Therefore, it declined to join the United

26. The RSP contested all the six elections, right from 1952. In 1952 it captured six seats, in 1954 nine seats, in 1957 nil, in 1960 one seat, in 1965 nil and in 1967 six seats. In 1957, 1960 and 1965 it joined no alliance. In the first two it had.

27. *Programmes and Policies of the Karshaka Thozhilali Party* (Cochin, April 1962).

28. The Communist leader, A.K. Gopalan, commenced a fast unto death at Amravati on 6 June, 1961 for that reason.

29. This view is based on information gathered from some of the leaders of the RSP and the CPI.

Front. The PSP is no force in Kerala.³⁰ So is the case with the Republican party and the DMK.³¹ There was no question of the Swatantra and Jana Sangh joining the United Front, led by Communists. As regards the Samastha Kerala Muslim League it claims to have originated because the Muslim League had accepted alliance with the Communists, in the formation of the United Front. Therefore, the question of its joining the Front did not arise.³²

III

Several things account for the phenomenal success of the United Front. First, by forging an alliance, the United Front could harness the entire leftist votes plus the Muslim votes in all the constituencies. Second, each constituent party of the United Front could secure votes of the supporters of other parties of the Front in addition to that of its own supporters. Third, the United Front of so many parties, including all the leftist parties in the State, was something extraordinary and unprecedented and, therefore, appealed to those voters who go in for novelty and change. Fourth, the United Front succeeded in establishing the impression as valid that they were going to win the elections. Fifth, leaders of the United Front, without exception, assured the people that if the United Front succeeded, unitedly they would provide a stable and good government. Sixth, a government composed of leaders of the United Front was the best available to Kerala in the present circumstances. Seventh, a United Front victory was in conformity with the general desire to have a government in the State which would be bold enough to make a hard bargain with the central government which was, rightly or wrongly, believed to have been adopting an unfavourable attitude to Kerala.

30. The PSP of today is only a negligible remnant of the old PSP which converted itself into the SSP. It contested seven out of 133 seats, one in Cannanore district, two in Trichur district, one in Alleppy district and three in Trivandrum district. In all the seven constituencies, it lost security deposit of its candidates. The total votes polled was 13,991.

31. The Republican party secured, altogether, 2176 votes in the elections.

32. Election manifesto of the Samastha Kerala Muslim League adopted by the party convention held on 13 November, 1956 at Ernakulam. Also see speech delivered by its President, Hasan Gani at Ernakulam on 28 January, 1967, *The Keraladhvani*, 30 January, 1957.

THE VERDICT OF THE KERALA ELECTORATE

To complete the picture, one should also look into the reasons for the disastrous defeat of the Congress. Unenviable record of Congress ministries and the party in the State since independence, faulty electoral strategy and the qualitative weakness of the leadership of the party—together, account for the debacle of the Congress in the 1957 elections.

It is a bitter truth that the people are disgusted with the Congress and its successive governments. The party has proved several times that it could not provide a stable government in the State even if returned to power with an overwhelming majority. The Congress is rightly held responsible for the ministerial instability in the State since 1948. Factionalism and group rivalry in the party, indiscipline of its members and acute shortage of dedicated party-workers, steadily eroded the prestige and popularity of the party. Neither the party, nor any of its ministries, could convince the people that they had ever made honest and sincere efforts in implementing the programmes and policies of the Congress. On the other hand, they created the impression that the Congress was controlled by wealthy people and communal and religious leaders, and it was subservient to their interests at the expense of the interests of the State and the party. The charges of corruption, nepotism, favouritism, bribery etc., against the Congress ministers were grave, persistent and vocal. On the whole, the general feeling of the people was that if the Congress came to power again, only the Congress leaders, their satellites and cronies would be benefited and not the public.

The inelegant record of Congress governments in the State could not be the prime cause of the failure of the party in 1967, for the record was no different in 1965 as well, when it did not suffer a similar crushing defeat. The electoral strategy of the Congress in 1967 was unrealistic, unwise and irrational. That accounts for its rout. It is true that the strategy was the same as in 1965. But in 1967, circumstances had very much altered with the formation of the United Front of seven parties. Without taking that factor into consideration, the Congress obstinately clung to the 1965 strategy of fighting elections alone. If the Congress had tried and succeeded in making at least an electoral understanding,

if not a reunion, with the Kerala Congress, together, they could have acquired at least the status of an opposition party in the State assembly. It is evident from voting figures that in twenty six constituencies, where both the Congress and the Kerala Congress were defeated by candidates of the United Front, their combined votes exceed the votes polled by successful candidates. If the two Congress parties had faced the electorate unitedly, they might have captured a few more seats, owing, probably to some sort of a favourable psychological or emotional reason, emanating from a united confrontation with the United Front. That means, their strength might have been about forty in the assembly, instead of the present fourteen.

Another serious fault in the electoral strategy of the Congress was that it kept the Muslim League alienated and antagonized. It is difficult to understand the Congress attitude of 'untouchability' towards the Muslim League while it has no objection in having alliance and co-operation with, and even patronage of, leaders of other communities and religions. It is generally believed that this policy of the Congress towards the Muslim League was dictated by the Congress High Command, against the wishes of party leaders in Kerala. The Congress leadership in Kerala was weak and dependent, incapable of being assertive, and, hence it could not prevail upon the Congress High Command to reconsider the policy which was devoid of political realism and wisdom.

In addition to the two reasons already cited, the qualitative weakness of the leadership of the party was also responsible for its rout in the 1967 elections. The Congress was led, on the eve of the elections, by those who were no match to leaders of the United Front, with regard to the record of service, ability, drive and popularity. By and large, Congress leaders in Kerala are very good persons; but they are poor leaders and comparatively new recruits to top positions. They had to bear the burden of heavy liabilities of their party in the State, a spill-over of the doings of the Congress in the country in general, and that of President's rule in the State in particular. Their position was further made worse by self-defeating statements made by some members of the Congress High

Command to the effect that they have no hope of Congress success in Kerala in the 1967 elections.³³

Some other factors also account for the debacle of the Congress. The parading of the Nair Service Society (NSS) leader, Mannath Padmanabhan, and a few catholic bishops, in open support of the Congress, perhaps helped to transfer a few thousand votes from the Kerala Congress to the Congress. But, at the same time, it enabled the United Front to effectively indict the Congress as a party taking refuge under the protection of reactionary forces. During the 1965 elections, Mannath Padmanabhan had vigorously campaigned against the Congress and in favour of the Kerala Congress, of which he was the patron saint. The sudden reversal of his stand, and the welcome given to him by the Congress, were generally looked down upon as political immorality and undisguised opportunism; and, consequently, it lowered the prestige of the Congress further. The indifference shown by a number of communal-minded members of the Ezhava community to the Congress seems to be another reason for the set-back of the Congress. But, in 1967, prominent Ezhava leaders in the Congress, for instance, R. Sankar, did not contest elections to the assembly but only to the Lok Sabha. That indicated that these leaders were not hopeful of the success of the Congress in the elections to the assembly and consequently they became indifferent.

IV

Coming to the voting behaviour of the Kerala electorate we find that out of the twenty million people of Kerala, about 8.6 million constitute the electorate. Of these 6.2 million, *i.e.* about 75%, exercised their voting right.³⁴ It shows that in spite of the recurring ministerial crises and frequent elections etc., the electorate continues to be enthusiastic, instead of becoming indifferent. But there was one remarkable change this time. The old techniques of huge demonstrations and large public meetings were given place

33. Newspapers in Kerala flashed such statements made by S.K.Patil and Atulya Ghosh on 28 January, 1967. Both these leaders are strongmen of the Congress High Command.

34. *Press release of the government of Kerala*, 27 February, 1967.

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to house to house campaign Attendance at public meetings was comparatively thin, particularly in the Malabar region. Except in certain major towns, like Trivandrum, Quilon, Trichur and Calicut and a few constituencies where there were keen contests, the election campaign was dull and less demonstrative. Political workers of all parties resorted to the technique of meeting the voters individually. They were of the opinion that most of the voters belonged to the category of 'convinced' voters, on whom persuasion and propaganda would be of little avail Another feature noticed was the peaceful nature of the election campaign. The discipline maintained by workers of various parties, by the voters on the day of polling and the meticulous observance of rules and laws by all concerned—voters, candidates, party workers, polling officers and others—throughout, during the election period, effectively removes any misgivings about the fate of democracy in the State

TABLE I

Total electorate : 86,79,038 Valid votes polled 62,81,152
Total candidates contested 423 Total constituencies 133

Party-wise break up of election results, 1967

Party	No of Candidates contested	Seats won	Votes Secured	Percentage	Forfeited deposit
Indian National Congress	133	9	22,25,275	35.4	10
Kerala Congress	61	5	4,75,112	7.6	38
Alliance	127	113	32,38,563	51.4	--
CPI (M)	59	52	14,75,456	23.5	
CPI (R)	22	19	5,37,824	8.5	
SSP	21	19	5,27,662	8.4	
ML	15	14	4,24,195	6.7	..
RSP	6	6	1,70,498	2.7	
KSP†	1	1	32,974	0.2	
KTP	3	..	68,954	1.1	
Independents*	6	4	
PSP	7	..	13,991	0.2	7
SKML	5	..	3,680	0.05	6
Jana Sangh	24	..	55,584	0.9	24
Swatantra	6	..	13,105	0.2	6
Republicans	3	..	2,176	0.03	3
Independents†	56	6	1,78,392	4.52	46
Total	423	133	62,81,152	100.00	140

* Included with Independents.

† Includes Independents supported by Alliance.

The outcome of elections as shown in Table I indicates that the electorate was in no mood to tolerate the right extreme. The Swatantra secured only 0.2% and the Jana Sangh 0.9% of the total votes.³⁵ Unlike in some of the north Indian States, no party emerged in Kerala on the right side of the Congress. In the former States, the Congress has been pushed to the position of a central party while here the Congress and the Kerala Congress still remain on the right. These two parties together captured 43% of the total votes and the United Front mustered 51.4%, including 6.7% votes polled by the Muslim League.³⁶ That means the leftist parties secured 44.7% votes, which was only just 1.7% more than that of the two Congress parties. In no way this could be considered a decisive swing to the left. It is only a leaning towards the left under certain circumstances, a change from which cannot be ruled out if the United Front government belies the hopes of the electorate

The outcome of the elections also shows that the people were tired of the long spell of the President's rule which fell far short of their expectations. The blame for the failure of the President's rule was partly on the Congress government at the centre and partly on the bureaucracy in the State. One thing was clear that the electorate did not want Presidents' rule to be replaced by the rule of the Congress, which had repeatedly been shown as unworthy of the trust reposed in it.

Another outcome of the elections is one of far-reaching consequences : that is a visible slackening of the hold of communal leaders and the church over their traditional following. The NSS leader enjoyed an unbroken reputation for carrying with him a sizeable section of the electorate whichever side he joined, since 1948. But, this time, his support to the Congress did not prove effective. So was the case of the catholic church. What is more, the NSS leader and the catholic church had to humbly watch being disobeyed resulting in a clear rift in their respective followings. From a position of meek submission and abject obedience,

35. See Table I for details.

36. *Ibid.*

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some of the catholics rose to challenging the propriety of their bishops actively campaigning for political party. Such a situation was something new and even unthinkable a few years ago. The leftist parties, benefitted by this change, indeed they welcomed the trend. But some of the leaders of these parties have disclosed in private conversations that this tendency of assertion by a section of voters indicates that more and more people have started making independent judgment on political matters and they could very well turn up against the United Front government if the government did not live up to their expectations. Therefore, the United Front government with its 8.4% excess votes cannot afford to be complacent. On the other hand, they have to be on their guard and be cautious at every step. In short, the 1967 elections, more than any of the previous elections, make it clear that the Kerala electorate has become increasingly enlightened and politically articulate.



CHANDRA MUDALIAR
MADRAS VERDICT

THE Madras verdict in the fourth general elections put Tamilnad on the map of the world. The DMK-led electoral alliance set in motion a storm of an unimaginable velocity which swept away all the Congress stalwarts in the State - not sparing the stoutest of them all - Kamaraj. The State Congress certainly had given to Madras a more efficient administration than its counterparts in other parts of India; yet the Congress suffered an utter rout. The verdict was cruel but not meaningless, because when the people of Tamilnad went through the quinquennial baptism of introspection for the fourth time, they emerged as a more mature and fearless electorate than ever before. They did not merely topple the Congress government but gave a clear mandate to a single party, which augurs well for democracy.

In order to understand the significance, it is necessary to examine the pros and cons of the verdict in its proper perspective viz the general elections of 1962, the civic elections, the by-elections during the period and above all, the main issues and factors which influenced the 1967 elections.

I

The 1962 general elections were a simple, straightforward contest, with none of the sophisticated strategy and tactics exemplified in electoral alliances in 1967. Each party set its own candidate and sought the people's verdict in its own right. There were then 13 parties and a horde of independents, involved in the contests. Besides the Congress and the DMK, other participants were the Communists, Swatantra, PSP, Socialists, Republicans, Forward Bloc, Jana Sangh, We Tamils, Tamil National Party and the Socialist Labour. It was thus a hydra-headed electoral politics.

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From the fray the Congress emerged as a majority party winning 139 out of 206 assembly seats and 31 out of 41 Lok Sabha seats. It increased its popular vote by a slight margin from 45.34% in 1957 to 46.1% of votes polled in 1962. The popular vote of the Congress, as far as the elections to the parliamentary seats were concerned, declined from 46.52% in 1957 to 45.39% in 1962. Moreover, the Congress performance in the districts of Madura Thanjavur and Tirunelveli, was excellent, where they captured most of the assembly seats and as a result these districts came to be regarded as Congress strongholds. Although the DMK was increasing its popular vote rapidly, it is doubtful whether its adherence to the demand of Dravidasthan and secession from India, would have returned it to power at such an early date. The amendment of the Constitution in 1963 and the jettisoning of the demand by the leaders of the party helped rather than harmed it. Instead of secession, the DMK began demanding greater autonomy and freedom to the Tamilnad from the Union. This may have caught the imagination of the people and the party thereupon concentrated on broadening its base. Politicization and enlistment of active support of the sympathizers proceeded concurrently and the trend during this period was towards polarization of politics between Congress and the DMK.

II

Six by-elections took place between 1962-1964, 2 parliamentary and 4 to the State assembly. Of the 2 parliamentary seats, Congress and the DMK won one each, whereas, of the 4 assembly seats, the Congress won 3 and the DMK 1. The results of the civic elections of 1964 were equally favourable to the Congress. Though the Congress failed to recapture the Madras Corporation, it staged a startling come-back in the municipal elections in the State, as a whole.¹

The DMK which had secured startling victories in 1959, generally lost ground to the Congress in 1964.

1. There are 64 municipal councils in the State, besides the Madras Corporation. The Congress captured absolute control of 32 and emerged as the largest party in 15 more. It was a striking contrast to the 1959 elections, when the Congress had absolute majority only in 21 councils and was the largest party in 12.

If the by-elections and civic elections had any relevance, they could only be seen as strengthening, on the whole, the electoral position of the Congress. The Congress, however, was not adding to its popular vote. The hard core of the Congress sympathizers remained constant. Between 1957 and 1967, more than 2 million voters were added to the electoral roll. Obviously a large section of this was not won by the Congress. In 1957 Annadurai is reported to have said that most of his sympathizers were under age and that by 1967, they would be active supporters of his party.

Added to the above imperceptible trends, the debilitating effects of the two aggressions and failure of rains, on the economy of the country and the food situation, began to be felt with increasing degree of severity. Prices were rising and the supply of essential commodities as rice and coffee etc. was erratic. It was during this period that the anti-Hindi agitation also took place and was crushed, alienating the youth of the State. The economic discontent of the people and the frustration of the youth were naturally making the Congress unpopular with the people. According to the pollster studies by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, the popular vote of the Congress fell from 42% in February 1966 to 37% in May 1966. Added to this, the Institute's findings registered a steep fall among the number of the undecided voters. In Madras it was 28% in May 1966 and by October 1966 only 6% of voters remained undecided. By the end of 1966 therefore, the situation was ripe for the opposition parties to cash upon. And these parties, masterminded by C. Rajagopalachari, forged an electoral alliance in which the DMK played a vital role. The aim of the electoral strategy was to woo and consolidate in its favour, the majority of non-Congress voters. It was against this background and against heavy odds that the Congress entered the electoral contest.

III

By the beginning of 1967, the opposition parties had struck an agreement to present a united front to the Congress. The DMK-led alliance included Swatantra, CPI (M), Muslim League, SSP, Tamil Arasu Kazhagam, and We Tamil Party. Under the constituency-wise adjustment reached amongst the allies, the DMK

decided to contest 173 out of 234 assembly seats and 25 out of 37 Lok-Sabha seats and the rest of the assembly and Lok Sabha seats were distributed among the parties to the alliance. The DMK, however, was not able to rope in the CPI (R) and the Tamilnad Toilers Party. However, an understanding was reached between the Tirunelveli district unit of the DMK and Communist Party (R); the DMK agreed to support the Communist (R) candidate for Kovilpatti and, the CPI (R) in turn, agreed to support the DMK candidate for Tuticorin and Gangaikondan.

Besides the electoral alliance, each had its own bases of support. The Dravida Kazhagam of Ramaswamy Naicker decided to support the Congress; while the Tamilnad Students Anti-Hindi Conference, passed a resolution at Coimbatore pledging support to the DMK.

Factionalism

As inter-party electoral alliances were being hammered out, differences within the parties were arising over issues and policies. It would however be wrong to infer that "factionalism" in the Congress in Madras or in the DMK, has the same virulence as it has in other States of India. Congress is more or less a cohesive party, so is the DMK. Yet both the parties were not entirely free from a few cases of dissidence and factionalism on the eve of the elections. The cases of dissidence in the Congress were of a serious nature, whose repercussions affected the prestige of important personalities including that of Kamaraj. While the differences within the DMK resulted in members turning rebels or some of them forming splinter groups.

Six of the sitting Congress MLAs resigned from the party on the eve of the elections on account of differences over the question of the issue of tickets. Three of these members contested elections and the rest supported the alliance candidates. The decision on the part of two candidates who contested elections had truly damaging effect on the Congress stalwarts. Ramaswamy Naidu, a prominent and old Congressman was denied the ticket to contest from Sattur constituency in Ramanathapuram district, though he had been a sitting MLA for a decade. The constituency was given, instead, to Krishnaswami Naidu, the TNCC

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chief. It is possible the majority of Naidus of Sattur turned against the Congress on account of the insult to a prominent member of their community. The discontent seems to have spread to the neighbouring constituency of Virudhunagar—from where Kamaraj was contesting, which had a few pockets of Naidu community. The result was his own defeat as also of Krishnaswamy Naidu. The other prominent case of dissidence was that of A. R. Subbiah Mudaliar, who defeated the State minister Majeed at Kadayannallur.

The DMK too had a few party rebels. When S. Rameshwaran, a sitting member was denied the ticket, it created a rift between the rank and file of the DMK at Ariyalur in Tiruchirapalli district and the defeat of the DMK official candidate, Sepperumal at Ariyalur, by the Congress was, perhaps, partly due to the above fact. A. A. Balu, a member of the DMK party at Coimbatore did not think DMK was sufficiently progressive, and therefore formed the "Theevira Munnetra Kazhagam", a party of his own. He contested from Pollachi constituency in Coimbatore district and lost by a large margin.

Nomination

With the bases of support thus determined, the electioneering gathered momentum after the filing of nomination papers.

It is perhaps worthwhile examining the nomination procedure of the DMK. The DMK has a different procedure of nomination from that of the Congress. The applicant has to be an ordinary member, i.e. one who pays the subscription of 50 paise to the party. Such a member is necessarily a member of a branch, the smallest unit of the party. An applicant has to be duly proposed and seconded. A member who proposes, explains the reasons why the particular candidate should be selected from the constituency. The branch office sends the application to the Parliamentary Board, which is a screening body for the assembly and parliamentary constituencies. It consists of 5 senior members of the party. The Parliamentary Board sends a list of selected candidates as well as an alternate list to the General Secretary. The final selection rests with the General Secretary, who may or may

not confine himself to the list submitted by the Parliamentary Board. Instances where the General Secretary made his own choice are not wanting. During 1967 elections the General Secretary did not confine himself to the list in the case of Kanchipuram assembly seat and the Tirutani parliamentary seat. The General Secretary therefore has enormous powers. And these rest with an individual, while in the case of the Congress, they rest with a board, which is the CEC.

Though every party conformed to its own rules and procedures for selection of its candidates, their final loyalty was to that unwritten law—the caste system. The Congress is committed to secularism; the DMK to everything that is “progressive”—abolition of the caste system, dogmatism, Brahmanism, etc. Yet none of them for practical reasons, failed to conform to the “Iron Law” of caste. Therefore, the caste of the candidate was an important fact in his selection, not only with the Congress, but also with the DMK, Swatantra, Communists and others. That caste was an important factor at nomination level can be illustrated by describing its operation in a district. East Ramnad district comprises of 10 assembly constituencies, populated mostly by the Thevar and the Chettiar communities. The alliance set up 10 candidates (DMK 3 and Swatantra 7). Of the 3 DMK candidates, 2 belonged to the Thevar community and one was a Chettiar. And of the 7 Swatantra candidates, 6 were Thevars, and the other a Chettiar. The Congress also set up 10 candidates, 8 of whom were Thevars and 2 Chettiars. Conformity to the caste system could not have been more rigid or obvious. And this was largely true of other districts as well.

Though caste was an important factor at the nomination level, it is doubtful whether it was equally important at the voting level during 1967 elections.

Candidates

In spite of the formation of the electoral alliance, there was no appreciable decline in the number of candidates in the field in 1967 from that of 1962.

There were 798 candidates to contest 206 assembly seats and 152 for 41 parliamentary seats in 1962, whereas in 1967, there were

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775 candidates for 234 assembly seats and 127 for 39 parliamentary seats. Thus, there were not as many straight fights as the opposition parties would have preferred. The following table shows nearly as many multi-cornered contests for assembly seats in 1967 as in 1962:

* Year	N straight	a Trian gular	t 4-Cor- nered	u 5 Cor- nered.	r c 6 Cor nered	o 7 Cor nered.	n t 8-Cor- nered	e s t s
1962	50	70	59	3	15	3	5	
1967	49	106	47	24	4	4	-	

Note—Report on the general elections in Ma'ras 1962 and figures for 1967 collected from the Public (Elections) Department.

The same was true of the contests in the parliamentary constituencies.²

However, mere similarity in the number of candidates contesting, does not tell the whole story. Though four fifths of all contests were among three or more contestants, they were not **truly** multi cornered contests in 1967. The contests were nearly all straight-i.e. between the Congress and the DMK-led alliance, those who did not belong to either group, i.e. Communists (R), the Jana Sangh, the independents and others were not really in the running and they lost heavily, in most cases losing their deposits.

Campaign

Unlike in the three previous general elections, when the campaign for wooing the voters had begun well before the nomination day, the 1967 campaign gained momentum only after the filing of nomination papers. The campaign was one of the noisiest and included a very expensive poster war. The Congress sources admitted to having spent Rs. 7,00,000 on the printing of posters and pamphlets whereas the DMK claimed to have spent Rs. 1,00,000, though

2. In 1967 following was the nature of contest for parliamentary seats

Straight	10
Triangular	17
4-Cornered	7
5- ..	3
6- ..	1
7- ..	1

one saw as many DMK posters as Congress posters. The DMK printed appeals in the form of marriage invitations, inviting the voters to come to the polling booths on the 'auspicious day' and cast their votes in favour of the DMK party candidates. The names of the candidates for assembly and parliamentary seats were printed in the places where the bride and bridegroom's names are found. The election appeals ranged from one sheet letters with photographs from the Jana Sangh to an 8-page letter from Annadurai. The Jana Sangh's appeal was both for votes and financial aid. Some of the striking features of the campaign were mile-long processions and presenting skits on the achievements or misdeeds of the parties. On the last day of the campaign, the Congress commissioned an aeroplane to drop handbills. There was more house-to-house canvassing than public meetings, which were many, sometimes over 100 a day. The advantage of house-to-house canvassing was that it gave an opportunity to the candidate to establish rapport with the voters. More often than not the candidate found he had to answer difficult questions mainly on the economic situation in the State.

Various planks were adopted by the candidates. Annadurai's plank was "shortage of rice", while Kamaraj's was the "twin necessities of the time—maturity and stability of the government". C. Rajagopalachari, in his inimitable manner, attacked the Congress for its misrule, and if, he said the Congress leaders could not be jailed for that, 'the least that could be done was to defeat them. The students' main targets of attack were Kamaraj and M. Bhaktavatsalam and their main plank was Hindi imperialism. They campaigned in the most remote and difficult areas of their constituencies, pleaded with every voter to defeat the Congress. Congress had its own batch of students campaigning in these areas. Promises and appeals were limitless including the assurance of a measure of rice for a rupee, by the DMK enthusiasts. Promises ranged from clean administration to the amendment of the Constitution to establish a two-party system and hand the police to the Governor. The din of the campaign subsided a day before the polling day.

Everything was normal on the E-Day, except for the long and silent queues of people near the polling booths. Under the

impact of vigorous campaigning by the DMK, Congress, Swatantra and other parties, a higher percentage of polling was achieved, thus increasing the involvement of people in the political process and reducing the gap between the base of democracy and its apex. The electorate, since 1957, has been expanding and so also the degree of involvement on the part of the people. The electorate of 1962 increased by more than 11 million over that of 1957 while the percentage of polling leaped from 49.05% to 70.60%, which is a phenomenal rise. The electorate of 1967 increased by over 2 million and the voting percentage increased to 75.56% which is equally remarkable. According to districtwise breakdown the polling ranged from 69.3% in Dharmapuri to 80.81% in Thanjavur, which is indeed high. Percentage of literacy ranges in the Madras State from 68% in Madras city to 23.1% in Salem district, yet the range of voting percentage was 74.21% in Madras city to 72.08% in Salem district. Voting in rural as well as urban areas was between 70 to 80%. There was no marked apathy on the part of the educated, as was generally the case in the previous elections.

TABLE No. 1
District-wise polling in fourth general elections for
Madras legislative assembly

Sl. No.	Name of district	Total Electorate	Total polled	Percentage
1.	Madras	1125459	835206	74.21
2.	Chingelpet	1403998	1095181	78.08
3.	North Arcot	1868312	1439002	77.02
4.	South Arcot	1836457	1439002	78.36
5.	Dharmapuri	761608	527819	69.3
6.	Salem	156262	1128267	72.08
7.	Nilgiris	219993	156009	70.92
8.	Coimbatore	2274858	1723426	75.96
9.	Madurai	2051247	1509203	73.57
10.	Thanjavur	1914707	1595537	80.81
11.	Tiruchirappalli	1974547	1558113	78.91
12.	Ramanathapuram	1527821	1197175	78.36
13.	Tirunelveli	1712113	1275079	74.47
14.	Kanyakumari	559764	413197	
		Parliament		
15.	Lok Sabha	20796846	15922406	76.56

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One of the reasons for the High rate of polling was the presence of a clear cut choice of Congress and DMK-led non-Congress candidates in the fight. There was no longer the bewildering choice from a large number of parties and candidates, as the parties and candidates outside the alliance or the Congress, did not seem to matter.

Voting behaviour

The factors which influenced voting were mainly economic and hence "modern." The influence of the traditional factor of caste was rather insignificant, especially during the elections of 1967 and the very limited role which the caste played was mainly at assembly levels and partly at parliamentary level though, even this cannot be fully established. For the Kumbhakonam assembly seat a Congress Brahmin defeated a DMK fisherman and for the parliamentary seat a DMK Mudaliar defeated a Congress Brahmin. The constituency had more than average percentage of Brahmin voters. Similarly the Virudhunagar assembly constituency consists mainly of Nadars, though there are pockets of Naidus who are a deciding factor. Srinivasan who defeated Kamaraj, is a Naidu and Kamaraj, a Nadar. It is difficult to assert from these results that caste has entirely ceased to influence votes; but it may be taken as a trend away from rigid caste patterns of voting.

The important factors were, of course, the economic and cultural. Some of the issues which finally decided the outcome were (a) high prices (b) shortage of rice (c) opposition to Hindi and (d) general desire for change in administration. Two months prior to election there was no regular supply of rice or foodgrains in the statutory rationing areas with the result that rice had to be bought at a high price in open market. This naturally annoyed the consumers. The farmers resented the compulsory procurement of rice at unattractive prices, land ceilings, non-availability of fertilisers etc. High prices and non-availability of rice and coffee beans particularly annoyed women, and it is quite possible this tilted the scale, because women voters were more numerous than men.

Added to this was the Congress government's failure to understand the resentment of the people of the State over the

language issue and its manner of handling the agitation alienated the youth.

Since the Congress had been in office since independence there was also a general desire for a change in administration. And since a well organised alternative party was available, they voted for it.

Analysis of results

The analysis of results of the election to the assembly seats and the Lok Sabha, projects the desire on the part of people for a change in administration.

There were 773 candidates for 234 assembly seats. As in the previous elections, the strongest contingent, was of the independents. There were 234 independents, of whom, 235 lost the election and 225 forfeited their deposits and only 7 won the elections. The independents got 49.1% of the total votes polled. But none of the independents who won, was truly independent, since all of them were supported by the DMK-led alliance. The factor which perhaps helped them to win were (a) party support (b) personality and local influence and (c) scattering of votes in many-cornered contests. From the examination of results, it is evident that there is no future for the really independent candidate in Madras. In 1951, there were 667 independent candidates, a majority of whom were not supported by any party. 62 won and among the defeated, 476 lost their deposits. In 1957, 336 independent candidates contested, 22 won and 261 forfeited their deposits. In 1962, 207 contested and only 5 won, 189 of them losing deposits. It is clear that independents, not supported by political parties have little chance of winning elections.

Assembly

The Congress contested 233 assembly seats. Election in one constituency was countermanded due to the death of a candidate. A bye-election was held in April and the Congress won the seat defeating the Swatantra candidate. The Congress has thus 50 members in the assembly now. In the general election, Congress won 49 seats, stood second in 183 constituencies and third in one. The party got 41.43% of total votes polled.

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It is often contended that the Congress has not lost hard core of its popular support. Examination of the Congress vote does not sustain this belief. First of all the number of voters have been increasing and yet there has not been a proportionate increase in the volume of Congress support. In 1957, the Congress obtained 45.3% of the total votes. In 1962 the Congress scored 46.1% of the total votes. This cannot be considered as too great an increase, because, the electorate had increased by 6.67%. When the electorate had increased by 10.20%, the Congress percentage did not increase, in fact, it fell. In 1967 the Congress scored 41.43% of total votes. A district wise examination of the same factor showed a general decline in popular vote of the Congress. In every district except in Dharmapuri and Kanyakumari, the Congress lost from 1%, in the districts like Thanjavur and Tiruchirapalli, to 12% in the Coimbatore district. It was in Coimbatore district that the Congress had won 20 out of 21 seats in 1962, while in 1967, they won only 3 out of 25 seats. In some of the other districts the fall was—6% in Madura, 9% in Ramnad, 11% in the Nilgiris.

TABLE No. 2
District-wise break-down of the number and percentage of
votes polled by the Congress in the third and fourth
general elections to Madras legislative assembly.

Srl. No.	Name of district	Number of votes polled by Congress		Percentage of the total votes polled	
		1962	1967	1962	1967
1.	Madras City	297657	342226	45.1	41.86
2.	Chingleput	364604	391022	42.84	35.67
3.	South Arcot	549441	588245	48.5	40.88
4.	North Arcot	479251	541092	40.23	37.64
5.	Dharmapuri*		237837	34.56	45.06
6.	Salem	525734	444901	41.77	39.46
7.	Nilgiris	69528	60691	49.20	38.9
8.	Coimbatore	688798	625725	45.16	36.32
9.	Madurai	580716	580198	44.02	38.45
10.	Tiruchirapalli	555446	650252	42.28	41.74
11.	Thanjavur	604066	672445	43.73	42.16
12.	Ramanathapuram	467589	457541	47.21	38.42
13.	Tirunelveli	504106	522120	39.54	40.96
14.	Kanyakumari	177451	200073	42.96	57.85

* The district of Dharmapuri was formed in 1965. Yet the percentage of total number of votes polled by Congress in the district of Dharmapuri in 1962 has been given. And this is, after collecting the number of votes polled by the Congress in all those constituencies which today form the district of Dharmapuri.

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Thanjavur and Tiruchirapalli were considered Congress strongholds, yet, just 1% fall in popular vote and delimitation of constituencies in these two districts, have hurt the Congress than helped them. The constituencies in these districts increased from 40 in 1962, to 45 in 1967. Since there was no increase in Congress votes, it is possible the supporters of the party got distributed in lesser proportion than necessary, resulting in the defeat of several Congress candidates.

The Congress performance was particularly good in Dharmapuri and Kanyakumari districts. It is possible a special factor operates in these districts in favour of the Congress. When the district of Dharmapuri was part of the Salem district, the Congress had secured (in 1962), 34.56% of total votes polled. In 1967 they polled 45.06% and won 6 out of 9 seats. Similarly in Kanyakumari, the Congress percentage of votes rose from 42.96% in 1962 to 57.85% in 1967 and the party won 6 out of 7 seats. The factors which worked against Congress in the Madras State, could not have spared the Congress in these two districts. In spite of it, the popular vote of Congress rose steeply and that must be due to the fact that it was Congress which was responsible for the merger of Kanyakumari with Madras State and for the formation of the Dharmapuri district. Again the same factor seems to have helped the Congress to the Tirutani assembly seat in the Chingelpet district. The Congress won just one out of 25 assembly seats in this district and that was at Tirutani. It was won by Vinayakam who was mainly responsible for the transfer of Tirutani to the Madras State from Andhra Pradesh.

The DMK contested 173 assembly seats out of 234 and won 138. They scored 41.21% of the total votes polled, about 0.22% less than the Congress, in spite of the fact that the DMK contested a lesser number of seats than the Congress. Even their percentage of votes polled district-wise has risen in 1967 by 0.2% in South Arcot to 32.54%, in the Chingelpet district over their own score in 1962. Some of their striking gains were in the city of Madras and in Salem and Ramnad districts, where they won all the seats which they contested.

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TABLE No. 3

District-wise break-down of the number and percentage of votes polled by the DMK in the 1962 and 67 elections to Madras legislative assembly.

Srl. No.	Name of city	Number of votes polled by DMK		Percentage of the total votes polled	
		1962	1967	1962	1967
1.	Madras City	292698	399249	44.33	47.79
2.	Chingelpet	182639	591898	21.43	53.99
3.	North Arcot	473759	661779	39.17	45.99
4.	South Arcot	418015	672018	36.9	37.1
5.	Dharmapuri		200266	29.91	37.92
6.	Salem	507222	551506	40.29	48.91
7.	Nilgiris	16.88	20.41
8.	Coimbatore	246585	604588	17.25	35.1
9.	Madurai	256231	499957	19.42	33.13
10.	Tiruchirapalli	495358	660824	37.7	42.41
11.	Thanjavur	355884	517257	25.76	52.43
12.	Ramanathapuram	73867	307377	7.46	25.66
13.	Tirunelveli	103068	448944	8.1	35
14.	Kanyakumari	..	--	4.19	8.83

The DMK defeated the Congress in more constituencies by higher majorities than Congress had been able to defeat the DMK. Thus in 35 constituencies, the DMK's margin of victory over the Congress was between 10,000 to 15,000 votes, while the largest number of constituencies in which the Congress defeated the DMK, the margin of victory had been between 1000-2000 votes. The DMK defeated the Congress candidates by over 25,000 votes in two constituencies; while the biggest difference which the Congress could maintain was that of 20,000 votes, in Pudukotai from where the former prince of Pudukotai contested on behalf of the Congress.

In straight contests too the Congress fared badly. The Congress won 7 out of 49 straight contests while the DMK won 33 of them; 8 were won by Swatantra and one by Marxist. Both of the latter were the members of the alliance. It was in triangular contests that the Congress fared best. Out of 105 of these, they won in 28 and the DMK in 56. The Congress' next largest number of victories was in 4 and 5-cornered contests-11 and 3 respectively.

TABLE No. 4
General Elections in Madras State—Comparative Study
Legislative Assembly

Parties contested	1957			1967			No. of candidates forfeiting deposits.
	Party position	Valid votes polled	Percentage	Party position	Valid votes polled	Percentage	
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	13	14,23,319	12.8	50	24,35,633	27.1	Nil
Indian National Congress	151*	50,46,576	45.34	139	58,48,974	46.1	Nil
Communist Party of India	4	8,23,582	7.4	2	9,78,806	7.7	24
Communist Party of India (Marxist)					2
Praja Socialist Party	2	2,93,778	2.6				Nil
Socialist	1	59,098	0.5	1	1,59,212	1.3	0.89
Samyukta Socialist Party					48,353	0.4	..
Forward Bloc	3	1,52,140	1.4	3	1,73,261	1.4	1
Congress Reforms Committee	9	5,84,161	5.3				..
Swatantra		6	9,91,773	7.8	..
Jana Sangh							2
Republican							24
Other parties & Independents	22	27,47,342	24.7	5	10,79,934	8.2	14
	205	1,11,30,996	100	206	1,26,76,346	100	256
				233	1,53,10,702	100	293
Total number of legislative assembly seats	205			206			

* Includes three candidates elected unopposed

§ For 1967 general elections, Communist Party of India relevant to the Communists (Rightist).

@ Election has been countermanded for 1967 on account of the death of a candidate in 133 Thirunangalam Constituency.

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The Swatantra contested 26 seats and won 20, forfeiting deposits in two. They polled 4.48% of total votes, compared to 7.8% in 1962 when they had contested 98 seats. Their largest number of gains were in Ramnad district. The Communists (M) who had joined the alliance, contested 22 seats and won 11, polling 3.89% of the votes polled. Their best performance was in Madurai and Thanjavur. While the Communists (R) who did not join the alliance, contested 32 seats and won just 2, forfeiting deposits in 24 out of the 30 in which they were defeated. They polled 1.78% of total votes polled. Between them the Communist candidates polled 5.67% votes after having contested 54 seats. While the Swatantra, the party to the right of the DMK contested 26 seats and secured 4.98% of votes polled. The Communists (R) drew blank in Tiruchirapalli and Coimbatore, though their position had been stronger in those districts in 1962. One of their gains—at Kovilpatti—in Tirunelveli district was, as stated earlier, with the support of the DMK.

The PSP and SSP, two other members of the alliance, set up 4 and 3 candidates each, and won 4 and 2 seats respectively. The PSP polled 0.89% and SSP 0.55 of the total votes polled. In 1962 the PSP had not won a single seat though they had contested 21 seats.

The parties which fared worst were the Jana Sangh and the Republican party. The Jana Sangh contested 24 seats and lost deposits in all of them; so did the Republicans who contested 14 seats. The Jana Sangh polled 22,183 votes in all. In 1962 the Jana Sangh had set up 4 candidates and all of them had lost their deposits. Considering their performance so far, it seems the Jana Sangh would not be able to muster popular support in Madras State.

Lok Sabha

After delimitation of 1966, Madras State is required to send 39 members to Lok Sabha. In 1957 and 1962 it had sent 41 members and each parliamentary constituency then consisted of 5 assembly constituencies; in 1967 it consisted of 6 assembly seats.

The Congress set up 39 candidates, so did the DMK-led alliance. However, the electoral alliance seems to have broken

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down in Tenkasi (SC) constituency, where, both the Swatantra and the PSP fielded their candidates. The others in the fray were the Communists (R) who contested 7 seats, the Jana Sangh 4, the Republican 2, and a horde of independents—36 in all. There were thus 9 political parties participating in the election. The DMK-led alliance distributed 59 seats in the following manner:

DMK	—	25
Swatantra	—	8
Comm. (M)	—	5
PSP	—	1
Muslim League	—	1

Muslim League candidates contested as an independent from Ramanathapuram parliamentary constituency.

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TABLE No. 5
General Elections in Madras State—Comparative Study
Lok Sabha

Parties contested	1957			1962			1967		
	Party position	Valid votes polled	Percentage	Party position	Valid votes polled	Percentage	Party position	Valid votes polled	No. of candidates for-fetting deposits.
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	1	5,14,223	4.7	7	23,15,610	8.6	25	55,24,514	35.78
Indian National Congress	31*	50,94,552	46.52	31*	56,23,013	45.3	3	64,36,710	41.69
Congress Reforms Committee	..	8,639	0.1
Swatantra	13,00,526	10.5	6	14,14,203	9.16
Communist Party of India §	2	11,01,338	10.1	2	12,72,302	10.2	..	2,99,841	1.94
Communist Party of India (Marxist)	4	10,57,542	6.85
Praja Socialist Party	..	3,99,789	3.6	..	2,09,101	1.7	..	12,162	0.08
Forward Bloc	1	4,05,760	3.7	1	1,75,772	1.4
Socialists	1	861,39	0.8	..	45,097	0.4
Other parties & Independents	5	33,40,401	30.5	..	14,82,614	11.9	1	6,60,491	4.28
	41	1,09,50,841	100.00	41	1,24,24,036	100.00	39	1,54,39,094	100.00
									44

* Includes three candidates elected unopposed.

§ For 1967 general elections, Communist Party of India refers to the Communists (Rightist).

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As in the elections to the assembly, independent candidates for parliamentary seat fared badly. In 1957, there were 68 independents, of whom only 5 won and 53 of the defeated candidates, lost their deposits. In 1962, 46 independents had contested the elections and all of them were defeated, 42 losing their deposits. In 1967, 36 contested elections, 35 of them were defeated, losing their deposits too. The one who won was, in fact, a Muslim League candidate supported by the alliance.

The Congress contested all the 39 seats and won only 3 of them. Never had the Congress suffered such a crushing defeat as in the fourth general elections to Lok Sabha. It polled 41.69% of total votes. As against this, it had polled 46.52% of total votes in 1957 when they had 41 candidates; whereas in 1962, they set up 41 candidates and polled 45.3% of the total votes polled. The electorate has been increasing since 1957 by about one and a half million voters, whereas the Congress percentage of popular votes has been gradually falling. It was again in multi-cornered contests where the Congress had been winning while it was defeated in all the straight fights.

The DMK's performance in elections to parliamentary seats was extraordinary. They set up 25 candidates and all of them won, perhaps the only example of its kind in the history of elections. Considering the results of earlier elections, their popular vote has also been rising steeply. In 1957 they contested 7 seats and secured just one, polling 4.7% of the total votes. In 1962 they set up 18 candidates and won 7, polling 8.6% of the votes, while in 1967, they raised their percentage of votes to 35.78% which is phenomenal. Perhaps one possible reason, for the cent per cent victory of the DMK is the image which the party is presenting to the parliamentary voters—that it is they who effectively safeguard the State's interest, and also fight for its rights, against the Congress.

There were some notable cases of splitting of votes. The Krishnagiri parliamentary constituency in Dharmapuri district was won by the DMK while they did not win a single assembly seat

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there, though they contested 4 of the six assembly seats (the Congress won 4 and the Swatantra 2) And to a limited extent there was splitting of votes in the Kumbhakonam and Chidambaram parliamentary constituencies. Here the assembly seats were shared equally by the Congress and the DMK.

Swatantra, one of the partners in the alliance, set up 8 candidates and won 6 seats. The Swatantra entered elections in 1962 but did not win a single seat, though they had polled 10.5% of total votes. The Communists (M) set up 5 candidates and 4 of them won, scoring 6.85% of the total votes. The Communists (R) set up 7 candidates, all of them lost, and 6 of whom forfeiting their deposits. All the 5 Jana Sangh candidates lost deposits, the same was true of the Republican party candidates. Contests to parliamentary seats too were mainly between the Congress and the alliance candidates, the other parties not counting for much.

IV

The election verdict has testified to the strength of Indian democracy; the people have not merely toppled the Congress government but have given a clear mandate to a new party to rule for the next five years. The victory was decisive, yet it was least expected. "The disadvantage of free elections" Molotov once remarked to Ernest Bevin, "is that you can never be sure who is going to win them." It is quite possible the same discomfiture was felt by the workers of both the parties. Uncertainties attended the general elections in Madras State till the last day of elections. Yet, as has been stated earlier, the results were decisive and a totally new party has been inducted into office. The capture of power by the DMK has been peaceful and through the ballot box.

What has emerged from the fourth general elections is the fact that the people in Madras State have, to an extent, understood the significance of the vote. They, perhaps, realise that it is not a meaningless, blunt instrument, but a sharp and effective one to dismiss the old and call in a new government. Though the DMK has been returned to power with an overwhelming majority, it cannot take the popular support for granted. The awareness of the signi-

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ficance of vote is a sign of maturity and the people have demonstrated it.

Besides the voters, the outcome of the fourth general elections, is, perhaps, also a lesson to the political parties. The fact that the people have thrown out the old timers should make the political parties realise that it is not enough to have experienced workers but it is also necessary to infuse fresh blood from time to time. Efforts at reorganisation henceforth, may work for the twin ideals of experience and rejuvenation.

The assumption of power by a locally based party such as the DMK may affect both the federal structure of India and the behaviour of political parties. There will be trend towards federalisation of the political structure. Greater efforts will be made not only to safeguard the interest of the State but also secure for it a greater share of general benefits. This will affect the political process as well. Besides the locally based parties, even the State wings of all-India parties will henceforth identify themselves with the interests and the rights of States rather than conform to party discipline dictated from the centre. It is quite possible that had the Congress ministry realised the consequences of its handling of the language issue, sensed the general feeling of the people and identified itself with it rather than adhere to the policy of the party as framed at the Centre, the Congress would not have suffered such a rout. It is, therefore, the satisfaction which the people of a State have that the party is "one with us" which will remain the moorings of a party or enable a new one to take root in the region. It is therefore possible that the political parties will become operationable as 'federal' as the political structure itself.

It is possible this tendency may create hopes as well as fears. In fact we are today equidistant from both opportunity and calamity. If the Centre and the States undertake their legitimate functions and observe the limitations to their power, it is possible a true federal state would emerge, establishing a more effective unity of India. On the other hand, if the Centre and the States pull in opposite directions or the Centre interferes unnecessarily in State's

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affairs or if the State blackmails the Centre into meeting its exorbitant demands, the unity and strength of India will be jeopardised. If the Centre has to guarantee the life of the nation and its units their autonomy, the Centre will have to avoid over-government and the units, excessive reliance on the Centre for their ambitious plans. This will entail a good deal of adjustment, statesmanship and co-operation. The years ahead, therefore, are full of conflicts and compromises. But these are, however, the essence of democracy. It is the interaction between the interests of the Centre, and the desire of the States to establish their identity, as well as the need on the part of both for cooperation that will more than anything else, promote the unity and stability of India.

B. R. PUROHIT

GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN MADHYA PRADESH

THE State of Madhya Pradesh came into being on November 1, 1956, as a result of linguistic reorganization of States. Consequently, erstwhile princely states of Madhya Bharat, Rewa, Chhattisgarh, Bhopal and Hindi speaking areas of Central Provinces, known as Mahakoshal, were merged together to create the State of Madhya Pradesh. However, that meant merger of areas and diverse regions which were not homogeneous. The Madhya Bharat Union, for instance, had a long and complicated history of political rivalries, party dissidence and unstable governments. A tradition of political rivalry in Madhya Bharat—at the level of ruling houses as well as that of Congress leadership—came as a disturbing legacy for the new State of Madhya Pradesh. Diversity of units so merged, mutual distrust and fear of domination of one region by the other in administration and services, obstructed a naturally expected feeling of reciprocity; and though a political union was carved out, it did not lead to the identities of a political community.

Another characteristic of Madhya Pradesh was the uneven political development of its constituent parts. Mahakoshal was a part of formerly British-administered territory of the Central Provinces and Berar. That area had witnessed the implementation of the Government of India Acts of 1909, 1919 and 1935. These developments had given to the people of this area some idea of political participation through elected legislatures and semi-responsible governments, the like of which was not made available to those living in the erstwhile native States, merged into Madhya Pradesh. On the contrary, the latter had a tradition-ridden society and feudal processes were predominant there. By and large, the

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impact of political articulation seen in Mahakoshal region, where the Indian National Congress had established its roots, presented a contrast with the lack of political awareness in princely States, where political parties were not allowed to function. Such a divergent legacy had its impact on the politics of the newly constituted State.

The population of the State, because of its political implications, deserves some mention. Madhya Pradesh has a population of 3,23,72,408, 20.6% of whom belong to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The result is that in the State legislative assembly which has a strength of 296 members, 42 seats have been reserved for scheduled castes and 67 seats for scheduled tribes. Thus, 36.82% seats in the State legislative assembly are reserved for backward classes and tribes. Any political party which aspires to control political power in the State has to recognize this fact.

Also, there were 76 princely States before the formation of Madhya Pradesh. As many as 36 princes entered the election fray. 17 of such contestants were supported by the Congress. The Jana Sangh had five princes among its candidates. Some influential rulers, Maharaja Martand Singh of Rewa being one of them, did not contest elections, but were there to support a particular party in their areas of influence. The Maharani of Gwalior, after relinquishing her membership of the Congress, entered the political arena to oppose the ruling party. The entrance of the former rulers in Madhya Pradesh politics has added a new dimension to it because of the fact that the princes still hold influence in their areas. The alignment of the princes with certain parties or groups, the Jana Sangh-Rajmata alliance for instance, is bound to influence the balance of power in the State.

The Principal Participants

The principal parties that made a bid for political power in the State are Congress, Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, PSP, SSP, Ram Rajya Parishad and Communist party. The Congress is the oldest, and the largest, where as Jana Congress is the youngest of the parties in the State. A brief survey of the principal participants

in the politics of the State would give some interesting characteristics. To take the Congress first, with the reorganization of the State, the PCC was also reorganized. The merger followed, therefore, of the existing units in Madhya Bharat, Bhopal, Rewa, Chattisgarh States and of Mahakoshal. Mention has already been made of the prevailing factionalism in these party units before the reorganization of the State. Madhya Bharat was the hot bed of intra-party rifts and personal rivalries amongst the leaders. This resulted in frequent reshufflings. The story in Vindhya Pradesh (Rewa) Congress was identical. The Bhopal unit of the Congress was relatively stable under the leadership of S. D. Sharma. It might be noted that Ravi Shanker Shukla, the first Chief Minister of the State, succeeded, in some measure, to give an impression of unity—however temporary, on the eve of the 1957 elections. His death removed a unifying force and reopened the flood-gates of factional politics once again. The consequent institutional weakness of the party was manifestly reflected in the successive reverses in local and national elections. The freeplay of factional politics in Madhya Pradesh Congress, between 1957 and 1967, is a fact of considerable significance for any student of State politics. Factionalism of such intensity also adversely affected administration as it was subordinated to regional pulls and individual pressures. Congress factionalism reached its climax however, in November 1966. On the issue of representation, the dissidents led by leaders like Takhat Mal Jain, Mahant Laxmi Narayan Das, M.C. Deshlehra and R. D. Totla resigned from Congress and formed the rival Jan Congress. The pattern of dissidence was clear: Madhya Bharat leaders were in the forefront backed by some leaders from Chhattisgarh region. This process of dissidence was further intensified by the Maharani of Gwalior who resigned Congress membership and entered into electoral alliance with the Jana Sangh and other parties with a view to defeating D. P. Mishra and his colleagues at the polls. The fourth general elections in Madhya Pradesh appeared to be a straight contest between D. P. Mishra and the combined strength of the opposition parties. Thus, the Congress, on the eve of the general elections, witnessed a divided house—leading to the exodus of dissidents and emergence of D. P. Mishra as the sole care-taker of the party at the polls.

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As compared to the Congress, the Jana Sangh began its career in Madhya Pradesh politics with a different background. It was established in Madhya Pradesh in 1952, just a month before the commencement of the first general elections. If the Congress vote declined in the succeeding elections, the Jana Sangh vote registered an upward trend: it secured 4,19,000 votes in 1952, rising to 7,26,000 in 1957 and to 10,87,411 in 1962. Its poll percentage was 9.83% in 1957 and 16.7% in 1962. Securing 10 seats in the second general elections, it increased its representation to 41 seats in the third general elections and got the privilege of becoming the largest single opposition group in the State legislature. The quick rise of the Jana Sangh in Madhya Pradesh may be viewed in the context of the erstwhile princely States. This feudal setting provided a fertile soil wherein the RSS could richly grow. When the Jana Sangh was established in Madhya Pradesh, it drew heavily on the membership and leadership of the RSS. Whole-time workers of the RSS were transferred to the Jana Sangh. Thus, K. B. Thakre, H. B. Joshi, V. K. Saklecha, Patwa and Patankar, to name a few, trusted leaders of the RSS, were drafted to the service of Jana Sangh, and today they constitute the backbone of that party in Madhya Pradesh. Compared to the Congress, the Jana Sangh has little to lose by ideological cleavages; it is a party with a comparatively better discipline among its followers. In terms of catching votes, the Congress mainly depends on the agriculturists; the Jana Sangh largely relies on middle class voters. The Jana Sangh, after the third general elections, has learnt a lesson that in order to contend for power against the Congress (which relies on the agriculturists for votes), it must also create a dent in rural Madhya Pradesh. One might see an appreciable leaning by the party in that direction.

If the RSS was forerunner of Jana Sangh in Madhya Pradesh, Hindu Mahasabha (HMS) and Ram Rajya Parishad (RRP) existed in the State as political parties even before the advent of the RSS. Before 1947, some of the native States were citadels of rightist political forces and enjoyed royal protection and patronage there. But, with regional and political changes and with the emergence of Jana Sangh as a solidly organized party displaying some sort of ideology, centralized leadership, disciplined followers, and some

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programme of economic reconstruction, HMS and RRP started losing hold on the electorate. The rise of Jana Sangh after the second general elections, at the cost of the HMS and the RRP is a fact of considerable interest. In the second general elections Jana Sangh had 41 seats in the State legislature, HMS 6 and RRP 10. The position of these three parties becomes more interesting after the fourth general elections when Jana Sangh got 78 supporters, HMS none and RRP only 2 seats.*

The PSP and SSP also show some interesting aspects. The emergence of these two parties followed the general pattern of breaking away from Congress, and subsequent combinations and permutations. The PSP won 12 seats in the State legislative assembly in 1957 and subsequently increased its strength to 33 in 1962 elections. This increased strength of the PSP gave some hope to the electorate that it would provide an appropriate alternative to Congress and satisfy the aspirations of the intellectuals or of those who believed in democratic socialism. That wish was not entirely fulfilled. Though several had joined the PSP, leaving Congress, both for personal and ideological reasons, no consistent political force could be summoned together. When D.P. Mishra became Chief Minister of the State in September 1963, he invited PSP members to return, and some 30 MLAs rejoined Congress. The SSP has its pockets of influence in the State, especially in some tribal areas of Jabua, and is content to retain that hold. The quiet and order loving sections of the electorate have shown little inclination for this party. The PSP, after the second general elections, had raised high hopes; its post-election performance was not satisfactory. Its members frequently crossed the floor; its organization was weak; its performance in local elections did not enthuse the people.

The Swatantra party is of recent origin in the State. After the Jan Congress, it is the youngest party. Formed hurriedly on the eve of third general elections, it secured 2 seats in the State legislature. Though Madhya Pradesh abounds in erstwhile Rajas, Maharajas and Jagirdars (who, in their interest, should have leaned

* See Table No. II

towards the Swatantra party, as it happened in the States of Rajasthan, Gujarat or Orissa), the Swatantra party did not do as well as anticipated. One possible explanation for that might be that many of the members of the feudal class were drawn to the Congress in the first flush of independence, but with the emergence of Jana Sangh as a recognized force, a sizeable chunk of the feudal class gravitated toward that rightist party. Jana Sangh also had a distinct advantage of time over the Swatantra. Also, the Jana Sangh could satisfy the aspirations of conservative elements because of its ideology, organization and leadership, which were lacking in the latter party.

In the third general elections, K. N. Katju, then Chief Minister was defeated by a Jana Sangh candidate Mandloi was elected party leader in March 1962 but he had to quit under the Kamraj Plan in September 1963. That facilitated the reentry, into State politics, of D. P. Mishra, who had been out of the Congress for some time that also marked a turning-point in the history of Madhya Pradesh in general, and of the Congress in particular. The process of disintegration that had begun in the party after the death of Shukla was temporarily arrested. Opponents of Mishra - he has many bitter opponents as he has loyal supporters and followers - are of the view that dissidence, factionalism and the consequent weakness of the party have grown only because of him. Opposition parties denounce Mishra as an autocrat and feel his presence, at the helm of the State, to be detrimental to the interests of the State. His followers, however, contend, if performance be the test of able leadership, Mishra must be recognized as one. He brought in 24 MLAs, mostly from PSP to Congress. Winning 9 seats out of 12 by-elections, he raised Congress strength to 172 in the State legislature after assuming office in September 1963.

This account of party position before the commencement of the fourth general elections would underline the fact that the real contestants for political power in the State were Congress and Jana Sangh. HMS and RSP were a decaying force; so were PSP and SSP; Jan Congress was an ineffective superfluity; Swatantra party had just begun; the CPI was a safe bet as a negligible entity. In fact, the Jana Sangh alone seemed to have attained some measure

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of identity. It might, therefore, be said that the general elections in Madhya Pradesh were fought as a two-party contest, between Congress and Jana Sangh, and the remaining parties only colluded with the latter against Congress.

On the basis of revised population data in the State after 1962, the number of seats for the State legislative assembly was increased from 288 to 296. Against these 296 seats, 1553 candidates were put up by various parties. The table below gives a tabular explanation for 1967 elections :

TABLE No. 1
Number of Seats Contested

Name of the Party	Seats Contested	Seats Won
Congress	296	167
Jana Sangh	265*	78
PSP	112	9
SSP	112	10
CPI (M)	10	..
CPI	31	1
Jan Congress	45	2
Republicans	40	..
Swatantra party	20	7
RRP	14	2
HMS	34	..
Forward Bloc	4	..
Republican (Ambedkar)	5	..
Independents	555	20
TOTAL	1554	296

The table also shows that some smaller parties proposed a small number of candidates. For instance, Republican party proposed 5 candidates, RRP 14, Forward Bloc 4, and HMS 34 only. Swatantra party put up 20 candidates, out of which 7 belonged to Gwalior division alone. All these were supported by the *Maharani* and they were successful at the polls. CPI (M) proposed 10 candidates whereas CPI proposed 31. Jana Sangh had high hopes of

* This number includes 25 candidates belonging to the group headed by the *Maharani* of Gwalior.

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defeating Congress and capturing power in the State. It was also confident of its election strategy. In 1962 it contested 195 seats but in 1967 that number went up to 265. The Congress contested all the assembly seats. At the same time, a large number of independents, 565, also contested. This figure was nearly double the total membership of the assembly. Ultimately though, only 20 independents were elected.

1

Qualifications sought for prospective candidates and the process of selection adopted by parties, did not vary much from one party to another. Certain common features, theoretically at least, were visible though it cannot be denied that each political party, in order to remain faithful to the ethos of its ideology and organization, laid down one condition or the other to be satisfied by the aspirant of the party ticket. Thus CPI laid down the condition that the party candidate must have faith in Communism and in overthrowing the capitalist system. It emphasized the fact that the candidate should be influential in his area and should command respect of the people there. The procedure for seeking tickets is that application of the candidate is first sent to the District Committee which forwards it to the Provincial Parliamentary Board (PPB) with its own comments. The PPB scrutinizes applications and forwards them to the All-India-Parliamentary Board which is the final authority. The Jana Sangh maintains distinction between a 'primary' and an 'active' member. An 'active' member should pay eight annas annually as party fee, enrol at least 10 primary members, donate one day's earnings to the party, do some 'field work', and above all, must be loyal to the party and its ideology. An 'active' member must have a standing of three years in order to be considered for selection. A candidate is proposed for a constituency when there are at least 600 primary members in that constituency. The application first goes to the District Committee, which forwards it to the State Parliamentary Board. At the apex is the Central Election Committee which scrutinizes, and finally decides. A similar procedure for the selection of candidates is followed by Congress. Applications are invited by the District Committees and are forwarded to the PEC. The PEC recommends names of candidates to

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the Central Election Committee (CEC) whose decision is final with regard to allocation of party tickets to candidates. With minor differences here and there, PSP, SSP and Swatantra, also follow a similar procedure in the allotment of the tickets.

What factors determined the choice of candidates ? This is a difficult question to answer. There were also considerations, not always consistent with the declared objectives of the party and at times militating against the accepted democratic standards, that went into deciding the selection of candidates. An impressionistic assessment of the mode of selection of candidates would underline the importance of various criteria that were followed by parties. Such criteria, to name a few of them, were : capacity of the candidate to win election from a particular constituency, locality, profession of candidate, his financial resources, personal reputation, caste of candidate, religion, language and caste of an area, local heroes, service rendered by candidate to that constituency, and personal relationship of candidate with party leaders.

The Congress took a lead in declaring names of its candidates. Early in September 1966, it called for applications from its members. The PEC met in the first week of October to scrutinize applications and make recommendations to the CEC. The dissident group in the Congress was hopeful that it would get adequate representation in the allotment of seats, at least proportionate to its strength in the Pradesh Congress. However, in recommendations made by the PEC to the CEC, one could see a virtual denial of tickets to dissidents. The recommendation of the PEC was as good as a foregone conclusion. D. P. Mishra, after the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, had played a significant role in the choice of Prime Minister. That brought him close to the centre of national politics and power. He was also an elected member of the all powerful CEC. He could, therefore, exercise effective discretion in selecting candidates. The dissidents, finding virtually no representation in the allotment of tickets made by the Pradesh Committee, resented, and protested against Mishra to the Central leaders. There was, however, to come about greater shock to dissidents when the final list of candidates for assembly seats was released by the CEC : they were given only

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12 seats out of 296, and some of their important leaders were dropped.

That was, then, the beginning of the final parting of ways between the two rival groups in State Congress, on the eve of elections. It was against this background of denial of tickets to dissidents that a meeting was called at Durg on November 28, 1966, when followers of Congress dissidents, representing 28 districts, decided to leave the parent organization. The Jana Congress was born on November 28, 1966, under the presidentship of Mahant Laxminarayan Das, an old Congressman. A Parliamentary Board, consisting of R. D. Totla, K. L. Gomasta, Laxmanrao Naik, Takhat Mal Jain and M. C. Deshlehra, was formed. The main objective of the Jana Congress was to end the alleged undemocratic Congress rule.

Soon after, another significant parting of ways for the Congress took place when Vijaya Raje Scindia, the Maharani of Gwalior quit Congress. The Rajmata was elected to Lok Sabha in 1957 and 1962. She commanded influence over a group of legislators from Gwalior region. That was a comforting fact, strengthening Congress ranks. But the party was put to severe trial when the Rajmata left Congress on the eve of elections. She also made public announcement of her resolve to defeat D. P. Mishra and uproot Congress in the State. If need be, she would forge electoral alliances with opposition parties to achieve her objectives.

Devoid of two such powerful sections, one drifting away with Jana Congress and the other swayed by Maharani of Gwalior, Congress could not have presented a more dismal picture. D. P. Mishra, however, contended that the presence of dissidents in the organization was only a risk, with possibilities of internal sabotage during elections. His strategy of weeding out dissidents was a step fraught with potent dangers. It was bound to strengthen the ranks of opposition parties, on the one hand, and leave behind a trail of bitterness and dissatisfaction within the party on the other.

Some Significant Events

Mention may also be made of some events which took place on the eve of elections and had a bearing on the course of election

strategies and results. The first mention here is of violent student trouble in Gwalior in 1966, which swiftly spread all over the State, threatening normal academic functions and order. It was a hard decision for the ruling party to put down the agitation for the sake of law and order; it was an opportunity for opposition parties to champion the cause of students and, thereby, win over sizeable chunks of popular appeal.

Equally eruptive was Bastar episode when the ex-ruler there Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo was shot dead in his palace. Opposition parties lost no time in skilfully using the situation to their own advantage. The gist of the opposition allegations was that as the ruler was a veritable threat to Congress dominance in Bastar, the Chief Minister got the ruler physically removed, a charge that could not be substantiated before the Pandey Commission appointed by the government to enquire into the incident. Echoes of events leading to the death of the ruler were heard in the Indian Parliament, where the opposition parties, particularly Jana Sangh, put forth demands for the removal of D.P. Mishra. As it was, the Bastar episode became a live issue in the fourth general elections in the State. Coupled with other factors, already looked into in the preceding pages, the climate was not very congenial as far as Congress was concerned.

In addition, the issue of 'cow-protection' was also smuggled into the arena of State politics, only to raise some political dust which subsided when the 'ban on cow slaughter' movement thawed in other parts of the country. Jana Sangh and the **Goraksha Samiti** organized demonstrations, processions and public meetings during November and December, 1966. The cow-protection agitation served as a timely booster for rightist elements.

Then came the decision of non-gazetted employees of the State to go on strike from February 13, 1967, just two days before the commencement of elections, if their dearness allowance was not raised to be on level with that of Central government staff. The State government, after some thought agreed on February 11, to pay dearness allowance to the employees at enhanced rates, at par with Central government rates. It was a characteristic case of

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pressure tactics being permitted to be recognised and tolerated. On the eve of elections, its significance became all the more obvious.

Electoral Alliances

The most significant development of the pre-election period was with regard to electoral alliances of parties. In the ensuing struggle for power, all parties, singly as well as collectively, directed their guns against Congress. Thus, the Congress was left alone to withstand the opposition fire; or, taking the initiative in its own hands, to batter their strategy. It was clear after the events of Bastar and Gwalior that the opposition parties were likely to come together with a view to defeating the Congress at the polls. They had not forgotten the lessons of the previous elections when Congress victory was ensured as a result of a divided opposition vote; and, it might be said that realization had dawned upon the opposition to fight Congress dominance collectively. The steps taken in that direction, however, were not very fruitful. There were several joint meeting of Jana Sangh, PSP, SSP, Swatantra, and Jan Congress leaders, initiated sometimes by Jana Sangh and at others by the Rajmata, to finalize the number and names of candidates each party should propose in mutual agreement. During December and January, 1966-67, there were so many meetings of the opposition party leaders and so many versions of the agreed list of the candidates for various constituencies, that it was difficult to believe whether there was any agreement at all among them. After all, there were ideological differences; there was clash of personalities; there was also a lurking distrust of the capacities of the partners. Each party wished to project its image of strength on the electorate and was not prepared to let slip its advantage into the hands of others. It should not be surprising, therefore, that there were only 15 straight contests for 296 seats. In others all the principal partners were engaged in direct contests. Thus, the much advertised electoral pacts were not worth the paper on which they were written. After much incosequential higgling, and without accord, the parties fell back on their individual resources, strategy and leadership. Each party, aware of its pockets of influence in a particular area of the State, did not allow other parties to nominate their candidates for that constituency and pressed for its own candidates. The result was a

virtual breakdown of the much coveted electoral alliances by the opposition parties. It was only toward the end of January 1967, that Jana Sangh came out with some understanding, in the name of a Joint Electoral Front, for some 25 seats with the Rajmata and Jan Congress. Jana Sangh was to support candidates of the Maharani in Gwalior division and the Maharani in turn was to support Jana Sangh candidates, especially in Madhya Bharat region. Other reasons apart, the lukewarm attitude of Jana Sangh toward the electoral alliance stood in the way of forging a united front against the Congress. The Jana Sangh was not eager for any understanding with leftist parties because of its own pronounced anti-left ideology. More than that, Jana Sangh seemed to be fully confident of winning the largest number of seats single handed.

The Congress, on the other hand, was left with no party with which it could seek electoral alliance. It had to rely on other tactics, one of which was to keep the opposition divided. Thus, against the Maharani of Gwalior, the Congress found support in the Maharaja of Rewa in the Rewa division. As against the possible loss from Madhya Bharat region, Mishra concentrated his attention on Chattisgarh and Mahakoshal regions. This policy of counterpoise, of a region against another region, of *Raja* against a *Maharani* did bring some temporary gains to Congress.

If the *Joint Electoral Front* was counteracted by the policy of counterpoise by D. P. Mishra, he took various other steps also to outwit the opposition and to negate the influence of their propaganda. A policy of toughness, with a sprinkle of conciliation, was adopted in many cases. The student agitation was tackled with firmness but the agitating State employees were given what they had asked for. Agitators in Bastar were firmly dealt with, along with public promises of turning this tribal tract into land of prosperity and welfare. Prompt relief was granted to the drought affected areas. Any Jana Sangh influence gained after the third elections in rural Madhya Pradesh was partly immunized by the declaration of remission of land revenue for the peasants. Granting of land revenue remission, just a week before the commencement of the election, was a masterpiece of Congress strategy, which

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materially influenced rural votes. With a view to appealing the voters, the Chief Minister asked the fasting *Jagatguru* to give up his fast as slaughter of milch cow was already banned in the State. The progress made under the five year plans was widely displayed. The State cabinet declared its intention to create an upper chamber, Vidhan Parishad, after elections.

Election Issues and Campaigns

All political parties, except Jan Congress, brought out their manifestoes; the statement of principles and policies of the Jan Congress was too brief to be called a manifesto. Party candidates were selected through a settled procedure by each party, though in practice the party boss in the State dominated the selection process. There were systematic and concerted election campaigns to influence voters. Election campaign bodies at district level were constituted by Congress and Jana Sangh. Public meetings of all sorts, processions, torch-light parades, slogans, songs, folk-songs based on popular cinema songs, speeches by national leaders, hand-bills, wall-posters, button-hole party badges, house-top party flags and bunting, meetings of voters belonging to various professions and departments, door-to-door and man-to-man canvassing constituted the general pattern of campaigns. The last day of canvassing witnessed huge and organized processions by each party. The campaign work of Jana Sangh, Maharani of Gwalior and of D P Mishra, were systematic as compared to that of other parties.

Apart from national issues, questions of local nature were brought into discussion by parties. While the Congress harped on its past performances, the opposition laid all blame upon Congress for present day ills, like unprecedented rise in the cost of living, fall in agricultural production and rampant corruption in administration. The Mishra regime was castigated as dictatorial, misusing government resources and exploiting relief work for political ends. Other charges raised by the opposition parties were : government's food policy, restrictions on inter-district movement of food grains, favouritism in the issue of licences for exporting *gulabi chana*, financial bankruptcy of government; failure of government in providing basic necessities of life; establishment of a *police raj*; unjustified firings on students and demonstrators in Gwalior and

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Bastar. The Congress denied these charges and described opposition unity a marriage of expediency and convenience. The Jana Sangh-Rajmata alliance was viewed by the Congress as an ominous symptom of feudal revival.

The is not to say that there were no violations of the rules of the game. Many public meetings witnessed disturbances and violence; opposition parties alleged misuse of official machinery by Congress candidates; complaints were heard of excessive use of money in elections, while others blamed that caste and religion were exploited for political ends.

Analysis of Election Results

There were 296 assembly seats for which 1553 candidates contested elections. The following table (No. II) gives details of seats and percentage of votes secured by each party in the fourth general elections :

TABLE No. 2
Election Results
Party-wise break-up of assembly seats and votes
1957—1967

Parties	1957	1962	1967	Votes	
	Total Seats			Polled	% of votes
Congress	288	288	296	3709035	40.69
Jana Sangh	232	142	167	2578119	28.28
Swatantra	10	41	78*	232099	2.55
PSP	12	53	9	426843	4.68
SS		14	10	481080	5.28
CPI	2	1	1	101429	1.11
Ram Rajya Parishad	4	10	2	77472	0.85
Hindu Maha Sabha	7	6	0	46332	0.58
Jan Congress†	-	-	2	138982	1.52
Independents & Others‡	21	39	20	1216475	13.38

* Including 25 MLAs of Maharani Gwalior.

(a) All from Gwalior Division only.

† Party not in existence.

‡ Republicans 76776; 8.4% votes; won no seats; CPI (M) won no seat. 24981 votes, 0.26%.

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There were 7,17,070 invalid votes out of the total 91,13,155 votes cast. Thus 7.29% of the votes were invalid. More than 10% rejection occurred in 39 constituencies, of these 25 constituencies were reserved for scheduled tribes. This may be ascribed to prevalent illiteracy and backwardness. The total vote percentage in the State in the fourth general elections was 49.56% as compared to 41.2% in 1962. Out of 1553 candidates who contested election, 926 lost their deposits.

Madhya Pradesh, consisting of 7 administrative divisions and 43 districts, presents a new pattern of party position and influence after the elections. Whereas Gwalior, Indore and Bhopal divisions in the north-west, have largely shown preference for Jana Sangh-Rajmata alliance; Jabalpur, Rewa, Raipur and Bilaspur divisions, have predominantly remained under Congress influence. Out of 121 seats of Bhopal, Gwalior and Indore divisions, Jana Sangh secured 61 seats as against 35 of Congress. On the other hand, Congress got 132 seats out of 175 in Jabalpur, Rewa, Bilaspur and Raipur divisions whereas Jana Sangh could secure only 17 seats in these divisions. In Gwalior division, with 31 assembly seats and where the influence of the Maharani is considerable, Congress failed to get a single seat. Again, it was in Gwalior division alone that Swatantra party under the influence of the Maharani, won all the 7 seats it contested. But it failed to get any other seat in Gwalior division. The SSP secured 10 seats, 8 of which were from Indore and Raipur divisions, where in tribal belts the party has its pockets of influence. The success of PSP remained confined to districts of Rewa, Sidhi, Hoshangabad, Mandla and Satna. The division-wise position of parties is obvious in table below :

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TABLE No. 3

A Division-wise Analysis of Percentage of Votes Polled and Seats Won by the Political Parties to the Assembly

Parties Division	Congress	PSP	Jana Sangh	SSP	Swatantra	Independents	RRP	HMS	Jana Congress	CPI
Bhopal	V.P. 36.48 32 Seats	3.76 1 21	40.57 21	1.37 -	0.29 -	11.18 1	00.00 -	1.97 -	1.81 -	2.10 1
Gwalior	V.P. 18.96 Seats	2.39 1 15	22.22 15	3.34 1	17.48 7	24.80 6	00.00 -	1.61 -	2.40 1	2.52 -
Indore	V.P. 42.39 23 Seats	1.32 - 23	37.78 25	9.12 5	2.55 -	4.79 1	00.00 -	0.11 -	0.85 -	0.30 -
Bilaspur	V.P. 50.28 30 Seats	6.51 1 30	23.71 6	2.84 -	00.00 -	18.99 1	00.00 -	00.00 -	2.90 -	- -
Raipur	V.P. 38.89 29 Seats	3.13 1 29	22.16 3	7.46 3	00.00 -	19.77 7	2.86 2	00.00 -	3.95 1	- -
Jabalpur	V.P. 46.05 43 Seats	8.73 1 43	20.27 7	2.07 1	00.00 -	15.43 1	3.07 -	00.00 -	1.75 -	0.17 -
Rewa	V.P. 46.72 30 Seats	11.76 4 30	17.97 1	6.97 -	00.00 -	13.87 -	0.34 3	00.00 -	1.97 -	- -

V.P. = Votes polled

Seats = Seats won.

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The district-wise analysis indicates that Jana Sangh improved its position in the Sehore, Vidisha, Shajapur Gwalior, Bhind, Sheopuri Ujjain, Mandsaur, Dewas, East Nimar Bastar and Sagar districts. As already mentioned, for the assembly seats in Gwalior, Indore and Bhopal division Jana Sangh entered into electoral alliance with the Rajmata of Gwalior and it was with her support that Jana Sangh secured more seats than Congress did. By a wise choice of electoral alliance, Jana Sangh enhanced its numerical strength and prestige. In these three divisions, Jana Sangh polled 33.52% of votes as compared to 32.61% of Congress. Jana Sangh gained some foothold in Bastar where its vote percentage (29%) was more than that of the Congress (19.99%). On the debit side, Jana Sangh failed to match Congress strength in Hoshangabad, Ratlam, West Nimar, Bilaspur Raipur Jabalpur, Balaghat, Chindwara, Seoni, Mandla, Narsinghpur, Rewa, Sidhi, Panna, Chhatarpur, Tikamgarh, and Shahdol—districts. These areas of Mahakoshal, Chhattisgarh and Vindhya Pradesh brought victory for the Congress. If the Congress failed heavily in Gwalior division, it succeeded, with greater surprise, in Mahakoshal and Vindhya Pradesh regions at the cost of opposition parties, including Jana Sangh. The Congress was able to dislodge Jana Sangh from its stronghold in West Nimar district. In 1962, Jana Sangh won 7 out of 8 seats in this district; in 1967, Congress turned the table against Jana Sangh by capturing 7 seats for itself and leaving 2 to Jana Sangh. If Gautam Sharma, food minister in Mishra government, lost the prestige contest of Karera to the Rajmata, Bagdare of Jana Sangh lost a similar prestige contest in Khargone constituency in West Nimar district. Similarly, Congress gains in the districts of Damoh, Narsinghpur, Seoni, Balaghat, Panna, Tikamgarh and Shahdol are spectacular in the sense that it captured all the seats in these areas.

Socialist parties, PSP and SSP, with 33 and 14 seats respectively in 1962, failed to come up to expectations in 1967 when the former could capture only 9 seats and the latter only 10. In 1967, the PSP got 4.69% of valid votes as against 10.72% in 1962. For SSP, it was a gain from 4.73% in 1962 to 5.28% in 1967, though in terms of seats it was a loser. PSP gains in 1962 were concentrated in Mahakoshal and Rewa regions. Congress pushed PSP out in

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Narsinghpur district and also in some districts of Rewa. Jhabua, stronghold of SSP in Indore division, has, largely been taken over by Congress in 1967. Of the smaller parties, HMS was the worst sufferer. It contested 40 seats but failed to get even a single seat. The RRP simply survived with two seats. Swatantra party, with the aid of the prestige and resources of the Maharani of Gwalior, secured 7 seats in Gwalior division. The CPI (R) has one representative in the State legislature from Bhopal constituency. The Jana Congress got 2 seats only. It was not a recognized party and therefore it had to work in collaboration with other parties, especially with Jana Sangh and the Rajmata group. Independents secured 20 seats in 1967 as against 39 in 1962. This may be viewed as a symptom of decline of the influence and utility of the Independents in the eyes of the voters.

Mention has earlier been made that out of 296 assembly seats, 42 and 67 seats are reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, respectively. This means that 36.82% of the seats were reserved for the two classes. The implications of the reserved seats are obvious in the sense that parties will have to keep their attention focussed on tribal votes. At least three parties—Congress, Jana Sangh and SSP grasped it. The following table shows distributive capture of reserved seats by the parties.

TABLE No. IV

Parties	Scheduled Castes	Scheduled Tribes	Total
Congress	22	39	61
Jana Sangh	16	16	32
Independents	3	7	10
PSP	-	1	1
SSP	-	4	4
Swatantra	1	-	1
Total	42	67	109

As obvious, out of 109 reserved seats, Congress captured the highest number, 61 seats, followed by the 32 by Jana Sangh, independents got 10, and, SSP and Swatantra took 4 and 1 reserved seats, respectively.

Some Concluding Observations

This is an impressionistic study of the background of the fourth general elections in Madhya Pradesh. Impressionistic studies of this kind present some difficulties in attempting conclusions about emerging trends or in interpreting certain events. Thus, in the absence of validating facts, which are normally available from micro-studies, we may at best attempt certain generalizations in the nature of hypotheses. Mention has already been made of the fact that Congress, under the leadership of K. N. Katju and Mandloi, was a house divided, failing to match the organization, unity and appeal of Jana Sangh. But, with the emergence of D. P. Mishra as leader of Congress in the State, the party fortunes took a different turn. A shrewd tactician and able organizer, Mishra first took a firm grip on party organization. He aimed at a united Congress, which did not endanger his leadership. His thesis, that a factionless and united party with a capacity to manoeuvre could win elections, was justified by results of the 1967 elections. It will be of interest whether D. P. Mishra would be able to retain the gains of elections as well as cohesiveness of the party.¹ Needless to say that much would depend, paradoxical though it might look, on the behaviour of the opposition and of Congressmen themselves.

Ever since 1962, Jana Sangh has taken upon itself the responsibility of standing up to oppose the Congress. 1967 elections bear some testimony to that. Later developments show that much more. The Jana Sangh has come to provide an alternative to Congress. The former party has a hard core of devoted workers; it has exploited every opportunity to enhance its political prestige and electoral chances; it has displayed realism in entering into electoral alliance with the Maharani of Gwalior; it has refused to bear the dead-weight of lesser parties; it has youth in its rank and file; its leaders have idealism and can claim a record of clean public life. These plus factors have an edge over Congress which can, at most, be proud of its old and seasoned leadership. Much of course will depend how Jana Sangh conducts itself in opposition and in power.

1. Since submission of this paper, political developments in Madhya Pradesh have taken a turn of immense significance.

But the success of the JS has another aspect also. It is true that it increased its strength from 41 to 78 members in the assembly and its vote percentage rose from 16.66% to 28.28%. But this success must be viewed in the context of the moral and material support given to it by the Maharani of Gwalior. If the Rajmata and her supporters chose to withdraw their support from Jana Sangh on some political issue, how would Jana Sangh survive? It is quite probable that Jana Sangh-Rajmata alliance may maintain post-election unity in their first hour of opposition to Congress, but personal and policy differences might create a wedge between them. It is not likely that the two groups will have identical objectives to pursue for a longer run of time.

The electorate in the State did not take much cognizance to RRP and HMS. The latter party was thoroughly routed and the former could win 2 seats only. This is to say that these parties have suffered an irrecoverable loss. It is our hypothesis that many of the voters who formerly looked at these parties favourably have turned their support to Jana Sangh now. Ideologically these parties are not apart; the differences are on the level of leadership. Though their leaders failed to merge these three parties, the voters have forced the issue by favouring Jana Sangh at the expense of RRP and HMS. The result is a distinct polarization of rightist votes in Madhya Pradesh.

The slow and uninspiring performance of Swatantra party in the State must be noted. In 1962, it gained 2 seats in the legislature; today it has 7 seats which it won under the influence of the Maharani of Gwalior. The State has some 76 Rajas and Maharajas and many more Jagirdars, who should, normally, have leaned favourably towards Swatantra party. In the neighbouring States of Rajasthan and Gujarat, a large number of princes and jagirdars have joined Swatantra party as their first choice, giving second preference to Jana Sangh. Things happened in a different manner in Madhya Pradesh where Jana Sangh was established earlier than Swatantra. By the time Swatantra was born, many of the members of the feudal class were already committed to Congress or to Jana Sangh. The Swatantra party may recoup this loss from Jana Sangh, if there is an able leader; or, when there is a vital issue concerning fortunes

of the princes. In the meanwhile, Swatantra remains a lesser force playing a second fiddle in Madhya Pradesh politics.

With ideological polarization and clear-cut party position in the State, independents have been real sufferers. There were 565 independents, both dummy and real, who contested election, and only 20 were elected. In the past, independents, after their election obliged some party or the other by their floating support. It might be that the voters have seen the futility of independents.

A similar hypothesis might be put forth so far as PSP and SSP are concerned. These Socialist parties, in 1962, were the hope of electorate; by 1967, they turned out to be their despair. Intellectuals, democrats and enlightened students looked upon these parties as an alternative to Congress but massive exodus of PSP members to the Congress on the one hand, and failure of SSP rank and file, on the other, did not appeal to voters.

Lastly, mention may be made of two more factors that played a significant role – regionalism and caste. A glance at the post-election map of the State would show that west and north-west Madhya Pradesh has voted support for Jana Sangh, while eastern regions have gone for Congress. And caste, which was so far a social phenomenon, assumed political significance. Caste has permeated election process, from the selection of a candidate to election campaign. Micro – studies of this phenomenon would surely validate this hypothesis.

K. B. Y. THOTAPPA & R. T. JANGAM

**GENERAL ELECTIONS IN
MYSORE STATE**

THE composite State of Mysore was carved out, consequent on the States Reorganization Committee Report, by integrating the 9 districts of the princely State of old Mysore, 4 districts of the former Bombay State, 2 districts of the former Madras State, 3 districts of the princely State of Hyderabad and one district of the princely State of Coorg.¹ The integration of the various areas into one composite State raised a number of problems. The boundary disputes, integration of various classes and categories of services, repatriation of the Kannada speaking employees from other States, fixing of uniform pay scales and service conditions for the employees coming from different integrated areas, were some of the most pressing problems.

The creation of the State on the principle of linguistic reorganization has doubtless brought together the Kannada speaking people who form the majority (1, 53, 71, 753 persons have Kannada as their mother tongue). But it has not solved the problem of the linguistic minorities. Persons who speak Telugu, Urdu, Tamil, Malayalam, Marathi, and Konkani constitute quite formidable minorities. The Telugu and Urdu speaking minorities are particularly large. According to the 1961 census, they number 2,047-379 and 2,034, 482 respectively.

The influence of caste, purely in descriptive terms, is real in Mysore politics. In the pre-1957 period the Vokkaligas and Lingayats wielded major influence in the princely State of Mysore. In

1. The present composite State of Mysore consists of 15 districts—Bangalore, Belgaum, Bellary, Bidar, Bijapur, Chickmagalur, Chitradurga, Coorg, Dharwar, Gulbarga, Hassan, Kolar, Mandya, Mysore, North Kanara (Karwar), Raichur, Shimoga, South Kanara (Mangalore) and Tumkur.

the new composite State the Lingayats take first place and the Vokkaligas second. The influence of the Kurubas and Muslims is also considerable. The scheduled castes, though numerically the second largest, do not wield influence in proportion to their number.

The party position in Mysore may be said to be broadly the same as at the Centre. The Congress has been the oldest, largest, and the most popular party. In the Bombay Karnatak, Madras Karnatak and, also to a significant extent, in the princely State of Mysore, the party provided leadership and organization for the independence movement, and has built a mass level support in the post-independence period. The opposition to the Congress in the State, was weak and ineffective. It was weak numerically, organizationally, and also in leadership and influence. The PSP provided steadfast and consistent opposition to the Congress in the post-1957 legislature. But, its strength diminished on account of defections to the Congress and the formation of the SSP. The Swatantra party and Jana Sangh were steadily building their strength. The Communist party, though weak, was struggling to make its impact felt.

II

In the fourth general election 1,30,74,694 voters were going to exercise their franchise, as against 1,13,53,892 voters in the 1962 election (an increase of 10%) to elect their representatives for 27 parliamentary seats and 216 assembly seats.

Despite the consideration that no voter was to travel more than 3 miles to exercise his vote, voters in a few places, like those in some villages of the North Kanara district, had to cover 10 miles to reach the polling booths. However, on the whole, there were considerable improvements in transport and communication since the last election.

Polling booths were common for both men and women. In Belgaum and Gulbarga districts, however, separate polling booths for women were provided.

Polling was planned in two phases; 119 assembly and 15 parliamentary constituencies were to go to polls on 15 February, 1967 and

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the remaining 97 assembly and 12 parliamentary constituencies on 19 February 1967. 15 February was declared a public holiday for the government offices, courts, and educational institutions. The question of declaring 19 February a holiday did not arise because it was a Sunday.

There were altogether 8 parties in the field. Three of them were all India parties viz. the Congress, PSP, and Swatantra. Five more – the CPI (M), CPI, Jana Sangh, and the Republican party which had multi - State recognition were assigned their respective symbols. The independents were assigned 6 symbols.

The polling on the whole was peaceful. But, in spite of the elaborate arrangements and care, a few incidents and disturbances did take place. Those at Bidar, Channapatna, Masti, and Kollegal attracted particular attention and publicity. Communal tension appeared to be an important cause of the disturbances at Bidar and Channapatna.²

III

In all 725 candidates filed their nominations for 216 assembly seats and 100 candidates for 27 parliamentary seats, 29 were reserve (27 scheduled castes and 2 scheduled tribes) and 187 general. Of the 27 parliamentary seats, 4 were reserve and 23 general. Of the women candidates who filed nominations only one (Congress) contested for parliamentary seat. Of the 79 women candidates for the assembly seats, 13 belonged to the Congress, 1 to PSP, 2 to Jana Sangh, while 3 were independents.

The party-wise breakdown of the candidates contesting the assembly and parliamentary seats was as follows:

2. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore 16 & 17 February, 1967

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TABLE No. 1
Total Assembly Seats = 216
Lok Sabha Seats = 27

Party	No. of Candidates Contesting	
	Assembly	Lok Sabha
Congress	214	27
Jana Sangh	37	5
Swatantra	45	11
PSP	52	5
SSP	17	2
Republican Party	12	3
CPI	6	-
CPI (M)	10	2
Other Parties (Like Janata Paksha, Muslim League etc.)	63	5
Independents	269	40
Total Number of Candidates	725	100

As is clear from above figures, the Congress nominated its candidates for all the 216 assembly seats and 27 parliamentary seats. The Congress also had the distinction of having 2 of its candidates—one of them Chief Minister himself returned uncontested.

The number of nominations by independents was the largest, larger than the nominations of any party: 269 for the assembly and 40 for the parliamentary seats. At the assembly level the Janata Paksha (figuring under "Other Parties") nominated as many as 60 candidates next only to the Congress.

Parties did follow a number of principles in nominating candidates. The Congress, for example, adopted a 6-principle test. One of the 6 principles was that a member who had availed himself of two successive terms in the legislature should not ask for a ticket except on special grounds. While a number of senior and experienced leaders of both the Congress and non-Congress parties had practically no difficulty in getting themselves nominated, a number of junior and relatively inexperienced aspirants also got tickets. The Congress in particular was said to be considerate and accommodative to the relatively young aspirants. There was also

a tendency to give tickets to the relatives of the Congressmen who were no longer there but who had held important positions in the party or the government. At least two important examples of this trend can be cited: H.D. Tulsi Das, son of the late Dasappa who was a Central Minister, from the Mysore parliamentary constituency and Lalitha Bai Chandrasekhar, wife of Chandrasekhar Patil, a leading Congressman from the Hyderabad Karnatak area, from the Kamalapur assembly constituency, were given the Congress ticket.

It would be unrealistic and misleading, however to say that all was well with the nomination process. While the nomination process of the non-Congress parties seemed to be relatively smooth and non-controversial, that of the Congress was quite eventful and caused quite a few resignations and switch-overs to the other parties. Perhaps all this was natural. As usual, there was a big rush and scramble for the Congress tickets. And all could not be provided for, some had to go disappointed. Hence there was considerable bitterness and frustration. A few of those who did get the tickets did not appear to get them easily or in the first instance. Erstwhile minister Devaraj Urs who got his ticket after some delay humorously remarked, while speaking at a conference of ticket checkers in his capacity as transport minister, that he was a "ticketless traveller". Deputy Minister Y. Ramakrishna and Sarojini Mahishi MP did not get tickets in the first instance but got them with the "help" of the Congress High command at a later stage. When the aspiring candidates did not get tickets, they left the Congress and joined some other party or decided to contest as independents. Two formidable erstwhile Congress ministers H.M Channabasappa and N. Rachaiah—did not get tickets. As a result, the former became a Janata Paksha nominee and the latter a Swatantra nominee. A number of candidates from Bharam-sagara, Gubbi, Harpanhalli, T. Narsipur, Ramanagaram, Heggaddevankote, and Somvarpet constituencies contested as Swatantra, Jana Sangh or independent candidates when they did not get the Congress tickets.

It was felt that the process of Congress nominations was greatly influenced by the Pradesh Congress Committee, the State Chief

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Minister, and the Congress High Command. The recommendations of the taluq Congress and the Mandal Congress Committees (MCCs) were not given adequate attention or weight. In some cases, MCCs were just taken for granted or ignored. Groupism or communalism were also said to have weighed heavily in giving tickets to some candidates while denying them to the others. S. Sunder Raj, a former Deputy Mayor of the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, resigned his primary membership of the Congress party because he found in the organisation he served for 35 years, "communalism and groupism and no democracy and no protection to the most backward communities."³ Dharmarao Afzalpurkar stated that "he could no longer continue in the (Congress) organisation due to groupism and internal bickerings. Sincere and honest and poor men had no place in the party, he said.⁴ At times leaving the Congress meant more than an just exit of a particular member; his followers also followed suit. Thus, about five to six hundred followers of Afzalpurkar were reported⁵ likely to leave their party following their leader's resignation from it. Mass resignations were also reported⁶ at Kadur.

An interesting feature of the selection process was that sometimes voters themselves took initiative in "nominating" some persons (who were denied tickets by the Congress) as candidates of some other parties. For example, 'The voters convention held under the joint auspices of the Swatantra and Lok Sevak Sangh parties selected Shivanna'⁷ who had resigned from the Congress, as a Swatantra candidate (from a constituency in Gulbarga district).

The position of the Janata Paksha leaders like S. Channaiah, T. Subramanya, H. Sidveerappa, H. K. Veeranna Gowda, N. Hucha Masti Gowda, K. H. Patil, and Annarao Ganamukhi should be distinguished from those who defected from the Congress, when they did not get the Congress tickets. The Janata Paksha leaders had occupied eminent positions in the Congress before they, along with

3. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 17 January, 1967.

4. *Ibid*, 2 January, 1967.

5. *Ibid*.

6. *Ibid* 17 January, 1967.

7. *Ibid*. 16 January, 1967.

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their followers left the Congress and formed a separate political party. Their defection from the Congress had nothing to do with the selection of the Congress candidates although their action might have been anticipatory to some extent

IV

The party programmes at the Mysore State level were broadly the same as those at the all India level. Most of the major parties-- the Congress, Swatantra, Jana Sangh, PSP, SSP, CPI, and the CPI (M)--which mattered most at the State level had an all India perspective. The manifestos, booklets, handbills, leaflets and other literature pertaining to elections were the same in Mysore as those used at the national level. These materials were in English. Hence, at the State level, they were often brought out in Kannada. Most of the manifestos, for example, were translated in Kannada. Pictures, posters, banners, appeals, particularly those relating to the State level personalities, policies and problems were produced locally.

Local issues which were taken up as campaign themes were the border problem, prohibition, location of steel plant at Hospet, development of Mangalore harbour, demands of NCOs and Junior Engineers, inefficiency and corruption in administration, and scandals relating to the Sharawathi Project, Khadi and Village Industries Board, Bangalore Dairy Project, etc.

V

While traditionally the Congress had been the dominant party and continued to be dominant as proved by the election results later, the non-Congress parties were not unnerved by the traditional dominance or the prospective success. On the contrary, knowing that the Congress did not enjoy the same strength and popularity as before, and that it was considerably weakened by dissensions and divisions the non Congress parties decided to make the best use of their obviously limited resources to get elected as many of their candidates as they could. In a number of constituencies all over the State the non-Congress parties arrived at poll understandings and formed united fronts. They also took advan-

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tage as did the Congress, of the dubious and vacillating positions of some of the independents and the "dummies."

The traditional strongholds of the Congress like Bangalore, Mysore, Mandya, Tumkur, Bijapur, Hassan, Davangere and Dharwar were no longer as safe as before. The opposition parties were poised to give a tough time to the Congress, particularly, the PSP in Shravanbelgola and Aithal assembly constituencies, the SSP in the Tirthahalli assembly constituency, the CPI in Mangalore and Gulbarga assembly constituencies.

The opposition parties formed anti-Congress united fronts and arrived at electoral adjustments particularly in Chickmagalur, Dharwar, Kolar, Mangalore, Mysore, and Shimoga. The Janata Paksha leader S. Channaiah was the chairman of the coordination committee of the opposition parties which decided on their election strategy and tactics in those constituencies where electoral understanding had been reached between them.

Not an uncommon feature of the campaigning was some candidates' tendency to work against their colleagues. This was mostly true of the Congressmen in parts of Belgaum, Bidar, Mysore, Chickmagalur, Mangalore, Raichur, Shimoga, and Tumkur.

The campaigning in general was directed to the Lingayats, Vokkaligas, and the scheduled castes since these communities were expected to play a major role in elections. However, there were smaller communities which because of their peculiar position, seemed to hold the balance in certain constituencies. Thus, the vote of the Kuruba community was crucial in Hassan, Chitradurga, Mysore and Tumkur. Naturally, the Congress was anxious to woo this community in its favour. In Kolar, the opposition strategy was aimed at netting as many as 32,000 votes from the mining area. The linguistic minorities often seemed to exasperate the campaigners. The 13,000 votes of Tamilians of the Hanur assembly constituency (Mysore-Madras border) of Mysore district worried the Congressmen as 60% of this vote was feared to be inclined favourably to the opposition candidate. The vote of the Marathi speaking minority in the border districts, particularly in Belgaum

and Bidar was a bugbear and the Congress seemed to have almost given it up to the opposition. In Aurad, Bhalki, and Hulsur assembly constituencies of Bidar district, the Congress spent many an anxious campaigning days, while in Khanapur and Uchagaon assembly constituencies of Belgaum district the pro-Maharashtra leaders, despite differences among themselves, were in full command of the campaign even though they could hardly create any impact on the electorate which had already made up its mind.

In course of the campaign, most of the parties brought their national leaders to address the electorate in various parts of the State. Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Asoka Mehta, N. Sanjeeva Reddy, Sadiq Ali, and C.M. Poonacha campaigned on behalf of the Congress. Indira Gandhi visited Bellary, Hospet, Davangere, Harihar, Ranihennur, Haveri, Hubli, Dharwar, Kittur, and Belgaum. She emphasized the Congress achievements, particularly the winning of independence and laying the foundation of planned economic development in the country, conceding, however, that the progress of the plan had slowed down because of the Indo-Pakistani war. In her speech at Davangere, she appealed to the voters to support the Congress as that alone could deliver the goods. In Mangalore, Morarji Desai condemned violence at election meetings and chided the opposition for the disturbances at the Congress election meetings. He warned voters against an opposition government which would muzzle freedom and be disruptive and dictatorial. AICC General Secretary, Sadiq Ali, who toured Mandya, Maddur, and Srirangapatnam, told his audience at Mandya that the Congress could certainly bring the fruits of planned economic development to the country but since the task was of a staggering magnitude the party should be kept in office for another 30 years.⁸ Asoka Mehta assured the voters at Raichur that the country would reach "take off" stage in another five years. Obviously cocksure of the progress of the plans he told his audience at Tumkur that "No free country could match India's progress in the last decade."⁹ Campaigning in Bellary where the Congress concept of planning was put to test and which the Swatantra had vowed to make a

8. *Deccan Herald* Bangalore, 3 February, 1967.

9. *Ibid.*, 6 February, 1967.

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“Waterloo of Congress planning”, N. Sanjeeva Reddy said that the ideas of Swatantra leaders like C. Rajagopalachari and N. G. Ranga were unrealistic and unworkable. He thought the Swatantra star (party symbol) would do better if it stuck to the sky rather than come down to the earth ! C. M. Poonacha told his voters at Mercara that he was amazed to see the Swatantra, Communist, DMK, and Muslim League flags on one and the same flagstaff. He felt that the Coorg planters belonging to the Swatantra party who were rich and who mistakenly criticized devaluation which had actually profitted them had, of all the parties, entered into poll alliance with the Communists who, if they came to power, were the first to nationalize plantation !

Most of the campaigning was done, however, by the State level ministers. Since MPCC Chief, Mohammed Ali, had been down with a heart-attack and was convalescing in Bangalore, the campaigning schedule of Chief Minister S. Nijalingappa was all the more arduous. Nijalingappa toured practically all the districts in the State and the major constituencies including the constituency of Mohammed Ali (Gulbarga) which the latter could not visit even once on account of his illness. In addition to explaining the familiar arguments of the Congress party, he took particular care to impress on the electors the good work the party had done in the State. He pointed out that under the Congress rule in Mysore as many as 9 crores of acres had been brought under irrigation as against 5 crores of acres in the pre-independence days. He was happy that nobody had died in Mysore for want of food under the Congress regime. He said one of the greatest achievements of the Congress was to provide free education up to matriculation level with the result that the percentage of literacy had gone upto 30% from 15% in the pre-independence days. In a number of meetings he spent considerable time in refuting the opposition charges of maladministration and corruption. At a meeting at Hunsur, near Mysore, he dismissed as a total falsehood the opposition charge that the Congress ministers had amassed wealth. He said, “today my bank balance is only Rs. 2,000.”¹⁰ Former Chief Minister K. Hanumanthaiah also refuted the opposition charges, and pointed out that the Congress always

10. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 30 January, 1967,

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had aimed at clean and efficient administration and had not tolerated corruption as was shown by the enquiries ordered against Pratap Singh Kairon, Biju Patnaik, T. T. Krishnamachari. Other ministers like Ramkrishna Hegde and Veerendia Patil also campaigned in some of the key constituencies. Yashodhara Dasappa, a former Prohibition Minister, appealed to the potential dissidents not to leave the Congress and to dissidents to come back to 'clean Congress.' She urged that women candidates should contest elections if the Congressmen did not work unitedly and sincerely. She was sure if women contested thus, they would be definitely elected since 50% of the voters were women.

The opposition parties also undertook whirlwind tours in the various constituencies in the State. The Swatantra party had its stalwarts like M. R. Masani and N. G. Ranga to address the electorate. Speaking at a meeting in Bangalore, Masani referred to the Congress as a "paper tiger" and said the party was in power because of only 40% "bogus majority." He said "there were three faces of the evil confronting the nation: the Congress and two Communist parties."¹¹ Professor N. G. Ranga told his audience at Hassan that the Congress had curtailed individual liberty in the name of socialism and if the Congress were to win election it would mean an end to the individual liberty. The SSP leaders introduced a bold, principled and challenging tone into the otherwise vote obsessed campaigning. The campaign was conducted on "ideological grounds" particularly in Shimoga. In the Mysore city too, SSP candidate Srikanta Sharma remained undaunted in the face of the formidable opposition presented by the Janata Paksha leader S. Channaiiah supported by the PSP and CPI and appealed to his voters on the basis of the party manifesto. Rammanohar Lohia, who toured some of the important constituencies in the State, carried on a sustained campaign against the Congress. He said the Congress government was a "big man's" government. Hence anything that brought down the Congress was welcome. He was sure that an alternative government of the opposition parties was quite possible and the SSP would be only too glad to extend its hand of cooperation. In his sarcastic attack on the Congress programme of cooperative far-

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ming, he said, "They (Congressmen) had been able to bring so far a total of about 3 lakhs acres of land under cooperative farming as against 32-crore acres under cultivation. The Congress, therefore, would require at least 5,000 years to fulfil its last election promise."¹² The Janata Paksha spokesmen mostly concentrated their fire on the Congress. With facts and figures they analyzed for the benefit of their audience the Congress maladministration and scandals, particularly those relating to the Sharavathi project, Bangalore Dairy project, and the Mysore State Khadi Board. At a village meeting in the Nanjungud taluq of the Mysore district, S. Channaiah, of the Janata Paksha, told the voters how the Congress leaders were ill-advised and even ungrateful in their attitude to the Janata Paksha leaders who had built up the Congress organisation in the State from its very grass roots. Taking listeners into confidence, he said it was he who had initiated Chief Minister Nijalingappa into the Congress in his early days. Another prominent leader of the Paksha, K. H. Veeranna Gowda was of the opinion that the separation of old Mysore from the integrated Mysore State would go a long way in promoting the interests of the old Mysore people who otherwise suffered on account of the unfavourable (communal) balance in the larger Mysore State. He also joined others in calling an end to the "permit raj" of the Congress. The Jana Sangh leader, Deendayal Upadhyay, who explained the Jana Sangh programme at Tumkur, Hassan, Sakleshpur, and Mysore, maintained that the elections would put an end to the Congress misrule in the country. He said that the Sangh was mustering sizeable support in a number of northern Indian States and deserved all possible support of the citizens of the Mysore State. N.G. Goray, H.V. Kamath, Mulka Govind Reddy, and S. Sivappa campaigned for the PSP. Attacking the "scandal-ridden" Congress administration, Kamath warned the voters that a vote for the Congress was a "vote for nepotism, corruption, profiteering, and blackmarketing"¹³ According to the PSP chairman Goray, the Congress had not quite deserved the vote of people (even) in the previous elections. The Congress had won the previous three elections by "deceiving the credulous people and making use of the names of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal

12. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 6 January, 1967.

13. *Ibid.*, 4 January, 1967.

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Nehru.¹⁴ CPI (M)'s E M.S. Namboodiripad defended in Mangalore Communist party's alliance with the Muslim League and other parties. He said such an alliance was a "historic necessity" to defeat the Congress. Bhupesh Gupta (CPI) was bitter about the deviation of the CPI (M) from its earlier stand of supporting the CPI in Mysore. B T. Ranadive CPI(M) thought that any further continuance of the Congress in power would be ruinous to the prospects of the country's economic development. A K. Gopalan of the CPI (M) criticised the Congress government for forcing the NGOs into the streets to demonstrate for their demands. Speaking to pressmen in Bangalore, All India Muslim League President Mohmad Ismail emphasized the need for proper representation to Muslims. He felt a few prominent Muslims occupying a few positions in the government did not solve the problem of representation of the Muslim interests. These prominent Muslims in the government were rather the "show boys" of the Congress. Commenting on the Muslim League stand, he declared, "we are not asking for any charity. We want an honourable existence with equal rights"¹⁵

As the campaign proceeded more and more meetings and rallies were held to sway the minds of the voters. But, as the number of meetings increased and the excitement grew, the competition for the voters' attention became intense and disturbances did take place here and there. Heckling was not a real problem. But the use of missiles like tomatoes, (rotten) eggs, stones, *chappals* and crowding to disturb the speaker as well as the audience turned out to be pretty serious in a few cases. A Congress party meeting to inaugurate the poll campaign which was to be addressed by Chief Minister S. Nijalingappa at the town hall *maidan* in Mysore was badly upset. A Jana Sangh worker stated that a few Sangh workers were beaten up by hired *goondas* while they were campaigning in old Mysore city. In Gulbarga some Swatantra party workers were reported to be kidnapped with a view to stopping them from campaigning.¹⁶

14. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 31 December, 1965

15. *Ibid*, 29 January, 1967

16. The present authors, in course of one of their visits to a *taluk* town for an on-the-spot study of campaigning, happened to enquire with a Janata Paksha worker—not knowing what he was—about the availability of a

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The monopolistic tendency to hold certain constituencies as impenetrable strongholds was quite evident. In a Janata Paksha stronghold a squad of wrestlers and "toughs" warned off campaigners of other parties. In a Congress stronghold—a Harijan locality, no stranger could escape the watchful and stern eye of the local chief.

Since in many places votes were controlled or, at least, influenced by the local chiefs or the leaders, attempts to win them over were often the core of the campaign strategy. As the polling dates approached fast, the importance and bargaining capacity of these vote controllers became more and more irresistible. Many a candidate, therefore, struck a bargain or compromise with them to ensure blocs or pockets of votes. In the countryside or villages, campaigning could be almost ineffective if the middlemen were not taken into confidence. Side by side with the middlemen worked the party workers and relatives of the candidates who usually commanded a network of friendships and contacts covering a number of villages. Thus equipped, the candidates went from village to village addressing meetings in front of temples, shops, street corners and so on. Wherever possible, the locally influential men were encouraged to introduce the visitors and commend them to the voters. The campaigning leaders sometimes took the advantage of local celebrations or weekly market days when crowds of people were readily available and all that needed to be done was improvising a platform or just a chair and a table, ordering cups of tea or coffee from the village tea shop or serving coconut milk around while the speakers got ready. Often, the local agents attracted the village folks with loudspeaker music, for the meeting.

A number of candidates made effective use of the newspaper columns to reach the voters. They had their appeals published, often along with their photos and election symbols. The MPCC published a whole-page appeal—"For a Happy and Prosperous

Congress candidate. With a scowl on his face and in a hostile manner he told us that he was not in the town and we could not see him. Suspicious about our visit and on being told that we had been there to study the election campaign, he wondered what on earth the Congress candidate had to tell us on the subject.

Tomorrow.” The Committee of Young Business Executives for Democratic Government put in an impressive advertisement with a picture of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, looking like a visionary, along with an appeal to voters to support the Congress. The appeal quoted Indira Gandhi thus : “I emphasize that India is determined to achieve a self-generating economy in the next decade and to build a socialist order in keeping with the needs and aspirations of our people.” There was also a non-partisan appeal issued by the society for the propagation of democratic thought soliciting the voter “to use his unbiased judgement and wisely elect the right man to the Parliament” and to influence others to do the same.

The “poster war” among the parties became intense especially in cities like Bangalore, Mysore, Bellary, Hubli, Belgaum, Mangalore and so on, as the polling days approached. Posters with the party symbols such as pair of bullocks, star, tree, bicycle, lamp etc. were posted on walls, lamp posts, across the streets, and on the branches of trees. Sometimes party hand bills and plastic emblems could be seen in stores, shops, bakeries and laundries. One could come across, for example, a plastic emblem of lamp (Jana Sangh symbol) worn as a badge on lapel or arm of shopkeepers and salesmen. The Congress poster with pictures of Indira Gandhi and S. Nijalingappa was most widely displayed.

The election symbols were displayed most imaginatively and strategically. The real-life bicycle was hoisted on building tops not only in big cities but also in villages – on the candidates’ house tops – and was often bedecked with electric bulbs for illumination at night. Fairly large-size miniature huts (PSP symbol) were found mounted on the tops of the buildings at street corners or junctions. In Mysore city, a huge pair of scales dangled atop all poles in the constituency of the Janata Paksha leader, S. Channiah.

Marches and processions organised particularly in cities added much colour and excitement to the drama of elections. In some Congress processions, significantly enough, pairs of decorated bullocks (Congress symbol) with pictures of Congress leaders mounted on their backs were paraded with great effect. At Devarnimbargi in Balloli assembly constituency of Bijapur district the procession

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had 101 pairs of bullocks, at Tiptur it had 150 pairs, while at Gadag it consisted of 1,001 pairs. Some candidates rode in colourful floats or vintage cars folding their hands in greeting and exuding solicitous geniality while music played and their followers shouted "Vote for Mr. so and so". The processions often attracted people from all walks of life – businessmen, landlords, community leaders, white collar and blue collar workers, students etc. Urchins who appeared to be long starved of fun and excitement often joined the band wagon and had a field day shouting slogans or just yelling in general as they trailed behind the processions adding their much – welcome number to the mass of human beings.

All types of vehicles and conveyances were pressed into service, trucks, jeeps, vans, cars, motor cycles, scooters, bicycles, tongas, bullock carts etc. The demand for vehicles became heavier as the campaigning got into full swing and the polling days approached. In Bangalore where the tempo of campaigning reached its height, the number of vehicles increased almost fourfold – vehicles from the district and smaller towns were withdrawn for concentrated election drive in the capital.

VI

What role did money play in influencing the voters' minds? The question though vital does not have a satisfactory answer. Official or accurate figures on the subject are not available. But, few would doubt the employment of money in the battle for votes. Field observers and even party workers, if taken into confidence, would confide how money changed hands to secure votes in favour of particular candidates or parties. Such was the magic of money power that it was feared it could upset vote calculations securely based on factors like popularity of the candidates, their record of service, the party backing and so on. In Chitradurga, for example, the Congress campaigners feared that though their candidates had more than a fair chance of winning, the last-minute flow of money could upset the apple cart of their expected victories.¹⁷ Money was said to be distributed particularly on behalf of the Congress and the Swatantra party candidates. In Raichur and Gulbarga, money

17. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 12 February, 1967.

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was said to be spent on behalf of the Congress and Swatantra parties. The payment of money sometimes came to light because of the occasional arguments or altercations which took place on the voting sites over who got how much from the candidate's agent who had his own reasons for giving different amounts to different persons. Payment in kind—clothes, food, drinks—was also said to be employed to influence voters. In Mysore and Bellary districts, for example, saris, dhotis, and clothes for children were said to be distributed among rural voters. A few candidates and their agents had a trying task of feeding their followers, well-wishers and voters—the number sometimes running into hundreds or exceeding a thousand. The canvassers were supplied with food, drinks, and sometimes uniforms also. A few days preceding the polling day, effort was made to keep voters and supporters in good humour. In a few places they also seemed to be generously supplied with eatables and liquor. In course of one of their field visits, the authors found a group of people in a village tight drunk. The place of their assembly was decorated with the Swatantra stars and they appeared to be seriously engaged in a discussion. When we asked one of them “whom do you support?” he gave a big grin (and also a puff of alcoholic odour) and replied “Congress!” Turning to the other when we asked the same question, he did not risk reply and left us to conclude that he was not sure of his mind!

Not all these cases of payment in money or kind, however, can be classified as corruption or unfair practices. In a very basic sense, paying Rs. 2 or 3 to a farm hand, an industrial worker or a free lance coolie for going to the polling station and voting for the candidate or party that paid him could not be wholly regarded as corruption. Because such a poor voter who led a hand-to-mouth life would lose his daily wage or earnings if he went and voted without any compensation. Entertaining people with food or drink (such as tea or coffee) would not be objectionable and was not prohibited by election law. Yet it cannot be gainsaid that these activities did have a degree of influence on the voters. Usually when the dinner was over, the host (the candidate or his agent) would come to say goodbye to the guests and request them to use their “valuable” votes in his favour. The voters were bound to be

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under some obligation or influence. In a few cases, however, voters were said to have accepted money for voting for certain candidates but did not vote for them as agreed. There were also a few voters who accepted money from two parties but voted for the third. But, these were few and far between and could be regarded as exceptions.

VII

The total electorate of the State was 1.27 crores. The total number of votes polled were about 73 lakhs. Of these 4,67,988 or 6.34% were invalid or rejected. The position of the votes polled by the various parties for both the Lok Sabha and assembly constituencies was as follows :

TABLE No. 2

Name of Party	Votes Polled	
	Lok Sabha	Assembly
Congress	57,55,339	35,67,765
PSP	3,92,597	7,10,930
SSP	2,00,310	1,58,013
CPI (M)	1,23,319	1,00,460
CPI		65,910
Swatantra	10,94,458	3,26,113
Jana Sangh	1,72,391	2,25,379
Janata Paksha		4,97,154
Republican Party of India	2,37,266	59,401
Lok Sevak Sangh	1,42,088	-
Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti	-	-
Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam	-	30,231
Muslim League	-	8,420
United Front	-	NA
Independents	15,43,650	15,37,770*

The number of those who failed to poll the minimum of 1/6th votes and consequently lost their deposits was pretty large. As many as 296 assembly candidates lost their deposits. The party-wise break-down is as follows :

- * These include votes polled by candidate of Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti, United Front of Kolar, those of United Front supported candidates, and Forward Bloc.

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TABLE No. 3

Name of the Party	Number of candidates who lost their deposits
Congress	1
Swatantra	12
Jana Sangh	24
PSP	10
SSP	5
Forward Bloc	3
CPI (M)	4
CPI	3
Republican Party of India	9
Janata Paksha	6
Muslim League	3
Lok Sevak Sangh	1
Independents	188

The toll of the independents who lost their deposits was the highest. The most important factor responsible for their defeat was lack of supporting machinery like that of a party. A second reason could be said to be voters' general distrust of the independents. The Swatantra party and the Jana Sangh were also comparatively heavy losers. This time voters did not spare even the Congressmen. For the first time the Congress lost deposit at two seats, both from Mysore.

TABLE No. 4

Party-wise break-down of successful candidates

Name of Party	No. of Contestants		No. of Successful Candidates	
	Lok Sabha	Assembly	Lok Sabha	Assembly
Congress	27	214	18	126
PSP	5	52		20
SSP	2	17	1	6
CPI	2	10	-	1
CPI	-	6	-	1
Swatantra	11	45	5	16
Jana Sangh	5	37		4
Janata Paksha	-	52	-	14
Republican Party of India	3	12	-	1
Lok Sevak Sangh	1	9	-	2
Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti	-	5		5
Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam	-	3	-	-
Muslim League	-	4	-	-
United Front	-	8	-	3
Independents	45	238	1	27

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TABLE No. 5

**Comparative Position (1962 and 1967 elections) of District-wise
Strength of the Congress and the Opposition.**

Name of District	Position (No. of candidates) after 1962 Elections		Position No. of candidates) after 1967 Elections	
	Congress	Opposition	Congress	Opposition
Bidar	4	1	3	3
Gulbarga	8	5	8	5
Raichur	7	3	7	3
Bellary	3	4	6	1
North Kanara	5	1	1	5
Dharwar	16	1	10	8
Belgaum	12	6	14	4
Bijapur	14	1	11	4
South Kanara	6	5	6	8
Chitradurga	7	2	7	3
Tumkur	4	6	9	4
Kolar	4	6	8	4
Hassan	4	4	2	6
Mandya	5	2	5	3
Shimoga	5	2	4	5
Mysore	10	6	9	7
Bangalore	10	7	13	10
Chickmagalur	3	2	1	5
Coorg	2	0	1	2

The above two tables (4 and 5) will help in understanding the position of the Congress and the opposition. As was expected, the Congress did emerge as the majority party. Most of the Congress stalwarts – the ministers and party leaders – emerged successful. The defeat of former Health Minister, Nagappa Alva at the hands of his PSP rival in the Surathkal assembly constituency, however, was an exception. The electorate, however, did display the general

tendency in the country to reduce significantly the margin of the Congress success. Out of the total of 216 seats it secured 126 as against the minimum targeted figure of 180. In 1962 it had won 138 seats (which swelled up to 150 subsequently as a result of opposition defection) in the house of 208 seats. This time it won 126 in the house of 216 which meant that it secured just 18 seats more than the required minimum to form a government. Barring the improvement in its position in Belgaum and Bellary, the party score went down uniformly in Bijapur, Dharwar, North Kanara, South Kanara, Chitradurga, Hassan, Mandya, Shimoga, Mysore, Chickmagalur, and Coorg. In Gulbarga and Raichur, it barely managed to retain the number of seats it had in 1962. The anti-Congress feeling in Mysore was responsible not only for the decline in the party's strength but also for the forfeiture of the deposits of two of its candidates. In Dharwar in 1962 it had practically swept the polls winning 16 seats and yielding only 1 to the opposition. This time it could win only 10 as against 8 of the opposition. In Bijapur too, in 1962 it left only 1 seat to the opposition, this time it had leave 4. In Coorg, in 1962 it commanded 2 seats with none for the opposition, while this time it had to yield 1 seat to the opposition, managing to retain 2 of its own. In North Kanara the Congress score was exactly reverse of that of 1962 : in 1962 the Congress won 5 seats as against 1 of the opposition, whereas in 1967 it just secured 1 seat, leaving 5 to the opposition. Explaining the Congress reverses S. Nijalingappa said in a press statement : "Quite a few Congress defeats are due to local squabbles and, in some cases too much of over-confidence. Results of the election must teach us - Congress men - a lesson that increased cooperation, coordination, earnestness and loyalty are called for, and should enable us to get together, and be a more well-knit, determined and united body than ever before."¹⁸ This analysis of the causes of the poll reverses was broadly similar to the one later spelt out in considerable detail by the AICC. The reaction of S. Channarayana, the architect of the Janata Paksha, called for holding a convention of non-Congressmen to take stock of the situation following the Congress debacles and form an all India party of likeminded opposition parties.

18. *Deccan Herald*, Bangalore, 25 February, 1967.

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Correspondingly, where the Congress suffered losses as discussed above the opposition profitted and improved its position. Besides improving on its 1962 performance in Bidar, North Kanara, Dharwar, Bijapur, South Kanara, Chitradurga, Hassan, Mandya, Shimoga, Mysore, Chickmaglur, and Coorg in general it outperformed the Congress in a number of keenly contested multi-cornered constituencies like the Malleswaram (Bangalore city), Chamaraj-nagar, Bhadravathi, Krishnaraja, and Narsimharaja (Mysore city) constituencies. A major implication of the success was that the opposition was in a position to form for the first time a sizeable opposition to the ruling party. It had not only increased its strength by 30 in absolute terms, but also it was very near the Congress strength, its score being less than that of the Congress just by 36.

Speaking about the parties individually, the PSP emerged, as before, the main prong of the opposition in terms of both number and influence. The Swatantra party and the Janata Paksha with their 15 and 14 seats respectively emerged next in importance. The Swatantra bettered its 1962 record, almost doubling its score. The performance of the Janata Paksha was creditable in view of the fact that it managed to bag 14 seats though it had been formed on the eve of elections and did not have enough time to organize its machinery and build up its influence. The Jana Sangh with its 4 seats made its maiden appearance though even its limited success was not an easy one to achieve – it won only 4 seats out of 39 contested. But, it had been keen on achieving a breakthrough it undoubtedly succeeded in this efforts. The SSP increased its strength remarkably. In 1962 it secured only 1 seat, this time it romped home with 6 seats. The United Front won its creditable 3 seats from Kolar out of 8 contested. The Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti won only 5 seats – 2 less than in 1962. But, it carried its constituencies commandingly – it contested 5 seats and won all of them. The CPI (M), CPI, Republican Party of India, and Lok Sevak Sangh secured just 1, 2, 1, and 2 seats respectively. The Independents managed to wrest just 15 seats out of the large number contested – 238. This time the number of independents went down by 4, in the 1962 assembly there being 19 of them.

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It is interesting to note that from the point of view of elections to the Lok Sabha the Congress, Swatantra, PSP, and SSP, in that order, were the only important parties, their score being 18, 5, 3, and 1 respectively. The CPI, Janata Paksha, Maharashtra Ekikaran Samiti, DMK, Muslim League, and the United Front (from Kolar) did not even contest parliamentary seats. The CPI (M), Jana Sangh Republican Party of India, and Lok Sevak Sangh contested 2, 4, 3, and 1 seats respectively. But, none of them won any seat. The gains of the independents were no better though they contested as many as 44 seats.

Even in some of the assembly constituencies the opposition performance was none too good. Indeed, in Tumkur and Kolar the opposition got heavy beating. While in 1962 it had secured 6 seats in each of the two districts, leaving the Congress with 4 seats in each, in 1967 it secured just 4 seats in each, leaving 9 and 8 to the Congress. In Bangalore city, Chitradurga and Mysore the differences and infights of the opposition were taken advantage of by the Congress to reduce its losses which otherwise could have been heavier.

Unlike the Congress the opposition sustained a serious blow in the exit of its top echelon leaders : S. M. Krishna, P. Revanna-siddappa, H. R. Keshava Murthy, and G. V. Anjanappa (PSP), Gangadhar Namoshi and A. Krishna Shetty (CPI), Chenna Byregowda (Swatantra), Annarao Ganamukhi and H.K.Veerana Gowdha (Janata Paksha), G. V. Gowda, and C. J. Mukkannappa (independents). One of the important reasons for the defeat of the top opposition leaders was their reported failure to take their constituencies seriously in between the elections. The second reason was the voters' vague and apparently unaccountable desire to see old hands replaced by new ones. The voters did not seem to bother much about the candidates' leaving their parties or changing over to other parties. They voted down some of the stalwarts of the PSP and CPI as well as those of the Janata Paksha who had been the Congress dissidents. The same point held good, though this time at the opposition's expense, when the voters elected the opposition converts to the Congress principal of whom were : S. Rajgopala

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(Kolar Gold Field assembly constituency), E. Narayana Gowda (Bethamangla), B. L. Gowda (Challakere), and K. S. Nagrathnamma Gundlepet). In voting down H.K. Veeranna Gowdha, Chenna Byregowda, and T. N. Madappa Gowda the voters also voted down the "Two Mysore" theory on which they had taken their stand and about which they had sponsored resolutions in the State assembly. The voters were influenced by and large by the same local issues and communal considerations in electing or rejecting the opposition candidates as those of the Congress.



B. B. JENA

**GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN ORISSA**

ORISSA voters have not shown their love for Congress in the general elections excepting the mid-term elections of 1961.¹ A combination of factors arising out of factionalism in the Congress organisation and the failure of the successive governments in the State to ameliorate the socio-economic situation have completely shattered the pre-independence image of the Congress. The results of the fourth general elections should, therefore, be analysed and understood by taking into consideration the forces ranging against the Congress and the political situation as it obtained on the election-eve.

II

At a time when the Congress was facing terrible opposition, the dissidents left the organisation and formed a separate party, Jan Congress with H K Mahatab as their leader. The pre-election climate was further poisoned by the appointment of the CBI to investigate into the alleged corruption of the leader of Orissa government. The leakage of the CBI report by the Home Ministry of Government of India further complicated the situation. The next development that took place on the eve of election was that

1 The following table is quite revealing in this respect

Percentage of votes obtained by the Congress

Year	Congress	G P /SWA	Other
1952	39	20	41
1957	38.21	28	33.42
1961 (Mid-term)	43.28	22.34	34.38
1967	30.66	22.58	46.69

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the ruling party even after the defection of the dissidents,² crumbled into factionalism again—one group was led by Sadasiva Tripathy, the Chief Minister and the other by Biju Pattanaik. Tripathy and his group appeared to have been aided and supported by the Central High Command and the Pattanaik group was in full control of the organisation and the majority of the legislators. The Chief Minister's faction visibly joined the chorus with the opposition in attacking Biju Pattanaik leading to the final showdown when a number of Ministers refused to comply with the Chief Minister's orders. With this background, the voters went to polls on February 21, 1967.

III

Nominations

The nominations were invited by January 20, 1967. The scrutiny was held on January 21 and the date of withdrawal was fixed to January 23, 1967. On the expiry of the last date of withdrawal, 603 candidates remained in the field to contest the elections in their respective constituencies. The Congress party set up 140 candidates and the Swatantra for 101 seats. The PSP set up 31 candidates, Jan Congress 43, CPI 31, Bharatiya Jana Sangh 19, the SSP 9, Jharkhanda Party 10, CPI (M) 10, the SUCI 2, and there were 201 independent candidates also. The following table gives the party-wise break up of the candidates contesting the elections as compared to their position in 1961 mid-term elections :

2. The dissidents formed Jan Congress with Pabitra Mohan Pradhan as the first President. H.K. Mahatab, the former Chief Minister Banmali Pattanaik, the former President of the UPCC, Upendra Mohanty, Surendra Nath Pattanaik, Santanu Kumar Das etc. were notable Congress leaders who joined the new party as founder members.

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TABLE No. 1

Candidates set up, party-wise

S.No.	Party	No. of candidates set up in 1961	No of candidates set up in 1967
1.	Congress	149	140
2.	Swatantra	121	101
3.	PSP	46	33
4.	CPI	35	31
5.	SSP	-	9
6.	BJS	-	19
7.	Jan Congress	-	47
8.	Jharkhand Party	-	10
9.	CPI (M)	-	10
10.	SUCI	-	2
11.	Independents	182	201
Total		533	603

The above table shows that the Congress like previous occasions contested all the seats and the Swatantra party set up only 101 candidates as against 121 in 1961 (mid-term) election. The PSP became more cautious and set up only 31 candidates as against 46 in 1961. As regards the CPI, its two wings taken together contested 41 seats as against 35 in 1961. It may be observed here that the Jharkhanda party had contested 9 seats in 1961 and could not secure a single seat. Six of its candidates had lost their deposits. The party as a whole got only 25,602 votes which constituted 0.87 percent of the total votes polled. Notwithstanding such a dismal picture, the party presented 10 candidates in the fourth general elections. Another point to be noted here is that the decrease in the number of candidates set up by the Swatantra and PSP was mainly because of the limited electoral adjustment made by them with the Jan Congress. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, SUCI, Jan Congress and the CPI (M) were the new entrants. The SUCI's two candidates contested only in the industrial and mineral townships.

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Electoral adjustments

The electioneering and the election results were greatly influenced by the agreement made by the various opposition parties in Orissa in a number of constituencies. The most important electoral alliance was made between the Swatantra and the Jan Congress. They entered into a 21-point joint-programme which was issued under the joint signatures of R.N. Singh Deo, the leader of the Orissa unit of the Swatantra party and Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, the President of the Jan Congress. The joint-programme included the following 21 points : (1) establishment of a clean and good government, (2) ruthless elimination of corruption, favouritism and nepotism at all levels and setting up of a commission of enquiry into the charges of corruption against the ministers, (3) setting up of an institution of the type of Ombudsman for the eradication of corruption, (4) increasing efficiency, uprightness and integrity of the administration and elimination of administrative delays, (5) establishment of the rule of law, (6) change of the outlook of the police for the public service and increasing their efficiency and sense of discipline, (7) freeing the administration from political pressure and ensuring impartiality and fair deal to the employees, (8) equal justice and fair dealings for all, (9) utmost economy in expenditure and the strict avoidance of all wasteful expenditure, (10) elimination of unnecessary controls, permits, licences and quotas, and administration of the remaining controls, permits, licences quotas through a non-political statutory body, (11) abolition of land revenue, reduction of the tax burden, and elimination of harassments in the collection of State dues, (12) establishment, expansion and completion of the existing Universities, (13) elimination of restrictive procedure and creation of proper conditions and freedom for the expansion of business and industry, and creation of increasing employment opportunities, (14) introduction of Oriya as the State language in all spheres of administration, (15) special attention to development of scheduled caste and tribes and other backward classes and underdeveloped or backward areas, (16) abolition of multifarious panchayat taxes and entrusting panchayats with resources of non-tax revenue, and effecting real decentralisation as envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution, (17) liberating primary education from the control of panchayat samitis,

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(18) expansion of both general and technical education throughout the State, with special attention to the backward areas, (19) re-orientation of development plans on a practical basis with emphasis on the development of agriculture, provision of basic necessities of the people and the provision of an infrastructure for economic development, (20) changing of the monopoly system in the kendu leaf trade and (21) appointment of a Famine Commission for an enquiry into and report on all aspects of the Orissa famine in 1966. The leaders of both the parties who were signatories to the joint-programme, resolved and made their intention known to the voters in the following words :

The last five years' Congress misrule in Orissa is a sordid story of corruption, inefficiency, wasteful expenditure and blatant disregard of moral values. To oust the discredited and corrupt Congress party from power in Orissa and provide a clean alternative Government, the Swatantra party, Orissa unit and the Orissa Jana Congress hereby agree to collaborate to form a Swatantra-led coalition in Orissa. Both parties have agreed to an electoral adjustment in regard to the constituencies enumerated in the schedule in which there will not be mutual contest between the two parties. The constituencies not mentioned in the schedule will be open, where the parties will be free to set up candidates if they so desire.

It was further agreed that both the parties would implement the common programme and "under no circumstances will either party support the Congress party, whether in the opposition or in the government."

The other opposition parties also entered into limited electoral adjustment in certain specific constituencies

In 1957 elections 34.3 percent of the electorate had exercised their franchise; this percentage increased to 36.60 in 1961 mid-term election and it went up to 43.43 in the fourth general elections of 1967. Seven percent increase in the polling was a definite sign of the voters' increased interest in the fourth general elections.

The fourth general election witnessed increased enthusiasm of the voters in as much as 43.43 percent of voters exercised franchise. The following table would give a comparative analysis for the purpose:

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TABLE No. 2
Statement of percentage of voters going to the polls

Year	No. of electors	No. of voters going to polls	p.c. of polling	No of valid votes
1961 (Mid-Term)	85,40,861	31,26,245	36.60	29,32,285
1967	98,73,357	4,348,838	44.05	4,028,258

The results

The election results were disastrous for the Congress; and the Jan Congress and the PSP received the quasi-rents. The following table would indicate the position.

TABLE No. 3
The election results of 1967

Sl No.	Party	No. of candidates contested	No. of seats secured	Remarks
1.	Congress	140	31	There are 140 seats in the Orissa Assembly and one seat was declared countermanded on account of the death of an independent candidate of the Parlakhemundi constituency.
2.	Swatantra	101	49	
3.	PSP	33	21	
4.	CPI	31	7	
5.	SSP	9	2	
6.	BJS	19	0	
7.	Jan Congress	47	26	
8.	Jharkhand	10	0	
9.	CPI (M)	10	1	
10.	SUCI	2	0	
11.	Independents	201	3	

The Congress party had calculated to gain 100 seats out of 140 and it could achieve only 30 p.c. of its expectations. It was a debacle for the Congress because even the opposition leaders did not anticipate such a disaster for the Congress. For instance, Mahatab, while refuting the claims of Bijay Kumar Pani, the president of the Utkal Pradesh Committee that the Congress would secure 100 assembly seats and 17 to 18 Lok Sabha seats, said that "his assessment of the situation was that the Congress would fail to return with absolute majority in the elections."³ The Swatantra and the Jan Congress together bagged 75 seats and the PSP made the greatest gain at the cost of the Congress, securing 21 seats which are equal to the total number of seats (11 + 10) it obtained in 1957 and 1961 elections. The CPI and CPI (M) have together got 9 seats as against 4 in 1961. Three independent candidates came out successful in 1967 elections out of 199 who contested.

³ *Hindustan Standard* August 13, 1966.

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One interesting outcome of the election was that nearly 50% of the candidates 2 contesting lost their security deposits and major casualties were the independents 179 of whom forfeited their deposits. Among the parties, Swatantra suffered 21 forfeitures, Congress 18, and Jan Congress 18.

As regards the three successful independents two of them were former Congressmen. Jogesh Chandra Raut, a prominent social worker of Banki, was a devoted Congressman and S. N. Bhanja Deo the Raja of Kanika, was a Congress minister for a long time. They fought against the official Congress candidates and won. It is interesting to note that there is, in Orissa, a tendency of an increasing number of independents contesting the election and a decreasing number of them being successful. The following table indicates the position.

TABLE No. 4
Number of independents contesting in the elections

S No	Year	No. contested	No. of success	p c. of the total
1.	1957	168	7	5
2.	1961	182	7	5
3.	1967	201	3	2

The above table shows that, the successful independents are always few in number. The fourth general election has cut their figure to three. The continuous decline in their number tends to bring confidence in the process of politicisation in Orissa.

IV

The election process was not complete even after the non-Congress government assumed the office on the basis of the results announced. The Bhubaneswar and Athagarh constituencies which returned two Jan Congress stalwarts, H.K. Mahatab and Pabitra Mohan Pradhar, the Deputy Chief Minister in the newly formed coalition government, had to go to polls again following the vacation of those seats by them because they had been elected from two other constituencies. A third seat was lying vacant due to the death of a candidate prior to the election in the Parlakhemindi constituency.

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The first bye-election after the new government came to power was held in the Parlakhemindi constituency on April 2, 1967. There were six candidates in the field the Congress, Swatantra, Communist (M) and three independents. The Congress was able to retain its seat with a very wide margin of votes. The following table would indicate the position :

TABLE No. 5
First bye-election in Parlakhemindi, 1967

Sl.No.	Name of the candidate	Party	Votes secured
1.	Nalla Kurma Naikulu	Congress	17,386
2.	P.V. Kameswar Rao	Swatantra	8,546
3.	Jagannath Misra	CPI (M)	2,562
4.	Dayalu Das Babuji	Ind.	8,919
5.	R Venkat Narasiham	Ind.	4,099
6.	Braja Kishore Pattanaik	Ind.	818

Out of total 72,506 voters, 45,222 exercised their franchise. Congress got 17,386 votes constituting 38.44 percent of the total votes polled. The Swatantra party now heading the coalition government in the State, suffered the defeat at the hands of the Congress in spite of the fact that there was a general decline of the public image of the Congress in Orissa and elsewhere. There may possibly be four reasons contributing to the Congress victory : (a) the Congress candidate was a popular sitting M.L.A., (b) there was wrong choice of the Swatantra candidate, (c) there was no straight contest, and (d) the voters chose persons and not parties. The Swatantra party's candidate was neither in 1957 nor in 1961 a candidate in the elections, whereas, the Congress candidate had won the seat as independent in 1957 and as Congress man in 1961. It is interesting to note that out of the six candidates, three were old contestants from the same constituency. The CPI (M) candidate was always there notwithstanding his defeats in successive elections. The 1961 election was held under the President's Rule and the 1967 bye-election was conducted under the Swatantra led coalition government. The Congress obtained 49.33 percent of valid votes in 1961 whereas in 1967 the percentage came down to 38.44. The Congress, therefore, cannot reasonably claim that this

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election defeat of the Swatantra party was a public censure. It has, thus, no political significance excepting the fact that it has increased the seats of the Congress from 30 to 31

The bye-election in the Bhubaneswar and Athagarh constituencies was an important post-general election event in Orissa politics. These two constituencies had returned two veteran Jan Congress leaders in February 1967. The bye-election was held in April 30, 1967. It is interesting to note that the Jan Congress did not set up its candidate in Athagarh constituency which had earlier returned Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, now the Deputy Chief Minister. The Editor of a local daily, Radha Nath Rath, was left to fight the election as an independent candidate. Rath was a Congress Minister for a long time and was in the Congress-GP coalition government of 1959. But in the context of decline in the Congress prestige he did not accept the Congress ticket. However, the Congress pledged support to him and did not set up its own candidate against him. The politicians in Orissa, by and large, have the superstitious belief, it appears that with the said editor on their side, they are safe in their saddle. Three important parties, therefore, withdrew their candidates and supported Rath's candidature to make him an all party man. The Deputy Chief Minister of Orissa who had vacated that seat issued a press statement stating that "according to the terms of electoral alliance with all like minded opposition parties, Athagarh seat was left to the Jan Congress to fight against the Congress. But now the circumstances have developed in such a way that Shri Radhinath Rath is supported by various parties. Hence Jan Congress would like to respect their wishes and support Shri Rath who contests as an independent candidate." It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the official appeal of the Deputy Chief Minister to all parties in the same statement to support the candidature of Rath, the CPI contested the election against him, which shattered the hallow that he was the all party man. The CPI candidate, Braja Kishore Pattanaik, has been contesting all the elections from this constituency right from 1952. The Swatantra party (former GP) did not contest in 1957 nor did it appear in 1961, but it had set up its candidate against Pabitra Mohan Pradhan in 1967 despite the

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election understanding between it and the Jan Congress. The results of the bye-election made the CPI candidate prominent who secured next highest votes. The following table would indicate the position:

TABLE No. 6
Athagarh bye-election results

Sl. No.	Candidates	Party	No of Votes secured
1.	Jasodhara Misra	Ind.	914
2.	Narasingh Misra	Ind.	266
3	Braja Kishore Pattanai	CPI	2,033
4	Radhanath Rath	Ind	19,340

The above table shows that Rath secured almost the same votes as both the Swatantra and Jan Congress candidates together had polled ($9,322 + 10,063 = 19,385$) in the general election.

The result of the bye-election of this constituency not only affected the strength of the Jan Congress in the assembly, but also its organisational base. From the Jana Congress point of view, it was perhaps not prudent to withdraw from the contest in favour of Radhanath Rath. The Jan Congress would have retained the seat had it decided to contest.

The other bye-election at Bhubaneswar was caused by the vacation of the seat by H.K. Mahatab. There was wide speculation about the choice of the candidates. It was disclosed by the PSP leaders that the non-Communist opposition parties allotted Bhubaneswar to Jan Congress in their limited electoral alliance. The Congress had a difficult choice because its candidate S P Mohanty who was badly defeated in the general election reportedly refused to face the election ordeal again so soon. The nomination of the Congress candidate was filed amidst apparently diffident conditions particularly when Mrs. Mahatab's name was mentioned as the Jan Congress candidate. The PSP was anxious to contest the election and its candidate Narayan Barisal filed the nomination.

4. The statement of the PSP leader, R.M. Das, April 10, 1967.

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But the President of the Jan Congress requested the PSP to make room for the Jan Congress to defend the seat in the bye-election and the PSP conceded to their request with a view to further consolidate the non-Congress front.

Finally however, nine candidates contested the elections. The following table would show the relative positions of the candidates:

TABLE No. 7
Bhubaneswar bye-election results, 1967

Sl No	Candidate	Party	Votes secured
1	Subhadra Mahatab	Jan Congress	13,565
2	Deenabandhu Bairisal	Congress	4,704
3	Pran Nath Pattanaik	CPI	2,118
4	Gaurang Charan Paltasingh	Ind.	1,571
5	Raghunath Naik	Ind	382
6	Giribala Mohanty	Ind	350
7	Sri Kailash Chahdra Bala	Ind	261
8	Girdhar Nayak	Ind	115
9	B C Pattanaik	Ind	95

The number of voters who exercised their franchise was not encouraging at all. Of 83,365 only 23,160 exercised their franchise as against 47,036 in the general elections. The Jan Congress retained the seat with a comfortable majority.

That there was less enthusiasm among the elections for the bye-elections was perhaps owing to the fact that the bye-elections were held so soon after the general election. The following table shows the decline in the number of votes polled in the two bye-elections as compared to the general elections.

TABLE No. 8
Decline of votes polled in the bye-elections

Sl.No.	Constituency	Total votes	General election	Bye-election	+ or —
1	Athagarh	63,207	34,802	23,491	- 11,311
2.	Bhubaneswar	83,244	47,036	23,160	- 23,876

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With the completion of the bye-elections, the election to the Orissa assembly was complete. The final party position in the assembly is as follows. Swatantra—49, Jan Congress—25, Congress—31, PSP—21, CPI—7, SSP—2, CPI(M)—2 and independents—4.

V

An autopsy on the nature of the contests would reveal that the electoral adjustments between the opposition parties in 1967 did not constitute any fundamental difference over the earlier elections. There were more straight contests notwithstanding the sprinkling of minor parties and independents, for instance, in the 1961 mid-term elections—80 in all as against 60 in 1967. There were 53 such contests in the second general elections of 1957. If we take the party-wise break up, the relative advantage gained by each of the parties would be discernible. The following table would indicate the position:

TABLE No. 9
Straight contests : Party-wise break up

Parties	1967	1961	1957
SWA (GP)	43	65	32
PSP	8	7	9
CPI	—	4	10
SSP	1	—	—
JC	8	Ind. 4*	2
Total	60	80	53

* Independent means disguised Congressmen.

It may be found from the above table that the Swatantra party had direct fight with the Congress in 43 constituencies in 1967, 65 in 1961 and 32 in 1957. The PSP got chances in 8 constituencies in 1967, 7 in 1961 and 9 in 1957. The other parties including Jan Congress had somewhat similar opportunity in 1967. The results of such direct contests were spectacular. The following

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table would indicate the position :

TABLE No. 10

Results of straight contests

Sl No	Name of the Party	Success in the election		
		1967	1961	1957
1	Swatantra/GP	34	32	22
2	PSP	8	2	3
3.	CPI	—	1	3
4	Jan Congress	5	Was not formed	

The above table indicates that in 1967 the Swatantra party bagged 34 out of its 49 seats by straight contests, PSP got 8 out of its 21 and Jan Congress secured 5 out of its 26 seats. The net result is quite substantial and it brings hopes for future electoral adjustments.

Let us now turn to another interesting feature of the election. The two partners in the loose alliance—Swatantra and the Jan Congress—fought against each other in 20 constituencies and the result was detrimental to their interests. The following Table would indicate the position.

TABLE No. 11

Analysis of the contests between Swatantra and Jan Congress

Sl No	Description	Number of Seats contested and lost
1	Number of constituencies where both fought	20
2.	Number of seats lost to Congress	9
3	Number of seats won by the Jan Congress	9
4	Number of seats secured by Swatantra	2

If we take the district-wise break up, it would be found that in ten districts out of thirteen there was no adjustment between the partners and, therefore, they faced each other in the election. The

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following table indicates the position :

TABLE No. 12

District-wise break-up of Jan Congress—Swatantra contest

Sl.No.	District	No. of constituencies where both fought in the election	No. of such seats lost to Congress
1.	Mayurbhanja	2	1
2.	Balasore	3	1
3.	Cuttack	3	0
4.	Puri	3	2
5.	Ganjam	3	3
6.	Koraput	1	1
7.	Phulbāri	1	0
8.	Sambalpur	2	1
9.	Keonjhar	1	0
10.	Dhenkanal	1	0

The above table is self-explanatory. The figures above make one significant point, that in the coastal districts like Balasore, Cuttack and Puri, the influence of the Jan Congress is considerable and it has allowed the Swatantra party to monopolise the western Orissa for the time being. The Congress also has not been able to make any dent in these districts because instead of extending its influence through sustained, hard organizational work, it relied upon the tactics of inducing the Ganatantra Parishad or Swatantra MLAs to cross over to its side.

Another significant picture that is discernible from the election records indicates that the CPI and CPI (M) fought against each other which resulted in defeating some of their sitting members. The following table would illustrate the point :

TABLE No. 13

Contest between CPI and CPI (M) in 1967

Sl.No.	Description	Seats
1.	Number of constituencies where both fought each other	4
2.	Number of such seats lost to Congress or others	4
3.	Number of seats won by the CPI	Nil
4.	Number of seats won by the CPI (M)	Nil

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If we take the most important Communist constituency, it would be found that their mutual fight was responsible for the defeat of the sitting Communist member, Rama Chandra Ram. Ram as the CPI candidate secured 4,440 votes and his CPI(M) rival Ramesh Chandra Panda got 6,594 votes. The total Communist votes were 11,034. As against this, the Congress which gained the seat secured only 9,995 votes.

Despite the fact that there was almost universal condemnation of the assault made on the Prime Minister during her Orissa tour, she could not swing the voters in favour of the Congress candidates. The Congress lost elections in three of the five constituencies which she visited. Another peculiar feature of the election in Orissa was that as many as 953 voters living on the Orissa-Andhra border exercised their franchise twice—first in Andhra Pradesh election and then in Orissa election. Even though the area continues to be administered by the Orissa government, the Andhra government managed to enrol them as their voters on the ground of the wrong report of the delimitation commission. Lastly, the government servants in Orissa were asked not only to be impartial but to appear to be so in a circular issued by the Chief Secretary of Orissa on the eve of election. The government employees were told that while they should make usual arrangements to enable the ministers to carry out their responsibilities, they should not organise election meetings or be present at such meetings.⁵ Notwithstanding this circular, there were sporadic reports of violation of the said order and the press was bringing to the notice of the government and the public the allegations of partisanship of some government servants.⁶ However, the election passed off smoothly without any noticeable tempering of ballot papers by the civil servants.

The constituencies where the Congress Ministers were defeated deserve close attention. Out of fourteen ministers and deputy ministers as many as eight were defeated in the election. Their

5. February 4, 1967.

6. There were cases of such violation in Bhadrak, Balasore, Cuttack and Sambalpur districts. Even an employee was suspended for taking active part in party politics in the Sambalpur district.

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performance is given below: ⁷

TABLE No. 14
Showing comparative voting figures secured by the defeated
ministers and the opponents

Constituency No.	Votes polled by Ministers	Winner's votes	Total anti- Congress votes	Total valid votes
3.	7,128	14,974	21,370	28,428
21.	15,765	36,309	36,309	32,074
23.	6,771	14,798	31,905	38,676
29.	18,805	26,924	27,699	46,504
46.	13,162	32,069	32,069	45,231
79.	5,974	7,531	8,322	14,296
104.	9,739	19,988	19,988	29,727

The above table make it clear that the people had become bitter against the Congress government and particular ministers and deputy ministers. There was an allegation of moral turpitude against a deputy minister and other charges of corruption against all others. The defeat of so many members of the Council of Ministers was clear censure against the way the government were run and the policies they followed.

VI

Let us now turn to examine the causes of the defeats of the Congress in Orissa. The first cause of the Congress debacle was ascribed to the continuance of Sadasiv Tripathy as the Chief Minister on the eve of election. There was persistent demand for the change of leadership because of the perpetual illness of the Chief Minister. A group of Orissa Congress MLAs met the Prime Minister and urged for effecting the change soon and the State UPCC chief also met the Congress High Command on this issue. There was hectic parleys at Bombay during the AICC session in May 1966 to find out a solution to this problem. The Congress High Command decided to let the stalemate continue to the detriment of the Congress. Meanwhile, the Chief Minister continued to be bed-ridden and was unable to attend the office. The State was

7. One of the defeated ministers was a contestant for Lok Sabha. His voting figures have not been included in Table No. 14.

passing through the drought period; the election was knocking at the door. Hence, the UPCC was anxious to make some arrangement for preparing itself to organise the election work of the party. Under the written advice of the Congress President,⁸ Biju Pattanaik was entrusted with the entire election work. Kamaraj sent a copy of that letter to Tripathy for information. On receipt of the copy of that letter, Tripathy wrote to the Congress President in which he made certain remarks casting aspersions against his cabinet colleagues and others working with him. A few days later, he changed the portfolios of many of his ministers and deputy ministers which took them by surprise. Hence, out of his 13 colleagues 12 tendered joint resignation on September 8, 1966. This change of portfolios of the ministers was a deliberate act to tarnish the image of his colleagues. The alleged collusion of the Chief Minister with the two former Chief Ministers, H. K. Mahatab and Naba Krushna Chaudhury, who were leading the "Congress hatao" movement in the State, was apparently corroborated by his action. Not only this, he released all the letters received and written by him to the press from his sick bed putting the entire blame on the resigning Ministers and their leader Biju Pattanaik. He also went to the extent of levelling specific charges against the striking ministers and Biju Pattanaik. Thus, the charges and counter charges which were published in the news papers completely exposed them to the public criticism. The Congress image had thus shattered to pieces before the voters went to polls.

The second cause of the Congress defeat was the Congress High Command particularly Kamaraj himself. It may be noted here that Kamaraj took 46 days to effect the settlement on a matter which was of supreme importance to his organisation. He made also certain public statements against Biju Pattanaik in the Press Conference which helped the opposition to attack the Congress with documentary evidence. Sanjiva Reddy was sent to Orissa as an emissary of the Congress President on October 13, 1966 and some sort of a settlement was arrived at. The Congress High Command took a considerable time to decide on the course of action against the dissidents who ultimately left the organisation and formed the Jan

8. August 23, 1966.

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Congress. They were given long time to establish themselves before action was mooted against them. The dilly dallying policy of the Congress High Command was responsible for weakening the Congress in Orissa. It was found from the press reports that Kamaraj and G.L. Nanda, the former Home Minister, were more critical of the Orissa leaders in whose hands they left the organisation and the government in Orissa than the opposition leaders.

The formation of Jan Congress with important Congress leaders like, Mahatāb of coastal Orissa and Pabitra Mohan Pradhan of the princely states' areas was the major factor in hastening the Congress debacle in Orissa.

The next cause was the agitational politics in Orissa led by the students. The historic students strike of September 26, 1964 which continued till November 24, 1964 took the shape of a mass agitation against the then Mitra Ministry. The leakage of the CBI report was detrimental to the leaders in Orissa. G. L. Nanda's role in the students agitation, it is alleged, threw discipline out of the educational institutions and put the seal of approval on what the opposition parties were saying of the Mitra Ministry. Nanda as a former strike leader led the Orissa students to victory at the cost of Orissa government and Congress. A few days later Mitra Ministry fell on account of the findings of the cabinet sub-committee on the CBI report against Mitra and Biju Pattanaik. This had demoralising effects on the Congress leadership in the State. The movement for the non-payment of irrigation taxes led by the PSP took the form of mass agitation on the eve of the election which brought impressive results for the opposition. The movement to establish two more Universities on regional consideration was another important aspect of the agitational politics which succeeded in forcing the government to enact the necessary laws for the purpose. Frequent submission to the pressures and agitations took away the reason from the operational politics and hence the debacle.

The next cause of the Congress discomfiture was its collusion with the bureaucracy. The Persian proverb which says "when the ruler of a country takes pinch of salt without payment, his officers loot the whole country" was in action in Orissa during this period.

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The CBI report, Pradeep scandal, allegation against the Chief Secretary, the allegations about the tractor transactions, the Contempt of Courts proceedings against the top judicial officers of the State, clearly make the impression that the Congress rule was suffering from a serious ailment which required immediate treatment.⁹

The limited electoral adjustment made by the opposition parties contributed another factor to the rout of the Congress. For instance, excepting 20 seats, in the rest of 120 constituencies there was adjustment between the Swatantra and Jan Congress. The PSP also had to a limited extent some electoral understanding with the Jan Congress. Their united move, therefore, was one of the important causes of the Congress debacle. The wrong choice of candidates was yet another factor which led to the Congress debacle. There were some new entrants, young and erstwhile Congress critics, fighting with the Congress ticket against stalwarts of the opposition; at many places the voices of the local workers were drowned and no heed was given to their opinion; there were cases where the long standing Congress workers were denied the Congress ticket forcing them to contest as independents,¹⁰ and it was a matter of common knowledge that a number of camouflaged Congress men were fighting against the Congress in the election. There were cases of putting the ring in the wrong fingers also. For instance, Biju Pattanaik contested from the Patkura constituency and the sitting MLA of the said constituency was asked to stand from another place. As a result, both of them were defeated. Gadadhar Dutta, a former Congress chief whip, was not nominated in the first instance by the PEC, but he fought and got a ticket to contest from another constituency in which he was not interested.¹¹ Hence he was defeated.

9. See in this context the CBI report published by the PSP branch in Orissa. See also the booklet called 'Pradeep scandal' circulated by Nishamoni Khuntia, the PSP leader. There was a case of defamation instituted by Sibaiaman, the Chief Secretary of Orissa against the *Prajatantra* concerning certain publication in that paper against him. It was later withdrawn.

10. Jogesh Chandra Raut a former Congress MLA, when he was refused the Congress ticket, contested as an independent candidate and won.

11. According to Dutta some Congress leaders were responsible for his defeat as they conspired against him almost openly during the election. See his statement of March 1, 1967, as published in the local dailies.

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Thus, the selection of the candidates and the places for them were not made on scientific lines and as such the Congress faced the music. Another cause of the Congress debacle was its inability to hold the price line and check corruption in the State. The post-devaluation economic crisis further accentuated popular feeling against the Congress.

VII

If we take the perspective of the politics in Orissa, it may be said that the Congress has lost the battle but not the war. Even though its strength in the assembly has been reduced to 31, it has secured 12,15,868 votes thus emerging as the largest single party in terms of votes. It cannot be taken as a dead force because of its defeat in the election so long as the parent organisation at the national level exists. Even in Orissa, Congress has its hold in all districts including the home districts of the Swatantra leaders. The following table would indicate the position:

TABLE No. 15

Position of the Congress in the Swatantra's strongholds					
Sl.No.	Districts	Congress		Swatantra— G P.	
		1957	1967	1957	1967
1.	Balangir	65993	65664	200896	155690
2.	Kalahandi	77823	49981	182595	110876
3.	Dhenkanal	60277	39563	122298	56203
4.	Sundergarh	53573	44071	107752	70055
5.	Mayurbhanj	47293	56815	46878	53978
6.	Keonjhar	37807	22517	65720	40147

The table above shows that within the last decade of party warfare the Congress has not been thrown out of the princely states' areas. In fact, these six districts, by and large, are responsible for dividing Orissa on geopolitics line resulting in perpetual political instability in the State. This trend is likely to continue for some years to come till education expands in those areas sufficiently enough to admit progressive parties to penetrate into the social and political set up there

The most important vintage of the post-election period in Orissa in the formation of the coalition government led by the

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Swatantra party. The joint meeting of the Swatantra and Jan Congress held on March 6, 1967, elected R. N. Singh Deo as the leader of the coalition parties and P. M. Pradhan as the deputy leader. The Governor of Orissa invited Singh Deo to form the government on the same day on receipt of the proceedings of the joint meeting of the Swatantra and Jan Congress legislature parties from their Secretaries. Earlier both the leaders of the Swatantra and Jan Congress wrote a letter to the Governor stating therein their joint 21-point programme and plan to form a coalition government in Orissa. The new government was sworn in on March 8, 1967.

The role of the PSP, the most active partner in the "Congress hatao" movement, is significant in the new pattern of the Orissa politics. It was speculated in the press following the statement of Mahatab and P.B. Pradhan that the PSP would join the coalition government. Mahatab said in a statement that the Jan Congress and the Swatantra had long ago combined together to defeat the Congress and form an alternative government in the State with the cooperation of the PSP and other parties. He, therefore, suggested that the Swatantra-Jan Congress coalition in the State should try to take the PSP into confidence and work in cooperation with them in the best interest of the people and the government. In reply to a joint letter of Singh Deo and P. B. Pradhan, the Chairman of the State PSP, Rabindra Mohan Das, said that the coalition government could count on support of his party only on all progressive measures. He also made it clear that his party "shall function in the legislature as an independent party and decide our course of action on the merits of the issues that will come before the legislature and try to carry out our own election manifesto." This view was further clarified by S.N. Dwivedy, PSP leader. He said that "no definite proposal had been made to the PSP for its participation in the Swatantra-Jan Congress coalition in Orissa nor was such a thing in the offing." Dwivedy also said that no attempt had ever been made in Orissa to unite all opposition elements to discuss the feasibility of a joint party or a joint programme. The Swatantra party and the Jan Congress had formed a coalition and they had "decided to have a Swatantra-led government. It does not represent the opinion of all opposition parties, nor did we have any responsibility for its formation." These clearcut statements ended the speculation

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and left the two coalescents to proceed with their joint-programme. Thus, the coalition government lost the active, vocal and effective opposition party that routed the Congress in the coastal area and which was once upon a time the party to the joint-alliance with the then Ganatantra Parishad.

Even though the SSP has declared its unconditional support for six months with right to "point out mistakes whenever they occur" the PSP and the Communists together with the Congress in the opposition would not, it is speculated, allow the coalition to live its full tenure of five years.

VIII

The open invitation of N.G. Ranga, the President of all India Swatantra party, to the Jan Congress leaders to join the Swatantra party brings a positive insight into the thinking of the Swatantra leaders on their future prospects and plans in Orissa. If the Jan Congress decides in favour of joining the Swatantra, it is politically a sound proposition. But if its nostalgic attitude brings internecine relation because of Swatantra's political conservatism, then it would lead itself to political abyss.

Another possibility is that the failure of the Jan Congress to produce a visible impact on the Orissa's economic and political conditions may cause desertion and devitalisation of its rank and file as has been the recent experience of the Bangla Congress in the West Bengal. In case, there would be a move to merge with the Swatantra party, it would amount to put them in a political oblivion. If that happens, it may safely be predicted that the Jan Congress workers and most of its leaders would return to their parent organisation.

P. N. MASALDAN

ELECTIONS IN UTTAR
PRADESH—SOME ASPECTS

POLITICS of the State of Uttar Pradesh since its formation in 1950 has been, until the 1967 elections, the politics of the Congress party. In fact ever since the achievement of independence in 1947, the State was placed under the government of the Congress party. The Congress leadership in the State, very appropriately, built up a strong base for itself among the rural masses of the State by introducing some fundamental land reforms giving the peasantry proprietary rights over the land they tilled or complete security of tenure. A number of schemes were launched for the uplift of the countryside. They were also given a feeling of participation in the management of some local matters through the panchayati raj system. All these measures carried the Congress in power through the years. There was only a weak opposition in the State legislature. But during the second half of the twenty-year period since independence, the opposition began to grow more important. The ruling party steadily lost its popularity on account of a number of factors, such as general economic hardship, disgust with corruption in the administration which was supposed to be sheltered by corrupt politicians, internal dissensions in the ruling party, and decline in its leadership. In the elections of 1952, the opposition and independent candidates together secured a little over 52 percent of the total votes polled. In ten years' time—in the elections of 1962, this percentage rose to 63%.

Of the opposition parties, before the fourth general elections, the Jana Sangh had a steady growth. It had emerged as the largest opposition group in the State assembly after the elections of 1962. It had nearly fifty members in a house of 430. The socialist parties

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also had a good position in the assembly but they failed to combine and constitute a single group or party in the legislature which could have been larger than the Jana Sangh group. It must also be mentioned that upto 1966 there was no Muslim communal group of any importance in the politics of the State.

The position of the different parties on the eve of the fourth elections was as follows :

TABLE I

Party	Position in January 67	Position after 1962 elections
Congress	275	249
P.S.P.	9	38
Communist	11	14
Jana Sangh	45	49
Socialists (now SSP.)	35	24
Swatantra	12	11
Hindu Mahasabha	2	2
Republican	6	8
Independents	25	31

II

For the purpose of the fourth general elections, the total area of the State, 113654 sq. miles, and its population of about 80 millions, were divided into 425 assembly constituencies and 85 Lok Sabha constituencies. The total electorate in Uttar Pradesh came to about 421 lakh voters. Over 80 percent of the voters were rural people. The polling programme had to be staggered for the sake of administrative convenience as also for the convenience of the voters of the hill areas. The first day of polling was 15 February and the last 21 February, after which date polling was pending only in two out of 425 constituencies.

Elaborate and adequate polling arrangements had been made by the Election Commission in all the constituencies. Good publicity

ELECTIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH—SOME ASPECTS

was given in advance, through the Press, as to how the voters were to conduct themselves inside the polling booths. Detailed instructions were issued also for the guidance of the presiding officers.

For the 425 assembly seats, there were 3,027 candidates in the field. For the 85 Lok Sabha seats, their number was 507. In the case of the assembly seats, 1237 viz. no less than 40 percent of the total were independent candidates. For the Lok Sabha seats, the number of independent candidates was 191 i.e. 37.7 percent of the total candidates in the field.

The main parties which had put up candidates were :

TABLE II

Party	Numbers of Candidates	
	For Assembly	For Lok Sabha
Congress	425	85
Jan ⁿ Sangh	401	77
Samyukt Socialist	254	43
Swatantra	207	38
Communist	96	17
Communist (M)	57	6
Republican	168	24
Praja Socialist	167	27

The procedure for selecting the candidates has by now become standardised so far as the larger, well-organised, parties are concerned. The proposals are sent up by the local units of the various parties to their respective State-level Parliamentary Boards set up for the purpose. In the case of the parties with a national organisation also, the lists of party candidates are finalised by the CEC. What actually happens in the CEC is that different factions try to get included the greatest possible number of their faithful supporters. All parties, including the most leftist, keep in mind the

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caste and religious structure of the electorate in the various constituencies while adopting candidates for them. These considerations are usually not of decisive importance but they sometimes may prove of crucial value in securing votes which may not be obtained on any other basis. Another consideration in the selection of candidates has been regional ties. An outsider is known to be less welcome than one belonging to the area constituting the constituency. In the case of the Congress in particular, an important consideration was whether a particular candidate was a member or not. This party, generally speaking, gave preference to sitting members

III

The parties in the field in U. P. did not produce any manifesto or programme addressed to the voters of the State specifically. The general manifesto of each party was the basis of its programme and election promises. The State being rural, poor, and over-populated, the people were concerned more about programmes or promises bearing on improvement of agriculture, measures to reduce pressure on land, population control, etc. The State also has a sizeable Muslim minority and a large proportion of its total population is comprised of persons belonging to scheduled castes and backward classes. Therefore, portions of the party programmes dealing with measures to safeguard the interests of minority groups and backward sections were also of particular importance.

The ruling party, the Congress, promised, in its manifesto, better implementation of land reform legislation, a new deal for agriculture labour, an extensive programme of minor irrigation, development of a strong cooperative movement to provide rural credit, and development of animal husbandry on modern scientific lines. Speedy and effective steps to check population growth were also included. The manifesto also promised special attention to the needs of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and other economically under-privileged classes. For the minority groups, the Congress promised to strive diligently for strengthening secular forces and to produce an atmosphere of unity and national integration. Conscious of the widespread dissatisfaction with the administra-

tive machinery, the Congress party's manifesto also stated that constant efforts would be made to secure the utmost integrity, efficiency and economy.

The Jana Sangh promised to give the first priority to agriculture, with greater emphasis on what it called intensive cultivation. All facilities were to be provided to the farmer to enable him to increase food production. Even insurance of farm produce was to be arranged. The breed of cattle must be improved and a legal ban on cow slaughter was to be imposed after amending the Constitution for this purpose. The party promised a master plan to ensure irrigation for every field. Special mention was made of making the "provincial" language the official language at the provincial level. The party promised to "emancipate the nation from the shackles of the English language". It promised to expeditiously implement various schemes for the rehabilitation of Hindu refugees from Pakistan. While promising a programme for the backward classes, it stated that it would not allow development of a vested interest in backwardness. People with low income were to be given all facilities enjoyed by backward classes.

The strange thing about the manifesto and programme put forward by the SSP was that it spoke not in terms of what a SSP government would do but in terms of what a "non-Congress State government" would or should do. It sometimes spoke of "the SSP and the government connected with it." Thus it clearly showed a lack of confidence in its ability to constitute a government of its own or one dominated by it. The party's programme also mentioned the improvement of agriculture as the biggest job of the day. It promised the abolition of land revenue (though not of all taxation) and more irrigation water. It promised special opportunities for women, sudras, harijans, adivasis, and "backward castes among minorities." The manifesto was generally of a negative kind-lot of criticism of the Congress administration and not many specific programmes of its own.

One of the major aims of the Swatantra party, so said its manifesto, was to help the farmer to grow enough food for the people. It promised to abolish land revenue and to reduce taxes

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generally. It said that the party's first concern would be to provide the necessities of life for the common man, "a better life to the people here and now." It promised a fair deal for labour, both industrial and agricultural. For the minorities and members of the backward classes, it promised effective implementation of the provisions of the Constitution for the protection of their rights and interests. It would not oppose the establishment of associations intended to protect the rights of a particular class or community. The party also advocated a check on corruption by creation of an independent authority on the lines of the Scandinavian Ombudsman.

The Communist Party of India also stood for the abolition of land revenue and its substitution by a tax on agricultural income. It wanted far-reaching land reforms, including the break up of "the existing concentration of land in the hands of landlords and big farmers." Share-croppers must be granted stable occupancy rights in their holdings. All "surplus land" should be distributed among agricultural labourers and poor peasants. A network of credit institutions in rural areas was advocated, along with the cancellation of all "usurious debts of small cultivators and agricultural labourers to landlords and big moneylenders. "Fertilisers at reduced prices and adequate irrigation facilities were recommended. State help for scheduled castes and people who lived in backward conditions was to be improved. The Muslim minority as also all other religious minorities were to be given full protection in matters relating to their culture, language and religious beliefs. Urdu language was to be given its due place in States like Uttar Pradesh. All facilities for education in Urdu upto the highest stage were to be provided. For official purposes also, Urdu should be used as the second language in a State like Uttar Pradesh. The party took a clear stand against the banning of slaughter of cattle, though it wanted positive steps to improve livestock

The PSP promised, in its manifesto, to introduce comprehensive and coordinated food policy whose implementation would result in greater food production and its equitable distribution. Land revenue was to be replaced by agricultural income-tax. A land army

ELECTIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH-SOME ASPECTS

was to be mobilised to bring under cultivation land reclaimed by State efforts. The peasant was to be assured of remunerative prices and the rich peasants were to be made to sell a fixed percentage of their surplus produce to the government. Irrigation facilities were to be improved. Cooperative farming was to be introduced on lands reclaimed through the efforts of the State but the idea of joint stock companies in the field of agriculture was rejected by the party. As a part of the food problem, the growth of population was to be checked. The party was committed to equality and social justice. It was to try to uplift the scheduled castes through extensive economic programmes. The administrative machinery was to be geared to the tasks to be undertaken by the creation of new administrative cadres.

The programmes of the different parties have been reviewed above mainly as they concerned the major problems of a State like Uttar Pradesh. But during the election campaign, the candidates and their supporters had to concentrate on two or three general issues which were of common concern to the masses and which were within their comprehension. So far as such issues were concerned, there was an effective blurring of the stands taken by the different parties. They all tried to gain popular approval first by criticising the record of the existing government, and, secondly, by promising relief from the worries and problems in the everyday life of the common man. The niceties of differences in the approach and methods to be adopted in their solution were not so important in the efforts to win over the vote of the common man.

If we leave aside the issues taken up in the party manifestoes and consider here only such questions and issues as were of interest and concern to a large body of common people, we may divide them into three categories. There were first questions raised by the opposition leaders and candidates to run down the ruling Congress party and to beat the government with. Scarcity of food, high cost of living, corruption in administration and high places, were most commonly mentioned questions of this category. Abolition of land revenue was also one such question. There were issues of another category which interested particular classes or communities. Uttar Pradesh was having a strike of State government employees

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since early December 1966. Thousands of these non-gazetted employees and their close relations were keenly interested in the improvement of their emoluments mainly in the form of enhanced dearness allowance. Most politicians participating in the election campaign had to take a stand on the question. A large body of Muslim voters in the State were interested in the issue of the status of the Urdu language as an official language and a language for instruction in schools. No candidate or his supporter could ignore this issue in a State like Uttar Pradesh. A third issue of this class was that of cow slaughter. The State has a large population of orthodox Hindus, and with an agitation going on for ban on cow slaughter, some communal parties with a sectarian appeal stood to gain votes in the State by championing a legal ban on cow slaughter throughout the country. A third category of issues were of a local or territorial interest. The most important in this category was the question of a separate Hill State for the hill districts of Uttar Pradesh. Considerable votes were to be gained or lost in the hill areas by the stand taken by candidates contesting the seats there. Generally, the Congress candidates wanted to cash in on this promise.

IV

In the great majority of constituencies, there were multi-cornered contests, although the main contestants usually were not more than three or four. This situation was indicative of the failure of the opposition parties to come to electoral understandings, either of a general nature or in particular constituencies. Only in a small number of constituencies, where some big gun of the ruling party was to be opposed, such understandings were reached for all practical purposes. No grand strategy was, therefore, adopted in Uttar Pradesh by the opposition parties to give straight fights to the ruling party. The comparatively less well-organised parties, which did not possess a large network of branches or a large army of campaigners, such as the SSP tended to concentrate their resources on a smaller number of prestige seats. Caste and communal consideration figured in the strategy of almost all political parties including the leftist. Hidden factional divisions in the Congress, as well as some other parties, were sought to be exploited by the rival candidates to their advantage. Quite often the beneficiaries of such internal dissensions were the independent candidates. In the Lucknow parliamentary

constituency, for example, the Congress faction which was not happy with the selection of the party candidate worked not very secretly for the independent candidate.

While considering the election strategies and fronts etc. special mention may be made of the role of organisations which gave advice to some religious communities. The most important of these was the Muslim Majlis-i-Mushawarat i. e. Muslim Advisory Council. This organisation was formed in August 1964. Its avowed aim was to promote the interests of Muslims and to secure the continuation of the personal laws of Muslims (as against the adoption of a uniform civil code covering the Muslims also), and to secure for the Urdu language a higher status in the State. The Mushawarat was, it appears, formed with a view to sway the Muslim voters in the fourth general elections according to the strategy of the leaders of the organisation. At least in this State, the leadership of this body wanted to "teach a lesson" to the ruling Congress party. It was opposed to the Congress candidates, particularly Muslim Congressmen, and to the Jana Sangh candidates. It did not consider it feasible to put up its own candidates in any constituency but it declared its support for 37 Lok Sabha candidates and 137 assembly candidates. Of these candidates, the largest number were contesting on the SSP ticket. The second largest number belonged to the Swatantra; independents came third and the PSP fourth. Candidates belonging to Republican and the two Communist parties also were adopted but in smaller numbers, the smallest being that of the Communist Party (M) candidates. The President of the U. P. Majlis i-Mushawarat explained that the Majlis had selected for its backing only those candidates who were non-communal in outlook, honest and progressive. However, owing to the over-zealousness of the President of the UP Majlis, who had unsavoury Muslim League associations in the pre-1947 period, to whip up the grievances of the Muslim minority against the Congress party, the Majlis came to be widely suspected and accused of injecting a strong dose of communalism once again in the politics of the State. The extremism of the UP branch was disowned even by the central organisation of the Majlis itself. It was condemned by some other Muslim organisations of the State also e.g. the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind. In some constituencies

at least, the support of the Majlis seems to have proved not an asset but a liability for it drove away a large section of non-Muslim voters to other candidates. Although the Majlis had said it would support non-Congress candidates and, therefore, it did not announce its support for any Congress candidate, it was known in the case of the Balrampur parliamentary constituency that the Majlis leaders had informally campaigned for the Congress candidate, Subhadra Joshi, who had a good reputation of being a strong champion of the minority community. This support produced a strong reaction against Subhadra among Hindu voters, many of whom were driven to give their vote to the rival Jana Sangh candidate, Atal Behari Vajpayee. The influence of the Majlis on the Muslim voters was, however, limited only. The Shia sect of the Muslim population of State was comparatively less amenable to the advice of the Majlis. Generally, they favoured the Congress candidates.

One or two other religious minority groups were also given advice regarding the casting of their votes by their religious and other leaders here and there in the State. The Archbishop of Agra, for example, issued on 6 February, 1967 a statement of the Catholic Bishops Conference of India calling attention to certain principles to be kept in mind by the followers. The candidates chosen by the Catholic voters "should be men of character, integrity and ability men who will stand for the equal treatment of scheduled castes and backward classes irrespective of religion", and they "should belong to a party which will uphold the liberty and dignity of the human person, defend the freedom of religion and conscience... and respect the right to private property, thus checking totalitarian tendencies." The disqualifying reference was clearly against leftist parties.

V

The election campaign in Uttar Pradesh gathered momentum rather late. This was largely the result of unusual delay in the selection of candidates by the largest party, the ruling Congress party, owing to its own internal feuds. The delay was partly due to long, though largely infructuous, efforts of the opposition parties, particularly the leftist, to come to some kind of electoral alliances. In most of the constituencies in Uttar Pradesh, there was hardly

any campaigning until the middle of January i.e. one month prior to the polling. Vigorous activity on behalf of the various candidates commenced only towards the close of the month. The subdued nature of the campaign in most parts of the State can be explained, in part, also by the higher cost of everything. Agents of the candidates had to be paid higher wages, the cost of transport, loudspeakers, badges, printing of propaganda literature, etc. had become much greater than during the earlier elections. The two main forms of canvassing were (i) personal contact on behalf of the candidate and (ii) public meetings organised in different parts of the constituencies. The unpopularity of the ruling party was so great in the urban areas that most of the public meetings of the Congress candidates were disturbed and, many times, had to be abandoned. In the urban constituencies, mobile agents with a loudspeaker fitted on the conveyance were commonly used. Small processions with placards and somekind of music or *Tamasha* were also used.

A liberal use of pamphlets was made only by the most rich of the candidates such as V. R. Mohan in the Lucknow parliamentary constituency. The standard of many of such pamphlets was very low. The rival candidates were run down sometimes for fictitious misdeeds alleged to have been performed by them. The Congress also air-dropped leaflets once or twice. This was obviously an expensive technique which every party could not use. Cinema slides were also used by some candidates.

During the campaign, the ruling Congress had to be on the defensive most of the time. Every section of society had some ground or other to be dissatisfied with the Congress government. The party's candidates had to face hostile audiences. They gave up large public meetings and arranged few even for the most well-known leaders. Actually, the Congress big guns were conspicuously absent. The Congress President, Kamaraj, paid only a fleeting visit to one or two places in the State. Even Indira Gandhi did not draw very large and enthusiastic crowds in some of the meetings addressed by her in her own constituency in Rae Bareilly. For several day during the campaign, the striking State government employees and their well-wishers indulged in heckling and creating disturbance at Congress meetings. So did also students at a number

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of places because they had failed to secure government's support and sanction for some of their "demands." A deplorable feature of the hostile atmosphere in which the Congress had to conduct its campaign was the use of violence at some places, including attacks on the election of the party.

While the ruling Congress party was most of the time on the defensive, the campaign by the opposition parties had a pronouncedly negative character. The common burden of their pleadings before the voters was "do not let the Congress party come back to power, whoever else may be returned." The large majority of the voters had taken well to this appeal and Congressmen knew the going was hard.

Only two or three parties had little financial difficulty in conducting their campaign. The Congress, the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh were financially in a better position than the other parties. The rich business community had subscribed to either the Congress fund or the Jana Sangh fund or to both. The Swatantra received help from industrialists and ex-princes and ex-landlords. Perhaps the Swatantra's funds were subscribed to more by patrons outside the State than by patrons inside the State. The UP. Congress boss, C B Gupta, was believed to be giving one thousand rupees to every Congress candidate irrespective of his factional associations. He had been presented a big purse of 65 lakh rupees on his 65th birthday during the previous year. How much additional help he gave to his own faction's candidates, no one can say. Apart from the funds of the contesting parties, the candidates had to spend large sums of their own depending upon the size of the constituency the amount being spent by the rivals, and the leeway they had to make up in the popularity scale. On an average, a candidate for the assembly constituency needed about fifteen to twenty thousand rupees to meet the campaign costs and one for a Lok Sabha seat needed about forty or fifty thousand rupees. In prestige constituencies, like that of the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, a lot more had to be spent. In her constituency in Rae Bareilly, an army of workers was deployed and there was a large supporting organisation. All kinds of amenities and help was provided on a large scale to the people of the area to

boost up the popularity of the Congress. All this must have cost a tremendous amount of money.

The Press in the State took keen interest in the elections. There was a good coverage of election meetings and speeches in the different parts of the State, both in the English dailies as well as in Hindi and Urdu newspapers. On the whole, the press took up either an anti-Congress or an independent, non-partisan, attitude. The Lucknow *National Herald* did not spare criticism of some candidates, like V. R. Mohan who was a candidate for the Lucknow parliamentary seat, even though they were candidates put up by the Congress party with which the paper had very old association. Several articles in the newspapers gave predictions about the results of the general elections. They did not prove quite correct. Every intelligent person could foresee that the Congress party had lost in popularity, but few had any accurate idea of the extent of this loss in the stock of the party as revealed by the actual results announced a few days later. Most of these forecasts had anticipated the party to capture an absolute majority of seats though a reduced majority as compared to that secured at the third election (which was 249 out of a total of 430 seats). Actually, the party's performance at the polls proved poorer.

The polling in the fourth general elections was over by February 21, 1967, and the announcement of the results was completed by 26 February.

VI

The poll results showed that a larger percentage of the voters had taken part in the fourth general elections than in the previous three general elections. In this respect, there has been a steady progress in the State. In the 1952 general elections the percentage was 42.4; in 1957, it rose to 46.94; in the elections of 1962, it became 51.44; in the fourth general elections, it was 54.55 i.e. an increase of 12.15 per cent as compared with the participation in the first general elections. Even if we adjust the percentage of invalid votes cast in the four general elections held in the State since independence, the percentage of effective or valid votes has also been steadily increasing. In the fourth general elections, the percentage of invalid votes was 6.6 as compared with 5.5 in 1962, 3.4 in 1957, and 3.5 in 1952.

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The results of the polls indicate that the elections were used by the electorate as an opportunity to express their disgust with the existing state of affairs and to indicate their loss of faith not only in the ruling party but also in the great majority of sitting members of the legislature, irrespective of their party affiliation, who had sought re-election in 1967.

The U. P. assembly has 425 seats and the State elects 85 members to the Lok Sabha. Of 425 Assembly seats, 423 were filled by elections in February and 2 in the middle of April 1967. The party-wise results of the elections for the 425 Assembly seats are given in the table below:

TABLE III

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Votes polled	Percentage of votes polled
Indian National Congress	425	199	6912104	32.20
Jana Sangh	401	98	4651738	21.67
S.S.P.	254	44	2150974	9.97
Swatantra	207	12	1012784	4.73
C.P.I. (R)	96	13	697942	3.23
C.P.I. (M)	57	1	272565	1.27
Republican	168	9	889010	4.14
P.S.P.	17	11	878748	4.09
Independents	1238	37	4012186	18.69

For the 85 Lok Sabha seats, the results were as given below :

TABLE IV

Party	Seats contested	Seats won	Votes polled	Percentage of votes polled
Congress	85	47	7197183	33.04
Jana Sangh	77	12	4919049	22.58
S.S.P.	43	8	2236385	10.27
Swatantra	38	1	1038968	4.77
C.P.I. (R)	17	5	116246	3.75
C.P.I. (M)	6	1	153960	0.71
Republican	25	1	886021	4.07
P.S.P.	27	2	815561	3.74
Independents	189	8	3720307	17.08

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If we compare the total percentages of votes secured by the different parties in the State as a whole for the assembly seats with those secured for the Lok Sabha seats, it would appear that there was very little of split voting in the State. In the case of most of the parties, the variation was less than 0.4. The greatest variation among the percentages of the parties was that in the voting for the Congress party. It came in the case of the Congress to 1.38 only. The party secured 1.38 per cent more votes in the elections for the Lok Sabha than in the elections for the State assembly. The variation was highest in the case of independents. The independents got 1.86 per cent less votes in the elections for the Lok Sabha than they obtained in the elections for the assembly.

In view of what has been stated in the preceding paragraph, it may be permissible to give an interpretation of the poll results as a whole on the basis of the figures for the assembly seats. At least here, we are proceeding on this basis and assumption.

VII

The Uttar Pradesh is among those States where the Congress party suffered a serious setback at the polls during the fourth general elections. Its following, as indicated by votes obtained, further declined from 36.3 per cent in 1962 to 32.20 per cent in 1967. It had won 249 seats in 1962 but in 1967 it won only 199 seats, that is about 47 per cent of the total. In F.P.W da Costa's language, the Congress party had a favourable "Multiplier" of nearly 0.7. As has become well-known by now, the loss of votes and seat suffered by the party was caused by such factors as high cost of living, shortages of all kinds, corruption in administration and politics, internal dissensions, and disappearance of charismatic leadership altogether. These factors more than offset the advantage of a bigger party machine and organisation, more funds, and the traditional halo of Congressmen as the fighters in the freedom movement. Still, the party managed to emerge as the largest single party in the State assembly.

Of the seven other parties which contested the fourth general elections, two—the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra—were rightist, and five leftist. The PSP has been included in the latter category along

with the more extremist SSP and the two wings of the Communists. Proceeding on such a grouping of parties into rightist and leftist, we find that the rightist parties have acquired 5.26 per cent more votes in 1967 than they did in 1962. On the other hand, the leftist parties (in which we have included the two Communist parties as well as the Republican) have lost by 5.86 per cent in popular votes as compared with their votes in 1962.

Among the rightist parties the most spectacular gain has been that of the Jana Sangh. It secured 21.67 per cent of the total votes polled and doubled its strength in the State assembly. In the elections of 1962, it had secured 16.5 per cent of the popular vote and 49 seats in the assembly. In 1967, it secured 98 seats. The party had a good organisation, better discipline, more unity, and perhaps also greater funds than most other opposition parties. It also benefited from the anti-cow slaughter agitation which did influence Hindu voters here and there, and also from the reaction produced by the recrudescence of Muslim communalism in the form of the Muslim Majlise-Mushawarat. The other major rightist party, the Swatantra, improved its position only so far as percentage of votes secured is concerned & that too to a nominal extent only. It had secured in 1962 4.6 per cent of the votes and 15 seats; in 1967, it secured 4.71 per cent of the votes, but only 12 seats. The two rightist parties might have done better if the first did not suffer in the eyes of many from the attributes of a revivalist, and even, in some respects, fascistic cult; and the second from a feudal and downright capitalist base.

Of the two socialist parties, the PSP suffered a rather steep decline. It could secure only 4.04 per cent votes and 11 seats in 1967 as against 11.5 per cent votes and 38 seats in 1962. Its organisation in the State was very inadequate and its prestige had suffered due to defections to the Congress party in 1964. It has no ideological identity left, with increasing emphasis on democratic socialism given by the Congress party. The SSP, with more extremist programmes and leaders, was able to improve its position. It secured 9.97 per cent of the votes and 44 seats in 1967 as against 8.2 per cent votes and 24 seats in 1962 when it contested the elections as Socialist Party. The SSP also suffered from internal squabbles and this fact obstructed greater success at the polls. If the socialist

ELECTIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH—SOME ASPECTS

parties or even all the leftist parties had come to some electoral understanding, the achievement would have been better.

The Communists were split. The Right Communists secured more votes than the Left Communists. The CPI got 3.23 per cent of the total votes whereas the CPI (M) got only 1.27 per cent i. e. about one-third of what the CPI got. The CPI got 13 seats in the assembly as against 1 of the CPI (M). This total of 14 seats was only one more than the seats secured by the united Communist party in 1962. But the total votes polled by the two Communist parties in 1967 was 4.50 of the total votes cast whereas in 1962 the Communist party had secured slightly higher percentage of votes 5.10. These figures indicate that the State is still largely free of Communist influence.

An interesting feature of the 1967 elections in the State was a remarkable spurt in the votes obtained by independents. In 1962 their votes had declined sharply over the 1957 figures, in 1962 the percentage was 12.9 as compared to 28.7 in 1957. In 1967 again, there was a rise, to 18.69 per cent of the total votes polled. The Independents secured 37 seats in 1967 as against 31 in 1962. The rise in the percentage of votes secured by independents is again an indication of the disgust which large sections of the people felt with the record and conduct of partisan politicians.

As is clear from the analysis of the results given above, sufficient polarization in State politics has not yet taken place. The opposition continued to be fragmented, more so the leftist opposition. Of all the opposition parties, only the Jana Sangh was returned in some strength. The result of this inadequacy has been evident in the working of the parliamentary government in the State since the elections.

Some interesting data about the socio-economic background of those elected at the 1967 elections were available, but not about all the members. Information was available only about 368 members of the assembly. Such information as could be had is given below.

The electorate did not favour women candidates for the assembly as much as it had done in 1962. Of the 43 women candidates

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for the assembly, only 6 were elected, all belonging to the Congress. Women fared better in the contest for the 85 Lok Sabha seats. There were 14 women candidates in the field out of whom 6 got elected.

Of the members of the assembly about whom data were available, about 62 per cent were of rural background and 37.7 per cent of urban background, the rest being of "mixed" background. But in the case of the Lok Sabha members, 56 per cent of the total were of urban background and only about 32 per cent of rural background, the rest being of "mixed" background.

Youth was generally at a discount with the electorate, if we go by the proportion of the elected members who belonged to different age-groups. Older age was favoured even more for the Lok Sabha. While 13.6 per cent of those assembly members about whom data were available belonged to the below 35 age group only 2.5 per cent of the total Lok Sabha members belonged to this group. The largest proportion, both of the assembly and the Lok Sabha members, belonged to the age group 35-50 years. In the case of the assembly it comes to 57 per cent of the members about whom information was available, and to 64.7 per cent in the case of Lok Sabha members. 29 per cent of the assembly members and 33 per cent of the Lok Sabha members belonged to the age group of over 50 years.

Profession-wise, the two largest groups both among the State assembly and the Lok Sabha members are of (i) those who label themselves as "social worker" and (ii) of lawyers. "Social workers" constituted about 60 per cent of the elected members of the assembly about whom data were available, and 57.6 per cent of the total elected Lok Sabha members. People belonging to the legal profession constituted about 15 per cent of the assembly members and 14 per cent of the total Lok Sabha members. It is interesting that while the third largest group among the Lok Sabha members was that of educationists (9 per cent), in the assembly it was constituted by farmers (a little over 12 per cent). Former government servants constituted 4.7 per cent of the total Lok Sabha members. People who were in service, public or private, before being elected

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to the State assembly constituted 4·3 per cent of the members about whom data were available. Educationists among the assembly members constituted less than 3 per cent and other professions were also represented but in very small numbers. Medical doctors and journalists constituted a little over 1 per cent of the numbers both in the assembly and in Lok Sabha. About 1 per cent of the assembly members belonged to the former ruling families but they constituted 4·7 per cent of the total Lok Sabha members elected from the State.

Such were the members elected at the fourth general elections in the Uttar Pradesh.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the most outstanding aspect of the elections was the desire of the electorate to exercise their sovereign power in a conscientious manner and with the determination of the great majority of the electorate to punish those who had failed to deliver the goods.

BANGENDU GANGULY

**1967 GENERAL ELECTIONS
IN WEST BENGAL**

THE fourth general elections absolutely changed the political scene in West Bengal. The relative positions of the political forces were reversed. The Congress, which had been in power in the State since independence, found itself in the role of the opposition, while the erstwhile opposition parties occupied the government benches.

Party Position

The Congress, however, emerged as the largest single party. In a House of 280 members, the Congress got 127 seats as against 157 in the previous 252-member assembly. As Table I shows, the CPI (M) emerged as the second largest single party with 43 seats and the Bangla Congress (BC) occupied the third position with 34 seats, while CPI secured 16 seats, the Forward Bloc (FB) 13, PSP and the SSP 7 each, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) 6, the Lok Sevak Sangh (LSS) 5, the Socialist Unity Centre (SUC) 4, the Workers' party (WP) and the Gorkha League (GL) 2 each, the Jana Sangh the Swatantra party and the Forward Bloc Marxist (I B-M) 1 each and the independents 11. After the elections, all the non-Congress parties, except the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra party, came together to form the United Front government.

1967 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN WEST BENGAL

TABLE I¹

Partywise Break-up of Elected Candidates

Party	1967*				1962**			
	Lok Sabha seats con- tes- ted	seats won	Assembly seats con- tes- ted	seats won	Lok Sabha seats con- tes- ted	seats won	Assembly seats con- tes- ted	seats won
Congress	40	14	280	127	36	22	252(a)	157
CPI (M)	16	5	135	43	-	-	-	-
CPI	11	5	62	16	24	9	145	50
BC	7	5	81	34(b)	-	-	-	-
FB	6	2	42	13(c)	6	1	35	13
SSP	3	1	26	7	1(d)	-	7(d)	-
PSP	2	1	26	7	12	-	87	5
RSP	2	1	16	6	2	1	17	9
SUC	2	1	8	4	-	-	11	-
ISS	1	1	6	5	1	1	11	4
WP	-	-	2	2	-	-	8	-
GL	-	-	3	2	-	-	4	2
FB (M)	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-(e)
Swatantra	3	-	21	1	4	-	24	-
JS	7	-	58	1	4	-	25	-
Other Parties and Independents	40	4	289	11	22	2	335	12
Total	140	40	1058	280	112	36	961	252

* Source : "Report on Fourth General Elections" in India, 1967, Elections Commission, Vol. II, pp. 8.

** Source : Report on Third General Election in India, 1962, Election Commission, Vol. II, pp. 6-7, 80-81.

(a) One Congress candidate was returned unopposed.

(b) and (c) One member has been elected from two constituencies.

(d) Socialist Party.

(e) Election Commission's Report does not mention seats contested and won by the FB(M) separately.

1. In this article all statistics relating to the 1962 elections are based on the "Report on Third General Election in India, 1962", Election Commission, Vol. II. Statistics relating to the 1967 elections are, unless stated otherwise, based on figures given in "West Bengal" (Vol. XII, No. 47), published by the Director of Information, Government of West Bengal.

Electoral Alliance

The coalition which assumed power after the elections was different from the electoral alliances that existed before the elections. To understand the nature of such alliance we must take into account the emergence of two new parties. Perhaps, these cannot be entirely new parties, for these were born out of parties that had existed earlier and had contested the elections in 1962 also.

Even before the 1962 elections strong differences of opinion had divided the members of the Communist party of India. Yet the party fought in the elections as a single unit and emerged as the strongest non-Congress force in the West Bengal legislature. An open split took place in April, 1964, at a meeting of the party's National Council in Delhi. There were efforts to patch up the differences, but in a convention held in August at Tenali, Andhra, the 'leftist group of the CPI decided to organise a separate Communist Party-(CPI-M). This party held its first congress in Calcutta in November, 1964.

It was also in 1964 that the PSP and the Socialist party came together to form the Samyukta Socialist party. The merger proved to be short-lived. The foundation conference of the SSP could not be held before January, 1965 and on the first day of the conference practically the whole leadership of the old PSP, 7 excluding S.M. Joshi, walked out. They later declared that the merger was annulled and that the units of the old PSP would be revived at all levels. Thus instead of the Socialist party and the PSP we found the SSP and the PSP contesting the elections in 1967.

A new party which gained considerable eminence in the 1967 elections was the Bangla Congress. As its name implies, it is a party confined to West Bengal. It was formed in 1966 under the leadership of Ajoy Mukherjee (the Chief Minister of the United Front government in West Bengal) with dissident Congressmen. Though a few new-comers also joined the party, the overwhelming bulk consisted of members who, after breaking away from the Congress, operated for a short period under the name of Paschim Banga Congress Karmi Sammelan.

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As is evident from Table I, the Bangla Congress and the two Communist parties occupied the first three places in the non-Congress front. But these three did not belong to the same front before the elections. Attempts were, of course, made to reach an electoral agreement under which the left parties would not contest against one another. But the talks were fruitless. It is difficult to say who was responsible for the failure of the talks, because, after the failure, each of the two Communist parties blamed the other. The Secretary of the CPI State Council (West Bengal) declared in a press statement that his party had reduced its claims a great deal and, at the insistence of the CPI (M), had placed a list of 23 constituencies where the party "is by all tests the strongest and the most organised" as its absolute minimum; but at this stage the CPI (M) suddenly broke off the talks². The Secretary of the West Bengal State Committee of the CPI (M), on the other hand, told a press conference that during the negotiations for electoral unity, his and not demanded a single seat where it was not the strongest party, but the Bangla Congress, the Forward Bloc and the CFI (particularly the CPI) appeared to have been more anxious to ensure reduction of the CPI (M)'s strength than to defeat the Congress.³ Whoever might have been to blame the result was the emergence of two fronts against the Congress: the United Left Front (ULF) and the People's United Left Front (PULF). Seven parties, the CPI (M), the RSP, the SSP, the SUC, the WP, the FB (M) and the Revolutionary Communist Party of India formed the ULF for electoral purposes. It was pointed out by the ULF at a press conference that this ULF was different from ULF that "led the great mass struggles of February-March-April and September" in 1966.⁴ Three parties belonging to the old ULF—the CPI, the Bolshevik Party and the Communist Unity Centre—were not in this new ULF. Soon afterwards the CPI, the BC, the FB and the Bolshevik Party formed an electoral alliance known as the FULF. Table I showing the number of seats contested by each party, brings out the distribution of seats within each front. Apart from this, both of these two fronts supported a number of independent candidates. The PSP, the Swatantra party, the JS, the LSS and the GL remained outside either front.

2. *The Statesman*, Calcutta, November 17, 1966.

3. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1966.

4. *Ibid.*, December 9, 1966.

Campaign

The nature and tactics of the pre-election campaign in West Bengal were necessarily influenced by the electoral agreements. Each party carried out the campaign on behalf of its own candidates and, if the party belonged to a front, in favour of candidates of brother parties constituting the front. It was an integral part of the campaign to show the opponents in a poor light.

It was to be expected that the Congress would be the target of attack by both the fronts. It is interesting to note, however, that each front used up a considerable amount of its energy in attacking the other front. For example, some of the campaign reports published in the evening daily of the CPI (M) picked out the PULI candidates as the main target of attack and tried to prove at the same time that the PULI was actively supported by the Congress workers in some areas.⁵

To be fair, however, to the fronts it must be pointed out that each front did, at least on occasions, ask the voters to vote for candidates of the other front in constituencies where it had no candidate of its own.⁶

Political parties having all India character carried the election campaign on the basis of their election manifestoes.

The Congress emphasised its achievements, claimed that it had established democracy in India and pointed out that there was no party in the Opposition which could be entrusted with the task of national development.⁷ In its opinion, a stable government was needed to protect the country against Chinese and Pakistani aggression and such a government could be formed by the Congress alone. The party also harped upon the failure of the leftists to achieve electoral unity.⁸

5. *Ganashakti*, Calcutta, January 17, February 18, 1967.

6. Speech by the CPI(M) leader, Jyoti Basu, *The Statesman*, Calcutta, January 15, 1967, speech by the CPI leader, Bhupesh Gupta, *Ganashakti*, January 5, 1967.

7. Speech by the then Chief Minister, P. C. Sen, *The Statesman*, Calcutta, January 15, 1967.

8. Speech by the Congress President, Kamaraj, *Ibid.*, January 30, 1967.

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Its opponents, on the other hand, highlighted the failure of the Congress government in all the spheres—particularly on the economic front. These parties laid stress on the Congress misrule, its corrupt practices and its indifference to the deteriorating conditions of the people. The atrocities committed by the government and the infringement of people's rights were also emphasised.

The Bangla Congress, also campaigned more or less on these lines. It emphasised, in particular, the problems of corruption, inadequacy of food, unemployment, inflation and rising prices⁹.

Pre-election promises are made by each party everywhere and in West Bengal also every party promised as much as would not transgress the limit of credibility. A party which is already in power can do more than make promises and this was borne out in West Bengal by the sudden flood of generosity by the government just before the elections. The control on cism-made sweets was removed. The cut in milk quota in Calcutta was restored. Open sale of black-market rice was overlooked. Miss casual leave was sanctioned to the West Bengal government employees who had stayed away from work on September 13, 1966. The State government also decided that stenographers need not take periodic tests and some other employees must get an immediate pay-rise. It may be mentioned here that paucity of funds did not stand in the way of new and massive relief work in drought-affected areas and such work was carried out even during the harvestin' season¹⁰. The extent of such relief work moved the Union government three men's evaluation team to remark that though the extent of damage caused by the drought in Bihar was much more devastating than that in West Bengal the Bihar government had spent Rs. 2 crores on relief while the government of West Bengal had spent more than Rs. 9 crores.¹¹

Campaigning devices are more or less the same everywhere. In West Bengal, numerous meetings were held all over the State. Party workers could be seen at street corners urging small groups

9. Election Manifesto and Immediate Programme, Fourth General Election, Bangla Congress, 1967.

10. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, February 4, 1967.

11. *The Statesman*, Calcutta, January 25, 1967.

of people to vote for them. Leaflets and booklets were issued. Festoons were hung up and posters were pasted on the walls. A notable feature of such posters and festoons was the use of pictures and couplets. Some of the pictures were, of course, crudely drawn, their appeal being more to the emotional than to the aesthetic sense of the spectators. Nothing more could be expected in an election campaign. But it was really surprising to find that some of the posters were really of a high artistic standard. In some localities poster-exhibitions were held under improvised conditions. It may be pointed out that the CPI (M) seemed to lead in this sphere of campaigning, at least in Calcutta.

Often the drawings on the posters were made more eloquent by the addition of lines from poems. Tagore's poems were naturally drawn upon. Among others who proved to be favourites were well known Bengali poets Kazi Nazrul Islam, Sukanta Bhattacharya and Subhas Mukerjee. These poets were utilised mainly by the leftists. But local talents appeared to be active in the campaign of all the parties. The Congress posters bore such couplets as "Krishak Majur bandhche jot, Jora balode dichchhe vote" (Peasants and workers are uniting to vote for a pair of bullocks) and "Gorte desh, rukhte Cheen, Congress ke vote din" (To build up the nation, to resist China, vote for Congress). The CPI (M) often popularised its election symbol by using such couplets as "Vote din banchte, Tara-haturi-kaste" (For a life worth living, vote Hammer-sickle and star) "Majur-krishak bandhlo jot, Kaste-haturi tarai vote" (Workers and peasants have united to vote for Hammer-sickle and star) and "Duhkhe jibon jirno tai jot bendhechhi banchte, Dhorechhi protik-chinho tara-haturi-kaste" (Life is full of misery, so for a life worth living, we have taken up the symbol of hammer-sickle and star). As a rule, however, the non-Congress fronts came out with couplets containing slogans on the food-problem, for example, "Dal chai, chal chai, Shunbo na aar nai nai" (We want pulses, we want rice, enough of hearing 'there is no more'). When P. C. Sen who was the Chief Minister at that time went to his constituency (Arambagh) there was a new couplet: "Kanchkalar baro dam, Prafulla Sen phire jaan" (Green bananas are too costly, go back Prafulla Sen). This was an obvious dig at the Chief Minister for his advice to the people to eat green bananas as substitute for rice.

As an essential part of the campaign, attempts were made to push up the sale of party periodicals and dailies. Such dailies in West Bengal included *Janasevak* (Congress) *Loksevak* (PSP) and *Kalantar* (CPI). The CPI (M) brought out an evening daily *Ganashakti*—specially for the election campaign. Forty-seven issues of this daily were published. Its publication was suspended from the date of polling.

Non-party dailies (for example, *the Statesman* and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*) also highlighted different aspects of the election campaign and published reports of meetings, constituency-wise campaigns and press conferences. Some of the newspapers printed advertisements by some political parties. For example, *the Statesman*, on February 17, 1967, printed a three-column page-long advertisement ("sponsored by a Committee of Young Executives for Democratic Government") showing a picture of Indira Gandhi, a pair of bullocks and a long queue of people. It contained excerpts from a speech by Indira Gandhi, a few lines about the importance of a stable government and a planned economy and, below it, the inscription "Vote Congress." On another page, on the same day, was printed a somewhat smaller advertisement by the Swatantra party. There was a picture of Minoo Masani whose answers to a few questions about the party were printed below it. The advertisement declared: "Swatantra means freedom from scarcity, freedom from restrictions, freedom from official oppression and freedom from Permit Licence Raj."

Another notable feature of the election campaign was the use of poster dramas. The dramas were always staged at the end of meetings and the audience was constantly reminded that the artists had arrived and the drama would be staged "soon." This device of poster dramas was undoubtedly more popular than harangues and proved to be a good substitute. In this sphere the CPI (M) proved to be the leader, followed at a great distance by the CFI and the Congress.

All the political parties had realised that a peaceful atmosphere was essential for a proper election campaign. At a meeting of the representatives of different political parties and groups (held

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in the council chamber of Assembly House in the first half of January 1967) it was unanimously agreed that a peaceful atmosphere would be maintained during the election campaign and on the polling day.¹² A code of conduct was also agreed upon. But this code was not fully implemented. The campaign was not wholly peaceful. But, according to police sources, the nature of pre-election clashes in Calcutta appeared to be less virulent than it was during the third general elections.¹³ From January 5 to February 14, 1967, there were 24 minor incidents in the city involving brick-battling at election meetings and camps, assaults, burning of election offices and gates and tearing down of election posters.¹⁴ The districts also had their share of disturbances. The atmosphere was, however, peaceful on the whole and the different political parties had ample opportunities to campaign for their own candidates.

In spite of all attempts by political parties, the election temper remained comparatively cooler this time. This was particularly noticeable in Calcutta. The lack of enthusiasm in the city led one newspaper to print election news under the following headline: 'Pessimistic Calcutta Waits Indifferently for Poll Day'.¹⁵ But this apathy was not limited to the city. The lack of interest among the voters was obvious in rural areas also.¹⁶

As the poll-day drew near, different political parties stepped up their campaign to create an election tempo. According to police sources, there were 443 election meetings in Calcutta in course of five days between February 10 and February 14. One hundred and thirty of these were organised by the Congress, 268 by the different leftist parties and 45 by the supporters of independent candidates.¹⁷ Speaking to journalists, the Police Commissioner commented that the police had received information about these 443 meetings, but more meetings about which the police had no information, might have been held. Attempts to create a tempo, however, were not

12 *Ibid*, January 12, 1967.

13 *Ibid*, February 15, 1967.

14 *Ibid*.

15 *The Statesman*, Calcutta, February 2, 1967.

16 *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, February 16, 1967.

17 *Ibid*, February 17, 1967.

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particularly fruitful. It can be said on the basis of personal experience that, at least in Calcutta, there was much more excitement after the election. Excited speculation spread like wild-fire as the election results started coming in. The climax was probably reached in the mood of the surging crowds on Calcutta streets when the results of constituencies where Atulya Ghosh (Treasurer, AICC) and P. C. Sen (Chief Minister) were contesting, were announced.

Expectations

The defeat of these two leaders of the Congress had probably not been anticipated by the Congress and not even by the opposition. It is, of course, not possible to assess fully the real expectations of a political party from its pre election declarations. No party will declare that it is going to be defeated even if it believes that there is little chance of success. Each party has to put up a show of optimism for the benefit of the voters as much as for the benefit of its own workers.

The Congress repeatedly declared that it was sure to win in West Bengal.¹ P. C. Sen declared that the Congress would have a landslide victory in the elections and that the results for the Congress would be far better than those in 1962.² Atulya Ghosh was more cautious when he told reporters in Calcutta that the *Status quo* in party-position would more or less prevail in the assembly and that the proportionate increase in the number of Congress seats in the enlarged assembly would be slender.³ Such expectations must have been coloured by the prestige of the Congress in the national movement and its victory in the State in the three previous elections. But, in the main, the Congress hopes seem to have been based on the failure of the opposition to achieve unity and the hostility between the two Communist parties.

It appears that at least some of the leaders of West Bengal Congress really believed that no force would be able to oust them from power. This is evident from a sense of complacency among Congress candidates. In some of the constituencies at least the

18 *The Statesman*, Calcutta, January 16, 1967, January 28, 1967, February 4, 1967.

19. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, February 9, 1967.

20 *The Statesman*, Calcutta, January 28, 1967.

candidates did not even bother to approach the voters individually and a house-to-house campaign was considered unnecessary.

The opposition leaders, on the other hand, repeatedly told the people that Congress misrule would no longer be endured and that a people's government would be formed in the State after the elections.²¹ Such expectations arose from the economic condition of the people and their disgust with it. West Bengal had already earned the dubious distinction of being known as a problem State. But in the last five years things really came to a head. Prices went on rising and the essential commodities disappeared-sometimes collectively and sometimes by rotation. Rice-the staple food of the Bengalees-was scarce and expensive. In December 1966, supply of rice to card-holders in the statutory rationing areas of West Bengal was totally stopped for a week. It was subsequently resumed but the quota was reduced. Mustard oil, fish and pulses were often not available in the market at a reasonable price. Baby-food and medicines were scarce, spurious and expensive. These problems, added to the chronic distress of the people, touched off a series of demonstrations, strikes and "bundhs." There was unrest among the teachers, the students, the factory workers and the general public. Figures maintained at the West Bengal Labour Commissioner's office show that the State lost 1.36 million man-days as a result of stoppage of work in factories during 1965 alone.

The hopes of the opposition parties were particularly strengthened by the mass-movement which swept through Calcutta and many other districts of West Bengal in February-March-April, 1966. The opposition parties expected that this popular indignation would be reflected through the ballot box as well.

A survey of public opinion appeared to confirm these hopes only to some extent. The Managing Director of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion remarked in the concluding article in a series of fifteen based on current surveys and analyses of political opinion by the Institute-that in West Bengal "the position on seats could

21. *Ibid.*, November 4, 1966, November 29, 1966, January 13, 1967, January 15, 1967; "Mood of the Masses for Radical Change", Bhupesh Gupta, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, February 3, 1967.

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favour the Congress only marginally²² ” In another article he declared that West Bengal was probably off the Congress danger list²³

An interesting report published in *the statesman* on February 11, 1967, brought to light the doubts in the minds of candidates on both sides. The paper remarked that Calcutta's astrologers were having a field-day on the eve of the general elections and "their houses chambers and portals were crowded with candidates and their supporters anxious about their individual fate and the fate of their parties "

Poll Results and Emerging Trends

Although a few incidents of violence had occurred in the pre-election days polling in West Bengal passed off quite peacefully. There were, no doubt disturbances at some places causing temporary suspension of poll. Re poll was ordered at two polling stations. On the whole, however the atmosphere was tranquil. It was a single-day poll and out of 23 000 polling stations about 19 (0) did not have a single policeman. Order was maintained by the people themselves²⁴

There was brisk and heavy polling in most of the booths. In some areas the percentage of poll was as high as 75 to 80. The percentage of poll in West Bengal assembly elections in 1967, consequently turns out to be higher than that in 1962. In 1962 the percentage was 55.55²⁵ in 1967 it rose to 62.53. In spite of this general rise in the percentage of votes polled the share of the Congress decreased considerably.

An analysis of the poll figures given in Table II shows that the percentage of votes cast in favour of the Congress in the assembly elections has declined from 47.29 in 1962 to 41.13 in 1967, that is to say the Congress has suffered a loss of 70.5 per cent of the valid votes polled. The percentage of Congress loss in the Lok Sabha elections is 6.95. If the votes obtained¹ by the two Communist parties

22 *The Economic Times* Bombay January 30 1967

23 *Ibid* February 14 1967

24 The Chief Election Commissioner's speech at a meeting of the Chief Electoral Officers at New Delhi on April 17, 1967, reported in *the Statesman* Calcutta, April 19 1967

25 *Report on Third General Elections in India* 1962 Election Commission Vol II, pp 82-83

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TABLE II

Percentage of Votes Secured and Proportion of Total Seats Won by Different Parties

	Lok Sabha			Assembly		
	1962	1967	1967	1962	1967	1967
	% of votes secured (a)	% of total seats won	% of votes secured (b)	% of total seats won (c)	% of votes secured	% of total seats won
Congress	46.78	61.11	39.69	35.00	62.30	41.13
CPI	29.38	25.00	9.14	12.50	19.84	6.53
CPI (M)	-	-	15.65	12.50	-	18.11
FB	6.32	2.77	4.88	5.00	5.15	4.46
PSP	4.54	-	1.70	2.50	4.99	1.88
SSP (d)	0.04	-	1.49	2.50	0.03	2.13
JS	1.05	-	1.39	-	0.45	1.33
Swatantra	1.02	-	0.77	-	0.57	0.81
Other parties and Independents	10.86	11.11	25.32	30.00	10.71	23.18
						23.21

(a) and (c) Source : Report on Third General Elections in India, 1962, Election Commission, Vol. II, pp. 12-13, 84-85.

(b) Source : 'West Bengal', Vol. XII, No. 49, p. 967.

(d) Figures for 1962 indicate percentage of votes and seats secured by the Socialist Party.

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in the assembly elections are added up, it becomes clear that votes in favour of the Communists has increased by 1.29 per cent, though the two parties fought bitterly with each other. The share of Communist votes in the Lok Sabha elections, however, has decreased by 4.73 per cent. If the votes obtained by the PSP and the Socialist party in 1962 are added up, and compared with the votes obtained by the PSP and the SSP in 1967, a decline of 1.31 per cent in the assembly elections and 1.39 per cent in the Lok Sabha elections may be noticed. The percentage of votes cast in favour of the Forward Bloc in the assembly elections has decreased by 0.15 and in the Lok Sabha elections by 1.44. The Jani Sangh has gained by 0.92 per cent in the assembly elections and 0.34 per cent in the Lok Sabha elections. The Swatantra party has gained by 0.22 per cent in the assembly elections. But the party has suffered a loss of 0.25% in the Lok Sabha elections. The Bangla Congress, it may be noted, has obtained 10.08 per cent of the valid votes polled in the assembly elections.

If seats were distributed proportionally to different political parties in proportion to the percentage of total valid votes obtained by each, the number of seats held by the Congress would have gone down while the share of the two CPIs would have gone up. The Congress would have obtained 115 seats, the CPI (M) 51 and the CPI 23. In the Lok Sabha elections, however, the Congress would have had 16 seats in place of the present 14, the CPI (M) would have 6 seats in place of 4 and the CPI 4 instead of 5.

The number of seats won by the Congress would have been much less if the opposition parties were not divided into two blocs, the UFI and the PUFI. If we add together the votes secured by candidates of these two blocs, we may safely say that the Congress would have been defeated in 39 more assembly constituencies and seven more Lok Sabha constituencies.

Some people feel that the Congress would not have lost 39 more assembly and 7 more Lok Sabha seats necessarily if the opposition parties were united, because it would have in that case given up its complacency. But this argument does not appear to be sound. A scrutiny of the 1967 poll figures shows that the

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performance by the Congress in constituencies where straight contests occurred is not at all good. As table III indicates, there were straight contests for 36 assembly and 9 Lok Sabha seats and the Congress has come out successful in 8 and 1 respectively, that is to say, in constituencies where the Congress was opposed by only one candidate it won 22.22 per cent of the assembly and 11.11 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats. Performance by the Congress in straight contests in 1962 elections was definitely better. It may be stated here that in 1962 there were such contests in 47 assembly constituencies and the Congress won in 26. The percentage of success was thus 55.31

TABLE III

Contests According to Number of Candidates and Number of Seats Won by the Congress in 1967

No. of seats contested by	Lok Sabha			Assembly		
	No of Constituencies	No of seats won by Congress	% of contested seats won by Congress	No of Constituencies	No of seats won by Congress	% of contested seats won by Congress
2 candidates	9	1	11.11	36	8	22.22
3 candidates	14	5	35.71	106	44	41.50
4 candidates	9	3	33.33	67	35	53.23
5 candidates	4	3	75.00	44	23	52.27
6 candidates	4	2	50.00	18	9	50.00
7 candidates	-	-	-	5	5	100.00
9 candidates	-	-	-	3	2	66.66
10 candidates	-	-	-	1	1	100.00
	40	14		280	127	

Figures given in Table III show that the performance of the Congress in the 1967 elections has been decidedly better in constituencies where it was involved in multi angular contests in comparison with constituencies where straight contests took place. The percentage varies between 41.50 and 100 in assembly elections, and between 33.33 and 75 in the Lok Sabha elections.

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A comparative estimate of the votes obtained on an average by candidates of the major political parties in assembly elections is found in Table IV. A scrutiny of the figures given in this Table shows that the performance by the Congress is better than that of any other party in as many as 10 out of 16 districts of West Bengal. Of these 10 districts, in 8, the difference between average votes secured by the Congress and any other party is quite considerable. The margin varies between 1375 in the district of Howrah and 7223 in the district of Malda. Performance by the Congress appears even better if we remember that the Congress contested all the 280 assembly seats whereas the CPI (M) contested 135, the Bangla Congress 81, the CPI 62 and the FB 42. If the number of seats contested by these parties were larger, their average might have been smaller. It must, however, be borne in mind that in this Table we have not taken notice of the votes obtained by the minor parties and independents.

Of the two Communist parties, the performance of the CPI (M) is better in all the districts except Jalpaiguri, Calcutta, Midnapore and Purulia.

When we compare the performance by the average Congress candidate in the assembly elections with that in the Lok Sabha elections, we find that he has done better in the assembly elections. As Table V indicates, in the Lok Sabha elections the Congress has fared better, in comparison with the major political parties, only in six districts. Of these six districts, in three—Jalpaiguri, Murshidabad and Purulia—the major parties did not set up any candidate. If we had taken into consideration votes obtained by the minor parties and independents, the picture would have been somewhat different.

Both the Communist parties had set up candidates in seven districts only. The CPI (M) has done better in four—the 24-Parganas, Howrah, Hooghly and Burdwan and the CPI in three—Calcutta, Midnapore and Bankura. In three other districts only the CPI (M) and in one other district the CPI alone had set up candidates. So, no comparison between the two parties can be made in respect of their performance in these four districts.

TABLE V

West Bengal Lok Sabha Elections, 1967 Performance by the Major Political Parties in Districts
Average number of votes polled by different parties and number of seats contested

Districts	Congress			CPI (M)			CPI			BC			FB		
	Contested	Average Vote	Seats Contested	Contested	Average Vote	Seats Contested	Contested	Average Vote	Seats Contested	Contested	Average Vote	Seats Contested	Contested	Average Vote	Seats Contested
Cooch Behar	1	124135.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	167971.00	-
Jalpaiguri	1	121613.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Darjeeling	1	6545.00	1	42136.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
M. Dinanagar	2	100561.00	1	100910.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	69753.00	-
Malda	1	123105.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Murshidabad	3	146413.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nadia	2	179439.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24 Parganas	7	124701.57	3	157306.33	-	-	-	-	-	1	215463.00	-	-	-	-
Calcutta	3	129136.00	3	126883.00	-	-	4	146793.00	-	3	125161.33	-	-	-	-
Howrah	2	160128.00	2	129965.50	-	-	1	67626.00	-	-	-	-	1	101033.00	-
Hooghly	3	158674.33	2	168027.00	-	-	1	62645.00	-	-	-	-	1	208724.00	-
Midnapore	5	134386.20	1	8494.00	-	-	1	103667.00	3	708143.00	-	-	-	-	-
Purulia	1	88754.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bankura	2	119422.00	1	35451.00	-	-	1	12059.00	-	1	106834.00	-	-	-	-
Burdwan	4	176133.25	2	151611.00	-	-	1	42138.00	-	-	-	-	1	28950.00	-
Birbhum	2	107728.50	1	115129.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	51479.00	-
40	-	-	16	-	-	-	11	-	-	8	-	-	6	-	-

Average votes secured by different parties do not, however, give a proper indication as to the number of seats won by these parties. A comparison between the number of assembly seats secured by different parties and independents in the West Bengal districts in 1962 and in 1967 has been made in

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Table VI. The number of seats allotted to different districts has altered since 1952. The composition and the size of several constituencies have also undergone a change. So, a comparison between the performance in

TABLE VI

Districtwise Distribution of assembly Seats Won by Different Parties in 1962 and 1967

Districts	Total Seats 1962 1967	Congress		CPI (M)		CPI		BC		FB		SSP		PSP		Other Parties and Independents	
		'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67	'62	'67
Cooch Behar	7	8	1	5	—	1	1	—	—	5	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jalpaiguri	9	11	7	6	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	2	1
Darjeeling	5	5	2	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
W. Dinajpur	10	11	6	6	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	1	2
Malda	9	10	5	6	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3
Murshidabad	16	15	6	13	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	3
Nadia	11	14	6	4	—	2	2	1	5	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	1
24-Parganas	42	50	33	12	—	18	8	3	9	—	2	—	1	—	—	1	5
Calcutta	26	23	14	11	—	5	8	4	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	3	3
Howrah	15	16	9	9	—	3	2	—	1	1	3	—	—	—	—	1	—
Hooghly	15	18	10	7	—	4	4	—	1	1	3	—	1	—	—	2	—
Midnapore	32	35	27	12	—	1	3	8	10	—	—	—	1	2	2	—	1
Purulia	11	11	6	4	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	4	5
Bankura	13	13	9	9	—	—	4	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Burdwan	21	25	10	14	—	7	10	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	1
Birbhum	10	12	4	6	—	—	2	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	2	4
252	280	157	127	43	50	16	34	13	7	5	7	27	33				

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terms of seats won by different parties in 1962 and that in 1967 is bound to be imperfect. We may still safely say that the Congress has been able to improve its position in five districts—Cooch Behar, Darjeeling, Murshidabad, Burdwan and Birbhum. Its position in four districts—West Dinajpur, Malda, Bankura and Howrah—has remained more or less static. But its position in the remaining seven districts—Jalpaiguri, Nadia, Purulia, Hooghly, Midnapore, the 24-Parganas and Calcutta has deteriorated. These seven districts account for 162 of the 280 assembly seats and the Congress has been able to win only 56 of these 162 seats. The position of the Congress in terms of seats captured has registered a sharp decline in Hooghly, the 24-Parganas and Midnapore. Of the 103 seats allotted to these three districts, the Congress has captured only 31.

The united Communist party in 1962 elections won 50 seats. In 1967 the two Communist parties together have been able to capture 59 seats (CPI-(M) 43 and CPI 16). The CPI (M) has been able to send representatives to the assembly from 10 out of 16 districts. The party has won as many as 18 seats from the 24-Parganas and 7 from Burdwan. The CPI has won 16 seats from four districts—8 from the district of Midnapore alone.

The Bangla Congress has won 34 seats and of these 34, 28 from four districts—Midnapore, the 24 Parganas, Nadia and Bankura. The party has been able to capture the remaining six seats from six other districts.

In the Lok Sabha elections the Congress has won only 14 out of 40 seats allotted to West Bengal. That means the party has made a better show in the assembly elections. It is interesting to note, however, that the Congress has won all the seats allotted to the districts of Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur, Malda, Birbhum and Howrah. But out of 21 seats allotted to Nadia, Purulia, Hooghly, Midnapore, the 24-Parganas and Calcutta, the Congress has won only 3. Performance by the Congress in these districts has been poor in the assembly elections as well.

The CPI has decidedly done better in the Lok Sabha elections than in the assembly elections. The party has been able to win 5

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seats—3 in the 24-Parganas and 1 each in Bankura and Calcutta. The CPI (M) and the Bangla Congress each has 5 seats to its credit. The CPI (M) has won 2 seats in the 24-Parganas and 1 each in Burdwan, Hooghly and Calcutta. The Bangla Congress has captured 3 seats in Midnapore, 1 in Nadia and 1 in the 24-Parganas

It appears that the swing away from the Congress is not necessarily a swing in favour of any particular political party or any particular ideology. In 1962, the Congress had won 157 seats in the 252-member assembly. If the Congress were to retain its proportionate share in the enlarged 280-member assembly, it ought to have obtained at least 174 seats. Actually it has won only 127. These 47 seats have not been won by any single party. On the contrary, these seats have gone to various parties upholding different ideologies.

Congress leaders have given different explanations for this reduction in the strength of the party. According to P. C. Sen, the two main reasons for the defeat of the Congress were—a swing of the Muslim voters and the formation of the Bangla Congress.²⁶ The WBPPC analysis also has laid emphasis on the swing of the Muslim voters against the Congress.²⁷ But this analysis regarding the behaviour of the Muslim voters does not ring wholly true. This becomes clear from a scrutiny of the poll figures for the district of Murshidabad. As noted in table VI, the Congress has substantially improved its position in this district, which has a predominantly Muslim population. Atulya Ghosh has correctly pointed out that Murshidabad registered the highest district-wise proportion of votes for the Congress.²⁸

Kamaraj appears to have been nearer the truth when he stated that the inadequate implementation of accepted socialist measures was one of the main reasons for the reverses suffered by the Congress.²⁹ He admitted that the deterioration of the economic situation was also partly responsible. He said, "Prices have gone up

26. *The Statesman*, Calcutta, March 11, 1967.

27. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 11, 1967.

28. *The Statesman*, Calcutta, March 26, 1967.

29. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1967.

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steeply, especially after devaluation. The middle classes and the poorer sections have been very much affected ³⁰” The third reason given by Kamaraj was internal fight among the party-leaders.

While this third factor might have been quite important in other places, here, in West Bengal, its influence has been indirect in the main. By the time of the elections, the internal fight in the party had been considerably reduced, because the main dissenting group had already broken away to form the Bangla Congress. The emergence of this new party was undoubtedly due to inner-party dissensions and this party has affected the course of elections, particularly in Midnapore. In this district the CPI has a strong base³¹ and when its strength was added to that of the BC the Congress lost heavily.

It appears that the main reason for the defeat of the Congress lies in the economic conditions prevailing in the State and the consequent indignation of the people. This indignation found turbulent expression in the mass-movement in 1966. The districts most affected by this movement were Calcutta, the 24-Parganas, Nadia and Hooghly and in all these districts the Congress strength has decreased. This does not mean, of course, that the movement has been the sole factor responsible for the Congress defeat. But the movement was indeed an important factor and this movement was merely a result of the malaise that affected the State.

The primary task of a government is to cure the State of such malaise and election results in the future also will largely depend on the success or failure of the government in carrying out this task.

30. *Ibid.*

31. WBPC Report, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, March 11, 1967.

J. C. ANAND

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN PUNJAB*

THE present State of Punjab was constituted by the Punjab Reorganization Act 1966 which came into effect on November 1, 1966.¹ It has only 40.9% (50,230 sq kilometers) of the territory and 54.83% (1,11,35,069 persons) of the population of the erstwhile composite State of Punjab. In many respects the Punjab of today is quite different from the Punjab of 1962 when third general elections were held. The following table will bring out some significant differences:

TABLE I

Name of the State	Percentage of <i>Hindus</i> in the total population	Percentage of <i>Sikhs</i> in the total population	Literacy percentage	Percentage of u-ban popula- tion	Per capita income at current prices
Punjab before the re- organization	63.67%	33.3 %	24.2 %	20.1%	Rs. 483 (for 1963 64)
Punjab as constituted at present after the re- organization	44.5% (about)	54.5% (about)	26.7%	23.1%	Rs. 637 (for 1964 65) calculated of areas forming re- constituted Punjab

Source : Based on statistical abstracts of Punjab for 1965-1966.

* The present writer is indebted to the Election Office Punjab for providing authentic data on elections.

1. Under the *Punjab Reorganization Act 1966*, the successor States of Punjab, Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh have been carved out, and sizable chunks of territory (about 23%.) and population (about 7%.) have been transferred to Himachal Pradesh. The Hindi-speaking State of Haryana has secured 35.80 % of the territory (43,869 sq kilometers) and 37.37% (75,00,543 persons) of the population of the pre-reorganization Punjab.

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The most significant result of the reorganization of the Punjab is that the Sikhs who constituted a minority in the composite Punjab now form a majority of about 54.5% of the population. In fact, the reorganization was brought about largely to satisfy the aspirations of a dominant and vocal section of the Sikhs for a State where the Sikhs could form a majority without suffering from the psychological fear of domination by a numerically larger Hindu majority. The Hindus constitute about 41.5% of the population but a large section (which forms 17.2% of the total population of the Punjab and about 39% of the total Hindu population) of the Hindus belongs to the scheduled castes. The Hindus form a majority of population in about all the cities and major towns. This has the effect of further reducing the ratio of the Hindu population in the rural areas.

The impact of the demographic changes made by the reorganization of Punjab on the position and electoral prospects of different political parties has been considerable. It has improved the prospects of those political parties which traditionally draw their support from the Sikhs. In this category may be placed the two Akali Dals (one led by Sant Fateh Singh and the other by late Master Tara Singh) and the two Communist parties. The Akali Dals are professedly communal political parties and have their membership open only to the Sikhs. The Communist party has traditionally been drawing its support mainly from the Sikh masses in the rural areas of Punjab. On the other hand, the Jana Sangh, which has its appeal confined to the urban Hindus, has been denied the prospect of ever coming into majority in the assembly. The Congress party has been deprived of the possibility of compensating and balancing its electoral losses in the Punjab by gains in the Hindi-speaking areas of the composite Punjab, which now form the State of Haryana or have been incorporated in Himachal Pradesh. In the immediate context of the reorganization politics, the Congress party has been exposed to criticisms from both the Punjab Hindus and the Sikhs. The Hindus blamed it for conceding the Akali demand of the Punjabi Suba, and the Sikhs criticised it for not going far enough in meeting the demand for a full fledged or "Sumpuran Punjabi Suba."

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The fourth general elections in the Punjab were held in February 1967. The polling of votes was completed in one day (on the 19 February) and all the results were announced by the 24 February. The total electorate was 6311501 and this marked an increase of about 5% over the corresponding figure for the Punjabi region during the third general elections.

Voter Turn Out

A notable feature of the electoral behaviour in India is the steadily increasing participation of voters in election as evidenced by a higher % of votes polled in each successive general election. Punjab is no exception to this trend. In the composite Punjab the % of votes polled for assembly elections rose from 56% in 1951-52 to 66.46% in 1962. The figures for Lok Sabha elections are 59% in 1951-52 to 65.41% in 1962. During the fourth general elections, the % of votes polled in the reorganized Punjab is 71.14% both for the assembly and the Lok Sabha elections. In constituencies which form a border with Pakistan, the percentage of votes during this general election is distinctly lower than the average for the districts in which these constituencies are placed as well as for the State as a whole. This may also explain why the percentage of votes polled in the district of Amritsar has marked a slight decline from 70.14% in 1962 to 69.86% in 1967. During Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, there was some displacement of population from these border constituencies and a small section of the electorate probably moved into the interior. Again a higher percentage of the scheduled castes population in Punjab² appears to have contributed to a lower percentage of the votes polled. In almost all the scheduled castes constituencies, the percentage of vote polled is lower than the general average of the State as a whole. It is evident from Table No II. Analysis of the poll results in other constituencies seem to confirm the hypothesis that there is significant relationship between the turn-out of the voters on the one hand and the level of economic and social developments on the other. Analysis of poll

2. In the Punjab, the scheduled castes constitute 22.3 percent of the total population as against 18 percent in Haryana.

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results in the 23 scheduled castes constituencies provides a concrete evidence to support this hypothesis. Similarly the analysis of urban constituencies show that a higher turn-out of votes is distinctly linked with a higher degree of economic growth, literacy and urbanization. Generally speaking, the percentage of voting is higher in urban constituencies than in the mixed or predominantly rural constituencies

When one shifts one's sight from the analysis of individual constituencies to that of the districts taken as a whole, the results are more difficult to interpret. But even then, it is possible to maintain that the % of voting is higher in districts with higher percentage of urban population and literacy ratio, the percentage of votes varies from 69.54% in the district of Hoshiarpur and 69.03% in the district of Bhatinda to 72.38% in the district of Ludhiana and 73.30% in the district of Jullundur³

Invalid Votes

Another aspect of election results is the higher % of invalid votes cast during the fourth general elections in Punjab. The figures for the assembly constituencies are 5.23% and for the Lok Sabha constituencies 4.77% of the total votes polled against the corresponding figures of 4.2% and 3.46% respectively during the fourth general elections in 1962. In fact, this is the highest % of votes declared invalid so far in the Punjab since 1952. What is even more intriguing is that the % of invalid votes is higher in Punjab than in Haryana, where the figures are 4.91% for assembly and 4.18% for Lok Sabha constituencies. Perhaps, a part of explanation lies

- 3 It is significant that the districts of Hoshiarpur and Bhatinda are the least developed districts of Punjab and those of Jullundur and Ludhiana are among the most industrialised and urbanised districts. The district of Amritsar has a voting percentage of 69.86% but a relatively lower poll percentage in this industrially developed district is due to the impact of the Indo-Pakistan war on the border constituencies. It is interesting to note that according to a recent study of Punjab State Electricity Board of the regional pattern of power consumption in Punjab, the per capita consumption of electricity is as low as 14 units in Hoshiarpur district and 16 units in Bhatinda district as against 75 units in Amritsar district and 64 units in Jullundur district.

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TABLE II

Constituencies

(Punjab Assembly General Elections 1957)*

S.No.	Description of the constituency	Percentage of votes polled	Percentage of invalid votes	Won by political party
1.	Muktsar	69.47	5.17	Akali Dal (Sant)
2.	Lambi	59.53	6.42	Congress
3.	Nihal Singh Wala	60.42	7.32	C.P.I. (Right)
4.	Atari	58.00	6.33	Congress
5.	Jandiala	60.26	6.47	Congress
6.	Verka	67.61	7.27	Akali Dal (Sant)
7.	Dina Nagar	69.56	5.99	Congress
8.	Narot Mehra	69.47	7.32	Congress
9.	Sham Churas	62.55	5.63	Congress
10.	Mahilpur	62.29	5.92	Congress
11.	Phagwara	71.12	6.53	Congress
12.	Kartarpur	74.24	7.74	Republican
13.	Jamsher	67.58	7.64	Congress
14.	Banga	70.33	7.26	Akali Dal (Sant)
15.	Dakha	64.88	3.41	Congress
16.	Khanna	70.79	5.21	Republican
17.	Morinda	71.54	4.94	Congress
18.	Samana	71.39	8.69	Independent
19.	Amlon	63.46	5.47	Congress
20.	Sherpur	69.14	6.75	Akali Dal (Sant)
21.	Bhadaur	57.02	9.54	C.P.I.
22.	Nathana	54.49	4.71	Akali Dal (Sant)
23.	Faridkot	67.10	5.29	Akali Dal (Sant)

* There are only 23 assembly constituencies reserved for scheduled castes in Punjab. In these constituencies, the voting % is lower and the ratio of invalid votes is higher than the general average for voting % and invalid votes for Punjab, which are 71.14% and 5.23% respectively. There are only some cases in these S.C. constituencies which do not conform to the general pattern, and have been *italicised* in this table. Even, in most of these exceptions, discrepancies seem to disappear when the data is considered in the context of the averages of the districts in which these constituencies are situated.

The scheduled castes form 22.3% of the total population of Punjab and include both the Hindus and Sikhs—about 75% of the scheduled castes are Hindus and the remainder 25% are Sikhs.

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in the higher % of scheduled castes population in Punjab. But the slight difference of 4% in the ratio of scheduled castes population in the two States cannot account for a distinctly higher % of invalid votes in Punjab

A charge has been made by the opposition parties both in public as also in the election review reports (circulated only among members of higher party organs) that the returning officers rejected a large number of otherwise valid votes in marginal constituencies to favour the candidates of the ruling political party.⁴ This is not borne out by the analysis of election results. There were only 7 assembly constituencies where the winning candidates won by margin of less than 1000 votes; and in 6 of these constituencies the % of invalid votes was less than the average percentage for the State as a whole. Even in the remaining constituency (Amloh scheduled caste constituency) the % of rejected votes was only marginally higher than the average for the State, and it was well within the average for the scheduled castes constituencies taken as a separate group. The higher % of invalid votes cannot also be attributed to the system of voting followed during the fourth general elections for the same system has been practised during the third general elections in 1952 as well as in the S. G. P. C. election in 1965 with distinct success. But there is one important difference. While till middle of 1961 election machinery took it upon itself to educate the voters on the method of casting votes, this task was left to the political parties in the fourth general elections. And political parties have neglected it, and this may account for larger % of invalid votes not only in Punjab and Haryana but also in many other States.

There appears to be a significant relationship between the percentage of invalid votes and the level of economic and social developments in constituencies as well as in regions. In the urban

4. *The Indian Express* (Punjab Ed.) March 8, 1967. It reported that Gurnam Singh, the leader of the newly formed People's United Front, believed that the mischief was done during counting. "Some unscrupulous and interested officials destroyed some votes during counting by affixing thumb impressions on the ballot papers. The foul practice, he said, became easier in case of women officials, for them the lipstick came handy."

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constituencies, the ratio of invalid votes is low while in the rural and scheduled castes constituencies the ratio is high. But there are some unexplained exceptions particularly when the analysis is made on the level of districts taken as a whole than on that of single constituencies. The lowest % of invalid vote is 3.35 for the district of Ludhiana which indeed has the highest % of urban population and is the most highly industrialised district as table III would show and yet the districts of Jullundur and Kapurthala which also have a high ratio of literacy and urban population register 6.51% and 5.90% of the invalid votes respectively. Even the districts of Hoshiarpur (5.23%) and Bhatinda (5.32%) have lower figures for invalid votes.

Larger Number of Candidates

Another significant feature of the forth general elections is an increase in the number of candidates contesting the elections; there were 602 candidates for 104 assembly seats as against 403 candidates for 82 seats for the Punjabi speaking region of the composite Punjab during the third general elections. Whereas the number of seats has increased by 14.4%, the number of candidates has increa-

TABLE III

Demographic Composition of Districts in Punjab

Name of District	Hindu'./.	Sikhs'./.	Literacy'./	Rural'./.
Ferozepur	40.6	57.9	22.5	70.1
Amritsar	33.0	64.5	29.7	30.2
Gurdaspur	50.1	42.9	24.9	19.5
*Hoshiarpur (unadjusted)	67.7	31.0	29.5	10.8
Jullundur	53.9	44.9	33.6	29.5
Kapurthala	41.0	58.2	29.3	21.1
Ludhiana	35.7	63.0	36.3	30.8
Rupar			27.7	17.6
Sangrur	34.5	60.9	18.6	19.2
Patiala	45.8	52.8	24.8	24.7
Bhatinda	27.1	72.3	18.9	21.2

* These figures for Hoshiarpur district are for composite Punjab. Due to some changes by the Punjab Reorganization Act, the percentage of Hindus is estimated to have been reduced by about 4%. Thus Hindus now form 63% of the population and the Sikhs about 35%.

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sed by 30.2%. This may be due to two reasons. First, the split in the Akali Dal led to the formation of two separate Akali Dals. The two Akali Dals not only set up candidates against other parties but also against each other, thus raising the number of candidates contesting the elections. The number of candidates set up by the two Akali Dals was 120 (58 by Sant Akali Dal and 62 by Master Akali Dal) as against 45 by the undivided Akali Dal in 1962. The split in the Communist party might also have led to similar results but their collaboration as member of the United Front of opposition parties along with the Sant Akali Dal prevented it. Secondly there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of independents whose number has grown from 151 (for the Punjabi speaking region) in 1952 to 255, an increase of about 48%. Most of the independents contestants polled an insignificant % of the valid votes cast, and it is important to know that 230 out of 252 independents forfeited their security deposits. Increase in the number of contestants has led to two results: the wastage of a sizeable % of votes cast in favour of candidates who had not the slightest chance of winning a seat and a greater competitiveness in election contests. The second aspect is clearly brought out by the following Table :

TABLE IV

Number of candidates in each constituency	Uncon- tested	2	3	4	5	6	More than 6
III general election 1962 (total seats - 87)	-	6	18	19	27	12	7
IV general election 1967 (total seats - 104)	-	1	8	20	23	19	33

Political Issue, Party Strategies and Political Campaigning

There have been two dominant political issues during the fourth general elections in Punjab : one relating to the Punjabi Suba problem and the other concerning the public grievance caused by rising prices, shortage of food stuffs and administrative lapses of the ruling party. The opposition parties have exploited both these issues in different ways in terms of their interests and ideological positions.

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In the early phase of the election campaigning, the first issue dominated the scene but, for reasons to be presently discussed, its role declined gradually and the second issue increasingly came into prominence during the closing months of the fourth general elections and dominated the political campaigning of all the political parties

The Punjabi speaking State was formed on November 1, 1966 but its formation did not settle the political controversy that has been befogging the Punjab politics since 1947. Each political party used the issue to gain support for itself and it would be interesting to examine the various strategies employed by different political parties in this context

The Akali Dals⁵—one led by Sant Fateh Singh and the other by late Master Tara Singh—adopted a two-fold approach to wean away the Sikh masses from the Congress party. The Akali Dals claimed credit for the formation of the Punjabi speaking State which secured a numerical majority for the Sikhs for the first time in Punjab. But they kept the controversy over the Punjabi Suba alive. They resented the exclusion of Chandigarh and some other Punjabi speaking areas from the present State of Punjab and described the continuing common links between Punjab and Haryana, such as a common Governor a common High Court and an administrative Board for Bhakra Dam complex) as instances of discrimination against the Punjabis. They presented the image of Congress party as an organization which has always been discriminating against the Sikhs and denying to them their just claims.

The Master Akali Dal, which inherited the official symbol of the old Akali Dal, adopted a strategy which, in spite of its provocativeness, proved less effective in winning support of the Sikh masses than that adopted by Sant Akali Dal. Master Tara Singh reiterated

5. The Akali Dal is a professedly communal political organization dedicated to serving the interests of the Sikhs. Its membership is open only to the Sikhs. In 1963, the Akali Dal was split into two factions—one led by Master Tara Singh and the other led by Sant Fateh Singh.

the demand for 'Sikh homeland' with a right of full self determination for the Sikhs. This was embodied in the major policy resolution of the 17th All India Akali Dal Conference held at Ludhiana in the second week of December, 1966. It was repeated in the election manifesto of the party, issued on January 1, 1967. It declared that the Sikhs homeland within the Indian union with a status analogous to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as it was originally under the Constitution Act 1950. While talking to newsmen at Mustafabad, a village near Jalandhar, Tara Singh declared that he would seek foreign help in getting his demand for a Sikh homeland conceded.⁶ This strategy did not win him much support if the election results are any indication of the response of the electors.

Sant Fateh Singh pursued a more subtle and a rewarding strategy. He expressed his disapproval of the Boundary Commission award which had recommended the inclusion of Chandigarh in Haryana and did not feel mollified with the Government of India's decision that Chandigarh should remain a Union Territory. As a mark of his dissatisfaction, the Sant called upon all the Akali legislators and district Akali Jathas to boycott the official functions held on November 1, 1966 to celebrate the creation of new States. In its election manifesto issued on November 17, 1966, the Sant Akali Dal declared that it would endeavour to make Punjabi Suba like all other linguistic States (and therefore without common links) and also to have included into it all the Punjabi-speaking areas which had been excluded by the Boundary Demarcation Committee. The Sant chose the agitational approach to secure his objectives. There is no doubt that the timing and the mode of agitation chosen by the Sant had the object of securing electoral support of the Sikh masses for the forthcoming general elections as also of coercing the Government of India into conceding the Akali demands. When the Jatha⁷ of 75 Akalis began its march on foot to Chandigarh, it did not include any representative of other opposition political parties, nor did it evoke much popular support. Thereupon the Sant was forced

6. *The Prabhat*, Jullundur, December 11, 1966 and later issues.

7. *The Statesman*, Delhi, January 18, 1967 and the *Tribune*, January 16, 1967.

8. *The Indian Express*, November 17, 1966—Sant Fateh Singh was appointed dictator of the march on November 16, 1966.

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to adopt a more drastic measure. In the form of a plan to immolate himself by at first fasting and then burning alive The Sant announced on December 5, 1966 that he would immolate on December 27, 1966 if his three demands viz., the abolition of the common links, the return of Chandigarh and the Bhakra Dam Project held by central government and the inclusion of the Punjabi speaking areas in Punjab, were not conceded forthwith. His programme of action laid down that he would go on a fast unto death at the Akal Takhat on December 17, and, if he did not die of fasting, he would immolate by burning himself on December 27, 1966 at the same place. The two dates were chosen to invest his action with immensely powerful religious sentiments. The date for beginning of the fast coincided with the date on which Guru Tegh Bahadur had been beheaded in Delhi by the orders of emperor Jahan-gir and the day fixed for immolation happened to be the day on which the two sons of Guru Gobind Singh were walled up alive by the orders of the Muslim Governor of Sirhind. Six of the Sant's followers put themselves on oath to immolate themselves a day earlier than Sant's immolation day.

Whatever the political ethics of fasting and immolation plan and its future liabilities, the Sant's strategy raised the political stock of his Dal vis - a - vis the Sikh masses. It further widened the gulf between the Akali Dal (Sant) and the Congress party and dissipated whatever slight prospects still existed of some electoral understanding between the two. It also set the stage for the emergence of the United Front of opposition parties with Sant's Akali Dal at the centre and other political parties--the two Communist parties, the Republican party and the SSP--⁹ playing the satellites, which in Sant's invitation had assured support to his agitational plans on general terms. Altogether, it imparted a deep communal and religious tone to Punjab politics which played a vital role in general elections. But soon after the Sant gave up his fast, the role of the Punjabi Suba

9. The SSP later disassociated itself from the five-party alliance. The Secretary of the Punjab SSP Murari Lal Nirmal issued a statement on January 23, 1967 that the party had not reached agreement on any of the seats with the other four parties. See the *Tribune*, January 24, 1967.

issue began to decline, and so the Akali Dal (Sant) turned to concentrate on the economic issues of rising prices and shortages in foodstuffs which were attributed to the Congress misrule. The Sant knew too well that it would not pay him dividends to flog the Punjabi Suba issue which had atleast been temporarily set at rest by the intervention of Hukam Singh, all the more because Sant himself was in the dock for breaking his immolation pledge. Further, the Sant Akali Dal could not harp on the communal note in the symphony of other secular parties as a senior partner of the United Front. Thus the communal and religious aspect of the Punjabi Suba controversy receded into the background in the election campaigns of the Akali party (Sant), but its impact on the Sikh and the Hindu electorate remained deep.

The two Communist – parties with all their differences on ideologies and personalities – had at least a great deal in common, particularly with reference to Punjab politics. Both welcomed the formation of Punjabi Suba and supported the Akali Dal demand for the abolition of the common links and inclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjabi-speaking areas in Punjab. Both the parties disagreed with the communal politics of Master Tara Singh and the agitational methods of Sant Fateh Singh relating to fasting and self-immolation. Almost the entire focus of their election strategy was first to concentrate on the economic grievances of the people and to expose the mistakes of the ruling party and, secondly, to work for a united front of like-minded political parties to defeat the Congress. The Punjab Communist party (Right) invited the SSP, Akali Dal, the Communist party (Marxist), the Republican party (already members of the 'Sangram Samiti' formed in October 1965, to agitate against the rising prices in the State) to hold discussions about a common minimum programme for the State and to contest elections on a joint platform against the Congress party. In spite of setbacks and difficulties, they succeeded in forging a united front with electoral adjustment of seats.

The Jana Sangh could not have hoped for a better political climate for its election campaigning than what it found in the post-reorganization Punjab. With its political support confined only to

the urban Hindus, it could arouse public sentiment among its supporters both against the Congress party and the Akalis. Sant Fateh Singh's immolation plans so completely alienated the urban Hindus from the Congress party that no effort was needed on the part of the Jana Sangh to use any persuasion with them. Its working committee passed a resolution on November 24, 1966 describing Sant Fateh Singh's plan to send a Jatha to Chandigarh as a stunt and decided to make a 'black flag' demonstration against it--a move which it wisely gave up on a mature counsel. It also opposed the Sant's immolation plan and described its demands as 'utterly unjustified' and urged on the Government of India to resist the scrapping of the common links even if either of the two governments of Punjab and Haryana supported the move.¹⁰ Agreement over arbitration on the Sant's demands was described as a (conspiracy between the Congress government and the Akalis.¹¹ The Jana Sangh also did not neglect to exploit the economic grievances of the people and as early as August, 1966, it organised rallies against high prices. During the closing weeks of the election campaign *The Pradeep* regularly carried tabulated statements of price index to show how the prices had been steadily rising during the last 20 years. The party did not--except in some constituencies--make use of the 'Cow Protection agitation'.

The Republican party also largely concentrated on the economic issues as its political appeal was made only to the scheduled castes. As a member of the united Front of opposition parties, it could not criticize the reorganization of Punjab; but equally it could not support it, for the bulk of the scheduled caste professed the Hindu religion.

The Congress party faced the election in such a divided and disorganized condition that it could not plan its strategy with any thought or design. The newly-constituted unit of the Punjab State

10. See *The Tribune*, December 22, 1966, for statements of Dr. Baldev Prakash and Krishan Lal, the President and Secretary of the Punjab Jana Sangh respectively.

11. The Jana Sangh daily, *the Pradeep* (Urdu), Jullundur, published a series of strongly worded editorial articles under the heading "Conspiracy of the Government and the Akali Dal."

Congress passed a resolution in the first meeting of its executive committee welcoming the formation of the Punjabi speaking State and demanding the inclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjabi speaking areas, left out by the Boundary Demarcation Commission.¹² This did not appease the Sikhs but further alienated that section of the Hindus which was opposed to the formation of the Punjabi speaking State. The four page election manifesto of the State Congress party released in the first week of February 1967, contained only bold promises. During the election campaign, the Congress studiously avoided reference to the reorganization of Punjab and the controversial language problem. The election strategy of the Congress party consisted first of selecting of candidates with local influence and capacity to contribute to the party funds in addition to meeting their own election expensess regardless of their standing in the Congress party or even of political opinions in some cases, and, secondly, of making full use of its official position as the ruling party, bestowing favours in almost bountiful munificence both on individuals and interest-groups. During the month preceding the poll, the Congress government conceded the demands of 162000 government employees to link dearness allowance with the cost of living index, raised the pay scales of transport workers, of teachers in government schools and colleges and of higher provincial civil servants. It accepted the major demands of traders, decided to establish a 'Revolving Fund' to extend interest-free loans to Harijans and announced the provision of Rs. 21 crores for disbursement to peasants as loans for minor irrigation works. Appointments were made to State public service commission and other important offices with a view to appeasing powerful political interests. 'The most repulsive feature of the current electioneering', reported a special correspondent of the *Statesman*, is the use of official position and money. During a brief interview I had with a Punjab minister at his campaign headquarters, I saw him signing one paper after another, giving a cement permit to one, priority for

12. *The Tribune*, August 26, 1966. The resolution was passed on August 25, and is reproduced in full.

13. *The Statesman*, February 3, 1967—See particularly 'special representative's report entitled 'Rich harvest of concessions in Punjab and Haryana'.

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a scooter to another and recommendation for a government contract to a third. All these brought up to him needy-looking individuals who were introduced to me earlier as the minister's principal campaigners.'¹⁴

Other political parties, such as the SSP, the PSP, the Swatantra party, did not count for much in the election politics of Punjab

Some interest-groups also interested themselves in elections. The Punjab Beopar Mandal¹⁵ and the ex-servicemen association (the northern zone unit¹⁶) even decided to contest elections and set up candidates for the assembly and Lok Sabha seats, but the bleakness of their election prospects and internal divisions on the issue prevented them from doing so. But the General Secretary of the Punjab Subordinates Services Federation, Ranbir Singh Dhillon, contested the Patiala assembly constituency as the representative of the federation. The Arya Samaj, with its great hold on the Punjab Hindus, did not contest elections in its official capacity and prominent Arya Samajists could be found both in the Congress party and the Jana Sangh, but in general the Arya Samaj support went to the Jana Sangh.¹⁷ A number of professional organizations, such as the teacher unions, the civil service, and trade organizations found the pre-election period a suitable occasion to have their long-standing demands conceded.

14 *The Statesman*, February 8, 1967, Dalip Mukherjee's report in the series 'Report on the Campaign-XI'.

15 *The Indian Express*, November 23, 1967.

16. *The Tribune*, November 23, 1967.

17 The well known Arya Samaj daily, *The Pratap* (published from Jullundur) editorially discussed the question of the possible role of the Arya Samaj voters in its issue of February 9, 1967 and argued that every Arya Samaj vote should be cast against the Congress party. But another influential Arya Samaj daily, *The Milap* (also published from Jullundur) supported the Congress party and its editor-proprietor Yash Pal contested the Jullundur South assembly constituency as the Congress candidate. Another prominent Arya Samaj leader, Jagat Narain lent the powerful support of his daily the *Hind Samachar*, to the opposition parties, and urged upon them to join themselves together to defeat the Congress party.

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In some of the constituencies, where the elections were contested by affluent landlords on opposing party tickets, the voters were provided with grain and other scarce food-stuffs at concessional rates by the candidates at their own expenses.

The problem of party finances presents much difficulty as each political party seeks to draw a veil of secrecy upon the sources which provide it with funds to contest elections. Broadly speaking it may be fair to say that in the fourth general elections in the Punjab, the main financial burden of contesting elections was borne by the individual contestants and only a small part of the election funds came from the party organizations. It is, therefore, not surprising that quite a large number of elected members particularly those on the tickets of the Congress party and the Akali Dal (Sant) belong to the richer sections of society. One may also underline in this context that the Congress party suffered from acute financial stringency¹⁸

Political Parties and the Poll Results

The Congress party, nine other political parties¹⁹ and 280 independents contested the 104 assembly and 13 Lok Sabha seats from Punjab. The total number of candidates for the former was 602 and for the latter 75, thus giving an average of about 6 candidates per seat in each case.

The main objective of the opposition political parties was to defeat the Congress party which has been the dominant political party since independence. But the opposition parties could not combine together for ideological and political reasons. The Punjab Jana Sangh, for instance, declared that 'it could not join hands with

18. The problem of party finances in the Punjab during the fourth general elections is discussed at some length in *The Indian Express* (Punjab Ed.) in its issue of February 8, 1967.

19. These nine political parties are . Two Akali Dals, two Communist parties, the Jana Sangh, the SSP, the PSP and the Swatantra party.

these forces which were responsible for the division of Punjab.²⁰ Similarly the State Communist party (Right) listed the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra party and the Akali Dal (Master) as three 'reactionary parties in Punjab' with which it would have no electoral alliance or adjustment of seats.²¹ No understanding could be reached between the two Akali Dals largely because of political rivalry between Sant Fateh Singh and Master Tara Singh. The negotiations for political adjustments between these two political parties finally broke down in the first week of February 1967; and the two parties faced each other in 39 assembly and 6 Lok Sabha constituencies.

The only electoral alliance over adjustment of seats that fructified was between the Akali Dal (Sant), the two Communist parties and the Republican party. Originally, the SSP was also a member of the United Front of like-minded political parties but it disassociated itself when it did not find satisfaction over the distribution of seats among member political parties. According to the arrangement reached at a meeting at Ludhiana on January 22, 1967, the Sant Akali Dal was given 56 assembly and 5 parliamentary seats, the Right Communist party was allotted 15 assembly and 2 parliamentary seats, while the Communist party (Marxist) received 10 assembly and 2 parliamentary seats, and the Republican party was assigned 4 assembly and 1 parliamentary seat.²² The SSP was also allotted 1 assembly seat, but the SSP disassociated itself from the Front.²³ Five independent candidates were also adopted out of whom only one succeeded in winning an assembly seat. In spite of the electoral adjustment between the four political parties,

20. *The Tribune*, August 2, 1966 for statement of Balramjidas Tandon convener, State Adhoc Committee of the Jana Sangh. Also the *Tribune*, September 5, 1966 for the press conference of Balraj Madhok, the President of All India Jana Sangh, on September 4 at Amritsar where he declared that the Jana Sangh could not enter into any electoral adjustment with the Communist parties or the Muslim League as these were considered by the party as 'anti-national organizations'.

21. *The Indian Express* (late Punjab ed.) October 3, 1966 for the statement of Avtar Singh Malhotra, Secretary of the State Unit of the CPI (Right).

22. *The Tribune*, January 23, 1967 for a detailed report of the proceedings of the Ludhiana meeting.

23. *The Tribune*, January 24, 1967.

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some contested seats were left open where the members of the Front opposed each other, these were the assembly constituencies of Kum Kalan and Baghanpurana, where the C.P.I. (Right) and the Akali Dal (Sant) opposed each other, and the assembly constituencies of Atari and Nangal where the two Communist parties could not reach agreement and both set up their candidates.²⁴ The Communist party (Right) did not cooperate with the Akali Dal (Sant) in Ludhiana district.

The table V below gives the number of seats contested by various political parties:

TABLE V
Seats Contested by Political Parties

Name of the Political Party	Number of candidates for assembly seats (Total seats -104)	Number of candidates for Lok Sabha seats (Total seats--13)
Congress	102 ²⁵	13
Akali Dal (Sant)	58	8
Akali Dal (Master)	62	7
CPI	19	3
CPI (M)	13	2
Jana Sangh	49	8
Republicans	17	2
PSP	9	-
SSP	8	1
Swatantra	10	6
Independents	255	25
Total	602	75

24 *The Tribune*, February 7, 1967 for Sohan Singh Joshi's letter, clarifying on behalf of the Communist party (R) the position in regard to the disputed seats

25 The Congress party actually contested 103 assembly seats. When the official Congress nominee for the Ajnala seat (who was a minister in the then Congress government) declined to contest election for 'private' reasons, an old Congressman and a former minister who had filed his nomination papers as an independent candidate was adopted. But he could not get the Congress symbol in the official election papers and the ballot paper. The only seat which the Congress party did not contest was Dakala assembly constituency which was left open for the Raja of Patiala to contest as an independent candidate.

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The nominees of the Jana Sangh were predominantly Hindu and those of the Akali parties predominantly Sikh, though the former nominated a few non-Hindus to unimportant seats where it had little chance of success, and the Akali Dal (Sant) nominated a few non-Sikhs. Thus the communal image of these parties remained firm in the public mind. The Republican party set up scheduled caste candidates with one major exception in the case of Tanda assembly constituency, which has a large scheduled caste population. The two Communist parties set up candidates largely for those seats where they had done relatively well in the third general elections but the allotment of seats by the Front did not satisfy the two parties, particularly the Communist party (Right). Most of the nominees of the two Communist parties were Sikhs, largely because of the demographic and communal composition of the districts in which the Communist parties had pockets of influence. The Congress party set up candidates drawn from all the religious communities Sikhs, having a large majority.

The following table shows the election poll results in some details:

TABLE VI
Analysis of the Poll Results in Vidhan Sabha Constituencies

Name of the Political Party	Number of seats won	Percentage of seats won	Total valid votes polled	Percentage of total votes polled
Congress ²⁶	48	46.15	15,94,162	37.46
Akali Dal (Master)	2	1.92	1,79,825	4.21
Akali Dal (Sant)	24	23.08	8,70,659	20.45
CPI	5	4.80	2,19,394	5.15
CPI (M)	3	2.88	1,38,857	3.26
Jana Sangh	9	8.65	4,18,921	9.84
Republicans	3	2.88	76,089	1.78
PSP	-	-	21,635	0.50
SSP	1	0.96	30,591	0.71
Swatantra	-	-	21,509	0.50
Independents	9	8.65	6,83,309	16.06
Totals	104	100.00 (about)	42,55,011	100.00 (about)

26. These figures are for 102 seats only. Actually, the Congress party contested 103 seats, though the Congress nominee for Ajnala seat could not obtain the Congress symbol on the ballot paper. On the basis of 103 seats, the total votes polled would be 1606547 with a percentage of 37.99%. For purposes of analysis, the figures for 103 seats have been accepted

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The Congress party failed to maintain itself as the dominant party and its decline was registered both in respect of seats and the votes polled. In the 1962 general elections, the Congress party had won 51 seats (57.3%) out of the total of 89 seats in the Punjabi region²⁷ with 45.72% of the valid votes cast. This would show a decline of about 11% in the number of seats won and of about 7.73% in the valid votes cast. The decline in the valid votes is larger in Punjab than the all India average for the Congress party²⁸ which is 4.3%. Even if we take the data for the composite Punjab as a whole for the third general elections, the decline is substantial i.e., from 43.72% to 37.99%, and it is more than in Harvna where the Congress has polled 41.40% in the fourth general elections.

The Akali Dals, taken together, have won 25% seats against 21.35%²⁹ seats in the 1962 general elections in the Punjabi speaking region. It has improved its % of the valid votes cast from 11% to 24.67%. This increase is not adequately reflected in the additional number of seats won by the Akali Dals and when we compare the % of valid votes cast in favour of the Congress party and the Akali Dals, the Congress party has substantially gained more seats than the Akali Dals. But the reason is not far to seek. The Akali Dal (Master) set up 62 candidates and won only two seats, but succeeded in damaging the electoral prospects of the Akali Dal (Sant) in some

27 The data for the Punjabi speaking region of Punjab (which forms the present State of Punjab with some minor changes) has been worked out by the present writer from the official data available for composite Punjab in 'Report on General Elections in Punjab 1962' printed by the Controller of Printing and Stationery Punjab. Unless otherwise stated, the data for 1962 general elections is for the Punjabi speaking region of composite Punjab.

28 *The Eastern Economist*, Vol. 48, No. 12, March 24, 1967, p. 521 for the all India figures.

29 The un-divided Akali Dal in 1962 had won 19 seats in composite Punjab, but all these seats had been won in Punjabi-speaking region which had a total of 89 seats. All its seats (46 in all) except one, had been contested from the Punjabi-speaking region. It polled 11.87% of the popular vote. If we exclude the Ambala City constituency where an Akali had contested the seat and which constituency now falls out of present Punjab, the % of valid vote is 11.9%.

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respects. The two Akali Dals³⁰ lost 4 seats owing to direct contest between themselves by dividing the votes which if polled by a united Akali Dal candidate would have defeated the Congress candidate.

The Sant led Akali Dal gained 24 seats, exactly 50% of those won by the Congress party, but it effectively eliminated the Master-led Akali Dal and established its claim to be the leading political party in opposition.

The undivided Communist party had secured 9 seats (10.1% of total seats) with 9.10% of the valid votes in the composite Punjab in 1962 but all the 9 seats and almost 80% of the valid votes had been secured from the Punjabi-speaking region. In the present elections the two Communist parties polled 8.41% of the valid votes each and won only 8 seats. Their performance has undoubtedly been poor, particularly when it is noted that they did not face the powerful opposition of the Akali Dal (Sant) since they joined United Front of 4 opposition parties. They further soiled their record by entering into an open alliance with a communal party, even when it is granted that the Sant's Akali Dal adopted a socialist economic programme in its election manifesto. The election contest between the two Communist parties cost them two seats, those of Atari scheduled caste seat and the Nangal seat.

The Republican party won three seats against none in the 1962 general elections but the valid votes cast in its favour did not change substantially. Its success in gaining seats can be attributed to its membership of the United Front of the opposition parties.

Altogether the United Front of 4 opposition parties won 35 seats with only 30.61% of the valid vote.

The Jana Sangh made substantial gains in the fourth general elections. It had won only 4 (4.5%) seats in the Punjabi-speaking region with about 6% of the valid votes in the third general elections, but its present performance has raised its seats to 9 and its share of

30. These are : Srihargobindpur, Dakha scheduled caste, Rajpura and Amloh scheduled caste seats.

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the valid votes cast to 9.84%. In 5 out of the 9 seats won by it, the Jana Sangh has secured more than 50% valid votes ³¹

Other political parties hardly deserve any mention. The SSP won only one seat, but that was more due to the personal influence and resources of the candidate than the hold of the party on the electorate

Nine seats were won by independent candidates, two of whom were "Congress rebels" who had been refused the Congress tickets. Two other independents were supported by Jana Sangh and 4 other winning independents were backed by the opposition parties in general. The Maharaja of Patiala, the remaining independent winner, contested his seat against the United Front candidate and won by securing 28,827 votes out of the total of 34730 valid votes cast, the winning margin being the largest for the present elections in Punjab

A Districtwise Review

One can now turn to have a districtwise review of the poll verdict with the help of the following table:

31. There are only 10 Congress-held seats where the winning party secured more than 50% of the valid votes cast.

TABLE VII

District-wise Distribution of Seats Among Political Parties (1967 General Elections)

Description of Political Parties	Ferozepur (15 seats)	Amritsar (14 seats)	Gurdaspur (9 seats)	Hoshiarpur (12 seats)	Julundur (12 seats)	Kapurthala (3 seats)	Ludhiana (10 seats)	Rupar (5 seats)	Patiala (9 seats)	Sangrur (9 seats)	Bhatinda (10 seats)	Total No. of seats won by poli- tical parties.
Congress	7	5	7	4	5	3	4	4	4	3	2	48
Akali Dal (Sant)	4	4	1	-	1	-	3	1	-	4	6	24
Akali Dal (Master)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
Jana Sangh	1	3	1	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	9
CPI	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	5
CPI (M)	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	3
Republicans	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
SSP	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
PSP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Swatantra	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Independents	1	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	3	-	1	9
Totals	15	14	9	8	12	3	10	5	9	9	10	104

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Three broad generalizations are suggested by this data :

First, the Congress won seats from all the eleven districts. This analysis is further confirmed by table VIII which details the percentage of votes polled by political parties in each district. The Congress party secured a higher percentage of votes polled than any other single party in all the eleven districts.

Secondly, the main support of the two Communist parties comes from the same districts in which the Akali Dal (Sant) has its strength—the districts of Ferozepur, Amritsar, Sangrur and Bhatinda. In fact, some of the gains made in the districts of Sangrur and Bhatinda by the Akali Dal (Sant) have been at the cost of the two Communist parties.

Thirdly, the Akali Dal (Master) has been virtually eliminated as a political party and its two seats have come from the district of Patiala and even here the total votes polled by it in the Patiala district are only 8.26% of the aggregate valid vote polled in that district.

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TABLE VIII

Valid Votes Polling Political Parties and Percentage of the Total in Districts (1967 General Elections)

Description of Political Parties	Ferozepur	Amritsar	Gurdaspur	Hoshiarpur	Kapurthala	Jullundur	Ludhiana	Kupar	Patiala	Sangrur	Bhainda	Total vote polled by the party in the state
Congress	240798 [38.3]	216007 [36.9]	145695 [30.9]	121084 [35.5]	51662 [31.2]	186197 [38.79]	173801 [38.4]	77745 [42.7]	107621 [30.5]	127656 [36.5]	145826 [35.9]	1594162 [37.46]
Akali Dal (Sant)	146010 [23.87]	145106 [24.96]	68350 [18.42]	20318 [6.08]	3220 [2.18]	387.6 [8.20]	154143 [33.90]	25197 [13.67]	29580 [8.29]	97328 [27.72]	141501 [35.32]	870656 [20.45]
Akali Dal (Master)	9854 [1.59]	7788 [1.33]	15575 [4.19]	10477 [3.09]	20451 [15.36]	10400 [2.22]	30387 [4.68]	5951 [3.23]	52434 [8.26]	6920 [1.93]	9598 [2.40]	179825 [4.22]
CPI	48767 [7.98]	30867 [5.27]	6748 [1.81]	13478 [3.98]	8997 [6.75]	33440 [7.15]	3413 [0.75]	16962 [8.66]	3297 [0.94]	21134 [5.90]	32291 [8.09]	219394 [5.15]
CPI (M)	6720 [1.09]	32556 [5.56]		11241 [3.32]		27588 [5.89]	3037 [0.67]	16422 [8.79]	3115 [0.88]	38178 [10.67]		138857 [3.26]
Jana Sangh	73768 [12.79]	66204 [11.1]	78706 [21.19]	29146 [8.6]	7724 [5.79]	44403 [9.5]	40822 [8.9]	18350 [9.9]	29109 [8.2]	17023 [4.79]	13666 [3.4]	418921 [9.94]
Republicans	1744			18923	5411	30130	18409		1472			76089 [1.78]
Other Political Parties												
Aggregate Vote polled in the Distt.	901669	580129	518251	513271	196583	682628	649981	271972	520937	536553	609527	100%

Data not processed

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When a comparison between the distribution of seats and valid votes cast by political parties during the third general elections is made, some revealing trends are noticeable. In terms of the valid votes polled, the Congress party has suffered a fall in almost all the districts, excepting in Rupar district as the following table will show:

TABLE I

Comparative analysis of votes polled by the Congress in districts during the III and the IV general elections

Name of the district	Percentage of aggregate vote polled by all political parties in the district			
	1962	1967	Gain or Loss (+)	(-)
Ferozepur	42.0	39.3	-	- 2.7
Amritsar	46.4	39.9	-	- 6.5
Gurdaspur	45.4	30.9	-	-14.5
Hoshiarpur	49.9	35.5	-	-14.4
Kapurthala	48.6	31.2	-	-17.4
Jullundur	51.7	38.8	-	-12.9
Ludhiana	39.6	35.4	-	- 4.2
Rupar	40.4	42.7	2.3	
Patiala (only 3 constituencies)				
Sangrur	47.2	35.9	-	- 11.3
Bhatinda	39.1	36.5	-	- 2.6

But when the analysis is made in terms of the seats won in each district through the two general elections, the Congress losses are less significant. The Congress has no doubt lost seats in the districts of Patiala (5.0%), Hoshiarpur (4.0%), Jullundur (31.3%), Sangrur (9.0%), Bhatinda (17.5%) and Amritsar (18.1%), but it has also made gains in the districts of Kapurthala (20%), Rupar (46.7%), Gurdaspur (15.2%), Ferozepur (13%) and Ludhiana (3.5%). The Akali Dals have lost some ground in the districts of Ferozepur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Kapurthala and Rupar, but made gains in the districts of Sangrur and Bhatinda and these have been made more at the cost of the Communist parties than the Congress party.

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TABLE X

Political Parties and Religion-wise Classification of Elected Members to Punjab Assembly
(1967 General Elections)

Description of Political Parties	Hindus (other than S.C.Hindus)	Scheduled caste Hindus	Scheduled Castes (23 Reserved Seats) Sikhs	Sikhs (other than S.C.Sikhs)	Muslims	Total No. of seats won by Political Party
Congress	9 (39.1 %)	7 (70 %)	5 (38.5 %)	26 (45.6 %)	1 (100 %)	48
Akali Dal (Sant)	-	1 (10 %)	5 (38.5 %)	18 (31.5 %)	-	24
Akali Dal (Master)	-	-	-	2 (3.5 %)	-	2
Jana Sangh	9 (39.1 %)	-	-	-	-	9
CPI	1 (4.4 %)	-	2 (15.4 %)	2 (3.5 %)	-	5
CPI (M)	-	-	-	3 (5.3 %)	-	3
Republicans	-	1 (10 %)	1 (7.6 %)	1 (1.8 %)	-	3
SSP	1 (4.4 %)	-	-	-	-	1
Independents	3 (13.0 %)	1 (10 %)	-	5 (8.8 %)	-	9
Totals	23 (100 %)	10 (100 %)	13	57 (100 %) about	1 (100 %)	104

**Analysis of Poll Results in Terms of the Religious Affiliation
of Elected Members**

The analysis made so far reveals that the Congress party has suffered a loss both in respect of seats won and the valid votes cast in its favour in the fourth general elections, though the loss has been more uniform in respect of votes than seats. When we relate these losses to the religious composition of districts and constituencies, some significant conclusions emerge from this analysis. When table VIII relating to comparative analysis of votes polled in the third and fourth general elections is examined, it appears that the major losses suffered by the Congress party have been in districts which have a majority of Hindu population than in districts which have a Sikh majority. The districts of Gurdaspur (loss in valid votes being 17.3%), Hoshiarpur (loss being 14.4%) and Jullundur (loss being 12.9%) which have a majority of Hindus, have gone against the Congress. Loss in the Sikh-majority districts is relatively minor except in case of Kapurthala, where only three seats were won by the Congress party due to multi-cornered contests.

When one examines the religious affiliation of members elected on the Congress ticket (see table IX) this analysis is further confirmed. The number of Hindus (other than scheduled caste Hindus) elected on the Congress ticket in 1962 was 15 (out of the 21 Hindus elected in the Punjabi-speaking region) which provided a percentage of 71.4% but in 1967 this number fell to 9 (out of 23) with a percentage of only 39.1%. The number of scheduled caste Hindus (in the reserved seats) fell from 83.3% (5 members out of the total of 6 elected to Assembly) in 1962 to 70% (7 members) in 1967. But in case of Sikhs, the loss has been much less. In case of the Sikhs other than those belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Congress seats fell from 50% (24 out of the total of 48 elected to assembly) in 1962 to 45.7% (26 seats) in 1967. Similarly, in the case of the scheduled caste Sikhs, the % fell only from 46.5% (6 out of 13 total elected) in 1962 to 38.5% (5 out of the total 13 seats) in 1967. The only Muslim member also was elected on the Congress ticket from the Malerkotla constituency.

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The loss in the Hindu vote suffered by the Congress party has been a gain for the Jana Sangh, which has almost doubled its membership in 1967 elections. The gain is still more marked when it is considered that two independent members from the district of Hoshiarpur were actively supported by the Jana Sangh and owed their seats in some measure to this support. The Jana Sangh, however, did not win a single scheduled caste seat; its influence has remained confined only to the non-scheduled caste Hindus and that also to urban Hindus only. Perhaps one reason is that in the rural areas the predominant Sikh vote is turned against the Jana Sangh owing to its public image as the party of Hindu communalism. Nor has the Jana Sangh succeeded in extending its influence to the districts of Patiala, Sangrur and Bhatinda. Its influence in the districts of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur may also be due to the support of displaced persons settled in these areas.

The Akali Dal (S) has only 1 scheduled caste Hindu elected on its ticket and retains its image of being a party of Sikh-communalism, though more reasonable and moderate than the Master-led Akali Dal.

The Communist parties also have 7 Sikhs (including 2 scheduled caste Sikhs) in the total 8 members elected on their ticket and only one Hindu. This is also a confirmation of the continuing trend. When the scheduled caste seats are examined as a distinct group for purposes of analysis, it appears that the Congress party has more or less retained the traditional support of the scheduled castes. It has won 12 out of 23 scheduled caste seats, thus providing a % of 52.1 of the total scheduled caste seats. This is incidently 25% of the total seats won by the Congress party in the assembly in the fourth general elections. In the third general elections, the Congress party had won 11 out of the total of 19 scheduled caste seats in the Punjabi speaking region which is 57.9% of the total scheduled caste seats. The Congress party has thus suffered a decline of only 5.8% in the fourth general elections in respect of scheduled caste seats.

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Elections to Parliamentary Seats

The Punjab has been allotted 13 Lok Sabha seats for the present elections.³³ The poll results of these 13 constituencies is shown in the table below :

TABLE XI
(Lok Sabha Results)

Description of the political party	No. of seats contested	No. of seats won	Percentage of valid votes	
Congress	13	9	37.31	(1598546)
Akali Dal (Sant)	9	3	22.61	(964712)
Akali Dal (Master)	7		4.42	(189290)
Jana Sangh	8	1	12.48	(534928)
CPI	3		4.28	(183341)
CPI (M)	2		1.89	(81008)
Other parties and Independents	33	-	17.01	(728726)
Totals	75	13	100	(4284561)

In the third general elections, the Congress had won 10 out of the total of 13 Lok Sabha seats from the Punjabi-speaking region. In 1967, the Congress has won 9 seats, thus reducing its % of seats from 76.9 to 69.2. But this performance is better than in the case of assembly seats, where the Congress party won only 46.15% of the seats. The Akali Dal (Sant) has won 3 seats, the same as in 1962. The Jana Sangh has gained its first Lok Sabha seat from the Punjabi region, which now forms Punjab. This gain has been at the cost of the Congress party.

There is a disproportion between the number of seats won and the valid votes polled by political parties. In the case of Lok Sabha seats, the Congress party average per Lok Sabha seat in terms of

33. Twelve Lok Sabha seats were entirely in the Punjabi speaking region, but the thirteenth seat, that of Una(SC) seat, include 2 out of its 7 assembly constituencies from the district of Kangra, which has now been merged in Himachal.

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valid votes polled by it is 4.14%, but in the case of Akali Dal (Sant) it is 7.53% and in the case of Jana Sangh 12.48%. The main reason is that the Congress party has contested all but one of the assembly seats and its support has been uniform in all areas. But the other political parties did not contest all the assembly seats even in those Lok Sabha constituencies in which they have won their seats. In the case of Akali Dal (Sant), the Ludhiana seat was lost to it because of the division of its vote by the Akali Dal (Master) candidate.

When the regional distribution of party strength is examined it is found that the Akali Dal (Sant) has retained its hold on the districts of Bhatinda, Sangrur and Ferozepur, while the Jana Sangh has won its Amritsar parliamentary seat largely on the strength of the votes gained in the urban constituencies in the city of Amritsar. In the remaining areas, the Congress has been victorious.

In terms of the religious affiliation of the new MPs., there are 9 Sikhs (including 2 scheduled caste Sikhs) and 4 Hindus (including 1 scheduled caste Hindu). The Congress party has 6 Sikhs (including 1 SC Sikh) and 3 Hindus (including 1 SC Hindu) among its elected M.Ps. Of the two women elected to the Lok Sabha, one belongs to the Congress party and the other to the Akali Dal (Sant).

The Fourth General Elections and Punjab Politics

One could now discuss the impact of fourth general elections on Punjab politics under the following heads :

The impact on party system

(1) The Congress party has been dethroned from its position as the single dominant party.³⁴ Yet it remained the largest single

34. The decline of the Congress party has been due to many causes, which have been classified by a top Congress leader in a letter circulated among Congressmen into two categories (a) *General causes which have affected the fortunes of the party in every State*, such as, price rise, economic distress in fixed sa'aried classes, student unrest, labour unrest, food shortages, cow agitation, decline in the foreign image which has affected the Congress prestige at home, mounting taxation pressure, the failure of the Five Year

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political party in March 1967 when all the election results had been announced. It was also the only party which represented all the sections of the community in all the districts and regions of Punjab. Its decline has been more among the Hindus, particularly among the urban Hindus than among the Sikhs.

(2) The communal parties have increased their strength. This applies to the Akali Dal (Sant) and to the Jana Sangh and, to a minor extent, to the Republican party. The two Akali Dals, the Jana Sangh and the Republican party, have polled 36.32% of the valid votes cast as against 23.75% in the whole of the composite Punjab in 1962 and 19 % in the Punjabi-region. In other words, the communal parties have almost doubled their votes, and raised their seats from 23 in the Punjabi region in 1962 to 38 seats. This does not include independent candidates who have won their seats with the support of communal parties.

(3) The Communist parties have not been able to maintain their position. They won less number of seats than they had secured in the third general elections. This has been partially due to the split in the Communist party and the formation of two separate Communist parties instead of one. This not only divided their votes and cost them at least two assembly seats but also weakened their bargaining power in negotiations with the Akali Dal (Sant) in the

Plans and controversy between 'rightist' and 'leftists' in the party.
(b) Causes which have affected the fortune of the party at States' level with particular reference to Punjab such as reorganization of Punjab which has made 'Akalis and Jana Sangh as heroes' ineffective leadership since Pratap Singh Kairon's exit, wrong distribution of party tickets, neglect of the Hindu community to please the Sikhs, frustration among Congress workers, creation of new vested interests, practice of bossism in the party, inadequate election funds, and 'system of giving a specific central leader the rank of State party boss'. Perhaps, the only major cause of the defeat of the Congress party which has been omitted, or at least understated, is the role of factionalism in the Punjab Congress. The Congress party was so disorganised and faction-ridden on the eve of IV general elections that there was no unified election campaign by the party as such. Each faction inside the Congress organised and contested its election for itself, in some districts, one faction tried to defeat the candidate of the other faction.

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allocation of seats among members of the United Front of opposition parties. But the elections have shown that the CPI has a greater hold in Punjab than the CPI (Marxist).

Can it be claimed that the socialist forces have fared better than before? The present data are insufficient to provide any definite answer. The main difficulty is as to which parties are to be included in the category of socialist parties. The two Communist parties and the SSP surely fit into this description, 'but would the Akali Dal (Sant) also qualify for it? The Akali Dal (Sant) has no doubt a socialist programme in its election manifesto, but so has the Congress party. Both these parties have selected their candidates for the present elections from the landlords and other richer sections of the society.

(4) The Akali Dal (Sant) has emerged as the leading party among the erstwhile opposition parties, and its gains would have been large but for the wilfully obstructive tactics of the Akali Dal (Master). The election results have, however, sounded a death knell for the Akali Dal (Master) and rejected the extremist slogan of Master Tara Singh for a 'self-determined status for Punjab'.

(5) The opposition parties could not combine against the Congress party despite their best efforts. By the very nature of their communal character, the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal could not come close to each other. The United Front of four opposition parties suffered from internal rifts, particularly the two Communist parties, and did not help one another in the constituencies where only one agreed candidate had been set up. The result has been that 10 seats³⁵ have been lost due to division of the opposition vote among contesting opposition parties.

35. These seats are : *Atari* (SC) and *Nangal* seats lost due to contests between the two Communist parties; *Sultanpur* and *Adampur* seats lost due to contests between the Akali Dal (Master) and the CPI; *Moga* seat lost due to contest between the SSP and the Akali Dal (Sant); *Kum Kulan* seat lost due to contest between Akali Dal (Sant) and CPI and *Srihargobindpur*, *Dakha* (SC), *Rajpura*, and *Amlah* (SC) seats lost due to contest between the two Akali Dals.

(6) Growing importance of independent members is another feature of the present poll results. What is particularly significant is that some of the independent candidates happened to be persons of resources and personal glamour with a large personal following. At least one of them contested elections to the assembly as a 'future king maker.'

Roll of big money

The role of 'big money' has increased in elections and politics. Election contests cost so much money that an honest middle class party worker cannot afford to meet the expenses of contesting elections on his own. Political parties also have lean purses, and cannot provide much financial support to the candidates. This drives the political parties³⁶ into the arms of big landlords, transporters and rich businessmen, whose major qualification for the party nominations is their ability to pay their own election expenses as well as to contribute to the party election funds. Moreover, as many of them are persons with local influence and traditional standing in the constituencies, they possess the ability to win seats and thus provide added attraction to political parties like Congress party and the Akali Dal. A knowledgeable analysis of the socio-economic background of legislators of various parties in Punjab as perhaps in other States would provide revealing data on this aspect of the problem.

Whither State politics

The gradual decline of the Congress party has been a continuing trend in the State but its performance in the fourth general elections has virtually brought about the collapse of the one party dominance system. It does not seem possible that the Congress party can reclaim its position in the next general elections, because the collapse of the party is a national rather than a local phenomenon. The fourth general elections destroyed the myth of its invincibility and the recent defections from its ranks in many States have eroded its image as the party which can regain its dominate position. Moreover, the Congress party without the prestige and patronage of its ruling power is like Alladin without his magic lamp or Samson without his hair.

36 This does not apply to the Communist parties.

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The exit of the Congress party as the dominant single party in the State has tended to create a political vacuum which seems hard to fill for a long time. It would appear that the old style of '*one party dominance stability*' has been replaced by a new style of '*coalitional instability*' in governments. The coalitional pattern in politics has produced one important result. It has generated a new spirit of compromise and adjustment among political parties, which had hitherto been divided over fundamental issues of State politics. It has made for a politics of moderation and compromise. This can be seen nowhere better than in the recent policy statements of the State Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal (Sant) on questions of language. Similarly, the Communist parties have modified their stand on nationalisation of transport and State trading in favour of a more pragmatic approach to these problems.

The Punjabi Suba has become an irreversible political reality past all political disputes. No political party reopened the issue during the election campaigns, though the Jana Sangh resented its formation in spirit of quiet resignation, and the Akali Dals blamed the Congress party for not including Chandigarh and some other alleged Punjabi-speaking areas in Punjab. And this recognition that the new unilingual Punjab is a political reality has also made the State Jana Sangh revise its previous stand on the questions of language and Chandigarh and to join the Akali Dal (S) dominated coalition government.

R. SRINIVASAN

ELECTIONS IN MAHARASHTRA AND CONGRESS DOMINANCE

As Congress political fortunes fluctuated outside Maharashtra, with caste factions in Bihar, divisive trends in Punjab, new polarizations in UP precipitating new directions of State politics, the party has not only kept the barnyard safe, it has also gained in popularity, erasing many disappointments and shocks suffered in 1957. Thus, in 1967, the Congress captured 215 of 264 assembly seats (over 81% of seats contested) and 44 Lok Sabha seats (about 93% of seats contested). As the Congress emerged with added political dignity, the hold of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti appeared to have melted considerably. How could the Congress achieve that ?

I

An important factor, of course, is the personality, quiet political sagacity and concerted endeavour of Y.B. Chavan. He has taken adequate advantage of Maratha dominance in the State and in the party, broad-basing the caste constituents of the Congress. Maratha leaders from other parties, especially the Peasants' and Workers' have been won over to the Congress. Other dominant leaders from various groups and parties have been effectively turned back to Congress by symbolic gestures of loaves and fishes available to the dominant party, special opportunities and favours, scholarships to the so-called backward communities and revival of B. R. Ambedkar's popular image-are outstanding illustrations. Adequate representation has been assured in the party and government to the various regional groups and interests; the peasantry have been showered with manifold benefits. In addition, the Congress government and MPCC have, time and again, scored over the opposition. Their variant voices and views have synchronized on some sensitive

issues, thereby improving the Congress image and making the opposition look like playing a mere second fiddle. A few more important instances would suffice : In 1963, the Congress government sent official delegates to the Deccan Agriculturist's Conference, which recorded a vociferous protest against alleged discrimination against Maharashtra *vis-a-vis* distribution of Krishna-Godavari water benefits. Again consequent upon the findings of the Gulati Commission, vigorous unanimous disapproval was put up fearing adverse effects on the Koyna project. Similarly, with respect to Goa, the 1963 election results there, were interpreted as an affirmative vote for Goa-Maharashtra merger. Active party interests in the MPCC pressed for finalization of the issue, as evidenced at its Nagpur meeting in December 1964. In March 1965 the State assembly—led by the Chief Minister—moved a unanimous resolution calling for amending the Constitution to facilitate Goa's merger with Maharashtra. There appeared to be ample confidence amongst the knowledgeable that a referendum on the issue would go for Maharashtra. However, in January 1967, the people of Goa gave their verdict in favour of remaining a separate unit. That came as a shocking blow to all the parties in Maharashtra. Another issue that has brought jitters to the Congress in the State is the issue of Mysore-Maharashtra border dispute. It might be recalled that the SRC report favoured retention of Felgaum with Mysore, whereas the Maharashtra view remains that the Marathi dominant areas should be merged with Maharashtra.

As the election year dawned, the opposition parties mounted pressure for merger of Mysore areas with Maharashtra. Violent demonstrations were held in both the States and it was believed that atleast one train crash could be linked with the agitated public opinion. The two Chief Ministers failed to reach a mutually amicable settlement. The Maharashtra government resolution in April 1966 sought to mark the gravity of the situation, if *status quo* were maintained. Senapati Bapat, noted Maharashtra leader, went on fast inside Maharashtra Chief Minister's residence. Nath Pai's intervention; assurances of the Prime Minister to appoint a Commission to enquire into the issue; AICC's resolution to appoint a one-man Commission; and, above all, announcement of the

appointment of ex-Chief Justice, Mehar Chand Mahajan, considerably eased the tense situation. It might be recalled here that before the announcement of Mahajan Commission, 23 Maharashtra legislators had resigned in protest against non-implementation of favourable boundary award

Political parties faced another sensitive issue consequent upon installation of integrated Maharashtra and Vidarbha regions of the State, which did not have adequate impact of the Congress. The party soon realized the importance of cultivating these areas and establishing a stable Congress following there. That was achieved through concerted attempts at conciliation and compromising policies. For instance, holding of assembly sessions at Nagpur; establishing a heavy plate and vessels plant (which had initially met with foreign exchange difficulties), to bring welcome relief to about 15,000 unemployed owing to the closure of nearly 1,000 large and small manganese ore mines; conciliatory allocation of cabinet membership; nomination of two successive Chief Ministers from Vidarbha—were some of the more important steps taken to create a sense of identity amongst the various regions. This attitude adversely affected the popularity of the Republican party and the Nag Vidarbha Andolan Samiti. Finally, the Vidarbha, Nagpur and Marathwada PCCs were merged.

So it was with respect to the Marathwada region. For its economic welfare and political integration various steps were taken. Vinayakrao Patil's (hailing from the region) unanimous election as president of the MPCC in 1962 and 1963, inauguration of Godavari irrigation project at Jayakandi (Aurangabad) in 1963, which promised relief to five districts in the region and subsequently became one of the biggest projects of its kind in the State; staging a conference for Marathwada's economic development, attended by 1,500 delegates and inaugurated by Chief Minister, V. P. Naik; and assurances given by the Chief Minister that the entire unspent allocation of the third five year plan would be spent for Marathwada's welfare were, indeed, corner-stones of an effective policy transformation

Another issue that confronted all the political parties was the challenging situation owing to price rise and food grain shortage.

If the administration seriously concerned itself with grappling with the challenge, the opposition tried to cash on the opportunity to add to the discomfiture of the administration and the party in power. Early in 1966, as the wholesale grain merchants in Vidarbha refused to cooperate, prices shot up; the government promptly clamped down on 16 of the merchants; godowns were raided to unearth illegal hoardings and prevent profiteering and black marketing; DIR were effectively used; anti-price rise committees were formed; INTUC called for price-rise protests; PSP and Communist party announced fasts by their leaders. The government could not afford to let the initiative slip off to the opposition: a five-man ministerial committee was formed to tackle the crisis on virtually a war footing; procurement of grains was made and fair-price shops and cooperatives were established. However, two protest demonstrations, the Bombay *bandh* in August 1963 and Maharashtra *bandh* a year later, assumed characteristics of a deep-seated frustration and concern of the masses against soaring prices and distributive mechanism of food grains. As the food situation worsened owing to failure of Monsoon in 1965, an all parties conference was convened at Poona. Though Prof. D. R. Gadgil took a leading role it was surprising that no ministers, senior or junior, thought it worthwhile to participate and put forth the government's policy, limitations and prospects on the delicate issue. It was not totally unexpected when in August 1965, unprecedented scenes of violation of parliamentary decorum were witnessed as the State legislature met. 12 opposition legislators began a fast outside the assembly; within the assembly, opposition members mounted pressure to speak all at the same time and the speaker had to suspend thirty-three such members as a consequence. However, the next day, these members vaulted the iron railings and entered the assembly to collect their daily allowance, only to be pushed back by the police. One member, Jambawant Rao Dhote came over four times. He was later removed from the assembly, being charged for rowdiness, insulting the speaker and throwing a paper-weight at the attendants. His seat thus fell vacant and in a bye-election, he was returned by his Yeotmal admirers, only to put forth his demand of Naik ministry's resignation.

Another issue that seriously challenged the Congress ministry

was the row over the Kolhapur successor adoption incident (1962), wherein the ministry seemed to have dis-regarded the popular feelings, which soon assumed threatening posture in and around Kolhapur, and later in the whole State. In fact, the controversy adversely affected the Congress hopes of a sweeping victory at the 1967 elections.

Of significance was the influence exerted by the introduction of panchayatiraj institutions in the State after May 1962. It is common knowledge how politically significant these have come to be. Inasmuch as effective powers have been delegated to these institutions and patronage is made available for distributing benefits of developmental programmes, and, for instance at least 40 of panchas are simultaneously members of managing committees of local cooperative societies, the far-reaching importance of the new phase could be understood. The Congress reaped a rich harvest of political promises and promising young leadership through these institutions.

A close look at the State Congress is now called for. Unlike the party in some other parts of the country, the State Congress emanated by and large as a stable and united organization. The organizational and functional wings were avoided with balance and thoughtfulness. One of the more important reasons was the overall control of Y. B. Chavan, who, as he was called upon to step up to the union ministership, chose Kannamwar as his successor. It was to many a surprise choice as the latter had been for long associated with party work in Vidarbha. It seems the decision was an attempt to harmonize the relationship between groups from Vidarbha and Maharashtra. Later events showed nevertheless that Chief Minister Kannamwar did not rise to the occasion and left much to be desired in skill and patience as a leader. On his passing away, another man from Vidarbha, V. P. Nark stepped in as Chief Minister, and again it was Y. B. Chavan's choice. The succession of all things clearly demonstrated the smooth efficiency of Chavan and his control over the party. It might be recalled here that when the Kamaraj plan was ushered in, Kannamwar opined for its non-implementation in the State in view of the prevailing party harmony.

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There was a point there as the State Congress had succeeded in balancing and harmonizing various interests in the State. Chavan also liked the exemption. But, as he altered his opinion a little later, the PCC readily supported him.

A point of interest here is the parallel existence of MPCC and BPCC. The differences between Y. B. Chavan and S. K. Patil on the Goa issue could be seen to have emanated from there, as the former controls the MPCC and the latter the BPCC. Recently, however, the latter body has receded in the background as it could be seen from its backseat role in the succession of Chief Ministers. However, differences between the two bodies came to an ugly head over the issue of Mysor-Maharashtra boundaries, when two State ministers (Shanti Lal Shah and H. J. Talyarkhan), president of the BPCC and 16 other Congress members resigned, assailing the government for failing to uphold law and order. That surprised the Chief Minister, who was not consulted on such a course of action. After prolonged negotiations, most of the resignations (except that by Shanti Lal Shah) were withdrawn and the BPCC president tendered an apology to the Chief Minister. A close look at the recent past shows that the MPCC and the BPCC have more often than not acted in contravention of understanding and reciprocity. The latter is commonly held to be a superfluous unit, actively involved in its trade against Maratha dominance; not averse to instant gains by chauvinistic patronage to causes without reasons; by and large, a domain of S. K. Patil and vested business interests; it is also anti-labour and anti-Maharashtra interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that time and again, one hears of vocal attempts demanding merger of the two units. The foregoing is an attempt to give some sort of an image of the house the Congress controls. Now we might turn to the state of the opposition in Maharashtra.

II

The opposition is yet to evolve as a threat to the Congress in Maharashtra. However, as evidenced in Madras and Kerala also, a regional party, Peasants' and Workers' party (PWP), has also come up in Maharashtra, which might play a significant role, if and when

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situation arises for it either to exert as an ally or bargain as an opposition. Its electoral record has been

<i>Year</i>	<i>Seats Won</i>	<i>% of total votes secured</i>
1952	26	9.1
1957	30	9.4
1962	15	7.5
1967	19	7.2

What is more significant apart from its numerical strength, is the fact that the PWR commands identical support of the landlords and the peasantry. Though originating in collusion of actions, it has chosen to keep itself aloof from either the Communists or the socialists. It is Marxian in several of its standpoints and carries a pronounced anti-Brahmin appeal.

The PSP, on the other hand, had few gains to its credit in the political climate of the State. However, in aligning with other parties in the Samyukta Maharashtra movement during 1957, it did catch 33 seats in the assembly but, it soon came to realize that the maximum advantage taken out of the alliance went to the Communists. In 1960 consequently the PSP broke loose from the alliance, though in the process it also lost an appreciable number of its members defecting to other parties. The figures for 1962 elections did no credit to PSP's electoral stability. The return of Asoka Mehta to the Congress also was an important point as in August 1964, about 900 PSP members declared their decision to go over to the Congress. The rest went over to the SSP. The PSP, consequently, was left with the leftovers.

The Communist party is of some political importance, though its hold on rural areas is far from satisfactory. Owing to the language controversy united front of the Samyukta Maharashtra Simiti continues to support the Communist party. Though in an ideological turmoil, the party's hold in urban area continues in some measure. During agitations, one could see traces of its anonymous strength and potential.

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A look at the Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti shows that it came up as a coalition after August 1966, except the Jana Sangh and the PSP, the parties that gave it strength were . CPI (M), CPI, Hindu Mahasabha and a few independents. Later, electoral adjustments were made with the Muslim League and the PSP. In other areas of the State, minor groups, such as Janata Agadhi, Lal Nishan and Socialist unity party, also were baited. The united front also lured the Gaekwad faction of the Republican party. The Jana Sangh and the PSP did not concur with the prospects of alliance with the Samiti for fear of the Communists taking advantage of the situation ultimately.

III

The prospects of various political parties on the eve of the fourth general elections were consequently at variance with each other. The Congress, for instance, was taken for granted as confidently continuing with its majority as in earlier elections. The party had been successful in appeasing the various sectional and regional interests. It was cautious in deciding upon nominations and followed an elaborate procedure of consultations at different organisational levels. Executives of various DCCs were asked to suggest prospective candidates and discuss the same with the PFC, presided over by Y B Chavan. He successfully struck a balance and new aspirants were given weightage to the extent of 25%. There were, in all, 1455 applicants for assembly seats and 263 for the Lok Sabha, of which the MPCC had to choose, respectively 240 and 40 alone. The applicants showed a wide and varied spectrum, including a minister's driver, representatives of various professions, erstwhile rulers and cabinet members the last named being given a fresh lease except for Nirmala Raje Bhosle, minister for social welfare, whose application was not considered.

The procedure adopted by the Congress to weed out and make final selections was simple enough. A 12 man committee headed by Y B Chavan took care to do the final selections. Of the 26 districts, only a few had submitted unanimously accepted lists, and the rest put up rival claims and lists. Chavan, on several occasions, called for leaders of rival factions in a bid to patch up

differences. The average age of candidates for assembly was 43 and for Lok Sabha it was 45, 92 were below 50 years of age, 43 below 60 and only 17 belonged to 60-70 age group. Of those finally selected, 132 were graduates, 82 law graduates, 9 doctors, 1 Engineer 4 Barristers at-law and 1 chartered accountant.

In spite of the organisational coherence achieved by the Congress in this State and attempts by the leadership to avoid cleavages, the final selection of candidates did cause some heart burning. Rejected candidates complained against the decisions of both the BPCC and the MPCC. Several allegations were made against the choice—one being that no principle save that of loyalty to the powers that be mattered in the final decision. It was alleged that careful examination of those selected revealed that the rejections had little to do either with the record of public service, or loyalty to the party or the integrity of the candidates. It was alleged that Congressmen with long years of experience and standing were rejected to favour others. Loyalty to the all India leadership mattered in the selection of parliamentary candidates, and a similar loyalty to the State leadership counted in regard to the assembly candidates. These allegations snowballed and appeals were made to the CFC. Discontent was particularly rife in the districts of Nasik, Dhulia, Poona and Sholapur, several communicated their decision to contest as independents.

The secession of candidates weakened the Congress though only in some regions. An important dissident was Naik Nimbalkar, once president of the MPCC and a long associate of Chavan. Chavan, on behalf of the MPCC publicly apologised to Naik-Nimbalkar when he learnt of his resignation and called him back to the Congress fold. He suggested that whether he decided to return to the Congress or not he would be treated with respect. He also alluded to the difficulties of choosing candidates in any nomination process.

Opposition from Nasik DCC to the MPCC mounted and the former just could not function. It was dissolved and an *ad hoc* committee of the MPCC began to function in the area.

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A number of rebel Congressmen from all parts of the State constituted the Jana Congress with an eleven-men *ad hoc* committee (April 1967) and with Naik-Nimbalkar presiding over its formation.

The Congress found its toughest opponent in the Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti. Its emergence in the 1967 elections recalled the late fifties when, over the issue of the creation of the unilingual Bombay State a similar united front was created. The main demand of the front was merger of Marathi speaking areas in Mysore with Maharashtra and effective action to stay soaring prices. The strategy of the front was to launch agitations which would high-light discontent and thus build up a favourable self-image on the eve of elections. The support of Naik-Nimbalkar, as well as his pre-conditions for prospective support, came too late to be effectively used by the Samiti. Some of the parties, such as the PWP, were in a strong position to bargain, as they already had an impressive membership in the State assembly.

The total number of contestants for the State assembly was 1239. The Congress contested 269 seats in all the constituencies, the Samiti contested 229 seats; the Jana Sangh 165; the PSP 64 and Swatantra party 39. Besides, independents numbered more than one third of the total number of candidates. Vidarbha witnessed several multicornered electoral contests. In some areas, there were as many as 10 candidates for one seat. These, it was feared, would help the Congress more than any of the opposition parties. The Nag Vidarbha Andolan Samiti was divided into two groups; there was no specific issue which it could present to the public. An electoral code of conduct was adopted at an all-party convention, convened by the Chief Minister in January 1967. This endorsed the eight-point code evolved by political parties meeting in Delhi a few days earlier. The Chief Minister gave an assurance that there would be a minimum exhibition of the security force when ministers went on tour.

IV

The election campaign of the Congress started as early as January 3, 1967 at Pratapgarh, when Y.B. Chavan offered his prayers to goddess *Bhavani*, Shivaji's family deity. He broke a

coconut at the foot of a statue of Shivaji, later, in a speech, he invoked the blessings of both *Bhavani* and Shivaji. The election tempo was peaceful, as by the end of the first week of February not more than five election meetings were disturbed. Soon, however, in different places, tempers ran high, for instance, Congress vehicles carrying volunteers were stoned. The meeting where this incident took place, was being addressed by the Rajmata of Kolhapur. Similarly, in one of the meetings of the Chief Minister there was some commotion and timely action prevented further deterioration of the situation. In Bombay North, there were persistent reports of violence and intimidation, and several meetings were disturbed. Chavan's remarks during election speeches at a couple of places, about the Kolhapur successor adoption issue were surprisingly tactless and evoked strong disapproval in Kolhapur. Significantly, he did not address any meeting in Kolhapur itself.

The war of posters reached giddy heights in Bombay city recalling earlier elections. The campaign took a rather ugly turn in certain areas in North Bombay because of the activities of the *Shiv Sena* and communities came to be discussed publicly for the first time. That, indeed, had a lot to do with the voting behaviour of the minorities. Suspicion about the motives of the dominant majority community invested, in its turn a communal colour to the response of the electorate to appeals made by the contestants.

V

On the eve of elections it was on the cards that the Congress would romp back to victory. The opposition parties found it impossible to swerve the voters to an anti-Congress position. The strength of the opposition appeared to be in a few urban pockets and, outside Southern Maharashtra, the border issue just failed to click. The PWP appeared to benefit most because it had dug deep roots in Central Maharashtra, Kolhapur, Satara and a few other parts. The PSP continued to be weak and concentrated in a few areas where it was hopeful of victory as, for instance, in Ratnagiri, (strong-hold of Nath Pai) Jalgaon, Bombay and, partially in Ahmednagar. The Jana Sangh and the leftist parties had some following in certain urban centres. The strength of the Congress was in the rural

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areas where the cultivator has been made fairly prosperous, thanks to the procurement policies, which assured him of a steady income. The strength accruing to the Congress from the panchayati raj has already been referred to earlier.

A few candidates, such as S. M. Joshi, the Rajmata of Kolhapur and Dhote, were facing elections most confidently. The Congress ticket to General Thorat was a definite disadvantage to him, since even those who highly respected him as a person, decided to vote against him. In Vidarbha, the defection of the General Secretary of the NVAS assured the ruling party of a definite victory. Thus weakened, the NVAS was further split by factions. Besides, opposition parties existed here only in name and none of them put up even ten candidates for the assembly. In areas like Marathwada, there was little of electoral excitement, though a number of dissident Congressmen swelled the ranks of the opposition. In Satara, the Congress was divided into caste factions.

Voting in the State was, by and large, peaceful with North Bombay providing an exception, where the jeep carrying papers was mobbed, and, but for the timely intervention of Krishna Menon, there could have been an ugly incident. There were charges of tampering with the ballot papers in the constituency. There were also a few instances of impersonation. Over 60% of the electorate participated and in some areas polling was as high as 70%.

VI

The results of the elections were extremely disheartening to the opposition parties. The Swatantra failed to capture even a single seat, and several of its candidates lost their deposits; the Jana Sangh got 4 seats. The Congress got a comfortable majority of 200 seats in an assembly of 269. The Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti obtained 34 seats; of these 19 belonged to the PWP which, on its own would have fared equally well. The CPI got 11 and the SSP and RPI faction aligned to the Samiti got 4 seats each. The PSP got away with just 8 and Ratnagiri its stronghold still remained with it. 16 independents were voted several of them supported by the Samiti.

Except Chavan there were not many leaders of all-India stature who did any active canvassing in the State. The well-knit organization of the MPCC was an important contributing factor to Congress victory. The favourable image that the present Chief Minister presented to the public and his down-to-earth policies endeared him to the voters. The farmer's vote went solidly for the Congress. The most surprising results were in districts like Nasik, where there were revolts against the Congress and where the Jana Congress and other opposition parties were expected to give a resounding defeat to the ruling party. But here, the Congress won twice as many seats as did the combined opposition.

Generally it is assumed that urban centres are sources of discontent in which the opposition parties would usually capitalize. Here also the cities of Poona, Nasik, Sholapur, Bombay and Nagpur returned Congress candidates, thus maintaining a lead over the opposition.

Regions where discontent has been continuous (such as Marathwada region) voted thrice as many Congressmen into power. Similarly in Vidarbha where apart from strong opposition, the Congress itself was faction-ridden, it did not suffer at the hands of the opposition as much as it was expected. However, it was generally believed that factions within the Congress were responsible here for the defeat of at least one minister. Satara and Sangli as well as Balghana district solidly voted for the Congress—not a single opposition candidate was returned to the assembly. But for Chavan's indiscretion and remarks about Kolhapur issue, the Congress would have done even better. In sum the heartland of the MPCC is obviously still faithful to the party. All the members of the cabinet with two exceptions were successful.

Compared to earlier elections, the percentage of votes polled by the Congress as well as the number of seats that it captured registered a decline of 3.3, and 13 respectively. The PWP gained four more seats though the percentage of votes that it obtained was almost the same. All the other parties fared badly. It is difficult to perceive any swing among the opposition parties either to the left or right. Several parties are localist and casteist and prospered

owing to tall local leaders. An important gain to the Congress has been its alliance with one group of the Republican party. For the first time, new legislators, in larger number, have been returned to the assembly and several of them have had experience in panchayati raj institutions. The innumerable benefits that the party in power has bestowed upon the rural groups by way of cooperatives, loans, patronage distribution, are, and will, probably, remain for a long time, important factors in the continued support to the Congress in these areas. Regionalism, both in Marathwada and in Vidarbha, has not weakened the Congress; in the former, the ex-President of the MPCC has delivered the goods and has been, as a reward, promoted to a ministership; another Marathwada representative has been made President of the MPCC. In Vidarbha, the number of factions, into which the opposition has divided itself, has been an important contributory factor in the victory of the Congress. Vidarbha regionalism, which stood for a separate State, has now ceased to be a problem for the Congress. Another important feature is the continued influence of Y.B. Chavan on the politics of Maharashtra Congress. In India, elevation of local party bosses to the Centre generally has meant loss of one's grass roots. With Chavan it has been otherwise; the Maharashtra Congress and Chavan have, more or less, become synonymous. A clear instance of this is seen in the steady erosion of the importance of the former Home Minister of Maharashtra, D.S. Desai. Several had tipped him as the future Chief Minister and, perhaps rightly so, for his control over the Congress machine in certain parts of Maharashtra was regarded as more or less total. Yet Chavan had opted in Naik's favour and he could do that. An important explanation of Chavan's charisma has been his leadership of the Maratha caste. On the other hand, opposition to Chavan has also come most vociferously from his castemen themselves. It is an open question whether Chavan will be in command of a unified Maratha caste in the decades to come. The rise of Naik-Nimbalkar against his former fellow political worker and his leading the Jana Congress, are important factors. Then, the oft-repeated charge, heard aloud for the first time during the election campaign, that Chavan had brought about factions and groups within the Congress for his personal advancement, is significant. By the next election there will be enfranchised a group of

young men and women to whom the magic of Chavan and of the creation of Maharashtra may not be as strong as it is now. In the urban areas they will be confronted with the problem of finding jobs, settling comfortably and meeting the demands for a good life. They are also going to find the necessities of life difficult to come by. They are going to be angry young men in quest of a new sense of identity, distinct from those of their elders.

For the first time the *Shiv Sena*, became an important factor at least in greater Bombay. And the leader of this group with his widely read weekly, has already begun penetrating the rural areas. His writings have had a widespread appeal and his logic will be electorally significant. The opposition parties have now discovered that they cut little ice on issues like Goa, Mysore and the distribution of waters across State boundaries. But 'Maharashtra for Maharashtrians' will be an electoral slogan with overwhelming appeal to a significant segment of the electorate.

K. C. PANDE*

THE POLL VERDICT IN RAJASTHAN AN OVERVIEW**

THE act of voting is the result of many complex and interwoven forces working on the voter. To analyse and establish causal relations between the determinants of voting behaviour and the voting act with the help of election return figures is perhaps trying to approach the problem from the wrong end. A person is motivated to vote in a particular fashion broadly due to varied phenomena like the nature of candidate, the party or the parties in the field, contemporary religious, socio-economic and political issues in the air, local, State and national problems as brought into focus by contesting candidates and parties, infra-structural factors and influence of socio-economic organisations, manoeuvrability of the candidates to outwit their rivals, last minute dramatic exposures and adjustments and the like. The ultimate poll verdict is the result of these factors which are not mutually exclusive but, which

* The author is thankful to Mohan Lal Sharma, Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science for assisting him in the preparation of this article.

** The sources used for compiling the tables for this paper which only covers round assembly elections, have been taken from the following publications .

1. The Statistical Study of the General Elections in Rajasthan - 1952, (Issued by the Bureau of Statistics, Rajasthan, Jaipur).
2. Report on the Second General Elections in India, 1957, Vol. II (Statistical), issued by Election Commission, India
3. A Report on the Third General Elections in Rajasthan (Cyclostyled), edited by S.P. Varma, C.P Bhambhri and P.C.Mathur (Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur).
4. Report on General Elections - 1962, issued by Election Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
5. Report on the Fourth General Elections in India - Vol II (Statistical), issued by Election Commission, India.
6. 1967 - Fourth General Elections - A Statistical Review, issued by the Election Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

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more often than not, work in conjunction with each other. To analyse and establish causal relations between the different factors that constitute the voting act is perhaps more difficult than the chemist's job of breaking a complex compound and separate its components. This is so for the simple reason that in the analysis of voting behaviour one has to take note of mass behaviour which happens to be beyond physical control, and the observation of which through various communication media tends to be both coloured and distorted. Thus the analysis of voting behaviour in Rajasthan through the last four general elections just with the help of one analytical tool, the election returns, suffers from serious handicaps and limitations.

For the analysis of election results the district has been taken as the basic unit in this paper. Though in Rajasthan there have been some changes in the district boundaries, yet they have not been so substantial as to limit the comparability of election data seriously. Further, district being an administrative unit, politics is rather in a crystallised stage of its life here, reflecting the interaction between local pulls and State level pressures. The analysis would have been much more fruitful if one could analyse the data on the basis of the local government units panchayat samitis-wise in rural areas and municipality-wise in urban areas. But the samitis are divided into two or more constituencies¹ which² weaken the comparability of election data. Similarly, the constantly changing boundaries of assembly and parliamentary constituencies limit their utility as a unit of voting behaviour analysis.

An attempt has also been made here to arrange the districts in tables in such a way as to reflect the topographical-cum geographical divisions of the State. Thus for purposes of this analysis without going into sophisticated geographical divisions, the State has been

- 1 For example, the Jhalarapatan panchayat samiti incidentally falls into four assembly constituencies of Jhalawar. The patwar circles Panwasa, Mandawar, Gordhanpura, Lawasal Badodia, Asnawar and Dungargaon are attached to the Khanpur constituency, the revenue circle Ganeshpura forms part of the Pirawa constituency, Pachbahar revenue circle has been included into Dag constituency and the rest has been left for Jhalarapatan constituency.

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divided into three broad regions. The first region consisting of Ganganagar, Bikaner, Churu, Jhunjhunu, Sikar, Nagaur, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, Barmer and Jalore is largely a dry region. The second region which is the plain region consists of six districts, Alwar, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Tonk, Ajmer and Pali. The third region mostly comprising of the rocky terrain consists of the districts of Sirohi, Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara, Chittorgarh, Bhilwara, Bundi, Kota, Jhalawar and Sawai Madhopur.

II

THE ELECTORATE

Rajasthan was divided into 16 double member and 138 single member assembly constituencies in 1952 and 38 double member and 95 single member constituencies in 1957. In 1962 the double member constituency system was abolished and the State was evenly divided in respect of voting strength in 176 assembly constituencies. The number was raised to 184 during 1967 elections. As the table below would show there has been a continuous rise in the voting consciousness of the people in Rajasthan. In the first two elections the increase in voting consciousness seems to be marginal; but in the subsequent elections it has registered a substantial increase.

TABLE I

Voting Consciousness

Year	Total electorate (in lakhs)	No. of electorate voted (in lakhs)	% votes polled	Increase in voting consciousness	Increase in consciousness taking 1952 as base
1952	75.02	33.37	44.5	-	-
1957	87.46	40.8	46.1	+ 1.6	+ 1.6
1962	103.28	54.32	52.6	+ 6.5	+ 8.1
1967	122.09	71.04	58.2	+ 5.6	+ 13.7

Note. For first and second general elections number of persons who exercised the voting right has been taken for measuring the increase in voting consciousness and not the total votes polled by taking into consideration the single and double member constituencies. But in all other tables only votes polled are considered.

One could venture to suggest here by way of a descriptive hypothesis that the increase in voting consciousness has been the cumulative result of not one but several factors, the more important of which can be identified as better accessibility of polling booths, simplification of voting procedures, the establishment of the panchayati raj and, finally, political campaign and activity both by political parties and candidates.

Range of Percentage Turn Out

It is also interesting to note that increase in turn out had been largely distributed over the constituencies which have, therefore, simultaneously registered an increase in their voting turn out. Table 2 shows the increase in percentage turn out and the range of its spread over the constituencies. As one can see there were about 35% of the total constituencies where the voting turn out was 30% or less during 1952. In 1957 elections only 8% constituencies fell in the category and their number was further reduced by 2.3% during 1962 elections. There was no constituency in this category in the 1967 general elections. In 1952 elections about 81% constituencies fell in the category of having a voter turn out of 50% or less, while in 1957 there were about 71% constituencies which belonged to this category. This was further reduced to 38% in 1962 and to 25% during 1967 elections. Thus it could be said that by 1967, about 75% of the constituencies had more than 50% of the electorate voting in their respective areas.

Invalid Votes

The phenomenon of invalid votes has also engaged attention of quite a few researchers in the field. As yet no satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon has been offered. Generally, it is supposed to have some correlation with the educational status of the voter. But, as evident from table III, this does not hold good at least in the case of Rajasthan. In the district like Jodhpur where the literates are 18.6% of the total population, the percentage of rejected votes was as high as 10% of the total votes in 1962. Similarly, in the districts of Alwar, Bharatpur and Jaipur where the percentage of literacy is quite high, one witnessed the phenomenon of the percentage of rejected votes being higher than the average of Rajasthan.

	No. of constituencies	Percent	Range	No. of constituencies	No. of constituent communities
percent					
	10		60		.00
					.00
			7		'20
			8 1'		61
			1		
and above					00'00

TABLE III
Invalid votes compared to Average Number of contestants per seat in the district and to the literacy level

Region and District	1957			1962			1967	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Average No. of contestant per seat	% rejection of vote to the total electorate	Average No. of contestant per seat	% rejection of vote to the total electorate	Average No. of contestant per seat	% rejection of vote to the total electorate	% literate and educants to total population* (1961)
I. Ganganagar								
Bikaner	31	19	39	24	5.2	2.7	16.8	
Churu	52	5	7.5	3.4	8.5	3.1	23.2	
Jhunjhunu	43	30	4.8	2.8	6.2	3.3	18.1	
Sikar	44	40	4.6	3.0	5.1	2.5	18.7	
Nagaur	58	19	4	3.0	4.3	3.5	15.7	
Jaisalmer	39	25	4.4	2.8	4.1	2.5	13.3	
Jodhpur	20	Neg.	5.0	2.3	5.0	1.6	8.1	
Ba mer	56	3.2	5.0	10.0	4.4	2.5	18.6	
Jalore	36	2.2	3.6	2.2	3.8	2.4	7.5	
	36	0.4	4.4	2.8	4.0	4.2	8.0	
II. Alwar								
Bharatpur	34	0.3	5.3	3.3	6.5	3.7	15.3	
Jaipur	38	0.7	6.2	3.8	7.5	4.1	15.2	
Tonk	38	1	6.4	2.2	5.3	2.4	18.5	
Ajmer	30	5.6	4.0	2.6	4.0	1.8	11.4	
Pali	41	3.3	6.1	2	5.2	2.3	25.3	
	55	6.6	5.9	3	4.6	3.1	13.7	

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
III. Sirohi	2.0	1.7	4.3	2.4	5.0	4.5	13.9
Udaipur	3.1	2.2	3.6	2.0	3.3	2.8	13.6
Dungarpur	2.3	Neg.	3.7	3.9	3.3	3.2	10.4
Banswara	2.0	Neg.	3.0	3.5	3.3	4.3	8.8
Chittorgarh	3.6	2.0	3.7	2.2	4.0	2.4	12.6
Bhilwara	4.3	1.0	5.0	3.0	3.9	2.5	11.2
Bundi	3.0	1.2	5.0	2.5	4.3	2.0	11.9
Kota	3.1	0.8	5.0	2.3	4.9	2.1	19.1
Jhalawar	2.0	2.1	4.4	2.4	4.0	2.9	13.6
Sawai Madhopur	3.8	3.1	4.5	4.5	5.6	2.7	12.7
Rajasthan	3.7	2.5	5.1	2.9	4.8	2.9	15.2

Neg = Negligible

* Census of India 1951 Vol. XIV—Rajasthan—Part II A.

Another explanation that has been offered is that the proportion of rejected votes would increase with the number of contestants. This theory is based on the assumption that more the number of contestants in the field, the more is confusion particularly for the illiterate voter who thus puts the stamp at wrong places. But this also does not hold good as far as the data in Rajasthan are concerned. In 1957 elections, Sikar had on an average 5.8 contestants per seat, while the percentage of rejected votes to the total electorate was only 1.9, while in Bikaner where the average number of contestant per seat happened to be 5.2 per seat, the percentage of rejection of votes was as high as 7.5. The reasons for invalid votes are thus to be sought elsewhere. Perhaps the efficient conduct of election and guidance by the officials at the polling booths may be a factor to be reckoned with.

Women Voters

Women in Rajasthan are very active on the domestic front as also in agriculture and cottage industries. The same does not hold good on the political front. In the first general elections there were only four women candidates and all lost security deposits. But in the subsequent bye-elections two were successful. In 1957 there were 21 women candidates out of which only 9 won the election. In 1962 there were 16 candidates and only 8 could win while in 1967 there were 19 candidates but only 6 were successful. The limited number of women candidates may be taken as indice of traditional apathy to women-participation in politics. It is heartening to note, however, that in the constituencies where women are contestants the over all turn out of voters has been comparatively high not merely of womenfolk but also of male voters. Though this could not be calculated for all the elections we give below the results of 1962 elections.

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TABLE IV

	Turn out		Total turn out
	Men	Women	
In all constituencies	62.6	38.6	52.6
In constituencies from which			
women candidates contested	64.5	47.3	56.1

Source : Report on General Election, 1962, Election Department, Rajasthan.

Table V gives the district-wise turn out of votes by sex and relates it to the number of contesting women candidates in each district in the last three general elections. It is to be noted that in the third region, except for Dungarpur and Banswara where the women turn out is substantially high, other districts have shown a turn out of women voters below 46%. In 1967 elections while in region I except for Jaisalmer, Barmer and Jalore, the women voters' turn out had been more than 45% ranging between 26% to 67%, in the second region the women turn out is almost in the range of 52% to 68%. The same trend is visible in the other two elections also, though perhaps in a less pronounced manner. The region I barring Jodhpure, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Jalore is mostly Jat dominated area. While in region II Alwar, Bharatpur and a portion of Jaipur again is Jat dominated. The high percentage of turn out of women voters may atleast be partially attributed to this factor, as among the Jats there is a sense of equal partnership among men and women. Similarly, the III region's comparatively lower turn out may be due to its domination by scheduled tribes and sheduled castes. All these explanations are just hypotheses which need further probe and analysis.

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TABLE V

Percentage turn out of voters during II, III and IV General Elections by sex and woman candidates,

Region and District	1957			1962			1967*			Women Candidates						% Literate Women in Total women population					
	M		T	M		F	T	M	F	T	1957		1962				C	W	C	W	
	F	(1)		F	(5)						C	(11)	C	W	C						W
	(2)	(3)		(4)	(6)						(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(12)						(13)
I. Ganganagar																					
Bikaner	63.9	50.2	57.2	69.7	56.8	63.4	68.9	55.9	62.8	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	6.6			
Churu	49.6	28.1	42.0	51.9	38.9	48.3	57.0	45.8	51.6	1	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	12.5			
Jhunjhunu	54.2	29.5	42.6	64.2	50.8	57.8	68.7	58.0	63.4	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	8.2			
Sikar	54.0	43.2	40.6	69.3	52.2	61.2	65.6	66.8	66.1	2	1	1	1	1	1	—	—	5.5			
Nagaur	57.4	39.7	48.3	63.6	53.4	58.5	64.3	61.6	63.0	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.7			
Jaisalmer	57.8	41.5	50.1	60.7	47.5	54.2	67.2	61.0	64.1	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	—	4.9			
Jodhpur	45.1	21.3	34.4	47.6	26.1	38.3	41.4	25.9	34.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.0			
Barmer	50.6	30.3	40.7	64.9	62.0	58.9	64.2	53.8	59.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9.1			
Jalca	44.7	17.1	32.5	55.8	21.0	39.3	52.7	33.0	43.8	1	—	1	—	1	1	1	1	1.6			
	39.4	18.8	29.6	52.6	27.6	40.6	56.7	37.4	47.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.8			
II. Alwar																					
Bharatpur	59.2	30.5	46.4	70.0	51.2	61.4	69.5	52.4	61.3	2	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	4.9			
Jaipur	62.1	50.6	56.9	73.9	51.8	63.9	75.1	55.6	66.1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	4.4			
Tonk	39.4	31.2	35.6	64.7	48.9	57.2	61.0	50.2	55.9	3	1	3	1	4	—	—	—	8.3			
Ajmer	52.0	22.1	37.6	75.6	54.0	64.9	73.5	58.0	65.9	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	3.9			
Pali	58.3	33.9	47.0	64.1	47.7	55.9	67.6	57.6	62.6	1	1	3	1	2	1	—	—	13.6			
	50.3	32.3	44.1	55.2	41.6	48.5	62.3	56.2	59.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.9			

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
III. Sirohi	47.5	32.7	39.9	44.4	28.6	36.6	51.2	41.4	46.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.2
Udaipur	51.2	19.0	35.2	61.5	25.1	43.5	70.6	46.0	58.4	1	—	1	1	2	1	5.2
Dungarpur	60.1	33.9	46.7	71.2	53.7	62.3	75.4	67.7	71.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.5
Banswara	59.7	31.9	45.5	72.6	50.5	61.5	79.0	64.8	71.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.4
Chittorgarh	53.9	12.6	33.5	65.5	20.7	43.3	67.4	34.0	51.1	1	—	—	—	—	—	3.8
Bhilwara	50.3	14.5	32.8	56.1	18.9	37.8	61.6	36.6	49.5	1	1	1	1	2	—	3.6
Bundi	45.9	13.4	32.5	55.3	24.2	41.3	63.9	37.4	51.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.9
Kota	50.6	13.5	30.0	62.2	33.4	48.2	65.0	42.2	53.9	1	1	2	1	1	—	7.8
Jhalawar	42.5	29.3	35.6	66.7	23.9	45.8	70.1	34.6	52.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.7
S. Madhopur	52.8	17.5	38.8	60.1	35.8	48.9	60.3	39.6	50.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.1
Rajasthan	52.0	29.3	41.2	62.6	38.6	52.6	65.5	50.4	58.2	21	9	16	8	19	6	5.8

* The data is provisional

M = Male F = Female T = Total of male and female C = Seats contested W = Seats won

Electoral Density and Voter Turn Out

Table VI shows the district wise distribution of seats in relation to the average area per seat in the district which is compared to the percentage turn out of voters. For this purpose the data for the election of 1967 have been taken. This has been done to avoid unnecessary duplication of statistical figures. It has been observed that the change in the seats allotted per district during the last four general elections has not been very significant. Thus the average area per seat in a particular district has not been very much changed.

Rajasthan is the second largest State in the Republic of India, the area of which is 3.42 lacs in kilometers. It would be seen from the table that in the larger constituencies in terms of area the total range of voter turn out has been smaller as compared to the districts of the East of Aravali where the constituencies are comparatively compact. It would be seen that Jaisalmer constituency is the largest in the State (38454.0 sq. km.) and perhaps this is the constituency where the percentage of turn out of voters is also the least (34.4%). Similarly, the constituencies in Barmer district have an average area of 4390.0 sq. km. and the voter turn out is also small in comparison to other smaller constituencies. Broadly speaking, this can be taken as the emerging trend. But it is also to be noted that constituencies in Banswara district have an average area of 1260.0 sq. km. where the turn out of voters is as high as 71.7%. In contrast to this, in Jaipur where the constituencies have an area of 221.6 sq. km., the turn out of voters happens to be only 55.9%. In comparison to this, Bikaner seems to fare better where the average size of constituencies has been 6838.2 sq. km. and the percentage of turn out of votes has been 51.6%. Thus it could be said that the topography and size of the constituency does not seem necessarily to discourage higher percentage of voter turn out, though at the same time their role cannot be ignored altogether. It could easily be hypothesized that the constituency which, in spite of a large size and rocky terrain has, comparatively speaking, a higher percentage of voter turn out, must be having an electorate politically more articulate and conscious or candidates more astute and painstaking in their campaign.

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

TABLE VI

Districtwise electoral density, average area per constituency and the percentage of voter turn out in fourth general elections (1967)

Region & district	Area* (sq. km.) (1961) (in 000)	No. of Elec- torate (1966) (in 000)	Electorate density (No. of electorate per sq. km.)	No. of cons- tituencies	Average area per constitu- ency (sq. km.)	% of voter turn out
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
I. Ganganagar	20.7	621	30	9	2.3	62.8
Bikaner	27.3	272	10	4	6.8	51.6
Churu	16.6	427	25	6	2.8	63.4
Jhunjhunu	5.9	469	79	7	0.8	66.1
Sikar	7.3	541	69	7	1.1	63.0
Nagaur	17.8	634	36	9	1.9	64.0
Jaisalmer**	38.5	70	2	1	38.5	34.4
Joohpur	22.7	523	23	8	2.8	59.2
Barmer	26.3	393	15	6	4.4	43.3
Jalore	12.7	335	26	5	2.5	47.3
II. Alwar	8.4	644	77	10	0.8	61.3
Bharatpur	8.1	695	86	10	0.8	66.1
Jaipur	14.0	1165	81	17	0.8	55.9
Tonk	7.2	294	41	5	1.4	65.9
Ajmer	8.5	533	63	9	0.9	62.6
Pali	12.4	509	41	7	1.8	59.3
III. Sirohi	5.1	202	39	3	1.7	46.3
Udaipur	17.6	849	41	13	1.4	58.4
Dungarpur	3.8	227	60	4	0.9	71.5
Banswara	5.0	263	52	4	1.3	71.7
Chittorgarh	10.4	438	42	7	1.5	51.1
Bhilwara	10.4	521	36	8	1.3	49.5
Bundi	5.6	207	37	3	1.9	51.2
Kota	12.4	500	40	8	1.6	53.9
Jhalawar	6.2	291	45	5	1.2	69.7
Sawai Madhopur	10.5	581	55	9	1.2	50.6
Rajasthan	342.3	12211	36	184	1.9	58.2

* Source : Census of India, 1961 Vol. XIV Rajasthan, Part II A (General Population Tables).

Fatehgarh (revenue circle) has been excluded in 1967 from the only one constituency district of Jaisalmer. As the area of Fatehgarh would not markedly viciate the conclusion, the district as a whole is taken as one constituency.

strategy, techniques and coverage or both. And yet one would easily concede that it is at best a very vague and in no sense an all comprehensive index

However, the above conclusion seems also to be confirmed by relating the electoral density (electorate per sq km) to the percentage of voter turn out. Here also it appears that the higher the density, the higher is the percentage of voter turn out in general. Bharatpur has the highest electoral density and at the same time also has a fairly high percentage of turn out of voters. Thus the size of constituency seems to have a positive co-relation with the voter turn out if one takes other factors as constant.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLL VERDICT

Political parties in Rajasthan are not a creation of pre-independence period except for sporadic Praja Mandal movements in some of the erstwhile princely states. It would not be very wrong to say that the parties in Rajasthan are mostly in extension of already existing parties in erstwhile British India which entered the State to contest elections. Purely local parties have been few²

Table VII shows parties in the field during the four general elections, and seats contested and won by each. An attempt has been made here to identify various parties on the basis of the ideological trends that they represent in politics, which in turn have been delineated with the help of the economic programmes of political parties and the interests that they support at national and State levels. From the table it would be evident that, as one moves towards the fourth general elections one comes across a discernible, though not always strong, trend towards assimilation and amalgamation of political parties. In the first general election there were nearly a dozen parties, excluding the independents, in the field and about five of them put up candidates numbering 28 or more of the total seats in the assembly. By the time of the fourth general elections

2 For example during the first general elections (1952) they were K L P (Krishak Lok party) and K J S P (Krishak Janta Samukta party). The former was a loose organisation of Rajputs, petty feudal lords and the latter was mostly an organisation of Jat peasants.

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

TABLE VII
Seats contested and won by parties through the four general elections

Party and Trend	I 1952		II 1957		III 1962		IV 1967	
	C	W	C	W	C	W	C	W
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1. Congress	160	74- (7)*	176	114- (5)*	176	88	182	99
(Centrist trend)	(25.1)	(50.6)	(26.1)	(67.6)	(19.8)	(50.0)	(20.4)	(48.4)
2. Rightist Trend								
Swatantra	-	-	-	-	93	26	108	49
Jana Sangh	50	8	47	6	94	15	63	22
RRP	59	25	46	17	23	3	-	-
HMS	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
KLP	46	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	161	42	93	23	217	54	171	71
	(25.8)	(26.3)	(14.2)	(13.1)	(24.4)	(30.7)	(19.1)	(38.6)
3. Leftist Trend								
CPI	11	-	23	1	45	5	20	1
CPI (M)	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-
Socialists	52	1	-	-	40	5	-	-
SSP	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	8
PSP	-	-	25	1	22	2	17	-
KMPP	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
FB	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	70	2	48	2	107	12	97	9
	(11.2)	(1.3)	(7.3)	(1.1)	(12.1)	(6.8)	(10.5)	(4.9)

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

the number of political parties has been reduced to only eight, while only three parties can be said to have put up candidates in 25% of total constituencies. If one, however, takes into in the Jana Sangh Swatantra-Janta combine, it would be obvious that the real contest in Rajasthan was largely between rightist and Congressite trends. The latter, though a type by itself, can broadly be described as embodying the centrist strand.

A look here at trend-wise results during the last four general elections will also be worth while. The performance of Congress seems almost uniform except in the second general elections when it scored the highest ever in terms of poll verdict, capturing 119 out of 176 seats (68%). On the average the party has maintained its strength at 50% of the assembly seats. On the other hand the rightist trend has registered an ascending curve. Though initially in the first two elections it showed a downward trend from 52 seats in 1952 to 23 seats in 1957 but in the third general elections it made up the loss appreciably by securing 54 seats which shot up to 71 seats in the fourth general elections. The left trend has registered a slow but somewhat steady progress. While in the first two elections it had 2 seats to its credit, in the third and fourth elections it could secure 12 and 9 seats respectively. But the strength of the left in the assembly is so small that it cannot easily have any tangible impact. Thus it would not be a very unrealistic conclusion to say that, unless the left improves its position to the tune of 25% or so, the assembly politics will tend to weave round the two major trends-the Congressite and the rightist.

The performance at the polls of parties of indefinite ideological shade was almost negligible and as such it does not deserve any special notice here.

The independents are a rather queer lot. The very act of their entering the election arena indicates their political-being. But their political identity is covered in the garb of independents. Many of the independents entered the field either because of sheer frustration and/or well planned strategy of the candidates of political parties. The motivation behind the entry of independents is itself a very interesting phenomenon of study by political scientists. It is assumed in this analysis that all shades of political opinion are

represented by the independents who thus become somewhat ideologically shapeless. In the first general elections the number of independents in the field was, comparatively speaking, small. They were about 37% of the total contestants and secured quite a sizeable number of seats (35) which came to 22% of the total. In the second general elections their proportion to the total contestants was the highest, their number being about 52% of the total contestants, though they could capture 32 seats i.e., only 18% of the total seats. In the third general elections, they were 390, i.e., about 44% of the total contestants, but they could secure only 22 seats which was just 12.5% of the total seats. In the fourth general elections they were about 55% of the total contestants, while their strength was reduced to 8%. One could, therefore, conclude, that while there is no constant downward trend in terms of the number of independent candidates there is a continuous decline in their seat catching capacity. This could be taken as one of the indices of the politicisation of the electorate which seems increasingly to prefer candidates with party labels over independents with no or latent party labels.

SHIFT IN POPULAR VOIE

It is generally assumed that the number of fluctuating and floating voters far exceeds the committed voters in developing countries like India more so in backward States like Rajasthan. And yet, paradoxically enough, one does come across stable pockets of electoral support here, which make one doubt whether a real wedge in one party dominance has been struck in the country or not. Table VIII which throws interesting light on this phenomenon broadly indicates the following trends :

It could be seen in table VIII that Congress, by and large, continues to enjoy substantially stable support base of voters. In the first two elections, the main rival of Congress seems to be Ram

- 3 While consulting this table it should be borne in mind that Congress contested almost all the seats while other rival parties entered election in a selective manner and, therefore, it is natural that the Congress should have secured higher percentage of votes in the districts. Even taking this into consideration, the conclusion arrived at here is not far from the truth.

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

TABLE VIII

Shifts in Voting

Districtwise percentage of votes secured by parties in four general elections.

Region and District	Congress				Jana Sangh			
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1952	1957	1962	1967
(1)	(2)'	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
I. Ganganagar	50.0	47.8	38.0	41.1	1.1	1.3	2.5	3.2
Bikaner	2.9	23.6	28.6	32.7	3.1	1.3	3.7	5.3
Churu	40.7	30.8	37.6	31.1	4.8	7.6	2.6	13.7
Jhunjhunu	37.6	43.6	37.4	42.5	2.1	6.2	2.9	1.7
Sikar	41.5	36.8	38.7	40.2	7.1	6.6	13.4	20.6
Nagaur	43.1	51.4	46.5	41.6	2.9	8.8	3.9	8.1
Jaisalmer	3.8	15.0	58.0	40.9	-	-	-	-
Jodhpur	20.2	38.3	42.7	48.6	0.1	2.0	6.3	18.2
Barmer	23.3	38.3	41.9	49.0	3.8	3.6	0.9	4.7
Jalore	26.2	37.1	43.5	39.0	1.5	2.4	3.8	10.3
II. Alwar	55.6	48.9	43.5	39.9	-	-	3.1	8.7
Bharatpur	37.9	42.3	33.9	28.3	-	0.1	0.6	1.2
Jaipur	46.5	37.9	27.9	34.7	1.7	5.4	13.2	7.3
Tonk	43.9	48.0	30.6	51.2	10.0	-	3.7	-
Ajmer	44.0	48.2	42.9	37.9	12.0	1.6	11.9	17.9
Pali	12.1	40.9	41.4	11.0	3.8	5.3	5.0	-
III. Sirohi	30.0	52.3	49.5	39.0	4.7	-	8.2	8.4
Udaipur	40.4	63.4	47.3	56.4	22.6	11.7	18.5	18.1
Dungarpur	62.1	45.5	48.1	59.1	-	-	-	-
Banswara	35.2	46.5	35.7	48.2	-	-	-	-
Chittorgarh	47.7	46.9	42.0	47.6	34.8	12.5	18.4	17.9
Bhilwara	37.6	48.1	49.7	55.1	10.9	4.5	6.3	9.1
Bundi	22.4	61.0	37.4	42.7	-	5.8	32.2	36.6
Kota	34.7	39.4	46.9	36.9	9.0	35.7	34.9	53.4
Jhalawar	37.7	78.8	55.9	22.3	7.4	-	23.0	26.7
S. Madhopur	50.0	42.4	37.2	41.7	19.1	8.2	22.0	16.2
Rajasthan	39.8	45.2	40.4	41.4	6.3	5.5	9.1	11.7

POLL VERDICT IN RAJASTHAN

Region and District	Swatantra		1952	Communist		Communist (M)	
	1962	1967		1957	1962	1967	1967
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
I. Ganganar		21.6	-	0.9	19.9	0.5	6.4
Bikaner	2.0	9.4		-	5.8	1.0	0.3
Churu		2.7		-	9.6	1.0	4.2
Jhunjhunu	24.6	38.1		18.7	14.3	-	2.4
Sikar	9.4	10.6	-	8.2	14.4	-	4.9
Nagaur	13.5	33.7	-		-	0.5	-
Jaisalmer	-	53.1	-	-	-	-	-
Jodhpur	0.7	22.5	1.5	3.6	2.3	0.4	0.2
Barmer		18.8				0.6	-
Jalore	0.9	36.1	-			-	-
II. Alwar	1.7	12.0	2.2	16.6	18.4	9.1	2.5
Bharatpur	17.2	7.1	-	-	3.3	1.7	-
Jaipur	51.5	44.2	1.8	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.1
Tonk	61.3	44.6	-		-	-	-
Ajmer	24.4	32.3	1.5	4.4	4.5	2.0	-
Pali	20.7	45.2	1.3	3.6	9.1	0.5	3.1
XII Sirchi	-	28.6	-		-	-	-
Udaipur	21.2	17.0	1.6	-	0.9	0.3	-
Dungarpur	47.1	38.0	-	-	1.9	1.9	-
Banswara	18.5	-		-	-	-	-
Chittorgarh	2.0	9.3	-	-	-	-	0.3
Bhilwara	5.1	12.8	0.8	3.2	2.5	-	0.7
Bundi	2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kota	2.2	-	-		-	-	-
Jhalawar	0.3	19.0	-		-	-	-
S. Madhopur	24.6	22.6	-	-	0.6	-	-
Rajasthan	17.1	22.5	0.5	3.0	5.4	1.0	1.2

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

Region and District	SSP		PSP			Other Parties			
	1962	1967	1957	1962	1967	1952	1957	1962	1967
	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
I. Ganganagar		10.8	5.3	—	—	3.3	—		—
Bikaner	—	6.5	20.9	20.4	9.5	6.7			—
Churu	—	—	—	0.7	0.7	4.1			
Jhunjhunu	—	—	—	—	—	25.9	4.8		—
Sikar	2.1		—	—	6.6	11.4	15.0		—
Nagaur		—	0.6	—	—	42.3	12.6	3.9	
Jaisalmer		—	—	2.4	2.8	—	—	31.0	
Jodhpur	—	—	5.9	5.1	1.2	0.5	22.6	11.3	
Barmer		—	—			36.5	41.3	13.9	
Jalore		—				16.1	32.4	20.4	
II. Alwar	3.7	11.0				11.0	4.4		
Bharatpur	22.0	23.2			—	1.9	—	—	
Jaipur	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.4	24.3	21.7	3.2	0.3
Tonk			19.3	2.8	—	12.4	14.6	—	
Ajmer	0.2	0.3	—	—	—		8.4	0.2	0.1
Pali	—	—				—	8.9		
III. Sirohi	—		—				17.0	3.1	
Udaipur	0.1	0.9	9.7	4.0	0.3	5.2	5.9	0.8	—
Dungarpur	2.9	—	—		—	—	—		
Banswara	45.8	47.1	—	—	—	11.0	—	—	—
Chittorgarh	4.1	3.2	1.7	4.1	—	—	24.4	—	
Bhilwara		7.5	3.6	3.6	1.5	2.0	27.3	2.4	
Bundi	3.0	7.7	29.7	17.4	6.7	52.1	—	—	—
Kota	7.2	1.2	—	—	—	25.0	—	—	—
Jhalawar	7.4	1.9	—	—	—	34.7	—	—	—
S. Madhopur	—	1.2	—	—	—	6.7	—	3.8	—
Rajasthan	3.7	4.8	2.4	1.5	0.8	11.5	9.9	2.3	0.2

POLL VERDICT IN RAJASTHAN

Region and District	Independents				% of valid votes turn out			
	1952	1957	1962	1967	1952	1957	1962	1967
	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)
I. Ganganagar	45.6	44.7	39.5	16.4	52.8	57.8	63.4	62.8
Bikaner	66.3	54.2	39.5	35.3	43.1	42.0	48.3	51.6
Churu	50.4	61.6	49.5	45.6	45.4	42.6	57.8	63.4
Jhunjhunu	34.4	26.7	20.8	15.3	47.1	49.6	61.1	66.1
Sikar	40.0	33.4	22.0	17.1	40.9	48.3	58.5	63.0
Nagaur	11.7	26.6	32.2	16.1	54.7	50.1	54.2	64.0
Jaisalmer	96.2	85.0	8.6	4.2	27.7	34.4	38.3	34.4
Jodhpur	77.7	27.6	31.6	8.9	46.5	40.7	58.9	59.2
Barmer	36.4	16.8	41.3	26.9	32.6	32.5	39.3	43.8
Jalore	56.2	28.1	26.4	14.6	34.4	29.6	40.6	47.3
II. Alwar	31.2	30.1	29.6	19.8	51.0	46.4	61.4	61.3
Bharatpur	60.2	57.6	23.0	35.8	54.1	56.9	63.9	66.1
Jaipur	25.7	24.4	3.1	12.8	33.7	35.6	57.2	55.9
Tonk	33.7	17.7	1.6	4.2	31.3	37.6	64.9	65.9
Ajmer	42.5	37.4	15.8	9.5	51.7	47.0	55.9	62.6
Pali	82.8	41.3	23.8	10.1	46.0	44.1	48.5	59.3
III. Sirohi	65.3	70.8	39.2	24.0	38.6	39.9	36.6	46.3
Udaipur	30.3	9.3	7.2	7.0	26.6	35.2	43.5	58.4
Dungarpur	37.9	54.5	—	1.0	46.8	46.7	62.3	71.5
Banswara	53.0	53.5	—	2.7	27.4	45.5	61.5	71.7
Chittorgarh	17.5	14.7	19.4	21.7	23.8	33.5	43.3	51.1
Bhilwara	48.7	13.3	30.4	12.5	26.8	38.8	37.8	49.5
Bundi	25.5	3.5	7.9	6.3	23.5	32.5	41.0	51.2
Kota	31.3	24.9	8.8	8.8	23.0	30.8	48.8	53.9
Jhalawar	20.2	22.0	13.4	30.1	44.2	25.6	45.8	69.7
S. Madhopur	24.2	4.4	11.8	18.3	35.5	38.8	48.9	50.6
Rajasthan	41.4	34.9	20.9	16.6	38.2	41.8	52.6	58.2

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Rajya Parishad and Hindu Mahasabha on the one hand and Independents on the other. But in the latter two elections Jana Sangh and the Swatantra have emerged as main rivals in most of the districts. The Congress seems to be much ahead of these parties in terms of popular votes.

One may also evolve a criterion here to find out whether a district, by and large, belongs to a political party, in spite of shifts in popular support. One could assume that if the turn out of voters in a district is progressively increasing in favour of a particular party and if this increase leads to near about 40% increase in the final stage, one can broadly say that the particular party is getting strengthened in that particular district. On the basis of this criterion, Tonk, Udaipur, Banswara, Chittorgarh, and Bhilwara can be broadly called Congress districts, while Kota, and to a lesser extent, Bundi can be said to be Jana Sangh districts. The Swatantra party came in the field only in 1962 and, therefore, it would not be possible to apply the criterion to it. Jaipur, Tonk, Dungarpur and Sawai Madhopur which are said to be Swatantra party dominated districts have registered a decrease in their support to Swatantra in 1967 as compared to 1962, while in Ajmer, Pali, Jhunjhunu, and Jalore the Swatantra has substantially improved its position since 1962. As far as other political parties are concerned except in the case of Banswara which has very substantial SSP base, no single political party other than Congress, Jana Sangh and Swatantra can claim to have won the support of a substantial majority. Regarding the Independents also, no reasonably strong trend identification can be made here.

(iii) Further, as stated earlier also, the higher turn out may be taken as one of the indices of intensive political activity within a district. For example, the percentage of voter turn out in the first two general elections in Sikar district has been 47.1% and 49.6% respectively. But in the next two elections it has increased to 61.1% and 66.1% respectively. The change in voting techniques, opening of more polling booths and such other facilities may have also helped in increasing the voter turn out, but they would be more or less a constant factor in all the districts. Thus the increase in voter

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turn out in Sikar may be attributed to the increased political competitiveness and the consequent intense political activity within the district. The same may be true of Nagaur where the voter turn out steadily increased from 41% in 1952 to 63% in 1967.

(iv) It would also be interesting to find out who really gets advantage of increased voter turn out and at whose expense. It would not be possible to attempt a trend analysis in regard to all the districts in Rajasthan. A few districts are being picked up by way of case studies here. Let us take Sikar again. In 1952 the voter turn out was about 41% with Congress getting 41.5%, Jana Sangh 7.1%, other parties 11.4% and Independents 40.0%. When valid vote turn out rose to 48.3% in 1957 the changed distribution pattern was Congress 36.8%, Jana Sangh 6.6%, Communist 8.2%, other parties 15% and Independents 33.4%. Here Congress, Jana Sangh and Independents appear to have lost by about 11.5% to the advantage of Communists, a new entrant in the fray, and other parties. Similarly, it could be said for the other two elections also.

Analysing this trend broadly one finds that except Tonk, Udaipur, Bhilwara and Chittorgarh, the Jana Sangh and Swatantra seem to have gained at the cost of Congress on the one hand and the Independents on the other*. This is more true of Banswara and Bharatpur where the gains of SSP appear to be due to the decline of the hold of Independents in those areas. Though Congress also has not been able to keep its position intact here but decline in popular votes in their case is less than the decline in the case of the Independents.

The increasing proportion of Independents to the total contestants may also be explained by the fact that major political parties in their effort to neutralise the minor interest or caste groups of the constituencies may put up candidates from such groups (presumably at their own financial cost) and thus divert the uncertain elements

4. If one takes into consideration the fact that Independents are heavily losing ground in all the districts, the Swatantra & Jana Sangh may be said to have gained largely at their cost.

among the electorate and consolidate their own support base.⁵

Candidate Voting Trends

In table IX below an attempt has been made to make a trend analysis of the number of candidates and the percentage of votes secured by them. Column 34 to 41 give the analysis of consolidated figures. It would be seen that winning candidates in the general elections have secured on an average less percentage of votes than in the first elections. But in the third and fourth general elections the trend seems to have reversed. This may be attributed to the political competitiveness and the intensity of campaigning during the third and fourth general elections. Among the defeated candidates the number of those who got less than 5% of the valid votes polled rose from 28.7% in 1952 to 50.6% in 1967, with a lower trend in 1957. As would be seen from the columns between 26 to 33, this is mainly due to the increasing number of Independents in this category. As stated elsewhere also, it seems that with the increasing political consciousness and the intensive political campaigning, the voters have tended to ignore the Independents. Among the elected candidates in the Independents category during the first general elections about 60% of them secured votes between 51% to 70%, while in the second general elections more than 60% of the elected candidates got votes between 11% to 50%. Thus it has shifted to a lower range of percentage of votes secured. Again, in third and fourth general elections, the position has been reversed. And the elected candidates have again got higher percentage of votes.

Analysing the data ideological trendwise, the majority of the elected candidates of the Congress party were elected on the 21 to 50% basis. This trend continued in the second general elections also, while in third and fourth it progressively improved its position

5. It was pointed out in an interview with one of the leading Congress candidates in Churu district that 50% of election is won if one has properly laid out the electoral strategy considering the composition of the electorate at the time of the nomination itself. He also pointed out the need of proper handling of interest or caste groups and the consequent requirement of so manipulating the nominations as to neutralize the opposing sections. The Independents play a very important role in this game.

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TABLE IX

Contestants by Trend and Range of percentage votes secured

Range of % votes	Congress								Rightist Trend							
	1957				1962				1967				1972			
	E	D	F	D	E	D	F	D	E	D	F	D	E	D	F	D
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
5 and less	3 (4.0)			1 (1.7)					19 (15.7)		12 (17.1)		52 (31.9)		6 (6.0)	
6 to 10	1 (1.4)			2 (3.5)					29 (24.0)		14 (20.1)		31 (19.0)		8 (8.0)	
11 to 15	4 (5.4)		1 (0.9)	7 (12.3)					16 (13.2)		12 (17.1)		22 (13.5)		10 (10.0)	
16 to 20	6 (8.0)	12 (16.2)	13 (11.4)	12 (21.1)	4 (4.5)				1 (2.5)		2 (8.7)		9 (5.5)		14 (14.0)	
21 to 30	18 (23.0)	20 (27.1)	29 (25.4)	16 (28.1)	15 (17.1)		3 (3.4)	24 (25.8)	4 (10.0)		7 (15.7)		27 (16.6)		21 (21.0)	
31 to 40	9 (12.0)	26 (35.1)	16 (14.1)	13 (22.8)	20 (22.7)	38 (43.2)	12 (13.5)	46 (49.5)	14 (11.6)	5 (1.7)	4 (30.5)		9 (16.7)		6 (8.5)	18 (18.00)
41 to 50	16 (21.3)	8 (10.8)	27 (23.7)	6 (10.5)	29 (31.8)	30 (34.1)	30 (33.7)	16 (17.1)	11 (27.5)	4 (3.3)	5 (21.7)		13 (24.1)		21 (29.6)	23 (23.0)
51 to 60	16 (21.3)		18 (15.8)		29 (33.0)	1 (1.1)	30 (33.7)		14 (35.0)		4 (17.4)		17 (31.5)		29 (40.9)	
61 to 70	8 (10.7)		4 (3.5)		8 (9.1)		10 (11.2)		6 (15.0)				10 (18.5)		13 (18.2)	
71 to 80	2 (2.7)		3 (2.6)		2 (3)		4 (4.5)		2 (5.2)				5 (9.2)		2 (2.8)	
81 and above			3 (2.6)		1 (1.1)				2 (5.0)							
Total	75 (100)	74 (100)	114 (100)	57 (100)	88 (100)	88 (100)	89 (100)	93 (100)	40 (100)	121 (100)	23 (100)	70 (100)	54 (100)	163 (100)	71 (100)	100 (100)

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Range of % votes	Leftist Trend										Independents									
	1957					1967					1972					1977				
	E	D	E	D	L	D	E	D	E	D	E	D	E	D	L	E	D	E	D	L
(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)					
5 and less	22 (32.4)		4 (8.4)	40 (42.1)			46 (52.3)		94 (43.3)		107 (34.6)		250 (67.2)		303 (72.0)					
6 to 10	25 (36.8)		14 (30.4)	16 (16.8)			12 (13.6)		47 (24.2)		76 (24.6)		45 (17.2)		51 (12.2)					
11 to 15	13 (19.1)		10 (21.7)	8 (8.4)			10 (11.4)		25 (12.9)		1 (3.1)		25 (6.8)		25 (6.2)					
16 to 20	7 (10.3)		9 (19.6)	12 (12.6)			9 (10.2)		12 (6.2)		6 (18.7)		40 (12.9)		16 (4.0)					
21 to 30	1 (1.4)		7 (15.3)	11 (11.6)			6 (6.8)		14 (7.2)		11 (34.4)		22 (4.5)		18 (3.8)					
31 to 40			1 (2.3)	7 (7.4)			3 (3.4)		7 (3.6)		2 (6.3)		12 (13.6)		9 (2.4)					
41 to 50			1 (50.0)	1 (1.1)			2 (2.3)		5 (2.6)		5 (15.7)		5 (1.6)		5 (33.3)					
51 to 60			1 (50.0)	5 (41.6)			10 (28.6)		10 (12.5)		4 (12.5)		10 (45.5)		3 (20.0)					
61 to 70			1 (50.0)	2 (16.7)			11 (31.4)		11 (3.1)		1 (3.1)		2 (13.3)		2 (6.7)					
71 to 80							5 (14.3)		5 (3.1)		1 (3.1)		1 (6.7)							
80 and above							2 (5.7)		2 (5.7)		1 (3.1)									
Total	2 [100]	68 [100]	2 [100]	41 [100]	12 [100]	95 [100]	9 [100]	88 [100]	35 [100]	194 [100]	32 [100]	302 [100]	22 [100]	368 [100]	15 [100]	421 [100]				

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Range of % votes secured	Total					
	1952		1957		1962	
	E	D	E	D	E	D
	[34]	[35]	[36]	[37]	[38]	[39]
	[40]	[41]	[42]	[43]	[44]	[45]
5 and less						
6 to 10						
11 to 15						
16 to 20						
21 to 30						
31 to 40						
41 to 50						
51 to 60						
61 to 70						
71 to 80						
80 a. 1 above						
Total						

E=Candidates Elected
D=Candidates Defeated
Figure in brackets are percentages in the column totals

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and the majority of winning candidates (65%) secured 41 to 60% and about 68% in the fourth elections came in the same range. Among the defeated Congress candidates 10% in 1952 and 15% in 1957 secured less than 15% votes. In third general elections there was no candidate in this category and in the fourth there were only two. Similarly, one may also add that increasing percentage of defeated candidates falls in the higher range of votes secured, thus indicating narrow margin of votes by which they were defeated. It would also be seen that substantially high percentage of them come within the range of 31 to 50 per cent of the votes secured which also has been, broadly speaking, the average winning range. From this trend it could be inferred that the choice of candidates in the case of the Congress has not been made just haphazardly, but the winning potential of the candidates has also been given due weight along with so-called factional and other considerations.

The same does not appear true of other political parties. The candidates of parties of the rightist trend in the first two elections won securing lower range of percentage. In second general elections about 40% of elected candidates could secure less than 30% of votes. But in third and fourth elections they also improved their position. Among the defeated candidates one finds that in the first three elections the majority of them were within the range of less than 15% votes and even in fourth general elections about 25% belong to this category. This may be due to lack of a well thought out plan for putting up candidates on the part of rightist parties or want of experience on the part of party elite or shortage of good candidates available to them.

About the parties of the leftist trend the elected candidates are so small that no definite emerging trend can be seen. But most of the defeated candidates, about 80%, have got less than 20% of the votes polled in their respective constituencies. About the Communist party it can be said with certainty and about two other left parties with near certainty that they put up candidates for spreading their ideology, irrespective of their mass base. This may also be partially true of parties of rightist trend. It may also speak of paucity of resources on the part of parties of the left trend to mobilise the voter.

Loss of deposits

In table X an attempt has been made to support further the inferences drawn above by showing party-wise position in regard to loss of deposits during the last four general elections. Loss of deposit is a prestige issue in elections and every serious candidate desires to secure at least the minimum percentage of votes required to save his or her deposit. The degree of loss of deposit may also be taken as a measure of popularity of a party. If one takes this view, one finds among all the parties only the Congress as having had least casualties in terms of loss of deposits the maximum loss of deposits in its case being 2.27% in the third general elections which have been further reduced to 1.64% in the fourth general elections. Further, the progressive decline in the loss of security deposits in absolute terms may be taken as an index of the increasing popularity of a particular party. In that sense Jana Sangh and Swatantra have improved their position considerably. 60% of the Jana Sangh candidates in 1952 lost their deposits, while they could reduce it to about 16% in 1967. Similarly Swatantra which entered the electoral arena in 1962 reduced its margin of loss of deposits from 37% to about 18% in 1967. But the process appears to be in the reverse gear in regard to parties of the leftist trend. As far as Independents are concerned, the loss of deposits curve has been showing a continuous increase since 1952, standing at 53% in 1967.

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TABLE X
Trend and Partywise position in regard to Loss of Deposit during Fourth General Elections.

Trends and Political Party	1952					1957					1962					1967				
	No. of con- testant	No. of candi- dates lost	Col. [3] as % deposits	Col. [3] as % to Col. [4]	No. of con- testant	No. of candi- dates lost	Col. [6] as % deposits	Col. [6] as % to Col. [5]	No. of con- testant	No. of candi- dates lost	Col. [9] as % deposits	Col. [9] as % to Col. [10]	No. of con- testant	No. of candi- dates lost	Col. [12] as % to Col. [11]					
I. Congress	160	Nil	0-00	0-00	176	2	1-14	1-14	76	4	2-27	2-27	182	3	1-64					
II. Jana Sangh	50	30	60-00	60-00	47	26	55-32	55-32	94	55	58-51	58-51	63	10	15-87					
Swatantra	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	93	34	3-56	3-56	108	19	17-59					
RRP	59	NA	—	—	46	—	—	—	23	13	52-52	52-52	—	—	—					
HMS	6	NA	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	6	85-71	85-71	—	—	—					
KLP	46	NA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—					
III. CPI	11	11	100-00	100-00	23	13	56-52	56-52	45	25	55-56	55-56	20	16	80-00					
CPM	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{	{					
Socialist	52	38	73-08	73-08	—	—	—	—	40	25	62-50	62-50	21	19	90-48					
SSP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—					
PSP	—	—	—	—	25	10	40-00	40-00	22	14	63-64	63-64	38	19	50-00					
KMPP	6	3	50-00	50-00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	15	88-24					
FB	1	NA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—					
IV. Independents	229	185*	—	—	339	221	62-24	62-24	390	322	82-56	82-56	436	361	82-80					
V. Undecided	7	NA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	6	100-00					
Total	627	277	44-18	44-18	656	262	39-94	39-94	890	498	55-96	55-96	892	490	54-93					

* This includes loss of deposit by candidates before election.

* This includes loss of deposit by candidates by all other parties for which separate data is not available and is indicated by NA at the appropriate places.

THE EMERGING TRENDS

It will be worthwhile in the end to attempt a summing up as to identify future trends in the life story of political parties in Rajasthan. As is shown earlier also the local rightist parties K.L.P., R.R.P., H.M.S. and the like have been eliminated and the sentiment and the interest represented by them have been ultimately consolidated in the broad based all India rightist parties, the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra. But in the case of the parties of the leftist trend it seems that they have tended more or less to move in tune with all-India pattern of splitting and amalgamation. In this respect a strange phenomenon is visible that, while the rightist parties have shown a trend towards consolidation, there is among the left a tendency towards balkanization. Another important point about these trends is that, while there is not only an electoral alliance between Jana Sangh and Swatantra but there also seems to be a long range working unity among them, the left, in spite of Dr Lohia's anti-Congress unity plank, could forge no electoral alliance and in many constituencies two rival Communist parties have been contesting against each other.

One may suspect a possible drift to regionalism in the future party politics of Rajasthan. Up to the third general elections, there seems a trend towards elimination of the local groups and the involvement of broad based national level parties in the Rajasthan politics. In the fourth general elections, however, the emergence of local groups has been witnessed. One could cite by way of examples the Janta party of Kumbharam Arya and the organized but scattered trend among Minas, Jats, Gujars and the like to assert themselves. The consideration for local candidates has also gained strength during fourth elections.⁶ It is also too well known that efforts at emotional integration of Rajasthan whether at the hands of the Congress or Swatantra parties have not borne fruit; it is still a case of political integration only. There is also the possibility of the business community of Rajasthan now spread over

6. The defeat of Ram Niwas Mirdha and Mukti Lal Modi is mainly attributed to this fact.

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Bengal, Assam and Bombay, staging the proverbial return of the native and that also smitten by regional frenzy. The business community is already getting involved in Rajasthan politics; this may only grow with the passage of time.

Thus the growing regional attitude within Rajasthan itself may give rise to local groups and parties which in turn may be supported and patronized by the business community on the one hand and the princely houses of the regions on the other, unless the progressive forces whether in the Congress or in the left actively work to counter the rising trend. If affairs were allowed to drift as of today with apathetic attitude of the Congress and negative attitude of the left parties, the fifth general elections may witness a plethora of regional parties in the field.

B. M. KAUSHIK

1967 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE UNION TERRITORIES

An attempt to divide the country into various administrative units on a rational and sound basis was made in 1956,¹ when under the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, provisions pertaining to the Part A, B, C, and D States mentioned in the First Schedule were repealed and there were created instead fourteen States and six Union Territories.² It was stipulated that the Union Territories (hereafter identified as UT) would be administered directly by the Centre so that their separate identity is maintained and their special problems tackled more effectively. While they were not to have separate legislatures of their own, the territories were provided for an adequate representation in Parliament.³ Subsequently, the accession of the former Portuguese territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli to the Union of India on 11 August, 1961 and the absorption of Goa, Daman and Diu on 20 December, 1961 necessitated the tenth and the twelfth amendments in the Constitution respectively to include them in the First Schedule as UT.⁴ With the *de jure* transfer of the former French Settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam to the Union of India affected by the ratification of the Franco-India treaty of 28 May, 1956 by the French government on 27 July, 1962, Pondicherry was made into a UT through

1. See The States Reorganization Act, 1956 (Act 37 of 1956) in the *All India Reporter*, Indian Act Section, Vol. 43, 1956.
2. These were : Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Andman and Nicobar Islands, and Laccadive, Minicoy and Aminidivi Islands.
3. Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura were allocated 5, 4, 2, 2, seats in the Lok Sabha respectively. Besides, representation in the Rajya Sabha was also given. The two groups of Islands were to be represented by one nominated member each.
4. Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Goa, Daman and Diu were listed as the seventh and eighth UT in the First Schedule. They were to be represented in the Lok Sabha by one and two nominated members respectively.

the fourteenth amendment in the Constitution.⁵ The demand for the Punjabi Suba led to the reorganization of the former State of Punjab and on 1 November, 1966 the UT of Chandigarh came into being.⁶ Thus, while on the eve of the second general elections in 1957, there were only six UT's at the time of the third and fourth general elections, these were seven and ten respectively.

Besides the increase in the number of UTs another very significant development that took place during the interregnum between the third and the fourth elections was the enactment of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963.⁷ It marked a major shift in the Centre's hitherto policy of keeping the UT under its direct administration. Separate legislatures having thirty elected representatives and not more than three nominated members were provided for each of the UT of Manipur, Tripura, Pondicherry and Goa, Daman and Diu. Popular governments, conforming to the pattern of former part C States, were set up on 1 July, 1963 in four of the UTs viz., Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Pondicherry, where in each Territorial Council in the first three and the Representative Assembly in the fourth one was converted into a legislature.⁸ For counting the period of five years—the stipulated life of legislatures in the UT—the legislatures were deemed to have come into existence on 3 August, 1962 in Himachal Pradesh and Manipur, on 1 August, 1952 in Tripura and on 25 August, 1959 in Pondicherry.⁹ The first ever elections were held in the UT of Goa,

5. Pondicherry was listed as the ninth UT in the First Schedule and given one seat each in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

6. Chandigarh, thus, became the tenth UT with one seat in the Lok Sabha.

7. For details see The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (Act 20 of 1963) in the *All India Reporter*, Indian Acts Section, Vol. 50, 1963, pp 47-59. It got the assent of the President on 10 May, 1963.

8. In each of the UT of Himachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura, Territorial Councils were provided for through the Territorial Councils Act, 1956. The State of Pondicherry (Representation of the People) Order, 1956 provided for a Representative Assembly in that state after its *de facto* transfer to the Union of India in 1954.

9. n. 7-Part V, Sec. 54 (3). Subsequently, the elections to the thirty-member legislature was held in Pondicherry on 23 August, 1964 when Congress secured 22 seats, Communist-sponsored People's Front 4 seats and the rest 4 went to Independents. (*Asian Recorder*, Vol. X, 1964, p. 6042).

Daman and Diu in December 1963 to elect two representatives for the Lok Sabha and thirty members for the legislature. Later on, the strength of the legislature in Himachal Pradesh was revised upwards to sixty and a Metropolitan council was provided for the UT of Delhi.

With the allocation to Pondicherry one seat each in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, the outer limit of twenty representatives to the Lok Sabha from all the UT had to be revised. In the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution it was fixed at twenty five and provision was made for elected members from those UTs which were hitherto represented by nominated members.¹⁰ It was, thus, only in 1967 that for the first time elections were held in all the ten UTs to elect their quota of representatives to the Lok Sabha and in some of them for their own legislatures.¹¹

II

In five of the eight UTs under the purview of this paper¹² the 1967 elections were held for one seat each allocated to them in the Lok Sabha.¹³ Except Pondicherry, which was already repre-

10 For details, see The Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962 in the *All India Reporter* Indian Acts Section, Vol 49, 1962. Its main provisions were (i) insertion of Act 239-A, (ii) Pondicherry listed as ninth UT in the First Schedule, (iii) Representation (outer limit) in the Lok Sabha from UT raised from 20 to 25 elected members.

11 The 1967 elections in the UTs were held for

	Lok Sabha	Seats	&	56 M C	Seat
Delhi	7		&	60 L A	,
H P.	6	,	&	30 L A	,
Manipur	2	„	&	30 L A	„
Tripura	2		&	30 L A	„
Goa, Daman & Diu	2	„	&	30 L A	„
Pondicherry	1	,	&	L A continues	
Chandigarh	1	,	&	no L A	
Dadra-Nagar Haveli	1	,	&	„ „	
Andman Nicobar	1	,	&	„ „	
Laccadives	1		&	„ „	

12 The present paper is confined to a study of 1967 general elections in 8 UTs only, as Delhi and Himachal Pradesh have been covered separately in this volume.

13. See n., 11.

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sented by an elected member, for the rest of them it was the first ever opportunity to elect their representatives.¹⁴ The electorate in the two groups of islands and the former Portugese territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, had no election experience,¹⁵ and eventually the party politics as it exists in the rest of the country was conspicuous by its absence there. They had remained almost cut off from the general stream of national life and politics. The smallest electoral district of India of which the people of Laccadives can justly feel proud of has an all-Muslim tribal population. In this scheduled tribe-reserved constituency with an electorate of barely 14,505, five candidates (all of them Independents, there being no political party in the territory) vied with one another for the coveted position of becoming the first elected M.P. While the campaigning was kept limited to the local issues only, it was nonetheless brisk. There being hardly any walls in the territory, instead of posters, huge cloth banners were tied from one coconut tree to another.¹⁶ Thus, the plank for electioneering seems to have been personal appeal and contacts with the electorate rather than an ideological debate on national issues, for which neither the voters nor the contestants were really prepared. However, the voting behaviour of these tribals for whom "time has stood still for a century and more",¹⁷ was quite interesting as well as intriguing. A polling percentage as high as 82 can be favourably compared with that of a highly politicized society anywhere. One major factor for this was probably the small size of the electorate, with certain polling

14. Chandigarh was made into a UT just on the eve of 1967 elections. Prior to this the area that now forms the UT of Chandigarh having an electorate of barely 76,232 was but a very small part of the Hoshiarpur constituency of the former state of Punjab having nearly 5 lakh electorate.

15. Of course, leaving aside, for example, the elections to the Varishitha Panchayat in free Dadra and Nagar Havel. (From 1955 when it was freed from the Portugese colonial rule by the local people without the help of the Indian army or police to August 1961 when it acceded to the Union of India and was made a UT the administration of the territory was looked after by the Varishitha Panchayat).

16. *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 6 February, 1967, p. 1.

17. *Ibid.*, 16 February, 1967, p. 8.

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booths for as low a number as 50 voters.¹⁸ But it was certainly not the only factor. The voter's enthusiasm for the first ever exercise of their right of vote was also a factor¹⁹, and they vindicated it by keeping the invalid votes to a very low level at 0.76% "In a keen, friendly campaign, mostly based on local issues", P. M. Sayle, a twenty-six year old law student (and the only English knowing contestant in the constituency) defeated his nearest rival A. A. Thangal, a supporter of the government and a member of the Advisory Council for the UT by a margin of 386 votes.²⁰ Out of the rest, two lost their deposits (see table 1). Curiously enough, the sitting M P N Koya (nominated) did not contest. In view of the fact that the Centre has been magnanimous to the people of Laccadives who are a happy lot enjoying several privileges which are very rare in the rest of the country,²¹ it can hardly be explained why neither the the sitting M P. preferred to cash upon it nor the pro-government candidate could do it

- 18 The islet of Bitra, one of the 20 islands comprising the UT of Laccadives, was the smallest polling station for 50 voters only

The proposition that the poll percentage is inversely proportional to the size of the electorate is best illustrated by the fact that in the largest of these ten inhabited islands in Minicoy, the polling was lowest at 61.3%, while in a comparatively very small island, Kiltan, the polling was recorded at the highest 87.2% (*The Hindustan Times*, 19 February, 1967, p. 7)

- 19 *Ibid* see, for example the UNI reporting from Trivendrum

"The enthusiasm of the voters was evident from the long queues formed in front of the polling booths some three hours before polling started. Within four hours more than 40% of the electorate had recorded their votes

In this all-Muslim Scheduled Tribes constituency, separate booths had been provided for men and women and according to reports received here women vied with men to exercise their franchise."

20. *Ibid* , 23 February, 1967, p. 9

- 21 *Ibid.*, 5 February, 1967, p. 1 According to a PTI reporting, some of them are . "The entire territory is tax-free-they do not pay any tax to the government; the people are given 14 oz of rice per day as against 5 to 8 oz. given in other parts of the country, cost of higher education of all students is compensated through scholarships, medical treatment is free; sugar and kerosene are available in plenty."

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Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the second smallest electoral district with an electorate of 29,564 only, is also a scheduled tribe-reserved constituency. Having been represented by a nominated member since it was made into a UT in 1961, the 1967 elections provided the people of the largely tribal inhabited territory with a total population of 57,963, to exercise their right of franchise for the first time. Curiously enough, all the five contestants for this seat were sponsored by all-India political parties, some of which started their activities in the territory at the time of its liberation from the Portuguese rule in 1955. Although only 34 polling booths were provided for the voters spread over 72 villages comprising the UT, the polling was very high, 78%. However, the quantum of rejected ballot papers was unusually high—highest amongst all the UTs and so adversely comparable to the otherwise parallel case of Laccadives (see table 1). The Congress candidate won with a comfortable majority securing over one half of the total votes. The rest half were divided into the rightist and leftist parties in a 1:3 ratio approximately. With the exception of the CPM candidate who received 20% of the votes polled, the rest of them all, viz., the Swatantra, BJS and PSP candidates forfeited their deposits.

In the third smallest parliamentary constituency, that of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the contest was an almost one-sided affair without much of the electioneering probably due to the fact that the territory remained uninvaded by political parties. Although there were six candidates in the area to claim the favour of the 47,064-strong electorate for the first ever elections in this UT which was hitherto represented by a nominated member (turned Congressman), it was a tame affair for the Congress candidate who secured over one half of the total votes polled and defeated his nearest rival (an Independent) by over 10,000 votes (securing 19,310 as against 9,270). While the rightist forces were represented by a Swatantra candidate and there was also a DMK supported Independent (although both of them lost their deposits and received 18% votes only), strangely enough the leftist parties kept away from this group of Islands in the 'Bay of Bengal'. The polling percentage in the male-dominated constituency was very high (see table 1). Given

TABLE I
Lok Sabha Elections in the Union Territories with one seat each.

The Territory	Name of the constituency GEN ST/SC	Male voters		Valid votes Invalid votes % rejection	Total conten- tants	Parties	Results — Party-wise					% votes
		Total votes polled % polling	Female voters votes polled % polling				Conten- tants	Seats won	Security lost	Votes polled		
1. Andaman and Nicobar Islands	Andaman- Nicobar (Gen)	32,386 14,678 47,064		36,732	6	INC Swat Ind *	1 1 4	1 0 0	0 0 3	19,310 1,717 15,705	52.57 4.67 42.76	
2. Chandigarh	Chandigarh (Gen)	45,057 31,175 76,232		49,155 674 155	10	INC Akali-M BJS CPI-M Ind	1 1 1 1 6	0 0 1 0 0	0 0 0 1 6	11,323 10,258 23,939 1,580 555	23.04 20.87 48.70 3.21 4.18	
3. Dadra and Nagar Haveli	Dadra Nagar Haveli (ST - RFS)	14,653 14,911 29,564		21,248 1,896 819	5	IND Swat BJS CPI-M PSP Ind.	1 1 1 1 1 5	1 0 1 0 0 1	0 1 1 1 1 2	10,654 1,948 869 4,248 3,529 11,807	50.14 9.17 4.09 19.99 16.61 100.00	
4. Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi Islands	Laccadive Minicoy & Amindivi (ST - RFS)	7,606 6,899 14,505		11,807 90 76	5							
5. Pondicherry	Pondicherry (Gen)	106,654 110,035 216,689		155,872 3,321 205	3	INC PF Ind	1 1 1	1 0 0	0 0 0	63,286 42,725 52,861	39.83 26.89 33.27	

(Figures based on the Election Commissions' Report on Fourth General Elections)

* Includes one DMK-supported candidate who received 4,891 votes i.e., 13.32% and forfeited his deposit.

INC—Indian National Congress, Swat—Swatantra, Akali-M—Akali Dal (Master Group), BJS—Bharatiya Jana Sangh
CPI-M—Communist Party of India (Marxist), PSP—Praja Socialist Party Ind.—Independents, PF—People's Front.

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the rugged terrain of these Islands²², it speaks of the enthusiasm of the inexperienced and largely illiterate Islanders to vote. What is more important to note is that the percentage of invalid votes remained unexpectedly very low.

Although the 1967 elections in the UT of Chandigarh and Pondicherry were held only to elect one member of Parliament from each of them, their case was radically different from that of the three UTs referred to above. The electorate in the territories were experienced in electioneering and the various political parties already had a sound base there. Being the capital town of the former State of Punjab, Chandigarh had been the hub of State politics and in Pondicherry elections were held (on party basis) even before the former French Settlements were transferred to India *de jure* and made into a Union Territory in 1962.²³ Having come into existence just on the eve of the fourth general elections and in the face of a bitter debate and rival claims made by the States of

22. It necessitated the setting up of as many as 123 polling stations in the Islands with a distance of some five hundred nautical miles separating the northernmost from the southernmost. Chaingneh and Pulkunji in the Great Nicobar were the smallest polling booths for only seven and nine voters respectively. It was a job for the election staff; they had to cover the elections there in one day—in one case they had to travel (along with ballot boxes) for more than 30 hours by motor boats and canoes to reach the booth. (See *Ibid.*, 13 and 18 Feb., 1967).

23. The former French Settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam were *de facto* transferred to the Union of India on November 1, 1964. A Representative Assembly was provided for under the provisions of the State of Pondicherry (Representation of the People) Order 1955 and the first ever elections were held in July 1955. Congress bagged 20 out of a total of 39 seats but the subsequent floor-crossings resulted into the dissolution of the assembly and the direct administration of the Chief Commissioner on 28 October, 1958. Later, in a bid to have an elected legislature and a Council of Ministers, elections were held on August 11–14, 1959. In the 39-member assembly, Congress bagged—21, People's Front—13, PSP—1 and Independents—4 seats (*Asian Recorder*, Vol. 5, 1959, pp. 2865–66, 2894).

Punjab and Haryana,²⁴ it was quite natural that the question of its future status should have dominated the election campaign in Chandigarh—a constituency with a predominantly educated urban electorate.²⁵ For the majority of the voters as well as the contestants, the Chandigarh elections were a sort of an ‘Opinion Poll’.²⁶ The ten candidates in the field included the nominees of Congress (sitting Congress M.P. A.N. Vidyalankar from Hoshiarpur, 1962), the Jana Sangh, the Akali Dal (Master Group), the Communist (Marxist) and six Independents. The Jana Sangh candidate’s plank i.e., the continuance of “status quo”, was subscribed to by the local trader, the industrialist, the property owner and the University teacher. Besides, the Hindus by and large, were opposed to its transfer to Punjab. The Akali candidate, on the other hand, fought

24. In the Punjab reorganization process, in 1966, the three-man Boundary Commission had allocated Chandigarh, by a majority vote, to Haryana. The protagonists of Punjabi Suba reacted to it sharply and with a view to avoiding strife, the Government of India made it a UT and Haryana accepted the decision without protest. The local population welcomed the new arrangement. But Punjab did not reconcile to Chandigarh being out of it. The Akalis, who received support of the State Congress, pressed Punjab’s claims on the town. Akali leader Sant Fateh Singh and a few of his supporters threatened to burn themselves to death, if Chandigarh and some other areas were not transferred to Punjab. As a result of that agitation, the involved parties agreed on Dec. 26, 1966 to refer the Chandigarh dispute and other inter-State issues to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for arbitration. Mrs. Gandhi’s award is yet to come. Meanwhile, Haryana’s claim on the basis of over 70% of the Hindi speaking population in Chandigarh as was evident from the 1961 census was pressed, and the Chief Minister Bhagwat Dayal Sharma made it known more than once that the people of Haryana would not accept anything else than the P.M.’s arbitration on the issue. *The Hindustan Times* 25, January, 1968, p. 8).
25. Out of a total electorate of nearly 76,500 Chandigarh city alone accounted for 60,000 including 20,000 government employees and their families. The vote-composition in the constituency was : about 80% rural, 27% government employees and their families, and less than 30% Sikhs (see *Ibid.*)
26. See, for example, a report from Chandigarh dated Jan. 24, 1967. “The poll issue here is none, except a categorical expression on the future mould of Chandigarh. All other matters have been pushed into the background. Every candidate faces the question, “What is your stand on Chandigarh ?” and every voter insists on getting an unambiguous reply”. (*Ibid.*)

the election mainly to "register the number of persons who want Chandigarh to go to Punjab"²⁷ An Independent, (Mrs.) Sudarshana Sharma, who left her government job (she was a headmistress) to fight the elections on the issue of the merger of Chandigarh with Hariyana, later withdrew in favour of the Jana Sangh candidate (Of course she did not withdraw within the time limit) Notwithstanding the large number of candidates in the field, the fight for the 'prestige seat' turned into a triangular one. The left communist and the six Independents lost their deposit and accounted for only 7.39% of the total votes (see table 1) The Hindu vote was unequally shared by the Jana Sangh and the Congress candidates (who fought on the official line to keep the issue out of elections) and the Akali could not muster even all the Sikh votes That the Jana Sangh got nearly one-half of the total votes in the keen contest does not necessarily indicate that the territory is a Jana Sangh pocket. However, it does vindicate the mind of the Chandigarhites in favour of the 'status quo'.

The people of Pondicherry are mainly pro-Congress In a by-election held on October 4, 1963 Congress captured all the three seats²⁸ raising its strength to 26 out of a total of 39 member Representative Assembly. In the elections held on August 23, 1964 for the 30-member legislature as provided for under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, Congress gained absolute majority by winning 22 seats²⁹ While the life of legislature still continues (at the time of the fourth general elections it was only 2½ years old), elections were held for one Lok Sabha seat which was previously held by a Congress man The contest was triangular between the Congress, the Communist-sponsored People's Front and an Independent candidate³⁰ The campaign was quite brisk and

27. Quoted in *Ibid*

28 *Asian Recorder*, Vol. 9, 1963, p. 5538 The Congress retained one seat and wrested two seats from the Communist-sponsored People's Front.

29 *Ibid*, Vol. 10, 1964, p. 6042.

30 The three candidates were : the President of the Pondicherry Congress Sethuraman, Subbiah of the Right Communist party having come to an electoral understanding with the Tamilnad Toilers' party fought as a Peoples' Front candidate; and Setakopan, the Independent candidate was supported by the DMK. See *The Hindustan Times* of February, 1967, p. 6).

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the polling very high (see table I) Congress, having polled nearly 40% of the votes vindicated the contention that the territory still remained a Congress pocket and that the leftist forces were yet to show their mettle

III

Ever since 1952, general elections have been regularly held in the UT of Manipur and Tripura (part-C States before 1956) on party basis and it is quite natural, therefore, that the 1967 elections for the two Lok Sabha and thirty legislative assembly seats in each of them should have testified to the maturity of the electorate. There has, in general been a see-saw game between the Congress and the leftist parties as is evidenced in Table II showing the party wise loyalty of the voters in the UTS as it existed at the time of the second and the third general elections. However, it is not all as simple, particularly so in the case of Tripura where it has been a tough-going between the Congressites and the Communists in their attempts to win over electorate which comprised of the tribals, the 'sons of the soil', and the ever increasing influx of refugees from East Pakistan³¹. While the refugees in general seem to have favoured the Congress the tribals have been the supporters of the Communists, and the swing in the popular votes secured by the two parties³² should have been caused by a concomitant swing in the refugee votes as part of the total votes³³.

³¹ Out of total of 6,05,701 in Tripura the tribals accounted for nearly one-third the refugees from East Pakistan nearly one half and the balance of about a lakh of voters being the 'Sons of the Soil', neither tribals nor refugees. (*The Hindustan Times*, 15 February 1967 p. 7)

³² 'Percentage wise the Congress increased its share of popular votes from 36% in 1952 to 45% in 1957 and 1962. The Communists started with 60% in 1952, slumped to 45% in 1957 but staged a partial recovery in 1962 when they obtained 51% of the total vote. *Ibid* Compare to the one obtained in 1967 with Congress getting 51% and the Communists 42% (Table III)

³³ The landslide victory of the Congress in the 1967 elections can be attributed to the Maharaja of Tripura entering into the arena as a Congress candidate for the Lok Sabha. A wholesome chunk of tribal votes which may have normally gone to the Communists were thus diverted to the Congress.

TABLE II
1957 and 1962 Lok Sabha Elections in Manipur and Tripura

The Territory	Seats		Major Parties		Contestants		Seats won		Votes polled		% of total votes polled	
	57	62			57	62	57	62	57	62	57	62
Manipur	2	2	Congress		2	2	1	1	48,687	81,800	27.96	30.93
			Communists		1	1	0	0	19,298	21,503	11.08	8.13
			PSP		2	1	0	0	12,692	10,909	2.29	4.12
			Other Parties									
			& Independents		6	7	1	1*	93,414	150,355	53.65	56.82
Tripura	2	2	Congress		2	2	1	0	253,241	136,586	46.01	42.81
			Communists		2	2	1	2	248,442	163,623	45.31	51.27
			PSP		0	1	0	0	—	6,302	—	1.98
			Other Parties									
			& Independents		3	2	0	0	48,675	12,574	8.84	3.94

(After: *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 9 January, 1967, p. 9).

* Socialist Party won this seat.

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TARI F III

1967 Lok Sabha Elections in the Union Territories with two seats each

The Territory	Male voters		Valid votes	Invalid votes	Total contestants	Results — Partywise					
	Total votes	% polling				Parties	Contests	Seats won	Security lost	Votes polled	% votes
1. Goa, Daman and Diu	2,64,922		2,77,786		16	INC	1	0	1	15,205	5.47
	2,13,472		8,264			CPI	1	0	1	5,753	2.07
	4,18,394		2.89			PSP	1	0	1	5,337	1.92
	2,86,080					UG-I	1	0	1	1,714	
	64.37					UG-S	2	1	0	1,00,137	3.67
2. Manipur	2,57,246		3,15,162		10	Ind.	10	1	8	1,49,640	53.57
	2,45,803		9,634			INC	2	0	0	1,03,010	32.68
	4,83,049		2.97			SSP	1	0	1	18,411	5.84
	3,24,796					CPI	1	1	0	91,131	28.92
	67.24					Ind.	6	1	4	1,02,610	32.56
3. Tripura	3,23,582		4,38,758		4	INC	2	2	0	2,55,583	58.25
	2,78,382		11,763			CPI-M	2	0	0	1,83,175	41.75
	6,01,964		2.61								
	4,50,521										
	74.84										

(Figures based on the Election Commission's Report on Fourth General Elections).

INC—Indian National Congress. CPI—Communist Party of India (Right). PSP—Praja Socialist Party.

UG-F—United Goans-Furtado Group. UG-S—United Goans-Sequeira Group. SSP—Samyukta Socialist Party.

CPI M: Communist Party of India (Marxist) Ind —Independents.

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

It was a case of an extra-ordinary understanding amongst the leftist forces to have united into a strong monolith (United Left Front) against the Congress on the eve of the 1967 elections.³⁴ The task for the Congress was to maintain its majority in the legislature and to add to its dwindling strength in the Lok Sabha by defeating the sitting Communist M.Ps.³⁵ It was just *vice versa* for the ULF. The contest was well planned. While the Congress contested all the 30 assembly seats and the two Lok Sabha seats, (see tables IV and V), the constituent units of the ULF challenged all the Congress candidates consequent upon an agreement on the division of seats amongst themselves.³⁶ Moreover, the campaign was conducted from one platform, and but for 27 candidates (Jana Sangh=5; SSP=1. Swatantra=1, and Independents 20) in the field for the various assembly seats, it was a grim battle between the ULF and the Congress.³⁷ However, the votes were not wasted by the matured electorate of this UT-almost all the 27 candidates that were not supported by the ULF lost their deposits and accounted for a very negligible share of the total votes (see table IV).

That the Congress, which was not in a much happier position before, gained in its over-all strength in the 1967 elections in the

³⁴ The United Left Front was forged by the two factions of the CPI—the Right and the Left—and the breakaway Tripura Congress. Unlike in other States, the ULF remained free from bickerings—the alliance of the leftist parties worked fairly smoothly (n. 31).

³⁵ Before the 1967 elections, the picture precisely, was
 Lok Sabha (2) both with CPI (Marxist)
 Assembly (30)—Congress=18
 CPI =11
 Speaker = 1
 (for details see, *India 1966*),

³⁶ There was a complete agreement on the distribution of the 30 assembly seats. CPI (left)=13, CPI (right)=7, Tripura Congress=4, Tapshil Jati Parishad—3; and Independents (supported by ULF) 3. For the two Lok Sabha seats, the two sitting M.Ps. belonging to CPI (left) were facing the Congress challenge in a straight fight (n. 31).

³⁷ In the two Lok Sabha and 11 assembly constituencies the ULF and the Congress were engaged in straight contests while in seventeen constituencies it was a triangular contest (n. 31).

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TABLE IV

1967 Lok Sabha Elections in the Union Territories with two seats each (Constituency-wise details).

The Territory		Name of the constituencies (GEN/ST/SC)	Total votes % polling	Valid votes Invalid votes % Rejection	Total contestants	Parties	Results — Partywise				
							Conts. won	Seats won	Security lost	Votes polled	% votes
1 Goa Daman and Diu	1	Panjim (Gen)	2,01,836 (1,44,891) 77.78	1,39,754 5,137 3.55	8	INC CPI PSP UGP UGS Ind*	1 1 1 1 1 3	0 0 0 0 0 1	1 1 1 1 2 0	15,205 5,753 3,827 1,714 45,810 54,327	10.88 4.12 3.82 1.23 32.78 39.36
	2	Mandrem (Gen)	2,16,558 (1,41,459) 65.19	1,33,032 3,127 2.22	5	INC CPI Ind	1 1 1	1 1 0	0 0 6	83,705	60.64
2 Manipur	1	Inner Manipur (Gen)	2,63,495 (2,04,785) 77.72	1,96,340 5,405 2.67	4	CPI INC Ind	1 1 2	1 0 0	0 0 2	91,131 74,148 34,041	45.72 37.0 17.08
	2	Outer Manipur (ST - RIS)	2,19,554 (1,20,008) 54.66	1,15,842 4,166 3.47	6	INC SSP Ind**	1 1 4	0 1 1	0 1 2	28,862 18,411 68,569	24.91 15.89 59.20
3 Tripura	1	Imphal West (Gen)	2,96,292 (2,23,765) 75.52	2,18,165 2,657 2.53	2	INC CPI-M	1 1	1 0	1 0	1,25,965 92,143	57.75 42.25
	2	Imphal East (ST - RIS)	2,26,750 (74,18)	2,20,650 6,106 2.67	2	INC CPI-M	1 1	1 0	0 0	1,29,618 91,032	58.74 41.26

(Figures based on the Election Commission's Report on Fourth General Elections).

* The Independent candidate who won the Panjim seat secured 56,764 votes i.e. 40.2% of the electorate

** The Independent candidates who won the Outer Manipur seat secured 30,403 votes i.e. 26.25% of the electorate. (Abbreviations as in Table II)

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TABLE V
Legislative Assembly Elections in Union Territories.

The Territory	No. of seats GEN/ST/SC	Male voters		Valid votes Invalid votes % Rejection	Seats contes- ted	Total contes- tants	Parties	Results — Partywise				
		Total votes	Female voters Votes polled % polling					Contes- tants	Seats won	Security lost	Votes polled	% Votes
1. Goa, Daman & Diu	30	2,04,528	2,74,911				MG	26	16	2	1,11,110	40.40
	Gen.	2,13,476	10,650		30	226	UG-F	6	0	5	7,881	2.88
		4,18,404	3.73				UG-S	30	12	8	1,04,426	38.00
		2,85,571					PSP	8	0	7	3,033	1.10
2. Manipur		68.25					Ind.	156	2	148	48,471	17.63
	21	2,31,310	3,12,015	29*		156	INC	28	15	3	1,01,504	32.53
	Gen.	2,37,397	11,843				SSP	12	4	3	36,520	11.70
	9 ST-RLS	4,68,707	3.66				CPI	6	1	1	17,062	5.47
	Total—30	3,23,858					CPI-M	5	0	5	2,093	0.67
		69.10					PSP	5	0	5	2,417	0.77
3. Tripura		3,23,568	4,33,692		30	87	Ind.	99	9	61	1,52,419	48.85
	18-Gen	2,82,366	16,642				INC	30	27	0	2,51,345	57.95
	3-SC-RES.	6,05,934	3.70				BJS	5	0	5	1,506	0.35
	9 ST-RES.	4,50,334					SSP	1	0	1	83	0.02
	Total—30	74.32					CPI	7	1	0	34,562	7.97
							CPI-M	16	2	0	93,739	21.61
						Ind.	28	0	21	52,547	12.10	

(Figures based on the Election Commission's Report on Fourth General Elections).
 * One seat, ST-RES was not contested — the seat went to Congress candidate unopposed
 MG = Maharashtrawadi Gumanak Party Rest of the abbreviations as in Table II.

territory even after receiving a serious jolt through the formation of the rebel Tripura Congress and that the leftist forces were almost swept off at the polls in spite of their un-precedented unity and their usual hold over the larger chunk of the electorate, is not only strange but baffling. It can be explained on three grounds : first, as stated earlier also, the drafting of the royal party added influence and strength.³⁸ The left CPI leader, Dasarath Deb, who had retained the Tripura East Lok Sabha constituency since 1952 was defeated by the young Maharaja by a comfortable margin of about 39,000 votes. The traditional respect of the tribals for the monarchy thus played its part. Moreover, the main burden of the Congress campaign was on the Maharaja, besides the Chief Minister S. L. Singh who was seeking re-election alongwith all of his cabinet colleagues. The Maharaja made "inroads into tribal votes which were hitherto cast solidly for the Communist."³⁹ Secondly, the new delimitation of the constituencies, through which the general votes were systematically separated from the tribal votes thus making them more compact, went in favour of the Congress.⁴⁰ Thirdly, the Congress campaigning machinery was geared afresh in a bid to defeat the Communist lest they should indulge in subverting activities in this territory of strategic importance.⁴¹ All these efforts were successfully vindicated when after a peaceful and heavy polling, the Congress party bagged 27 out of 30 assembly seats and both the Lok Sabha seats (see table IV and V).

In the UT of Manipur as well, the challenge to the Congress came largely from the leftist parties but, unlike as in Tripura, they fought the elections on their own and not as a United Front. In the absence of an electoral understanding amongst the various opposition parties, the non-Congress vote was divided and consequently the

38. *ibid.*, 31.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. Tripura, on the southwest of Assam, is surrounded by East Pakistan on three sides.

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ruling party⁴² retained a working majority in the assembly in spite of a meagre 32% of the total votes in its favour, (see table IV). While in Tripura most of the contests were either straight or triangular, in case of Manipur every seat was contested by 5 to 7 candidates. The presence of an unusually high number of Independents in the field (they were 99), who bagged nearly one half of the total votes polled (see table IV), blurred the whole picture making it difficult to ascertain the comparative influence of the Congress *vis à-vis* leftist forces over the electorate of Manipur. Moreover, because of the large number of Independents, the campaign was restricted mostly to personal appeal and contacts. The electioneering was quite brisk except in the "ceasefire areas" where it was restricted to a whisper campaign for fear of the under-ground Nagas who boycotted the elections.⁴³ In spite of the terror created by the armed hostile Nagas,⁴⁴ the polling, which had to be spread over to four phases in this picturesque valley due to its hilly and rough terrain, was quite high and although the non-Congress vote was divided, the ruling party, to its dismay, could muster only a marginal majority (16 out of 30) in the assembly and lost both the Lok Sabha seats to a Communist and an Independent each. This can be explained only in terms of the personal influence of the various contestants rather than on the basis of the influence of the leftist forces or of the Congress in general. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the political awareness in the people of Manipur is comparatively at a lower level than that in their counterpart of Tripura.

42. On the eve of the 1967 elections the party position in the Manipur legislative assembly was :

Congress — 20 ; SSP — 3 ; Independents — 6 ; Speaker — 1 ; Nominated — 2 ? thus making a total of 32. Besides, both the Lok Sabha seats were with the Congress (See *India, 1966*)

43. *The Hindustan Times*, 6 February 1967, p. 1.

44. See *Ibid.*, 21 and 22 February, 1967. The Nagas opened fire in the Northern area with automatic weapons, killing two persons in one case, and forcing the voters to run back for safety. The army had to be sent to Tengnoupul sub-division on the Burma border and polling postponed in its second phase for a few days.

IV

The 1967 elections in Goa, Daman and Diu stand apart as a case by itself, particularly in view of the "merger" issue that dominated the politics of the UT ever since it was liberated by the Indian army in December 1961.⁴⁵ While a majority of the Goanese have been in favour of a separate entity for the territory⁴⁶ on account of its separate culture, traditions, religious and linguistic composition,⁴⁷ the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) that came into being after the liberation⁴⁸ on an initiation and with active support of the Maharashtra leadership, has all through worked for the merger of Goa with Maharashtra and that of Daman and Diu with Gujarat. The issue got crystallized at the time of the first elections (December 1963) held in the territory under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. Although the 1963 elections were not held to determine the future status of Goa, yet the MGP "gave the campaign a twist of a referendum sort to it" and the United Goans Party (UGP) came on the scene scarcely two months before the date fixed for elections to answer a desperate need of opposing the MGP manoeuvres.⁴⁹ The Goa Congress

45 For a detailed study of the "merger politics" in Goa, Daman and Diu as it existed before the Opinion Poll of January 1967, see Esteves, Sarto "Goa and its Future", Bombay, Manaktalas, December, 1966.

46 This stand was later vindicated in the Opinion Poll held in January 1967

47 See n 45 above

A. Religion-wise break-down

Hindus 3,88,654 61.2

Catholics 2,30,997 36.3

Other Christians 51

Muslims 14,716

Buddhists 18

Other religions 145

Without religion 3

2.5 approximately

B. Mother-tongue

Konkani .. 89.10./; Gujarati 5.74./

Marathi 1.67./; Portugese 1.46./

C. Sex Ratio in the territory is above 100. Out of a total population of 6,34,584, there are 3,06,753 males and 3,27,828 females.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 97. "Until the liberation day there were no political organizations and hardly a single seasoned politician in Goa."

49. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

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(provincial unit of the AICC) stood for the maintenance of the 'status quo' for ten years. In sum, about 56% of the total votes polled were "against the parties that made the merger any time in the near future an issue at the elections,"⁵⁰ but the MGP with only 40% of the popular votes was successful in forming the first popular government with the support of the PSP.⁵¹

The pressure from the party in power (MGP) which had fought the 1963 elections purely on the "merger" issue and the resolution and counter-resolution passed by the Maharashtra and Mysore legislatures,⁵² forced the Centre to go back on their earlier decision of keeping Goa as UT for 10 years in the first instance and thereafter to decide the issue through ascertaining the wishes of the

50. *Ibid* , p. 106.

51. The results were :

Parties	Seats contested	Seats won	Deposit lost	Votes polled	Votes
MG	27	14	4	1,00,117	40.13
UG	24	12	5	74,081	29.69
INC	30	1	18	43,100	17.28
Front Popular	8	0	6	4,589	1.82
Ind.	60	3	52	27,648	11.08
Total..	149	30	85	2,49,494	100 00

(After *Ibid*. p. 105 & *Asian Recorder*, Vol. 10, 1964, Pp. 5609-10)

—Two PSp candidates who won and supported the MGP fought the elections as Independents.

Besides various efforts for merger, of significance are :

- (i) A non-official resolution adopted by the Goa assembly on January 22, 1965.
- (ii) An official resolution passed by Maharashtra legislative assembly on 10 March, 1965.
- (iii) A non-official resolution passed by the Mysore legislative council on 12 March, 1965.
- (iv) Maharashtra PCC'S Nagpur resolution of 13 December, 1964.
- (v) A resolution adopted at Goa-Maharashtra Merger Convention held in Panjim on 23 May, 1965.

(For details see *Asian Recorder*, Vol. 11, 1965).

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people of Goa.⁵³ Consequently, the Goa, Daman & Diu (Opinion Poll) Bill was introduced on 21 November, 1966. In the face of a stiff opposition by the UGP,⁵⁴ the Bill was passed by the Parliament and the Presidential assent given to it on 11 December, 1966. With a view to conducting the Opinion Poll in a "free" atmosphere, the Goa legislative assembly was dissolved and the President's rule promulgated in it on 3 December, 1966. The poll was held on January. 16, 1967 with 'flower' and 'two leaves' as the symbols for mergerites and anti-mergerites respectively. Interestingly enough, the voters of Goa cut across the religious barriers and the verdict was in favour of the "status quo". It was a sharp rebuff to the pro-merger elements in Goa and the manoeuvres of the Maharashtrians, besides an ample testimony of the electoral maturity of the Goanese.⁵⁵ It was unfortunate, therefore, that the mergerites should

53. This decision was based on the Congress Parliamentary Boards' Resolution dated April 7, 1964. (For details see, *Asian Recorder*, Vol. 10, 1966, p. 6167).

54. Dr Furtado, President of the UGP opposed the Bill strongly and later went up to the Supreme Court to challenge it (see *Hindustan Times*, 28 Nov., 1966 and 5 Jan., 1967). In a statement issued before the poll, Dr Furtado said, "Goans will never forget that the 10 year moratorium prescribed by no less a person than the late Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to decide the future of Goa and other solemn promises held out to them were thrown to the winds by the Union Government under pressure from Maharashtra and the political pantomime, miscalled opinion poll, that is set for January 16, is a sordid betrayal of the pledged word (Quoted in *Ibid*, 3 January.

55. 1967, p. 8). The poll of 16 January, 1967 aroused much interest in the Goanese which is explicit in a massive turn out of 82 %. The final results were: Total electorate = 3,88,392; total votes cast = 3,17,633; invalid votes = 7,272 votes for merger = 1,38,170, votes for UT = 1,72,191. (*The Hindustan Times* 20 January, 1967).

In spite of the fact that "the merger side was actively very unfairly supported by gigantic forces from outside Goa..." (Purshottam Kokodkar, President of the Goa, Daman and Diu Territorial Congress Committee as quoted in *Ibid*, p. 6), the mergerites could claim majority only in 11 out of 16 Hindu-majority constituencies. The voters in Daman and Diu were mainly for the 'Status quo'. (See for details *Asian Recorder*, Vol. 13, 1967 p. 7540).

For an excellent analysis of the voting behaviour of the Goanese and the problem of Maharashtra's having taken an undue interest in the question of 'merger' see the editorial in *The Hindustan Times*, 20 January, 1967, p. 6-7 specially the following :

have alleged the polls as rigged.⁵⁶

It was precisely with such a political profile in the background that the 1967 elections were held in the UT of Goa, Daman and Diu. Moreover, the scramble for power led to factionalism in both the major political parties of Goa : the Goa Shetkari Kamkar Paksh (GSKP) was formed by the dissidents of the MGP just on the eve of the elections, while the United Goans (Furtado Group) broke away from its parent body, UGP a little earlier and later came into headlong clash with the UGP (Sequeira group). The Goa Territorial Congress, under a directive from the High Command, did not fight the assembly elections but most of its office bearers were in the arena as Independents. The PSP fought the elections on its own this time and not in cooperation with the MGP as before. Thus, unlike as in the 1963 elections, the Goan voter this time had a very difficult choice to make—from more candidates and from a multiplicity of parties. Out of a total of 226 in the field, the UGS had 30, the MGP 26, GSKP 14, the UGF 6, the PSP 8, the Social and Democratic party 12 and the rest stood as Independents. (see table V). Similarly, for the two parliamentary seats, there were as many as 16 contestants in the field including the sitting PSP member, Peter Alvares (see table III). In the elections that were held on March 28, 1967 the polling was comparatively poor—68% as against 71% in 1963. This testifies to a dampening of the voters' interest who had to go to the polls thrice in forty months.

“If the people of Goa have decided to deliver a sharp rebuff to Maharashtra, it is, partly at any rate, Maharashtra's own fault. In its enthusiasm to obtain total integration of the Maharashtra personality, the people of the State, with conspicuous assistance from its government, could not avoid giving the impression of hustling the territory's merger. But for Maharashtra's impatience, there was no reason why the late Mr. Nehru's solemn assurance in 1962 of 10 years of Central administration in Goa should have been brushed aside. The Goans' verdict today in favour of remaining under the Union government's administration may even be evidence of an electoral maturity. Voting behaviour in India is not necessarily as predictable along communal lines as it is often made out to be..”

⁵⁶ See Chief Minister Bandekar's statement in *The Sunday Standard*, 22 January, 1967, p. 4. Also see a resolution passed by the MGP to this effect (*The Hindustan Times*, 4 February, 1967, p. 7).

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The MGP, which gave up its 'merger' plank in pursuance of the Opinion poll⁵⁷, brought home victory with a clear majority (16 out of 30 as against 14 out of 30 in the 1963 elections) and maintained its share of popular votes at 40%. While the Furtado faction of the UG was almost swept away (with no seats in the assembly and five of its six contestants losing their deposits), the Sequeira group fared extremely well. It gained in its share of the popular votes (38% as against 30% in 1963) and retained its 12 seats. PSP accounted for a bare 1.1% of the popular votes and a host of Independent candidates (156) which included a good number of Congressites could bag only 2 seats with a total of 17.63% of the total votes polled to their credit (See table V). The results of the parliamentary seats were in conformity with the general trend that emerged from the assembly results. It was a major set back for the sitting M.P. Peter Alvarus of PSP who lost his deposit and the seat which he held in the third Lok Sabha went to an Independent backed by MGP. He defeated his nearest rival, a UGS candidate, by nearly 11,000 votes in an eight cornered contest (See table VI). The Congress which fought the elections for the Lok Sabha seat only could get a bare 5.47% of the total votes polled in the territory, and its candidate lost his deposit. The Marmagao seat was bagged by the 28-year old son of the leader of UGS, Dr Jack de Sequeira, who defeated the 7 Independents in the field including one backed by MGP (see table III). Thus, the over all picture remains the same there is an almost even distribution of the voters' favour between the MGP and the UGP⁵⁸ who often transcend the religious barriers at the polls and in spite of being novice in party politics that was unknown to them before 1961, they have emerged as quite a matured electorate.

57 In pursuance of the Opinion Poll verdict the MGP modified its plank by dropping its erstwhile demand for merger. This realistic stand should have won the party many a new supporters but for a statement of the Maharashtra Chief Minister made in the legislature a week before the polls that the Goa issue was not dead which stirred a hornet's nest just on the eve of elections. (See *The Statesman* New Delhi) 28 March, 1967, p. 1)

58 The Goa Congress, the oldest party in the territory having started its work some forty years back under the influence of the A.I.C.C. has almost an insignificant following and accounts for marginal uncommitted votes.

PART FIVE
SELECT CONSTITUENCY STUDIES

NORMAN D. PALMER

ELECTION AND BY ELECTION IN NORTH EAST BOMBAY*

IN 1967, as in 1962, the most widely publicized single contest in the general elections was fought in the northern part of Bombay city. In India it was regarded as perhaps the most important prestige fight, and it was the only contest which attracted any significant international attention at least before the results were known.

While the cast of characters and the circumstances of the North Bombay elections in 1962 and 1967 varied greatly, the central actor in each drama was V. K. N. Krishna Menon, a longtime stormy petrel of Indian and international politics. In 1962, as in 1957, Menon, contesting as the Congress candidate, won handily over distinguished opponents. In 1967 as a "non-party" candidate, Menon was barely defeated by an able but lesser-known Congress nominee, and then, as a kind of ironic anticlimax, when his successful opponent died suddenly shortly after his victory, he was again defeated by a slender margin by a lady of solid qualities but of no significant political standing.

Involved in the 1967 contests, as in that of 1962, were such prestige issues as the influence of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC) and especially of its best-known member, S. K. Patil, veteran Congress leader and the political "boss" of Bombay city, the political position and future of Krishna Menon, the relative strength and influence of the Congress party and major

* The author of this article was in India from early October, 1966, until late April, 1967, chiefly in order to study the fourth general elections. He was in Bombay for most of the period from mid-December until the end of February, and again in late April. He also was in Bombay in 1962 when he made a special study of the election in north Bombay. See Norman D. Palmer, "The 1962 Election in North Bombay," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXXVI (Summer 1963), 120-137.

opposition parties and groups of the left and right; and, in general, the future trends and style of Indian politics.

While many sophisticated reasons may be advanced to explain the out-come of the 1967 elections in North East Bombay, a very decisive explanation may be made on grounds of relatively simple facts of geography and demography. In 1957 North Bombay, a huge area covering 148.1 square miles, comprised one Lok Sabha constituency and six assembly constituencies – Mahim, Parle, Andheri, Bandra, Kurla, Chembur, and Borivli.¹ Before the 1967 elections, in accordance with the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, the North Bombay constituency was divided to take account of population growth. Two Lok Sabha constituencies known as North West and North East Bombay, each with six assembly constituencies, were carved out of North Bombay. North East Bombay, where Krishna Menon chose to stand, consisted of only about half of the former North Bombay constituency, plus two assembly constituencies, Thana and Kalyan, carved out of a part of Thana district, lying just outside the metropolitan area. In these two new assembly constituencies outside of Bombay city the Congress party was strongly entrenched and Krishna Menon had no opportunity to develop a base of political support. As the election results showed, without the Congress majorities in these two constituencies, Krishna Menon would have won his race for re-election, even though he had left and was opposed by the ruling party. This may not have been a deliberate product of Congress "gerrymandering", but it does suggest that relatively accidental and seemingly unimportant factors may affect profoundly the political fate of men and of parties.

Another factor which hurt Menon's chances for re-election was that the great majority of the Maharashtrians in North Bombay were living in the new North East Bombay constituency. Maharashtrians in Bombay have generally been loyal to the Congress party, and Menon's main opponent, the Congress nominee, was a Maharastrian Brahmin. So was the Jana Sangh candidate, the

1 See Aloo J. Dastur, *Menon vs. Kripalani : and North Bombay Election, 1962* (Bombay : P.C. Manaktala & Sons, 1967), Chapter I, "The Constituency."

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only other candidate with any significant political support. This fact both helped and hurt Menon; on the one hand, the Jana Sangh candidate undoubtedly took many Maharashtrian votes from the Congress candidate but on the other he also got many votes from Maharashtrians and others who were opposed to the Congress and who otherwise might have voted for Menon.

II

In its delimited form the North East Bombay constituency extended for some 23 miles, from Kurla and Chembur to Thana and Kalyan. In both area and population it was the largest of the five Lok Sabha constituencies in Bombay city. It is primarily a working class area. Nearly one-third of the voters live in hutment- or slum areas. However, there are many middle class residential areas and even a number of villages (in Thana and Kalyan alone there are some 100 villages). It may, therefore, be described as an urban-rural constituency, with an emphasis on its urban or suburban character.

A break-down of the electorate, numbering approximately 630,000, reveals the predominance of the Maharashtrians and the conglomerate nature of its composition²:

TABLE I

Maharashtrians	320,000
Gujaratis	75,000
South Indians	69,000
North Indians	57,000
Muslims	60,000
Christians	23,000
Sindhis	18,000
Punjabis	8,000

Krishna Menon, who had represented North Bombay since 1952, chose to apply for the Congress nomination for North East Bombay, as did S. G. Barve, I.C.S., a former Finance Minister of

2. The figures are taken from an article by a Staff Reporter, entitled "Spot-light on the Elections: Poll Fight in N.-E. Bombay Will Be Keenest," in *The Times of India*, February 10, 1967. Other sources give substantially similar figures, but with some variations.

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Maharashtra and a member of the Indian Planning Commission, and three other lesser-known persons. If he had been selected again, as he expected, Menon would almost certainly have been elected by a substantial margin; but his position in 1967 was much more vulnerable than it had been in 1962. His greatest supporter, Jawaharlal Nehru, was dead; in November 1962, after the China debacle, he had been removed from the post of Defence Minister of India, and he had been strongly criticized for India's unpreparedness to meet the Chinese attack; since his forced departure from the Cabinet, he had been much less conspicuous in Indian political life, although he continued to sit in the Lok Sabha, travelled extensively about the country and made many speeches, often to large and appreciative audiences, and still received strong support from various left-wing publications and groups and leaders; and while he had cultivated his constituency, he had paid almost no attention to the BPCC and was on notoriously bad terms with the "boss" of Bombay, S.K. Patil who in 1967 openly branded Menon as a Communist.

In 1962, in spite of the expressed preference of the Mandal and District Congress Committees for another candidate and in spite of the known reservations of Patil and other members the Election Committee of the BPCC unanimously selected Menon as the Parliamentary candidate for North Bombay; but in August 1966 it became known that the Election Committee had unanimously decided not to give Menon the seat for North East Bombay, for which he had applied, and on October 16 S. G. Barve (who had applied for both North Bombay seats) was formally selected. This recommendation, which was promptly endorsed by the BPCC, was forwarded to the Central Election Committee (CEC) of the Congress party which had the responsibility for approving the final list of Congress Parliamentary and assembly candidates.

Ordinarily the CEC endorsed the selections of Pradesh Congress Committees (PCC) and made the actual selection only when a PCC was divided in its recommendation or when it failed to recommend a single candidate. But the question of the candidate for North East Bombay was not an ordinary one, and the members of

CEC, themselves sharply divided on the issue were subjected to strong pressures, openly and behind the scenes, for and against the controversial Krishna Menon. The issue was described as a trial of strength between the "Syndicate," whose leading members were S. K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh and K. Kamaraj, the Congress president, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister. So viewed, the outcome was a victory for the "Syndicate" over the combined influence of the two leading figures in the Congress party. At a stormy meeting on November 25 the CEC informally took a decision to support the recommendation of the BPC, but it released an official announcement that the decision had been left to Kamaraj, who like the Prime Minister, was a member of the CEC. The CEC also decided that Krishna Menon should be asked to contest the election from some other constituency. On the following day, while addressing the Press Club of India Mrs. Gandhi introduced a further complication by expressing herself strongly in favour of renominating Krishna Menon. "My own view," she said, "is that there is no special reason why Mr. Menon should not be given this seat. He is a sitting member and he has nursed this constituency. As a general rule we have not disturbed sitting members."

On the morning of December 2 Kamaraj conveyed the decision of the CEC to Krishna Menon who described the decision as unfair and unjust and who flatly refused to contest from any other constituency. Whereupon, later the same day the CEC made a formal announcement that the North East Bombay seat had been allotted to S. G. Barve.

For three and a half months before the final announcement by the CEC, the question of Menon's claims to the North East Bombay seat had been a matter of controversy both within the Congress party and in the nation at large. The decision of the CEC added further fuel to the political controversy. Naturally Menon's supporters criticized the decision in the most caustic terms. In an impassioned editorial headed 'Ignominious', the *Patriot* a pro-Menon left-wing newspaper published in Delhi, declared "The rejection of his claim will be and should be interpreted as a victory for those who are out to obstruct the growth of Indian socialism and democracy", and a week later one of its special correspondents

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wrote that Mrs. Gandhi's "failure to see that justice was done to Mr. Menon" was "a calculated decision to ignore the path accepted by the nation under Nehru's leadership." *Organiser*, the organ of the Jana Sangh, a party with a very different political slant, made an even more sinister charge: "Those familiar with the levers of power in New Delhi see in the Menon episode the double clash of American and Russian lobbies and the clash of Indira's and Kamaraj's ambitions."³

After his meeting with Kamaraj on December 2 Menon told correspondents: "I can categorically state that I shall not stand from any other constituency. In this regard, my mind is irrevocable." He adhered to this stand, in spite of subsequent efforts by Kamaraj and other Congress leaders to persuade him to reverse it and to accept another seat. On December 22 he took the crucial step of resigning from the Congress party, of which he had been a member for 35 years. His decision was conveyed in a formal letter to Brahm Prakash, President of the Delhi PCC, of which he was a primary member. (For this reason, as Patil and others opposed to him had often pointed out, as a member of the AICC he had represented Delhi and not Bombay.) He told newsmen that the decision was "painful" one for him, and that it was the cumulative effect of "so many things" and not just the denial of the ticket in North East Bombay. On the following day he told newsmen in Bombay that if the Congress Parliamentary candidates who had been nominated were all elected, the "complex will be weighted more against the attainment of the Congress objectives than for it". On the same day he attended a reception to celebrate the double wedding of a son and a daughter of his main opponent, S. K. Patil, where he posed with Patil and members of his family and spent much of his time playing with the children who were present.

After he announced his decision to resign from the Congress, Menon said that he would need more time to decide whether to contest the North East Bombay seat as an independent. This

3. These quotations are taken from 'Pulse of the Press', *"The Times of India"*, December 25, 1966.

decision was announced at a mammoth rally on New Year's Day, 1967, in historic Shivaji park in North Bombay, convened by the *Blitz* National Forum and presided over by R. K. Karanjia, editor of *Blitz*. Menon told an audience of perhaps 200,000 people that he was willing to "seek the suffrage of the people of the North Bombay (East) Parliamentary Constituency as a non-party candidate." His candidature was formally endorsed a week later at a convention convened by the Bombay Voters' Council, which also selected H. R. Gokhale, a former judge of the Bombay High Court, as the Parliamentary candidate for North West Bombay. (The Congress candidate for this constituency was Shantilal Shah, former Labour Minister in the Maharashtra cabinet). At this meeting Menon arrived five hours behind schedule.

Shortly after the selections of the Congress party were finally announced, one important opposition group—the Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti (SMS) and two parties with national status, the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra parties, announced their candidates. The Samiti, which had some strength in various parts of the State of Maharashtra, was the feeble remnant of the SMS, a coalition of opposition parties of various shades of political beliefs which had given the Congress some stiff opposition in 1957 in what was then the Maharashtrian section of undivided Bombay State, over the issue of the division of the State. In 1967 it included both the Right and Left Communists, the Peasant and Workers party, the Hindu Mahasabha, and a few political groups, and it had reached an understanding with the Muslim League and one branch of the Republican party led by Dada Saheb Gaekwad. The CPI (Marxist), the dominant element in the Samiti, was allocated the North East Bombay seat, and its choice was a well-known Left Communist leader, S. S. Mirajkar, President of the All-India Trade Union Congress. As was expected, however, after Menon's decision to stand as a "non-party candidate" was finalized, Mirajkar, on January 15, 1967, following a "mutually satisfactory understanding" between the Maharashtra State Committee of the CPI (Marxist) and the North Bombay Voters' Council, announced his withdrawal from the race. In this way the Samiti threw its support to Krishna Menon.

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The Swatantra party, representing the other end of the ideological spectrum, and seeking to establish a foothold for the party in North East Bombay, nominated Girish Munshi, son of Dr K.M. Munshi, distinguished scholar and veteran political leader who had left the Congress and had become a pillar of the Swatantra party, but on January 19 Munshi, acting on advice from C. Rajagopalachari, the super-chief of Swatantra, withdrew from the contest. Apparently Rajaji's advice created a difference of opinion within the Central Parliamentary Board of the Swatantra party, which had selected Munshi for the North East Bombay constituency, and Munshi was authorised to stay in the contest or withdraw, as he saw fit.⁴

The Jana Sangh, which was making a strong bid to establish itself in Bombay city, with pockets of strength in various parts of North East Bombay,⁵ put up an excellent candidate in Dr Mukund-rao S. Agaskar, Professor of History at Ruia College in North East Bombay, who had been an active member of the party since its founding by Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee more than fifteen years earlier. Because the Congress leaders, especially Patil, feared that he would hurt Barve's chances more than Menon's they made

- 4 On January 19 Munshi contradicted a statement by N. G. Ranga the Chairman of the Swatantra party, to the effect that the party withdrew its candidate because he stood no chance against either Barve or Menon. He declared that Ranga's statement was 'entirely wrong in facts and assessment of the situation regarding North Bombay'. He insisted that he had a good chance in the constituency, but had withdrawn to maintain party discipline and out of deference to Rajaji's advice, even though the situation in the constituency was wrongly assessed by Rajaji in *Swarajya*, the organ of the party. In support of his position he quoted from a letter addressed to him by M. R. Masani, General Secretary of the party: "The official position is that you remain the party's duly nominated candidate and may certainly go ahead with filing your nomination papers. If, on the other hand, you wish to withdraw in the light of Rajaji's advice and the situation created by it, you have the right to do so."
- 5 At an underpass on a main road leading to Chembur a very prominent sign, painted in large white letters read "Welcome to Chembur, the Jana Sangh constituency." Other large painted Jana Sangh signs covered walls and the sides of buildings, and in entire city blocks, especially in areas inhabited mainly by Sindhis, hundreds of saffron flags, the Jana Sangh flag could be seen, while no other party flags were visible.

several attempts to persuade top leaders of the Jana Sangh to withdraw Agaskar's candidacy, but to no avail.⁶

Several other candidates filed nomination forms as independents, and five of them remained in the race until the end; but the votes of these candidates ranged from 1,539 to 5,845, out of nearly 450,000 votes cast. All of them lost their deposits and their combined votes had no influence on the final outcome. The contest was essentially a straight fight between Barve, backed by the Congress, and Menon, supported by the North Bombay Voters' Council, the parties and groups associated with the SMS, and a variety of other left-wing organizations and personal admirers, with Dr. Agaskar, the Jana Sangh candidate, in a position where he could not expect to win but could expect a fairly sizable vote and might even have a decisive influence on the outcome.

III

Almost as soon as the main candidates had been selected, the active campaign began. The Congress campaign got under way in December, not long after the CEC had given its final approval to Barve's candidacy, but its real launching may be said to have been a well-attended public meeting at Ghatkopar on January 1, 1967, at which Morarji Desai was the stellar attraction. Menon's campaign really began with the huge mass meeting at Shivaji park in North West Bombay on the evening of the same day, at which he indicated his willingness to seek re-election as a "non-party candidate", if the people wanted him. More formally it was launched a week later at the Bombay Voters' Council convention in Thana, where Menon was asked to contest and where he announced his acceptance of the invitation.

From early January until the date of voting, February 21, the candidates and their supporters knew no rest. The Congress

6. Two weeks before the date of voting, Professor Agaskar was prompted by a news item in *The Times of India* hinting at the possibility of his withdrawal to issue a public denial of any such intention. In a letter to *The Times of India* he indicated the basis of his opposition to both of the leading candidates: "On principle, I consider Mr. Menon and Mr. Barve as two facets of the failure of the Governments's policy. One has been branded for our failure in defence and the other for the failure of our planned economy."

established headquarters in the constituency, and placed K.K. Shah, a former president of the BPCC, a member of the Rajya Sabha, and a general secretary of the AICC in overall charge of the campaign, but the leading figures in the BPCC, working from the main office and from the headquarters of the leading Congress politician of Bombay city, S. K. Patil, gave special attention to the contest in North East Bombay. Even though his own seat in Parliament from South Bombay was in jeopardy as a result of the serious challenge of the labour leader George Fernandes—a challenge which proved to be even more serious than he realized Patil himself masterminded Barve's campaign. When the results were known, Barve quite properly said that his victory was a victory for S. K. Patil, who was himself defeated in South Bombay. Menon moved to a hotel in North East Bombay, and worked indefatigably, without regular meals and without much sleep, until the day of voting. This time he was without the support of Nehru, the Congress party, film stars (except for Balraj Sahney), or Dr. Baliga, the skilful Bombay doctor who had served him so ably in 1962, but who had died soon afterwards. Rajni Patel, a prominent left-wing barrister and trade union worker, served after a fashion as a campaign manager for Menon but he had neither the political finesse, nor the following in the constituency nor the personal confidence of Menon which Dr. Baliga had enjoyed. In effect Menon ran his own campaign in a most helter skelter fashion. He had to rely heavily on the leaders of the Bombay Voters' Council and to a lesser extent of the Samiti. Both Congress and Menon had an army of workers. Most of Menon's were volunteer workers, including hundreds of university students. Professor Agaskar had a devoted and well-organized but smaller band of supporters and workers.

Public meetings were a conspicuous feature of the campaign, especially on Sundays. The meetings on behalf of Menon were usually more lively and better attended than those for Barve who was much less of an attraction and a much less colourful campaigner than his better known opponent. On several occasions Menon took part in large public meetings with the other leading anti-Congress candidates for the Lok Sabha from the Bombay constituencies H.K. Gokhale (Independent-North West Bombay), P. K. Atre, (R.P.I -

Samiti-Bombay Central), S.A. Dange (CPI-Bombay Central South), and George Fernandes (SSP-Bombay South). He often shared the platform with opposition candidates for assembly seats in North West Bombay or elsewhere in Bombay, but he usually refused to remain on the platform when any of these candidates spoke. Not only did he lack the support of "running mates" for the assembly seats—a factor which in many Indian constituencies was of decisive significance—but he virtually ignored the assembly candidates, whatever their affiliation.

Although public meetings were often held, they were less important than in 1962 or earlier elections. Greater emphasis was placed on more personal campaign methods, such as small street corner gatherings, *padyatras* ("pilgrimages" on foot), personal appearances in almost all parts of the sprawling constituency, at almost any hour of the day, by the candidates, and house-to-house canvassing. A candidate's day often began before or shortly after daybreak and ended with a series of meetings of various kinds and sizes, often ending only late in the evening or even in the early hours of the morning.

Processions and parades were also features of the campaign, especially in the final stages. Krishna Menon chose the bicycle for his symbol, and he could be seen on a bicycle pedalling furiously, on many posters. One Sunday several hundred enthusiasts participated in a bicycle race through miles of streets in the constituency, and the winner was presented with a prize by Menon himself.

Almost every available space was covered by wall signs and by posters. As the campaign progressed the posters became larger, more numerous, more imaginative, and often more vituperative. On one of the late campaign Congress posters read "1 vote for Menon is a vote for Mao", and another "Avenge precious blood of jawans—*rout menon-vote Congress*". Menon supporters often changed the first poster by crossing out Mao and substituting Nehru, and the second by pasting a substitute sign over *Rout Menon-Vote Congress*, which read: *Rout Reaction*. The Jana Sangh was not as active in the poster war, but it made an impressive showing with wall signs. Toward the end of the campaign, after the Shankacharya of Puri

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who had fasted for 73 days on the anti-cow slaughter issue, came to Bombay and denounced the Congress in general and S. K. Patil in particular, the Jana Sangh tried to capitalize on the cow slaughter issue. One of its latest posters carried a large picture of a cow and the heading : *Save the cow and oust the Congress* But it is doubtful that this appeal carried much weight in a sophisticated urban area.

Undoubtedly the majority of the voters of North East Bombay, especially the factory workers and the hutment dwellers, were primarily concerned with local issues and problems, and many appeals were made to them in these terms. But, more than in almost any other constituency in India, the leading candidates often talked of national and international issues and of broad questions of ideology and policy. Krishna Menon's main themes, aside from his frequent allusions to his special claim on the seat as long-time sitting member who had served his constituents well, were that he wanted to help to bring India back to the path which Nehru had charted, and from which, in his view, Congress had strayed, and that the country's hard-won independence was in peril of being sold for a mess of pottage to foreign—especially American imperialists. Again and again he rang charges on the theme of American domination of India, interspersed by criticisms of American economic and foreign policies. "I am not prepared," he again once remarked, "to be an American citizen in India." At several public meetings he won applause by asserting : "I believe that the policies of India should be made on the banks of the Jumna and not on the banks of the Potomac." Barve's central theme was a simple one. The "confrontation" in North East Bombay, he often declared, "is between the Communist and democratic socialist ideologies." Dr. Agaskar took a "plague on both your houses" approach, insisting that the Jana Sangh could offer a truly Indian and national approach which could introduce discipline, dedication, and purpose to Indian life in place of the indecisions and economic failures of the Congress party and the defence and foreign policy disasters and the perverted ideological orientation represented by Krishna Menon.

An ugly element was introduced into the campaign by the

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activities of the Shiv Sena (meaning the army of Shivaji), an organization of uncertain character, leadership, and support, which played on the prejudices and grievances of the Maharashtrians of Bombay city—who formed a majority in North East Bombay and the city as a whole. It was apparently founded in October, 1966. In that month, at the end of the Diwali season, a meeting was held in historic Shivaji park at which the cry was raised “Maharashtra for the Maharashtrians.” The next day non-Maharashtrian shops and eating places were attacked and looted, and in the following weeks many similar incidents, plus others involving violence or threats of violence to establishments or even to persons, occurred.

The founder of the new organization was Bal Thakare, a Maharashtrian cartoonist and newspaper editor and publisher. The proclaimed objective was “to give the Maharashtrian an honourable place in their own State.” Opposition spokesmen charged that the Shiv Sena was encouraged and even supported by the Congress party, and especially by S. K. Patil as an instrument of intimidation of political opponents. It was often referred to as “Patil’s Storm Troopers,” even though Patil emphatically denied all connection with it and publicly denounced it. It was noted that Barve was the only Lok Sabha candidate in Bombay city whom the Shiv Sena openly supported, and that the organization was aiming its fire at Krishna Menon, a South Indian, and his supporters among the non-Maharashtrian elements in the constituency. There were a few unpleasant incidents of intimidation of voters, interference with election meetings, and attacks on known supporters of Menon. *The Patriot*, a pro-Menon newspaper, which issued a daily Bombay supplementary edition during the month prior to the voting, charged that “the Shiv Sena is in the field with big money doled out by certain political bosses and pro-U.S. imperialists with the slogan that Mr. Menon being a Keralite has no right to represent Maharashtrians.”

It is impossible to determine the impact of the Shiv Sena on the elections in North East Bombay. Its appearance and activities were deplored and denounced by many Maharashtrians, as well as

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by non-Maharashtrians. At first the tendency was to brush it aside as a feeble effort by fanatical Maharashtrian intellectuals, but as it seemed to be gaining some general support and became identified with acts of violence and intimidation, apprehensions grew, probably out of all proportion to the threat. Certainly, in North East Bombay, as a reporter of *The Times of India* stated on February 10, "it contributed to a hardening of feelings". There is little evidence that it had any real influence on the election results.

Among the many rumours which circulated widely during the election campaign, and which were often stated as facts by anti-Congress speakers and journals, was the charge that large amounts of foreign money, especially from American sources, were being poured into the Bombay campaign, mainly to support S. K. Patil in South Bombay and to defeat Krishna Menon, America's *bete noire*, in North East Bombay. *Blitz*, the left-wing weekly which was well known for its sensationalism and liberal use of large black or red type, publicized this charge in almost every issue,⁸ as did *Patriot* and other left-wing journals, plus, of course, the Left Communist press. When queries were made as to the source of American funds, the replies usually focussed vaguely on P. L. 480 blocked rupees at the disposal of the American government or direct subsidies by the CIA. *Barmidar*, a Marathi weekly, alleged that the CIA was spending "lakhs of rupees" to help defeat Krishna Menon. One of the leading candidates who openly voiced these charges and suspicions was George Fernandes, who turned out to be a "Giant Killer" by his spectacular defeat of S. K. Patil. These charges could not be substantiated, or for that matter proved to be false.

The whole question of the sources of financial support of the various candidates in an Indian election is a tantalizing one to analyze. Obviously, in Bombay city the Congress spent many lakhs of rupees on the elections but many of the opposition candidates—notably S. A. Dange and Krishna Menon—also seemed to have substantial funds at their disposal.

With few exceptions, some of which have been noted, the campaign in North East Bombay was conducted peacefully, and at

8. On February 15 *Blitz* issued a "Midweek Election Special," carrying the headline, CIA IS HERE.

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a high level as far as the leading candidates were concerned. In spite of the issues involved, and the added interest surrounding Krishna Menon because of his rejection by the Congress for the seat and his entry as a "non-party candidate", the campaign was not a very exciting one, except in the final days. Few politicians of national stature came to North Bombay to support any candidate. Even Morarji Desai and Y. B. Chavan, who had special associations with Bombay, came only once—Desai in early January to help Barve launch his campaign, Chavan toward the very end of the campaign when he appeared only at meetings in Thana and Kalyan. Both Mrs. Gandhi and Kamraj were scheduled to address meetings in North East Bombay, but neither put in an appearance.

IV

As the day of voting approached the outcome was still very much in doubt, even though *Blitz*, in its last issue prior to the election, carried a headline in black and red letters: MENON HAS WON. The campaign officially came to an end at 5.00 p. m. on Friday, February 19, allowing a brief lull before the voting began. The polls opened at 8.00 a.m. on Sunday, February 21, and closed at 8.00 p.m. The turnout was heavy, eventually amounting to some 70% of the registered voters in the constituency. Each of the 571 polling stations in North East Bombay was supervised by a returning officer, assisted by several polling officers and police. Representatives of the various candidates were also permitted to be present at all times, and many party desks and other temporary centres were set up just outside the area where such activity was not allowed. At times voters had to wait for an hour or longer in queues, sometimes under the broiling sun. On the whole, the voters were calm and good humoured and the voting went off quite peacefully.

Counting the ballots began at the Sachivalaya Gymkhana in central Bombay on the morning of February 22, and was not completed until the evening of February 24. By this time it was known that Barve had been victorious by a very narrow margin. On February 25, after listening for over six hours of arguments over the demand of Krishna Menon, conveyed through his election agent, for a re-poll or a recount of the votes polled in Thana, Kalyan, and Kurla, where Menon claimed mistakes in counting and illegal handling of ballot boxes had occurred, the returning officer for North

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East Bombay rejected the charges and made an official announcement of the results, as follows :

TABLE II

Sadshiv Govind Barve (Cong)	171,902
V. K. Krishna Menon (Ind)	158,733
Mukundrao Sunderrao Agaskar (JS)	78,796
Balkrishna Bhaskar Paranjpe (Ind)	3,452
Saraswati Hassasing Butani (Ind)	2,944
Ramji Shivanarayan Kurmi (Ind)	2,908
Bholabhai Nanka (Ind)	5,845
Ratan Hasasing Butani (Ind)	1,539
Invalid	16,220

In all, 442,348 votes were cast. Barve's margin of victory was only 13,69, substantially less than the number of invalid votes.

A more detailed analysis of the votes, on the basis of the results in each assembly constituency, shows that Barve won because of the relatively large Congress majorities in Thana and Kalyan, two areas which had not been included in the North Bombay constituency in 1957 or 1962 and which lay outside the limits of the Bombay municipality. Menon carried every other assembly constituency in North East Bombay :

TABLE III

Name of Assembly Constituency	Votes Polled ⁹	
	Menon	Barve
Thana	12,116	32,829
Kalyan	19,587	26,614
Mulund	32,107	27,849
Ghatkopar	35,136	31,983
Chembur	29,725	26,946
Kurla	31,653	27,497

In three of the six assembly constituencies in North East Bombay the Congress candidates for the legislative assembly lost to the Jana Sangh in Chembur, to the Republican party, supported by the Samiti, in Ghatkopar, and to the Peasant and Workers party, also associated with the Samiti, in Kalyan.

Barve's narrow victory, and the failure to win more than half of the assembly seats, indicated that the Congress hold on this

9. These figures, taken from *Bombay Samachar*, February 27, 1967, vary slightly from those officially announced by the returning officer.

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organized several meetings which drew large crowds, but this time it did not disturb any election meetings

The three-week campaign did not generate much interest, thus accentuating the feeling that the by-election was an anticlimax. Less than half (approximately 48%) of the eligible voters turned out on the day of voting, Sunday, April 23. Some had already left Bombay in the usual pre-summer exodus. Some refused to vote because they resented a pre-election announcement raising the price of milk distributed to consumers from the State government's milk scheme. Some, perhaps recalling their discomfort while standing in queues in the burning sun, stayed away from the polls because the weather was hot and sticky. Some were less interested this time than they had been in February. And the large number of habitual non-voters who had not really been reached by all the appeals and electioneering kept their records of political non-participation intact. Voting was dull and slow, but it was quite peaceful in the entire constituency.

On the following evening the results were known. Menon had again failed in his campaign for re-election. He received 141,257 votes, but Mrs. Sapie got 156,313. Her margin of victory was, therefore, nearly 20,000 votes greater than that of her brother, even though she lacked her brother's experience and reputation. But the odds, in fact, had been very much in her favour. She was a Maharashtrian, she had the support of the Congress party, and she undoubtedly won many sympathy votes. Even the view that a low turnout would hurt her chances proved to be unfounded. For the second time in a few weeks, however, Krishna Menon had gambled for high stakes against formidable odds, and for the second time he had almost won. If Dr. Agaskar had remained in the race, Menon might have emerged as the victor. Again, Menon carried every one of the assembly constituencies within the municipal limits of Bombay and was beaten only because of sizable Congress majorities in Thana and Kalyan. But many factors affected the results, and no simple explanation can account for such a complex phenomenon as the North East Bombay elections of 1967. For many months to come they will be discussed and analyzed.

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For Menon himself, the central actor in the election drama, the story is one of near triumph against great odds, leading to reduced political influence and stature, if not to political oblivion. For Patil it is a story of startling defeat in his own constituency, somewhat mitigated by solid accomplishment in North East Bombay. For most members of the Congress party, including Mrs. Gandhi and Kamaraj, Krishna Menon's defection, following his failure to secure the Congress ticket for North East Bombay, was an unfortunate and regrettable act; but while they deplored his departure, they agreed that his challenge had to be met. Their gratification over the results of the two North East Bombay elections of 1967 was muted by the realization that they had had two narrow escapes, and by Patil's unexpected defeat in South Bombay. Barve's sudden death, and the startling electoral reverses in many parts of the country. After the voters had spoken, the drama of the North East Bombay elections was overshadowed by the greater drama of the "revolution by ballot" which transformed the entire Indian political scene

R. R. KASLIWAL AND C. S. NAINAWATI

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTION IN A
CHIEF MINISTER'S CONSTITUENCY
(*The Case of Rajasthan*)

The Udaipur city assembly constituency, represented by the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Mohanlal Sukhadia since 1952, has acquired special significance from the point of view of studying electoral behaviour. In the context of prevailing political situation on the eve of the fourth general elections in the country in general and in Rajasthan in particular, the electoral contest in this constituency became of crucial importance and naturally, therefore, the Department of Political Science, University of Udaipur, adopted it for intensive study of the electoral politics. In collaboration with the Political Science Department of the University of Rajasthan, the authors with the help of a team of student investigators, administered questionnaires to the electorate selected on the random sampling basis¹ and combining this with participant observation technique, carried out the study of the election in the constituency covering it in all its aspects from nomination to the announcement of results, together with the strategy, technique and style of campaigning and its impact on and the response of the electorate to it.

I

THE CONSTITUENCY AND THE CONTEST

In order to fully appreciate the political climate in the constituency on the eve of the fourth general elections, it would be relevant to recall that in the municipal elections in Udaipur city held in December 1963, the Jana Sangh had secured a majority.² In order to win a large number of supporters to its side the Jana Sangh had promised the abolition of house-tax and carried out its promises, thus establishing its bonafides with the electorate.

1. The sample covered 50 electors-about 1% of the total electorate
2. As against the Jana Sangh's 21,000 the Congress got 16,000 votes, although it did not contest the election on party basis officially.

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Negatively for the Congress the students trouble in 1966 the communal riots (which occurred twice in 1965-1966) and factionalism within the party had been the factors which had to be reckoned with on the election eve while determining the contours of electoral battle in the constituency. The constituency had been a preserve of the Congress party in which the Jana Sangh had made a serious dent as illustrated by the municipal elections. A third political force, though very weak, was represented by the feeble Communist party with small pockets of influence in labour areas. Thus the main contest was visualized between the Congress and the Jana Sangh, and in view of the accretion of strength to the Jana Sangh camp, and the factional squabbles within the Congress involving Sukhadia on the one hand and Kumbharam Arya on the other, the question of selecting the Congress candidates remained in suspense for quite some time. While the Jana Sangh announced its candidate, the Congress could take a decision after a tortuous process. Mohanlal Sukhadia, who had earlier been tipped for the general secretaryship of the AICC, had rescinded from his decision to quit the Chief Ministership causing consternation in the Kumbharam faction, which now wanted him to seek election for the Lok Sabha and not for the assembly. Sukhadia refused to oblige, but instead of announcing his candidature for the Udaipur city constituency he preferred Nathdwara, his home-town. This, however, seemed to be merely a tactical move, for, soon after he received implorations from his supporters in Udaipur asking him not to change the constituency.³ He finally agreed. The Kumbharam faction after leaving the Congress, organised itself in the name of Janta party and pitched itself against Sukhadia in Udaipur constituency lending total support to the Jana Sangh candidate. This also proved to be a formidable factor affecting the electoral climate in Udaipur on the eve of the elections.

The last date for filing the nomination was January 20, 1967. Besides Sukhadia (Congress) and Bhanu Kumar Shashtri (Jana Sangh), Madan Lal Sharma, a local Communist leader also filed

3. Earlier the names of K. L. Bordia and Janardan Rai Nagar were mentioned in the local Congress circles as possible Congress candidates in case Sukhadia decided not to contest from Udaipur.

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part of Bombay city was declining. The results for the city as a whole revealed the same trend. Whereas in 1962 the Congress had carried all four Lok Sabha seats and 21 of the 24 assembly seats, in 1967 it lost two of the five Parliamentary seats, (winning one other by the narrowest of margins) and 8 of the 28 seats in the legislative assembly.

V

Barve's victory, even by a narrow margin, over a more famous opponent who, even though he lacked the backing of Nehru, the Congress, and many other supporters of 1962, had put up a stiff fight, was regarded as particularly meaningful, if not unexpected. Menon took his defeat philosophically, although he publicly hailed the electoral humiliation of S.K. Patil, the man whom Barve credited for the Congress victory in North Bombay, but who could not retain his own seat in South Bombay. *Blitz* claimed that the election had been "rigged", and that Menon had really won. Many observers expressed the view that Menon's defeat marked the end of his political career, at least in Bombay.

But B. M. Barve had not seen the last of Krishna Menon. On March 6, hardly more than two weeks after his electoral victory, S.G. Barve, not quite 53 years of age, died suddenly in New Delhi, and as a result a special by-election, eventually scheduled for April 23, was called to fill the vacant seat. On March 17, at the first meeting of the BPCC after the elections S.K. Patil, speaking on a resolution condoling Barve's death expressed more than personal grief when he said "I do not know why God want to thrust fresh trials on us in order to testify our political faith." Patil quickly ruled himself out as a candidate to oppose Krishna Menon, who announced that he would again contest the seat. In fact, Patil notified the Congress president that he would not seek election to the Lok Sabha in any by-election anywhere in India "in the immediate future." But the main task of selecting a suitable candidate to oppose Menon devolved upon him, for he still controlled the slightly reorganized BPCC. This was a difficult matter, which took some two weeks of complicated negotiations, the full story of which is not known. Apparently Patil requested the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC) to attempt to persuade either Lieutenant General Shankarrao Thorat or

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V.N. Gadgil to contest the seat. Both General Thorat and Gadgil had been unsuccessful candidates on the Congress ticket for election to the Lok Sabha from Maharashtra constituencies. When the MPCC refused to oblige, Patil approached several other persons, including Sushil S. Kavalekar, a Marathi advocate and writer who had filed for nomination for the Lok Sabha seat from Marmagaoa, where elections were held on March 29 (Kavalekar was defeated by the narrow margin of some 2,500 votes), and a well-known film actor, Prithviraj Kapoor. He even sounded out Dr. Gajendragadkar Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University and a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India but Dr. Gajendragadkar publicly disavowed any interest in being a candidate. Many other persons were suggested, and probably several of them were approached. Then it was reported that Dr. T.R. Naravane, a prominent Congress leader in Bombay who had just won an assembly seat in the February elections from the Kurla constituency, had been selected by the BPCC, and had reluctantly agreed to contest.

But the final selection had not yet been made. Just before the final date for filing nomination Dr. Naravane's name was suddenly withdrawn. It was reported that the Congress High Command in New Delhi, possibly because of a reluctance to cause another by-election, had put pressure on Patil and the BPCC to withdraw Dr. Naravane's candidacy. In any event, in a last minute shift the BPCC came up with a surprise candidate, Mrs. Tara Govind Sapre, a worthy lady who was the sister of S. G. Barve and whose political experience had been confined largely to some work on her brother's behalf during the regular campaign. She promised to carry on the unfinished work of her brother—a promise which she did little to explain. Thus the BPCC appealed to the voters with a candidate of unimpeachable integrity and connections, if with little political standing, under the slogan: "Honour the Memory of Barve."

Dr. Agaskar, like Menon, filed again for the North East Bombay seat, but on the last day for withdrawal, March 30, he withdrew his nomination. Most of the Bombay leaders of the Jana Sangh felt that he should stand again on the ground that it was

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important to retain the hard-won foothold for the party in certain pockets in the constituency and to offer an alternative to both the Congress candidate and Krishna Menon; but the national leaders of the well-disciplined party, after originally approving of this action, reversed the decision of the local group. Many of the Bombay Jana Sanghites resented this reversal, and throughout the by-election campaign there were confusing reports of Jana Sangh support of Mrs. Sapre and Menon alike. Officially the Jana Sangh took no position in support of any candidate; unofficially its members in Bombay took various positions and moved in various directions. Some supported Mrs. Sapre as the lesser of the two evils; others supported Menon for precisely the same reason; while others, probably the majority, took no active interest in the campaign, and many of these probably did not vote at all on April 23.

In all no fewer than 26 persons filed nomination papers for the North East Bombay seat, most of them, of course, as independents. Some withdrew almost immediately, but sixteen names appeared on the ballot papers. No independent candidate received more than 1,000 votes, and one got only 78.

Although equally important issues were at stake, including the prestige of S. K. Patil, the BPCC, and the Congress party, and the political future of Krishna Menon, the bye-election was very much of an anticlimax. The campaign was conducted pretty much along the same lines, but the spirit was missing. When Barve's death was announced, supporters of Menon proclaimed: "Menon has won" and when Congress put up a political unknown to stand against him, even though she could appeal to the sympathy of the voters, his chances seemed to be quite bright. But Mrs. Sapre, like her brother was a Maharashtrian, and the regular election results had demonstrated that it would be difficult for a non-Maharashtrian to capture the Lok Sabha seat from North East Bombay. Dr. Agaskar's withdrawal was a blow to Menon, for this left Mrs. Sapre as the only important Maharashtrian candidate. While Menon was again nominated by the North Bombay Voters' Council, leaders of the Council who had been prominent in the regular campaign, including Rajni Patel, often described as something approximating a campaign manager for Menon in the campaign that had just ended, and

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R. K. Karanjia, editor of *Blitz*, took little part in the second fight. There had been some feeling against them in the constituency, and possibly they, or Menon himself, decided that they should play a less conspicuous role this time. Menon was more assiduous in soliciting the support of the SMS but the Samiti and most of its cooperating parties and groups, including both Communist parties, were surprisingly indifferent to him. S. A. Dange addressed only one meeting on behalf of Menon; then he left for Europe, and did not return until after the election. One member of the Samiti, however, the SSP, mobilized its heaviest guns in support of Menon's candidacy. Prominent national leaders of the SSP, including Madhu Limaye and S. M. Joshi, addressed meetings in North East Bombay, and Georges Fernandes, fresh from his victory over S. K. Patil, became in effect the manager of Menon's campaign. Fernandes worked indefatigably for Menon's election, boasting that he would humble Patil and Company again and would show the Congress "boss" how really to run a campaign. Most of the non-Congress chief ministers came out in support of Krishna Menon. The chief ministers of Kerala, Haryana, and Bihar came to Bombay and addressed public meetings, but Annadurai of Madras and Ajoy Mukherjee of West Bengal cancelled announced visits.

Menon again was assisted by several thousand volunteers, mostly young people, and again he worked himself into a state of virtual exhaustion. This time, however, he was even more alone than ever, and many things conspired against him. Patil and the reorganized BPCC were determined to finish Menon in Bombay for good. They could command resources and had an organization which Menon lacked. They conducted a systematic campaign, with even less emphasis on public meetings and more on personal contacts and solicitations. Mrs. Barve seldom addressed a public meeting, except some women's gatherings, but she proved to be a quietly effective and tireless campaigner. This time Chief Minister Naik and other Congress leaders of Maharashtra gave the Congress candidate some support—Naik addressed several well-attended meetings—but Y. B. Chavan did not put in an appearance at all, presumably because he was held in Delhi by a police strike. The Shiv Sena was again active. It

his nomination. Thus ultimately there were three candidates in the field.

II

THE CAMPAIGN

The Jana Sangh had fired the first shot in the election campaign which the party launched even before the nominations had been filed. On January 5, Balraj Madhok, president of the Jana Sangh inaugurated the campaign. The meeting was also addressed by the local Jana Sangh leader, B. N. Sharma, who had recently joined the party after retiring from the post of principal of the Government Medical College, Jodhpur.

On January 15, Indira Gandhi came to Udaipur and addressed a public meeting at the Maharana Bhupal Stadium in support of the Congress nominee. It was announced earlier that the Chief Minister would also attend and address the meeting but owing to a minor motor-car accident a few days earlier, he could not come to Udaipur.

Kamaraj, the Congress president, arrived here on January 23 and addressed a public meeting in which he asked the electorate to vote Congress for the prosperity of the country and the stability of the government. He spoke in Tamil and his speech was translated into Hindi, sentence by sentence.⁴ Sukhadia was also present at the meeting and exhorted the audience to vote for the Congress party. Oozing optimism he declared that the Congress would be able to secure about 110 seats out of the total of 184 in the State assembly. A section of the audience created some disturbance at this meeting.

On February 5, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, leader of the Jana Sangh, made an effective anti-Congress speech charging Sukhadia for his many acts of omission and commission including the alleged embezzlement in the Chhoti Sadri Gold case. In the same meeting the Jana Sangh leader assured the Muslim community that his party was not anti-Muslim and that they should "come out of Shri Sukhadia's pocket."

Maharani Gayatri Devi delivered a speech at the Stadium on the February 7, espousing the cause of the Jana Sangh (assembly) and the Swatantra (Lok Sabha) candidates. This

4. All other speeches during the election campaign were delivered in Hindi.

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being her first public appearance in Udaipur, the meeting was largely attended and a sizeable number of local women turned up in their colourful dresses. Maharawal Lakman Singh of Dungarpur, Hurma Bhal (Lok Sabha candidate for the reserved scheduled tribe seat), Sardar Narendra Singh and Bhanu Kumar Shashtri also addressed the meeting. The speakers exhorted the audience to vote for the Swatantra-Jana Sangh alliance. The Star and the Deepak flags were fluttering side-by-side at the meeting. Three days after the meeting the Jana Sangh organised another big meeting which was addressed by Sunder Singh Bhandari, MP.

The Communist candidate, Madan Lal also addressed a few public meetings but the audience was usually small. No outstanding Communist leader from outside came here to address a public meeting.

Apart from big public meetings addressed by prominent all India leaders, which were more spectacular than effective, the campaigners also organised *mohalla* and street corner meetings addressed by local leaders and active canvassers. In this field, Jana Sangh and Congress both vied with each other. It was in these meetings that the Congress harped upon the theme of Sukhadia being responsible for remarkable all-round progress of the city.

There were times when the atmosphere in the city seemed to be in favour of the Jana Sangh Swatantra alliance. It was natural that such an atmosphere should have affected the confidence of the Congress circles. In the wake of the mounting propaganda of the Jana Sangh and Swatantra, the supporters of Sukhadia took out a procession (February 12, 1967) through the main streets and bazars of the city. It was about a mile long. It included conveyances of every description, like buses, cars, jeeps, trucks, tongas, bullock carts and also a large number of bicycles. Mention must also be made of those elements in the population which took a prominent part in the procession. Bohras and other Muslims, Khatiks, Bhalis, Minas, Kalbelias, Dhobis, Mochis and some businessmen belonging to different castes, editors of some of the local papers as also quite a few advocates were noticeable. A large number of women were accompanying Indu Bala Sukhadia. The procession also included a sizeable number of labourers working on daily wages at

different sites in and outside Udaipur. Hundreds of children who figured in the procession were enjoying joy rides, many of them atop the buses. The procession presented a gala atmosphere. The Congress candidate for Lok Sabha, Dhuleshwar Mina (scheduled tribe), was also seen in a jeep.⁵ The procession ended up in a public meeting. Sukhadia's speech on this occasion was very forceful and effective.

A little later the same evening another meeting was held by the Jana Sangh. The meeting was preceded by a small Mashal Jaloos (torch light procession) taken out by Jana Sangh workers. This meeting was addressed by local Jana Sangh leaders and Bhanu Kumar Shashtri.

On 13 February, the last day for demonstrative canvassing, two mammoth meetings were held at the Mukerjee Chowk, Kumbhararam Arya, leader of the Janata party, addressed the meeting in support of the Jana Sangh candidate and said in challenging words that the Congress party would be routed in Rajasthan. He exhorted the people of Udaipur to vote the Congress out of office. The other meeting was organised by the Congress at the same spot. Sukhadia addressing the gathering, rebutted the charges levelled against him by his opponents.

In all, the Congress held six large public meetings. Out of these, three were addressed by eminent all-India leaders and the other three by the candidate and his local supporters. However, the Congress candidate as well as his campaign managers regarded the method of personal contact with voters as the most effective way of campaigning. Second in importance came the mohalla meetings, followed by public meetings addressed by prominent leaders.⁶

Other methods of campaigning were also employed such as putting up of posters, distribution of handbills and party badges and taking out of processions. The Congress mobilized about two thousand election workers. Some five hundred of these were giving

5. The authors were witness to the spectacular show of strength by the Congress. Sukhadia, himself was accompanying the procession on foot.

6. The authors discussed personally with the campaign managers the campaign techniques and their relative merits and effectiveness.

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their full time while the rest worked part time. Out of these two thousand workers, some thirteen hundred were party-supporters and the rest being the members of Sukhadia's family and his friends and members of their families. These workers were not paid any honorarium.⁷

The Jana Sangh Swatantra and Janata party alliance held four large public meetings addressed by their all-India leaders. In addition, ten public meetings were addressed by the candidate and his local supporters. In their case also the mohalla meetings outnumbered the large public meetings. The Jana Sangh and the Communist candidates did not figure in any procession. Among the methods of campaigning they also generally regarded the door-to-door canvassing method as the most effective. Next in order of importance were stated to be mohalla meetings and large public meetings. There were about three thousand party-supporters who were canvassing for the Jana Sangh candidate besides more than a hundred personal friends of his and their family members. None of them was a paid worker.

The Communist candidate had six paid workers and fifteen party-supporters working without any honorarium. Madanlal, on personal enquiry, said that the number of his workers was 'insufficient'. Whereas the Congress candidate thought that he had 'many' workers, the Jana Sangh candidate regarded the number as 'sufficient.' The Communist party organised only three public meetings addressed by the candidate and his local supporters. About forty mohalla meetings were held. The candidate himself contacted the voters personally to a limited extent. He could not muster sufficient supporters for house-to-house canvassing. Posters and leaflets in large number were issued by the Communist candidate. There was, however, no local paper supporting him.⁸

A great deal of personal approach was made with the key voters by both the major candidates, especially after 13 February

7. Personal interview.

8. Madan Lal's life sketch, however, appeared in one or two local papers.

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and this lasted till very late in the night of 14 February before the polling. This canvassing was done largely with a view to weaning away the committed voters of the other side. Local problems were made much use of in this personal approach. The problem of unemployment was regarded by all the three candidates as the most serious of local problems. The Congress candidate pointed out shortage of water as another serious problem of the city. The Jana Sangh candidate regarded corruption in the civil administration as one of the most important local problems. The Communist contestant mentioned the food problem coupled with the rising prices as among the other important problems facing the citizens.

During the days of election campaign thousands of posters and party flags were displayed all over the city. All sorts of slogans, some of them couched in abusive language, could be heard in every part of the city from early morning till late in the night. In this slogan-shouting much use was made of teen-agers and especially of urchins by all the three parties.⁹ Some of the slogans were also written on walls with sketches depicting their themes.

The local press played a prominent role in the election campaign. A number of local dailies and weeklies supported the Congress, while an equal number were eloquent in support of the Jana Sangh candidate. The Jana Sangh weeklies the *Organiser* and *Panchjanya* were being largely circulated.

As the campaign proceeded, charges and counter-charges were made by rival parties. Distribution of money and liquor was

9. Some of the slogans were :

1. There is a knife in every lane; Jana Sanghite is a decoit.
2. What a glorious record you have Sukhadia; Rajasthan has starved to death.
3. What has Congress done ? it has achieved independence for the nation.
4. What has Congress done ? it has destroyed the nation.
5. Ban cow slaughter.
6. Reduce prices.
7. It is Sukhadia's rule, one gets one kilo in ration.
8. Defeat the Congress; save the nation.

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alleged. The opponents of the Congress opined that the party being in power was in a position to indulge in corrupt practices. Congress on the other hand alleged that the vested interests, the capitalists and feudal elements had conspired against the Chief Minister who had angered them by his progressive socio-economic policies.

III

THE POLLING

Despite the virulent campaign, and the violence of words the situation, by and large, remained unmarred by physical violence. Once or twice, however, a situation had arisen in which the rival groups of youngmen were on the verge of coming to blows. It was saved from deteriorating owing to the timely intervention of the sober minded citizens as well as prompt arrival of the police on the scene.

On the whole, the election campaign was conducted by the rivals in keeping with the traditions of democracy. More political consciousness and awakening were observed this time than in the past elections. Moreover, the voters in general began to understand the importance of their voting right and its significance. The whole atmosphere was such that the most thoughtful observer considered this election to be a neck-to-neck fight between the Congress and the Jana Sangh.

In the elections held in 1962, Sukhadia had won by a comfortable majority of 11402 votes although after a considerable struggle.¹⁰ It is interesting to note that in the 1962 election also the main contest was between the Congress and the Jana Sangh and the two candidates in the field were also the same as in 1967. In 1962 the total number of voters in this assembly constituency was 54,723. By 1967 this figure had gone up by the addition of some 10,000 new voters. It was widely accepted that the Muslim voters in the city had been extending their support *en bloc* to the Congress. The addition of new voters could go to tilt the scales in favour of the Jana Sangh due to a number of reasons. A larger number of these voters were non-Muslims. Those young men and women who had

10. The weekly *Lalkar*, January, 1967.

acquired the voting right for the first time were generally anti-Congress. The younger generation of voters was largely frustrated owing to the rising prices and unemployment. Many of them had come under the influence of the RSS. Further more, two unfortunate communal riots between these two elections - the second of them hardly four months before the election - was also a factor to be reckoned with. Quite a few of the youngmen, mostly non-Muslims, had suffered at the hands of the law-and-order machinery.

In this constituency, there are to be found certain major groups of voters on the basis of community, caste, religion and profession. Among them, the Bohra Muslims have been the greatest supporters of the Congress. Together with the Bohra community most of the other Muslims have also been siding with the Congress. Many of the businessmen and service class people, drawn from the Jains, Maheshwaris, Agrawals and Brahmins gravitated towards the Jana Sangh this time. The refugee votes were also of crucial importance and the Jana Sangh candidate attracted a majority of Sindhis, being himself a migrant from Hyderabad (Sindh).

The polling took place on 15 February, 1967. There were 78 polling booths spread over 34 wards of the Municipal area. Each ward had at least two polling booths while five of them had four each. Half the number of booths in every ward was meant for women voters. From personal knowledge the authors are in a position to say that the general atmosphere at the polling booths was one of enthusiasm. In view of the recent communal disturbances, as mentioned above, a sizeable police force had been posted at key points. Small sections of the same were patrolling in various parts of the city but they did not figure prominently inside the polling stations. No canvassing was done within the 100 metres limit of the polling booths. Workers and agents of the two major candidates were to be seen working peacefully in their respective seats identifying the voters and distributing the slips showing the voters' serial numbers etc. as given in the official lists. The polling had begun exactly at 8.00 A. M. By 9.00 O'clock the rush of voters was great and big queues were formed outside the polling stations. But there was no disorderliness and general atmosphere was friendly and even festive.

IV

VOTING ANALYSIS

This year the total number of voters was 70,339 (36274 males and 34065 females). The total percentage of the votes cast was 68.3, whereas in the second general elections (1957) it was 44% only. In 1962 this percentage had increased to 61. From this analysis it would be perfectly clear that more voters have become politically active.

The total votes cast were 48027 out of which 2089 were declared invalid. Besides these, the postal ballots numbered 538 out of which 101 were rejected. The Congress secured, including 318 postal ballots, a total of 24272 votes. The Jana Sangh got 119 of the postal ballots; its total votes were 20841. The Communist candidate secured only 1262 votes. None of the postal ballots was cast in his favour. He lost the security deposit. The result was that Sukhadia was declared elected leading by 3431 votes over his nearest rival.

At some of the polling booths there was almost neck-to-neck fight between the Congress and the Jana Sangh. The counting of votes revealed that out of the 34 wards the Congress was leading in 19 and the Jana Sangh in remaining 15. The Communist candidate was able to secure a few votes at least at every polling station. A ward-wise analysis also revealed that the Congress was leading in those wards where Muslims constituted a sizeable number

To sum up, it may be said that the Jana Sangh has steadily gained strength in the city, obviously at the cost of the Congress. Personal contact with the voter has become the most important single device to catch votes. Last, but not the least, political consciousness has been spreading gradually among the voters and this goes to show that democracy is striking deeper roots.

P. C. MATHUR

**DYNAMICS OF TANDEM VOTING IN
INDIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS :
THE CASE OF ALWAR LOK SABHA
CONSTITUENCY***

SYNCHRONIZATION of polling for State assemblies and Lok Sabha (LS) is a distinctive feature of the Indian electoral system. This simultaneous exercise of franchise by the voters for two different bodies is a case of 'Tandem voting', the political implications of which have escaped the attention both of political campaigners and psephological scholars. According to the provisions of the Indian Constitution there is no formal linkage between the LS and State assemblies. It is not constitutionally binding upon the election authorities to hold the elections to the two bodies at the same time. However, keeping in view the factors of administrative convenience and economy, the Election Commission has so far organized all the four general elections in the country simultaneously so that a voter is called upon to exercise his franchise for the assembly and LS one after the other. This arrangement worked quite well upto the fourth general elections as the number of 'mid-term' polls for the assembly during 1952-67 was rather small and the possibility of a mid-term poll for the LS was virtually nil. The spate of mid-term polls after the fourth general elections may, however, seriously upset the electoral time-table and make the electorate, election campaigners and candidates as well as the election authorities conscious of the separate identity of the two set of elections.

II

THE QUEST

The main objective of the paper is to delineate the political pattern and corollaries of Tandem voting in Alwar LS constituency of Rajasthan by analyzing the nature, direction, and range of

- * This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Seminar on Research Methodology and Political Sociology organized by the Department of Sociology, University of Udaipur, at Mount Abu from May 15 to 22, 1968

variations in the votes polled by the L S candidates and assembly candidates who had been sponsored by Congress, Swatantra and S S P. Since the election for the Alwar L S seat in 1967 coincided with the election for the Rajasthan assembly seats and since the three major parties contesting the Lok Sabha seat also fielded candidates in all the eight assembly constituencies falling in the jurisdiction of the Alwar L S constituency, an attempt has been made to study the comparative voting behaviour of the electorate by calculating polling station-wise differentials between the 'assembly votes' and 'L S votes' polled by the candidates of these three parties.

Approach and Assumptions

The basic assumption here is that the voters place a greater weightage on the 'assembly vote' and the choice for exercising the 'L S vote' is conditioned, to a large extent, by their preference at the assembly level. This is, of course, an operational hypothesis only based on, among other things, on an extensive first-hand coverage of the fourth general elections in Alwar district. There is however no intention to raise it to the level of a political axiom as the analysis even in this paper shows that a significant body of electorate places a greater premium on the 'L S vote' as compared to the 'assembly vote'. In this connection one may like to add that the nature and structure of the electoral contest for the L S seat is itself an important determinant of the relative weightage that a voter in a given constituency assigns to the assembly votes. In many cases the L S contest overshadows the contests for assembly seats within the L S constituency, while in other cases the contest for L S seat turns out to be a mere aggregate of the assembly contests. Most of the L S contests combine elements of these polar-types. The detailed analysis of the nature of contest for the Alwar L S seat reveals that the contest for the seat was of the mixed variety inasmuch as the three main candidates for the L S adopted varying politico-electoral strategies in relation to their assembly running-mates, overshadowing some of them and depending passively on others.

Concept of 'Pillar' Candidate

Another basic methodological assumption underlying the analysis in this paper is that the assembly running-mates are regarded

as 'Pillars' of the LS candidates on whose support they mount their own campaign. This assumption is not to be treated as a universal generalization but has been adopted for purposes of analyzing the pattern of 'Tandem voting' in Alwar LS constituency. It is possible to conceive of a situation in which a LS candidate may have no 'pillar' candidate at all (as is the case with most of the independent candidates) or may actually be working at cross purposes with his supposed 'pillar' candidates. Whatever be the actual state of relationship between the LS candidates and assembly candidates in a given constituency, the concept of 'pillar' candidates is of considerable general significance, especially in the case of party candidates who share the same symbol. Further, in the case of 'pillar' candidates contesting on the same party ticket, it is reasonable to assume that the assembly candidates would try their best to ensure that a voter who votes for them also votes for their Lok Sabha running-mate. But, as the later discussion would show, they are not always sincere and/or successful in this attempt. The ultimate decision as to whether a person votes for the LS running-mate of an assembly candidate of his choice or not rests with the voter concerned. Still by sustained campaigning the assembly contestants can motivate the voters to vote for their LS running mates also. The same is true, of course, of LS candidates, for they can also contribute towards the quota of votes received by their 'pillar' assembly candidates. Empirically speaking, both the tendencies were operative in the case of Alwar LS constituency. An attempt has been made in this paper to analyze the extent and range of variations between the vote polled by LS candidates and pillar assembly candidates in each of the 523 polling stations in the LS constituency.

'Coupled-voting' and 'Cross-voting'

This has been calculated on the basis of a simple assumption that all the voters who voted for a particular assembly candidate

1. The term 'Pillar candidate' has been drawn from the political vocabulary of Alwar itself. A more sophisticated equivalent would perhaps have been 'supportive candidate'. But the term 'pillar candidate' has been preferred to keep intact the flavour of Alwar politics.

also voted for his LS running-mate. For such a small unit as a polling station, consisting on an average of 945 voters out of whom nearly 60% or approximately 600 only exercised their franchise, it is reasonable to assume that most of them must have voted for the same 'ticket' at the assembly and LS levels. This assumption is likely to operate with greater force in case of rural, largely illiterate, electorate which votes mainly on the basis of 'symbol' and is likely to be less true in the case of urban voters who may prefer to vote on the basis of different determinative influences in the case of assembly and L S candidates. In the absence of any reliable analysis or guess estimates regarding the extent of 'coupled-voting' (i.e., exercise of franchise for assembly and LS in such a manner that both the votes go to candidates who are contesting in a tandem) or 'cross-voting' (i.e., exercise of franchise in such a manner that the two votes go to different candidates not forming part of an electoral tandem) it is difficult to rigorously prove the contention which like all other operational assumptions enumerated above, is only to be treated as a working hypothesis. A cursory glance at the polling station-wise result sheet of the LS and assembly elections is enough to show that it is rarely that the LS candidate and his assembly running-mate poll the same number of votes in a given polling station, the difference between the two figures ranges between 0 to 500 and even more in a few cases. For purposes of our analysis we have calculated this difference for each polling station and then proceeded to analyse the extent and range of variation in terms of 'surplus' and 'deficit' recorded by the L'S candidate as compared to his 'pillar' candidate (s). As minor variation in votes polled by running-mates can occur on account of rejection of votes, the variations have been further categorized in three sizes viz. 0-50, 50-150, 150 and above. Special emphasis has been laid on polling stations where the variation, positive or negative, is of the order of 15-votes or more. It is evident that out of a small electorate of 600 or so, if a LS candidate polls 150 votes more or 150 votes less than his assembly 'pillar' candidate (s), then there must be some special factors influencing the voting intention of the electors who are indulging in 'cross-voting' on a large scale, the 'special factors' being all the more important in the case of party candidates running on the same symbol.

Size and Significance of Variations

As the later sections show, the range of variation in most of the polling stations in Alwar LS constituency was of the order of 0 to 50, especially in the case of Congress and SSP candidates for LS, underlying thereby the significance of the polling stations where the variations were of the order of 50 to 100, or 100 to 150 or 150 and above. Of course, in a polling station where one LS candidate has a large 'surplus' (over his assembly running-mate) another LS candidate may record an equally large 'deficit' (in comparison to his own assembly running-mate) thereby indicating a strong probability that the voters indulged in 'cross-voting' on a significant scale. These surpluses and deficits arise, as indicated earlier, on account of unequal political impact of the assembly and LS candidates and it is really difficult to ascertain as to which of the two running-mates has been responsible for the variations and to what extent. But we have tried to indicate the relative pull of LS and assembly candidates by taking into account the variations in those polling stations where they are not purely incidental and by correlating them with other non-quantifiable facts gathered during the field survey before, during and after the poll in February 1967.

III

THE CONSTITUENCY

The Alwar district is one of the 26 principal revenue districts of Rajasthan, its territory being virtually coterminous with the area of the erstwhile princely state of Alwar² which was last amalgamated into a smaller union, known as Matsya Union, consisting of four princely states of Alwar, Bharatpur, Karauli and Dholpur and latter merged into the larger unit known as Rajasthan. For purposes of assembly elections in 1967, the Alwar district was delimited into 10 single member constituencies but the Alwar LS constituency was co-extensive with only 8 of these constituencies, the remaining two constituencies falling in the jurisdiction of Bharatpur LS

2. The only significant alteration in the boundaries of the Alwar State occurred in 1951 when the Kotkasim Tehsil of Jaipur State was merged with it. For details see *District Census Handbook : Alwar District*, (Jaipur, Superintendent of Census Operations, Rajasthan, 1966).

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constituency. The following table gives the major statistical information regarding the 8 assembly constituencies :

TABLE I

Assembly Constituencies included in Alwar LS constituency (Basic Data)

No.	Name	Nature	Total Electorate	Number of Polling Stations	Average Elec- torate per Polling Station
1.	Bansur	General	63,294	63	1005
2.	Behror	..	64,752	68	952
3.	Mundawar	..	65,238	65	1004
4.	Tijara	..	60,453	62	975
5.	Jhairthal	Reserved	66,085	64	1034
6.	Ramgarh	General	64,643	65	995
7.	Alwar	..	62,046	68	912
8.	Thanagazi	..	66,581	68	980

Source : 1967 Rajasthan Election Results, (Government of Rajasthan, Government Central Press, Jaipur, 1968 pp. 41-46).

The total LS electorate of 5,13,326 in Alwar constituency was thus spread over 8 assembly constituencies and 523 polling stations. Only one of the 8 assembly constituencies was a reserved one while the remaining 7 were general ones. The area of the Alwar LS constituency has remained unaltered and coterminus with that of the Alwar district during the first three general elections and, apart from some minor adjustments in 1962, the inclusion of two assembly constituencies of the district into a neighbouring LS constituency in 1967 was the first major change in its area. As such, the Alwar LS constituency covered the entire Alwar district in 1952, 1957 and 1962 and even in 1967 it covered nearly eight and a half tehsils out of ten tehsils of the district. Consequently, the pattern of political processes and forces in the Alwar LS constituency has been the same as the nature and structure of 'district politics' in Alwar.

The Candidates

For the 1967 election from the Alwar LS constituency there were five candidates in all. Out of these only three were regarded as leading contenders, their names being Bhola Nath (Congress) Kashi Ram (SSP) and Chander Singh (Swatantra) while the chances of the two remaining independent candidates (Amar Singh and Teja Singh) were generally regarded as bleak. Most of the political commentators in Alwar in fact, looked upon the 1967 contest as a two-horse race between Kashiram the sitting MP and Bholanath. But the final results sprang quite a bit of surprise inasmuch as Chander Singh came very close to snatch away the second place from Kashiram, while Bholanath scored a decisive victory with a margin of 34,586 votes, although his share of total valid votes polled was only 36%. The overall result for the Alwar LS seat was as follows :

TABLE 2

Voting Pattern in Alwar (LS, Constituency)

No	Name of Candidate	Party	Votes polled	%
1	2	3	4	5
1	Bhola Nath	Congress	1,08,117	36.07
2	Kashi Ram	SSP	73,531	24.53
3	Chander Singh	Swatantra	66,123	22.06
4	Amar Singh	Ind.	28,734	9.59
5	Teja Singh	Ind.	23,223	7.75
Total valid votes polled			2,99,723	100.00

Source *Report of the Fourth General Elections in India*, Vol. II (Statistical), p. 75

Voting Pattern for Assembly Seats

The Congress not only captured the Alwar LS seat but it also won 5 out of the 8 assembly seats included in the Alwar LS constituency, one each being bagged by CPI, SSP and independent. The details of the poll verdict can be seen in the following table :

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TABLE 3

Election Results in eight assembly seats in Alwar LS Constituency.

No.	Constituency	Total valid votes polled	% to total votes	No. of contestants	Winning candidate	Party	Party votes polled	% to votes polled
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Bansur	31,685	51.6	4	Badri Prasad	Ind.	13,248	41.81
2.	Behror	38,821	59.6	4	Amilal	SSP	19,089	49.17
3.	Mundawar	39,841	61.1	5	Hari Prasad	Cong.	15,861	39.81
4.	Tijara	40,392	66.7	8	Aminuddin	Cong.	17,108	42.35
5.	Khairthal	33,835	51.2	6	Gokul Chand	Cong.	12,012	35.50
6.	Ramgarh	32,434	61.1	12	Shoba Ram	Cong.	13,665	34.65
7.	Alwar	37,150	59.6	11	Ramanand	CPI	11,783	31.72
8.	Thanagazi	35,298	53.1	7	Jai Krishan	Cong.	12,667	35.89

Source : *Report of the Fourth General Elections in India*, Vol. II (Statistical), pp. 456-7.

Voting Pattern for LS Seat

The overall voting figures for the LS, however, do not reveal the variations in the votes polled by different LS candidates in the eight assembly constituencies, for, as the table 4 given below shows, the LS candidates did not fare uniformly in all the eight constituencies :

TABLE 4

Voting Pattern in Alwar LS Constituency

No.	Assembly constituency	Bholanath (Cong.)	Kashiram (SSP)	Chander Singh (Sw.)
1	2	3	4	5
1.	Bansur	6,860 (3)	7,613 (2)	8,695 (1)
2.	Behror	12,615 (2)	19,195 (1)	5,300 (3)
3.	Mundawar	13,060 (1)	12,909 (2)	4,043 (3)
4.	Tijara	17,154 (1)	4,772 (4)*	11,579 (2)
5.	Khairthal	12,651 (1)	6,182 (2)	6,138 (3)
6.	Ramgarh	16,833 (1)	3,634 (4)**	12,181 (2)
7.	Alwar	14,427 (1)	11,232 (2)	5,487 (3)
8.	Thanagazi	14,471 (1)	7,980 (3)	8,937 (2)

Note:—The number in bracket shows the relative ranking of the candidates in each assembly constituency in terms of total votes polled.

* The third place went to Teja Singh (Ind.) who got 5,119 votes.

** The third place went to Amar Singh (Ind.) who got 4,896 votes.

DYNAMICS OF TANDEM VOTING

The foregoing table shows that the Congress candidate outpolled his rivals in 6 out of 8 constituencies but was pushed to second place in Behror and to the third place in the Bansur constituency. Kashiram, the SSP candidate, on the other hand, secured the first rank in only one of the eight constituencies and in two viz. Tijara and Ramgarh, he even lost the third place to independent candidates. The performance of Chander Singh, the Swatantra candidate, was better inasmuch as he outpolled both Bhola Nath and Kashiram in the Bansur constituency, secured the second highest votes in three constituencies and got the third position in the remaining four constituencies. This table thus confirms overall superiority of Bholanath, the Congress candidate *vis-a-vis* his rivals but throws up certain important questions which require elucidation as to the factors responsible for the variations in the constituency wise votes polled by these LS candidates.

A still more intriguing feature of the Alwar LS polling was the wide margin of votes separating the two candidates contesting in tandem for the LS and assembly. In the case of none of the three leading LS candidates the votes polled by them match perfectly the aggregate votes polled by their 'pillar' candidates contesting for the assembly in any of the eight assembly constituencies as can be seen from the following table showing the constituency-wise voting figures for LS and assembly.

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TABLE 5

Comparative Statement of Votes Polled by LS Candidates and their 'Pillar' Assembly Candidates in eight Assembly Constituencies included in Alwar LS Constituency.

S. No	Name of assembly constituency	Congress			SSP			Swatantra		
		Votes Polled by 'Pillar' candidates	Votes Polled by Bh Mantra	Variation of (margin of 3 over 4)	Votes Polled by 'Pillar' candidates	Votes Polled by Kailash	Variation of (margin of 7 over 6)	Votes Polled by 'Pillar' candidates	Votes Polled by Chander Singh	Variation of (margin of 10 over 9)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1.	Bansur	8,709	6,860	-2,047	7,613	13,248	-5,635	8,695	6,915	+1,780
2	Behror	17,383	12,615	4,768	19,195	19,089	+104	5,300	2,078	+3,222
3	Mundawar	15,861	13,060	-2,801	13,060	15,416	-2,356	7,796	2,590	+5,206
4.	Tijara	17,108	17,153	46	4,772	18,366	-13,594	11,579	1,408	+10,161
5.	Khairthal	12,103	12,651	638	6,182	9,856	-3,674	6,138	6,335	-197
6	Rangarh	13,665	16,533	3,168	3,634	4,502	-868	12,181	8,063	+3,118
7	Alwar	10,645	14,427	3,782	11,232	11,783	-551	5,487	7,008	-1,521
8	Thanaghazi	12,667	14,471	1,804	7,950	6,289	+1,661	8,937	3,282	+5,655
Total		1,08,071	1,05,249	-178	75,531	1,04,349	-28,818	66,113	37,869	+27,244

The Patterns of Variations

The foregoing table shows that, while the Congress LS candidate had a small overall deficit of 178 votes in comparison to the Congress 'pillar' candidates for the assembly the margin of variation was sizeable being as much as 4,768 in the case of Behror and 3,782 in the case of Alwar constituencies. Tijara and Khairthal constituencies formed an exception in this regard. Thus Bholanath fared much better in certain assembly constituencies and secured even more votes than the winning Congress assembly candidate in Ramgarh constituency, though he lagged behind by a large margin of 3,801 votes in Mundawar assembly constituency which was won by the Congress candidate. The margin of variation between LS candidate and his assembly 'pillar' candidates were even more significant in the case of Kashiram and Chander Singh who seemed to be totally out of tune with their running-mates in a number of constituencies. Thus, in the case of Tijara constituency Kashiram polled 13,594 votes less than the aggregate votes secured by his 'pillar' candidates while Chander Singh polled 10,101 votes more than his assembly running-mates. Again, Chander Singh had a 'surplus' of over 5,000 votes over his assembly running-mate in two constituencies, Thana gazi and Mundawar and a 'surplus' of over 3,000 votes in two other constituencies Behror and Ramgarh. Chander Singh, in fact, consistently secured more votes than his assembly running-mates in 6 constituencies and had a small 'deficit' of 197 votes in one and a slightly larger 'deficit' of 1,521 votes in another constituency, his total 'surplus' over his assembly running-mates being 28,427 which is nearly 40% of the total votes polled by him. In other words, had Chander Singh passively depended upon his assembly running-mates to secure votes for him he would have received nearly 40% votes less than that he actually got and, similarly, had Kashiram received the 'LS Vote' of every voter who voted for any one of his assembly running-mates, he would have secured 37% votes more than he actually did. The net 'surplus' or 'deficit' at the assembly level is, of course itself a net aggregate of 'surplus' and 'deficit' in each polling station and the kind of simplistic logic implicit in the foregoing analysis may not hold good for such a large area as an assembly constituency but at the polling station level the net 'surplus' or 'deficit', especially if it is of sufficiently large magnitude, does have the political significance

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postulated earlier. However, before presenting a detailed analysis of polling station-wise 'surpluses' or 'deficits' it would be in order to present a brief profile of the main political currents prevailing in the Alwar LS constituency on the eve of fourth general elections so that the 'shifts' in voting at such a micro level as the polling station may be understood in their proper macro context.

IV

DISTRICT POLITICS IN ALWAR AND THE PILLAR CANDIDATE'S STRATEGY

The politico-electoral history of Alwar district during the 15 years can be summed up, in brief, as that of a gradual decline of the Congress in the successive three general elections and steady expansion of the political influence of the CPI which won 2 assembly seats in 1962 general elections from this district alone while in the rest of the State it captured only 3 more seats. The following table showing the percentage of votes secured by various parties and independent candidates in the first three general elections in the Alwar district would amply bear out the point :

TABLE 6

Votes and seats secured by political parties in first three general elections in Alwar district

No.	Party	Election					
		1952		1957		1962	
		% Votes	Seats	% Votes	Seats	% Votes	Seats
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.	Congress	55.6		58.6		43.5	
2.	CPI	2.2		1.6		18.4	
3.	CPI (M)						
4.	SSP	.				3.7	
5.	PSP						
6.	Jana Sangh	.				3.1	
7.	Swatantra	.				1.7	
8.	Other Parties	11.0		4.4			
9.	Independents	31.0		30.1		29.6	
Total		100%	(10)	100%	(10)	100%	(10)

The Pre-election Moves

The political complexion of Alwar district had undergone a noticeable change after the 1962 general elections, the major shift being a decline in the hold of the Communist party in the wake of its split in 1964 into two parties. The Jana Sangh and Swatantra had been trying to make in-roads into the district politics of Alwar since 1962 and they were very much there to challenge the Communist party dominance in 1967 elections. Thus, at LS level whereas in 1962 Kashiram had defeated the Congress candidate on the basis of an all-party united front, he had to contend with a powerful Swatantra rival in 1967 besides the Congress candidate. After the death of Maharaja of Poonch, one of the feudatory States of Jammu and Kashmir, who had been put up as Swatantra party candidate, Kashiram, the sitting MP, approached the Swatantra leaders with the proposal that they should not 'triangularize' the contest by putting up a fresh candidate. The Swatantra party was not prepared to negotiate with Kashiram unless he elected to contest on the Swatantra symbol. Kashiram did not accede to this offer as he owed his dramatic win in 1962 mainly to the support of the CPI led alliance of leftist parties including SSP and Socialists. For the 1967 general elections also the CPI and SSP had already extended their support to him and he preferred to bank upon them rather than taking a risk of joining forces with newcomers to the district like Swatantra party. The Swatantra, in turn, awarded its ticket to Chander Singh, an ex-officer of the Indian National Army who had served one term as MLA in the Rajasthan assembly, and yet he was not a front rank political leader in Alwar district.

The 'Pillar' Candidates

The three leading LS candidates had also their running-mates for the assembly. Since the Congress was contesting all the eight assembly seats the 'pillar' candidates of Bholanath were none-else but the official Congress candidates and similar was the case of Chander Singh who could count upon the support of the 5 candidates contesting on behalf of the Swatantra party and 3 candidates contesting on behalf of the Jana Sangh. Thus, the Congress as well as the Swatantra LS candidates had one 'pillar' candidate in each of the eight assembly constituencies but Kashiram, who was in reality an independent

candidate contesting on the SSP symbol, followed a complex policy regarding 'pillar' candidates trying to secure the support of more than one assembly candidates in certain constituencies while in others he was content to rely on one 'pillar' candidate only. The State SSP leaders, in fact, gave a blank cheque to Kashiram as far as selection of SSP candidates in the eight assembly constituencies was concerned. Besides putting up candidates for various assembly seats with the SSP symbol, Kashiram also tried to enlist the support of a few influential independent candidates and even tried to work out a *modus vivendi* with the Jana Sangh candidate from the Alwar assembly constituency. Since the voting pattern for LS seat was vitally influenced by the flaws and success of the strategy of obtaining more than one 'pillar' candidate in one constituency, a brief constituency wise account of Kashiram's efforts at alliance making is given below.

(i) **Bansur** In this constituency Kashiram found a very strong 'pillar' in Badri Prasad Gupta who had left the Congress and joined the newly formed Janta party after being denied the ticket for the Bansur assembly constituency as, apart from their common anger against erstwhile Congress colleagues, both were united by caste bond, kinship ties and common business interests. In fact Kashiram went to the extreme extent of getting the original SSP candidate for the Bansur seat to withdraw his nomination at the last minute and tried his best to secure the SSP symbol for Badri Prasad who had filed his nomination form as an Independent but the rules did not permit it.

(ii) **Behror** . From the very beginning Kashiram tried to induce Amilal Yadav, pradhan of the Behror panchayat samiti to contest for the assembly as his 'pillar' candidate and was ultimately successful in wresting him out of the Congress fold and making him enter the contest on the SSP ticket.³

The full story of the pre-election defection of Amilal is not known but it was reported in local newspapers that Ram Sevak Yadav, General Secretary SSP, helped Kashiram in wooing him who was, moreover anxious to match his strength with Ghasiram Yadav, the existing local 'boss of the Congress'.

(iii) **Mundawar** : In Mundawar assembly constituency Kashiram was able to forge an alliance with Ram Singh who had recently left Congress after being denied the Congress ticket and who was considered to be a formidable candidate in view of backing of Janta party leaders like Kumbharam Arya. Kashiram, accordingly got the SSP symbol allotted to Ram Singh for the Mundawar constituency.

(iv) **Tijara** : In Tijara assembly constituency Kashiram did not have one but two 'pillar' candidates, one being a strong independent candidate, Gopal Sharan Mathur and the other being the official Communist party candidate, Raturam. The double alliance did pose several knotty problems for Kashiram for, after all, his supporters were mutual rivals; but he neatly tackled them by avoiding any open commitment to either of them, all the while joining with them in order to appeal to the voters to cast their 'LS vote' for himself irrespective of their choice for either of his supporters.

(v) **Khairthal** : With the CPI as well as CP (M) putting up candidates here Kashiram was faced with the prospect of a sizeable loss in the constituency as a consequence of the internecine warfare among his 'pillar' candidates. He had thus to maintain a careful balance between the two 'pillar' candidates.

(vi) **Ramgarh** : The Ramgarh assembly constituency posed a big problem for Kashiram in view of multiplicity of candidates and his predicament was accentuated by the filing of nomination form on behalf of the SSP by a politically unknown person who, as Aditendra, President of SSP declared in public, had obtained the official seal of the SSP on the nomination form fraudulently. The CPI candidate, Haru Mal was, of course, pledged to support him but Kashiram also tried to work out some sort of an adjustment with a powerful independent candidate, Nathi Singh. But nothing definite came out of this attempt.

(vii) **Alwar** : In Alwar assembly constituency Kashiram was mainly depending upon Ramanand Agarwal, the CPI sitting MLA, but he also tried to discover a *modus vivendi* with the Jana Sangh candidate Ram Chandra Upadhyaya who was generally regarded as one of the key non-party lieutenants of Ramanand. During the

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1967 elections Upadhayaya's candidature completely upset Kashiram's plans in Alwar assembly constituency as he was banking upon the CPI candidate whose position now appeared to be shaky and, accordingly, he tried to work out a Tijara-type adjustment with Upadhayaya. Whatever his private assessment of the chances of this rightist alliance ousting Congress from power in the State might have been, Kashiram's capacity to manoeuvre was limited by his past indebtedness to left wing alliance as well as the extremely feeble impact of Swatantra and Jantâ parties in Alwar district. Baffled by the ideological inconsistencies of his effort, Kashiram ultimately thought it best to maintain his alliance with the leftist parties but he did not give up hopes of securing limited support from Upadhayaya on account of personal friendship between the two.

(viii) **Thanagazi** : In Thanagazi Kashiram had no difficulty in finding a good 'pillar' candidate as Ramjilal Agarwal, a dissident Congressman who had been pramukh of the Alwar zila parishad during 1960-63, was contesting as an independent candidate. While he was within the Congress Agarwal was known for his honesty and 'progressive' views. He was thus found quite willing to accept Kashiram's offer of SSP symbol as he himself wanted to hitch his bandwagon to a recognized symbol without formally joining the party.

V

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS : PATTERNS OF DOVETAILING

The final election line-up would show that all the three leading LS candidates had at least one 'pillar' candidate in each of the 8 assembly constituencies. It was, however only, in the case of Congress that there was a perfect synchronization of symbols. The importance of sharing a common election symbol received an extra-ordinary emphasis in Alwar LS constituency because the Congress candidate Bholanath undertook very little electioneering on his own, depending to a very large extent, upon the 'pillar' candidates and the drawing power of the Congress symbol for securing votes. He did, of course, make some special efforts in areas which he regarded as his strongholds. He, however, hardly did anything to reinforce those of his 'pillar' candidates whose prospects looked weak for one reason or

the other hand there was, for example, little coordination between the election campaign of Bholanath and Kumari Uma Mathur who was contesting for the Alwar assembly constituency and who suffered from the handicap of having been allotted the Congress ticket as late as January 15, 1967. In contrast, Kashiram had to strain every nerve of his mind and body to coordinate and dovetail the campaigns of his diverse 'pillar' candidates with different symbols. He had to, for example, take special care not to offend any of the mutually rivalrous 'pillar' candidates, as in the case of Tijara and Alwar assembly constituencies.

Chander Singh, the third leading LS candidate, also failed to develop a well-coordinated joint campaign with his 'pillar' candidates mainly because he received the Swatantra ticket at a late hour and many of the 'pillar' candidates were not happy with his nomination. Another factor militating against active joint campaign on behalf of the candidates sponsored by the Jana Sangh-Swatantra combine was the absence of a district level coordinating machinery both in the case of Jana Sangh and Swatantra so that, by and large, each candidate of this combine was conducting a separate battle. The State level leaders of the two parties, also did not pay special attention towards the fate of their candidates in Alwar district because they were treating the 1967 elections more or less, as a dress rehearsal for the next general election knowing full well their weakness in district politics.

VI

SIZE AND PATTERN OF VARIATIONS : AN OVERVIEW

The overall aggregated voting figures, given in table 5, show that the Congress LS candidate had a small net 'deficit' of 178, the SSP candidate, Kashiram, had a relatively larger 'deficit' of 28818 while the Swatantra candidate, Chander Singh, had an equally large 'surplus' of 28427 votes. The table 5 also shows that, in any given constituency, where a LS candidate had a net 'surplus' or 'deficit', there were many polling stations where the candidate had sizeable 'deficit' or 'surplus', the magnitude of polling station-wise variations not being reflected in the resultant aggregate for the constituency as

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a whole. The internal variations in each of the assembly constituencies falling in the Alwar LS constituency can be quantitatively measured in terms of number of polling stations as well as actual number of votes.

‘Deficit’ and ‘Surplus’ Polling Stations

With regard to number of polling stations the Congress candidate had a ‘surplus’ in nearly half of the total 523 polling stations and ‘deficit’ in other half, the SSP candidate had a ‘surplus’ in nearly two-fifths of the polling stations and ‘deficit’ in the remaining three-fifth and the Swatantra candidate had a ‘surplus’ in four-fifth of the total polling stations in Alwar LS constituency and a ‘deficit’ in the remaining one-fifth polling stations, details being as follows :

TABLE 7

Number of ‘Deficit’ and ‘Surplus’ Polling Stations in Alwar LS Constituency

No.	Name of Candidate	Party	Number of Polling Stations Deficit	Surplus	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Bholanath	Congress	258	262	520*
2.	Kashiram	SSP	319	198	517*
3.	Chander Singh	Swatantra	99	422	521*

The foregoing breakdown of the polling stations as either ‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’ only shows the general trend regarding the pattern of variation in voting in Alwar LS constituency but does not indicate either the size of ‘deficit’ or ‘surplus’ in these polling stations or the total number of ‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’ votes in these polling stations. The following table, containing a breakdown of polling stations, according to size of variations, however, shows that in nearly 60% of the polling stations the variation was of a small size, which may be regarded as incidental, the details being as follows .

- * The totals in column 6 do not add up to 523 because the polling stations showing a nil variation have been excluded from analysis. The number of such polling stations was 3, 6 and 2 in the case of Congress, SSP and Swatantra candidates respectively.

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TABLE 8

Size of Polling Station-wise Variations in Alwar LS Constituency

Range of variation	Congress			Number of Polling Stations			Swatantra		
	D	S	Total	D	S	Total	D	S	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0-50	167	167	334 (64.3%)	139	153	292 (56.4%)	55	206	261 (50.1%)
50-150	79	81	160 (30.5%)	107	43	150 (29.1%)	40	158	198 (38.1%)
150+	12	14	26 (5.2%)	73	2	75 (14.5%)	4	58	62 (11.8%)
	258	262	520 (100.00%)	319	198	517 (100.00%)	99	422	521 (100.00%)

The foregoing table shows that the net variation, irrespective of the sign, was high in the case of only 5.2%, 14.5% and 11.8% of the polling stations in case of Congress, SSP and Swatantra candidates respectively. The percentages in columns 4, 7 and 10 of table 8 also reveal that out of the polling stations where the variation of votes was over 150, in the case of Congress candidate the number of 'surplus' and 'deficit' polling stations was nearly equal; the distribution pattern of these polling stations was highly skewed in the case of SSP and Swatantra candidates, the former having a 'deficit' in 73 out of 75 polling stations with a variation of over 150 and the latter having a 'surplus' in 58 out of 62 polling stations with a variation of 'over 150'.

'Deficit' and 'Surplus' Votes

While the table 7 and table 8 contain an analysis in terms of number of polling stations, the following table, showing the actual number of votes in these polling stations, not merely confirms the trends indicated in polling station-wise analysis but also shows that the percentage distribution of votes is significantly different from the percentage distribution of polling stations. It is, thus, obvious that

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analysis of variations in terms of unweighted number of polling stations is not an accurate index for measurement of variations in LS and assembly voting :

TABLE 9

Size and Patten of Variation in Votes in Alwar LS Constituency

S. No.	Range of variation	Number of Votes					
		Congress		SSP		Swatantra	
		D	S	D	S	D	S
1	0—50	3907 (30·9)	3405 (27·3)	2865 (9·1)	3084 (45·3)	1090 (20·1)	8488 (25·2)
2	50—150	6481 (51·3)	6451 (51·1)	9754 (30·6)	3297 (48·6)	3574 (65·6)	13425 (39·6)
3	150	2242 (7·8)	2596 (22·6)	19213 (60·3)	419 (6·1)	778 (14·3)	11956 (35·2)
		12630 (100·0)	12452 (100·0)	31832 (100·0)	6800 (100·0)	5442 (100·0)	33869 (100·0)

The foregoing table reveals the full significance of the phenomenon of 'coupled voting' and 'cross-voting' and highlights the fact that quite a large proportion of variations in voting are highly significant. Thus, in the case of SSP candidate the total number of 'deficit' votes in the Alwar LS constituency was 31832 out of which 19213 (nearly 60%) were polled in 73 (23%) of the polling stations. Similarly, the Swatantra candidate scored a 'surplus' of 11956 votes, which was nearly 35% of the total 'surplus' in 58 polling stations which formed only 13% of the total 'surplus', polling stations for the Swatantra candidates. A comparison of percentages in table 8 and table 9 tends to further underline the important fact that a substantial proportion of SSP 'deficit' and Swatantra 'surplus' votes was concentrated in a small number of polling stations with large-scale variations indicating thereby the need for a detailed analysis of political forces operating in the key polling stations where the LS

candidate of SSP lost heavily in comparison to his assembly 'pillar' candidates, while the Swatantra candidate fared much better than his assembly running-mates.

VII

PATTERN OF CONSTITUENCY-WISE VARIATIONS

Having examined the overall pattern of variations in Alwar LS constituency, it is now possible to probe deeper into the pattern of voting variations in each constituency for the three main LS candidates, which would highlight the constituency-wise performance of LS candidates in Alwar and pinpoint the polling stations where the variations are significant.

Bholanath High Degree of 'Coupled-voting'

The Congress candidate, Bholanath, it may be recalled, had an overall 'deficit' of 12,630 votes in 258 polling stations and a 'surplus' of 12452 votes in 262 polling stations. The constituency wise break-up of the polling stations, given in table 10 below, shows that the 'deficit' was concentrated mainly in three constituencies: Bansur (53 polling stations and 2284 votes), Behror (58 polling stations and 4774 votes) and Mundawar (58 polling stations and 2868 votes) and the 'surplus' was spread over in three constituencies: Ramgarh (58 polling stations and 3468 votes), Alwar (53 polling stations and 4441 votes) and Thanagazi (60 polling stations and 1850 votes). It may be noted that the first three constituencies (Bansur, Behror and Mundawar) are geographically contiguous and form part of the famous 'Rath' belt heavily populated by Ahirs or Yadavas. The three surplus constituencies on the other hand are located in south-east and central parts of the district where no single caste dominates political life as in the 'Rath' region. The following table shows the detailed pattern of variations in all the 8 assembly constituencies.

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TABLE 10

*Pattern of Variations in Votes Polled by Congress Candidates
in Alwar LS Constituency*

Constituency	Deficit				Surplus			
	0-50	50-150	150	Total	0-50	50-150	150	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Bansur	913 (40)	981 (11)	390 (2)	2284 (53)	156 (8)	81 (1)		237 (9)
Behror	1136 (29)	2540 (32)	1098 (6)	4774 (67)	6 (1)	-		6 (1)
Mundawar	878 (37)	1618 (19)	372 (2)	2868 (58)	67 (7)	-	-	67 (7)
Tiara	328 (20)	231 (3)	161 (1)	720 (24)	474 (33)	137 (2)	155 (1)	766 (36)
Khairthal	332 (18)	647 (8)	-	979 (26)	545 (28)	661 (8)	411 (2)	1617 (38)
Ramgarh	79 (6)	-	221 (1)	300 (7)	1185 (36)	1490 (18)	793 (4)	2468 (58)
Alwar	195 (9)	464 (6)	-	59 (15)	266 (9)	3107 (38)	1068 (6)	4441 (53)
Thanagazi	46 (8)	-	-	46 (8)	706 (45)	975 (14)	169 (1)	1850 (60)
	3907 (167)	6481 (79)	2242 (12)	12630 (258)	3405 (167)	6451 (81)	2596 (14)	12452 (262)

The foregoing table shows that bulk of the Congress 'deficit' as well as 'surplus' was concentrated in the size 50-150 and only 17% of the 'deficit' and 20% of the 'surplus' was due to high variations in 12 and 14 polling stations respectively. Again, a large proportion of variations in terms of votes, 31% in the case of 'deficit' votes and 27% in the case of 'surplus' votes fell in the category 'incidental' showing thereby that the Congress LS candidate generally polled as many votes as did his assembly constituency 'pillar' candidates in all the 8 constituencies and nearly two-third of the polling stations in each assembly constituency. This statistical conclusion lends validity to the popular belief that Bholanath won the LS election mainly on the basis of the support obtained by the Congress candidates for the assembly seats and in none of the constituencies he could poll a significantly higher number of votes as

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compared to his assembly running-mates. It also follows that the Congress assembly candidates encouraged the voters to resort to 'coupled-voting' so that a large percent of 'deficit' recorded by Bholanath was just incidental. Further, the absence of dramatic fluctuations in the votes polled by the Congress LS candidate and the 'pillar' assembly candidates underlines the utility of the standard Congress strategy of joint campaigning for the assembly and LS seats.

Kashiram : High Losses due to 'Cross-voting'

The extent of 'coupled-voting' was markedly less in the case of Kashiram whose strategy of contesting with the help of 'pillar' candidates of all shades failed to pay-off the requisite dividends as can be seen from the following table

TABLE 11

Pattern of variation in the votes polled by Kashiram and his 'pillar' candidates in Alwar LS constituency

Constituency	Deficit				Surplus			
	0-50	50-150	150-	Total	0-50	50-150	150	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Bansur	387 (13)	2490 (25)	3237 (14)	6114 (52)	132 (7)	347 (4)	-	479 (11)
Behror	508 (25)	223 (3)	167 (1)	898 (29)	632 (33)	370 (5)	-	1002 (38)
Mundawar	339 (13)	1887 (21)	1391 (6)	3617 (40)	279 (16)	630 (7)	203 (1)	1112 (24)
Tijara	191 (6)	1512 (15)	11905 (40)	12608 (61)	14 (1)	-	-	14 (1)
Khairthal	382 (16)	2131 (24)	1877 (9)	4390 (49)	149 (7)	567 (8)	-	716 (15)
Ramgath	538 (25)	593 (11)	224 (1)	1705 (37)	209 (22)	338 (5)	-	837 (27)
Alwar	344 (28)	618 (8)	412 (2)	1374 (38)	444 (24)	379 (5)	-	823 (29)
Thanagazi	126 (13)	-	-	126 (13)	935 (43)	666 (9)	216 (1)	1817 (53)
	2865 (139)	9754 (107)	19213 (73)	31832 (319)	3084 (153)	3297 (43)	419 (2)	6800 (198)

The foregoing table shows that Kashiram was a net loser to the tune of 31,832 votes in the Alwar L.S. constituency and, generally speaking, he lagged far behind his 'pillar' candidates in all the 8 assembly constituencies. Behror and Thanagazi constituencies, in fact, were the only constituencies where he out-pollled his 'pillar' candidates but, as the foregoing table shows, in both the constituencies a large proportion of 'surplus' votes accrued in polling stations where the size of variation was 0-50, which means that a major fraction of the 'surplus' votes polled by Kashiram was due to incidental factors. Thus, in Behror, Kashiram had a total 'surplus' of 1002 votes out of which as many as 632 or nearly 62% were polled in 33 polling stations with a variation of 0-50 votes. Similarly, his 'surplus' of 1817 votes in Thanagazi constituency was accumulated in small dribblets as revealed by the fact that 935 or nearly 50% of these came from polling stations where the margin was 0-50. In contrast to these constituencies, Kashiram had a sizeable 'deficit' in Bansur, Tijara and Khairthal constituencies, the 'deficit' in each case being concentrated in a few polling stations where the variation was of the order of '150-above'. Thus, out of the total 'deficit' of 13,608 votes in Tijara constituency as many as 11,905 votes were accounted for by 40 polling stations each with a variation of over 150 votes. In other words, despite having two 'pillar' candidates in the Tijara constituency, Kashiram failed to collect the 'LS vote' of the electors who voted for either of his 'pillar' candidates in 61 out of 62 polling stations and in as many as 40 polling stations he lagged behind by the significant margin of over 150 votes. The electors of the Tijara constituency thus negated Kashiram's strategy by voting for his 'pillar' assembly candidates but casting their 'LS vote' in favour of a candidate other than the one logically implicit in the electoral tandem. It follows that in the case of Kashiram a large number of voters exercising their franchise in favour of Gopal Sharan and Rati Ram indulge in 'cross-voting' in Tijara constituency. The extent of 'cross-voting' was also significant in Bansur, Mundawar and Khairthal constituencies as far as Kashiram was concerned. Thus, in Bansur, where his 'pillar' candidate, Badri Prasad Gupta, scored a thumping victory, Kashiram had a total 'deficit' of 6114 votes spread over 52 out of 63 polling stations in the constituency. What is even more surprising is the fact that a large part of the 'deficit' was

composed of variations of the order of 50-150 and 150 and above which cannot be treated as incidental. One of the explanations for this large discrepancy, as given by poll analysts in Alwar, was that a large number of the voters who voted for Badri Prasad were led astray by the confusion of symbols. As an independent candidate who could not obtain the SSP symbol, Badri Prasad had the same symbol as Amar Singh who was contesting for the LS as an independent candidate. During election campaign Badri Prasad had done his best to educate the voters to vote for him and Kashiram by marking 'Camel' and 'Tree' respectively but in a rural area this campaign could not be effective, causing thereby a large cut in the votes polled by Kashiram in comparison to votes polled by his 'pillar' assembly candidate. In the case of the 'deficit' accruing to Kashiram in Mundawar and Khairthal constituencies the main point to be noted is that, unlike Bansur and Tijara, bulk of 'deficit' falls into the 50-150 size (in Mundawar constituency out of a total 'deficit' of 3017 votes as many as 1887 or slightly over 50% were concentrated in 21 polling stations with a variation of the order of 50-150 and in the case of Khairthal constituency 2131 votes out of a total 'deficit' of 4390 were accounted for by 24 polling stations with a variation of the order of 50-150) and, hence, it is very difficult to offer any macro-generalization about the possible causes for these variations. In the case of Khairthal constituency, which had an overwhelming majority of scheduled caste voters, the political observers were of the opinion that Amar Singh, himself belonging to a scheduled caste known as 'Jatav Chamars', exercised a strong pull. This impressionist political analysis receives strong support from the fact that in the case of Chikani polling station Kashiram had a 'deficit' of 217 votes even though the Chikani polling station was considered to be a strong-hold of his 'pillar' assembly candidate. Sevak Ram, who was a resident of Chikani village, the single largest village in this polling station covering four villages. The fact that Chander Singh had a 'surplus' of 31 votes only in Chikani polling station further rules out the possibility of the voters favouring Sevak Ram voting for Chander Singh at the LS level. Further, the fact that Amar Singh polled as many as 207 votes from this polling station shows that a large number of voters who voted for Sevak Ram at the assembly level indulged in 'cross-coting' in favour of Amar

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Singh in preference to 'coupled-voting' in favour of Kashiram. A similar voting pattern was found in 3 contiguous polling stations, viz. Kithur, Karoli and Bhejeda, which tends to confirm the hypothesis that, despite their best efforts, Kashiram's 'pillar' candidates could not deliver all the 'LS votes' of their supporters to their running-mate at the LS level.

Chander Singh : High 'surplus' due to 'Cross-voting'

The Swatantra candidate Chander Singh had a total 'deficit' of 5442 votes and a total 'surplus' of 33869 votes in the Alwar LS constituency, the constituency-wise break-up being as follows :

TABLE 12

Pattern of Variations in the Votes Polled by Chander Singh and his 'pillar' Candidates in Alwar LS constituency

Constituency	Deficit				Surplus			
	0-50	50-150	150	Total	0-50	50-150	150	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Bansui	332 (16)	557 (7)	187 (1)	1076 (24)	436 (18)	1583 (17)	840 (4)	2858 (39)
Behror	51 (5)	-	-	51 (5)	990 (41)	1433 (18)	851 (4)	3273 (63)
Mundawar	39 (2)	71 (1)	-	110 (3)	875 (28)	2027 (23)	2114 (11)	5316 (62)
Tijara	-	-	-	-	534 (19)	1439 (16)	8189 (27)	10162 (62)
Khairthal	226 (13)	791 (8)	423 (2)	1440 (23)	725 (33)	518 (7)	-	1243 (40)
Ramgarh	104 (4)	-	-	104 (4)	688 (22)	2806 (36)	728 (3)	4222 (61)
Alwar	338 (15)	2155 (24)	168 (1)	2661 (40)	473 (18)	667 (9)	-	1140 (27)
Thanagazi	-	-	-	-	698 (27)	2952 (32)	1954 (9)	5655 (68)
	1090 (55)	3574 (40)	778 (4)	5441 (99)	5418 (206)	13425 (155)	11956 (58)	33869 (422)

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The foregoing table shows that the most remarkable variation in the case of Chander Singh occurred in the Tijara assembly constituency, where he had a 'surplus' of 10,162 votes and did not have a 'deficit' in any of the 62 polling stations of the constituency. The sizeable 'surplus' in Tijara is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that 8189 out of 10162 (80%) of the 'surplus' votes were polled in 27 polling stations where the 'surplus' was of the order of 'above 150' and only 534 votes accrued in small dribblets of '0-50'. The electorate in Tijara constituency, thus, reposed an overwhelming confidence in the Swatantra candidate for the LS while it had given only a token support to his assembly running-mate. Besides Tijara constituency, Chander Singh had significant 'surplus' in Mundawar and Ihanagazi constituencies. The case of Mundawar constituency is, indeed, noteworthy as Chander Singh's 'pillar' candidate in Mundawar constituency was none other than Raghuvir Singh, the president of district unit of Swatantra party who had been a very influential minister in the cabinet formed on the eve of Independence and who later became the Chairman of the Rajasthan branch of Ram Rajya Parishad. The main explanation for the large 'surplus' recorded by Chander Singh in the four contiguous constituencies of Bansur, Behroi, Mundawar and Tijara lay in the voting strategy of the Ahir or Yadav electors in the 'Rath' region who preferred to cast at least one vote for a co-casteman while taking into consideration more politically relevant criterion in the case of assembly elections. The fact that electors who preferred Congress at the assembly level did not indulge in 'cross-voting', while the electors who voted for Kashiram's 'pillar' candidates did not vote for Kashiram but preferred to vote for a co-casteman tends to support the contention that the voters in these constituencies put a greater premium on 'instrumental' politics at the assembly level, while they were swayed by sentimental political appeals in the case of LS elections.

In view of the fact that two 'pillar' candidates of Chander Singh were contesting on a different symbol it is interesting to note that there was a close correspondence in the votes showing that the electors casting their votes for Col. Shriram and Ram Chandra Upadhyaya, the Jana Sangh candidates from Bansur and

Alwar constituency respectively, voted, by and large, for Chander Singh, the difference in the Jana Sangh and Swatantra symbols notwithstanding. Keeping in view the difficulty of the voters in marking two different symbols in order to indulge in 'coupled-voting' the close correspondence between the votes polled by Chander Singh and his Jana Sangh 'pillar' candidates is indeed, striking.

VIII

FLOW PATTERNS OF 'CROSS-VOTING'

The foregoing analysis of constituency and polling station-wise variations in the votes polled by electoral team-mates for assembly and LS seats has revealed that the electors in Alwar LS constituency adopted distinct voting strategies regarding the two elections. The electors who voted for the Congress, for example, voted consistently for the Congress candidates at the assembly as well as LS levels but the electors voting for non-Congress candidates at the assembly level indulged in 'cross-voting' on a large scale.

The SSP-Swatantra Cross-Voting

The most distinctive feature of this 'cross-voting' was the fact that the 'LS votes' of those electors who voted for Kashiram's 'pillar' candidates flowed to Swatantra candidate Chander Singh in most cases and an independent candidate in some cases. An unmistakable index of this flow pattern of 'cross-voting' is the fact that in as many as 33 polling stations Chander Singh had a high 'surplus' and Kashiram had an equally high deficit, while Bholanath's votes were, more or less, equal to the votes polled by his 'pillar' candidates. It may be further noted that as many as 27 of these polling stations were located only in one constituency viz Tijara. A similar flow pattern obtained in the case of 5 polling stations in Behror constituency and one polling station in Mundawar constituency. The volume of the votes gained by Chander Singh at the expense of Kashiram was relatively similar in the three constituencies viz., Behror, Bansur and Mundawar but, by and large, in most of the polling stations in Rath' region Chander Singh obtained the votes of electors who did not vote for Swatantra candidate for the assembly.

Independent-Swatantra 'Cross-Voting'

The electors in Thanagazi constituency, on the other hand,

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indulged in 'cross-voting' of a different type : In most of the polling stations all the three main LS candidates polled roughly the same number of votes as their running-mates but in 9 polling stations Chander Singh recorded a high 'surplus' without cutting into the votes of his rivals. This form of 'cross-voting' occurred in those polling stations where an independent candidate, Laxmi Narayan had polled heavily, as can be seen from the following table :

TABLE 14

Flow Pattern of 'Cross-voting' in Thanagazi Assembly Constituency

No	Name of Polling Stations	C A N D I D A T E S			Votes polled by Laxman
		Congress Bholanath	SSP Kashiram	Swatantra Chander Singh	
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Nagalbam				
	Assembly Votes	268	32	30	423
	LS Votes	254	45	186	
	Variation	- 14	- 13	- 156	
2.	Lalpura				
	Assembly Votes	149	166	57	250
	LS Votes	145	167	302	
	Variation	- 4	- 1	+ 245	
3.	Piplai				
	Assembly Votes	112	25	10	342
	LS Votes	124	65	224	
	Variation	12	40	+ 214	
4.	Kayara				
	Assembly Votes	68	45	55	363
	LS Votes	102	82	291	
	Variation	+ 34	- 37	236	
5.	Dera				
	Assembly Votes	82	28	21	385
	LS Votes	104	63	290	
	Variation	40	35	269	
6.	Ajatgarh				
	Assembly Votes	80	84	16	348
	LS Votes	99	129	255	
	Variation	+ 19	+ 45	+ 239	
7.	Suchandpura				
	Assembly Votes	138	32	13	407
	LS Votes	155	63	235	
	Variation	17	31	- 222	
8.	Thana				
	Assembly Votes	119	82	19	348
	LS Votes	207	109	226	
	Variation	+ 88	+ 27	+ 205	
9.	Bhigota				
	Assembly Votes	54	69	3	411
	LS Votes	80	108	205	
	Variation	+ 26	+ 39	+ 197	

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The foregoing table shows that in all the polling stations in Thanagazi constituency where Chander Singh had a high 'surplus' Laxminarayan alias Laxman had polled very heavily and since the electors voting for Congress and SSP 'pillar' candidates had also voted for their LS running-mates, it is obvious that Chander Singh had obtained the 'LS votes' of a large percentage of those who voted for Laxminarayan at the assembly level. As far as could be ascertained there was no formal electoral pact between Chander Singh and Laxman and interviews with the chief campaigners of the latter revealed that they had simply ignored the question of 'LS vote' and had instructed their supporters to remember to vote for Laxman only and do as they liked with their other vote except marking 'Tree' or 'Bullocks with Yokes on'. Consequently, Chander Singh received an unexpected windfall in Thanagazi constituency where he had done little campaigning and where his assembly running-mate had a poor performance to his credit.

Flow Pattern in Alwar Constituency

As could perhaps be expected on the basis of general socio-political logic, the flow pattern of 'LS votes' in Alwar assembly constituency was quite complex. The Alwar assembly constituency containing an electorate of 62,046 was neatly divided into two unequal halves: out of 68 polling stations 47 fell inside the municipal limits of Alwar town while the remaining 21 covered villages of Alwar Tehsil. The overall voting pattern for the assembly was such that the Communist candidate Ramanand Agarwal fared very well in the 47 urban polling stations, while the Congress' candidate Kumari Uma Mathur polled heavily in the 21 rural polling stations, the detailed break-up of their votes being as follows :

TABLE 15
Voting Pattern in Urban and Rural Polling Stations in Alwar Assembly Constituency of Alwar LS Constituency

No	Name of candidate	Votes Polled		Total
		Rural Polling Stations (21)	Urban Polling Stations (47)	
1.	Ramanand Agarwal (CP)	3,231	8,552	11,783
2.	Uma Mathur (Cong)	4,786	5,859	10,645
3.	Ramchandra Upadhyaya (JS)	1,032	5,966	7,008
4.	Other Candidates	3,278	4,446	7,714
Total		12,327	24,823	37,150

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In the light of the foregoing table it is interesting to note that none of the 6 polling stations where Bholanath had a high 'surplus' were rural and all of them were situated inside the municipal limits of Alwar town. This shows that Bholanath polled a large number of 'LS voters' of urban voters of Alwar assembly constituency who did not vote for Congress at the assembly level the detailed voting pattern in these 7 polling stations being as follows .

TABLE 16

Voting Pattern in High Congress 'Surplus' Polling Stations in Alwar Assembly Constituency

No	Polling Stations	VOTES POLLED		
		Congress Bholanath	SSP Kashiram	Swatantra Chander Singh
1	2	3	4	5
1	Ward No. 3			
	Assembly Votes	204	237	276
	LS Votes	362	246	138
	Variation	+158	+9	138
2	Ward No. 6			
	Assembly Votes	99	117	186
	LS Votes	282	87	57
	Variation	183	30	-129
3	Ward No. 9			
	Assembly Votes	39	309	55
	LS Votes	201	318	50
	Variation	+162	9	-5
4	Ward No. 11			
	Assembly Votes	193	264	189
	LS Votes	374	257	73
	Variation	180	7	116
5	Ward No. 13			
	Assembly Votes	97	202	60
	LS Votes	280	169	111
	Variation	183	33	51
6	Ward No. 4			
	Assembly Votes	143	330	206
	LS Votes	299	334	71
	Variation	156	4	135

The foregoing table shows that in 4 out of 6 polling stations where the Congress LS candidate had a high 'surplus' the Swatantra candidate had a substantial 'deficit' while the variation in the votes of Kashiram vis-a-vis his assembly 'pillar' candidates was very small. In these polling stations, therefore, it can be inferred that electors who voted in favour of Jana Sangh candidate at the assembly level voted neither for his LS running-mate Chander Singh nor for

Kashiram who was known to have good relations with Upadhya but voted in favour of Congress LS candidate without voting for his assembly 'pillar' candidate.

Party-Independent 'Cross-voting'

While in most of the polling stations the electors divided their two votes among various candidates contesting in an electoral tandem, a large number of electors in Khairthal constituency voted for an independent LS candidate without voting for any independent candidate at the assembly level. Thus, in as many as 20 polling stations of Khairthal constituency both Kashiram and Bholanath recorded substantial 'deficit' but these votes did not flow towards their main rival, Chander Singh as indicated by the fact that he had a small 'surplus' in these polling stations. As pointed out earlier also, Amar Singh, himself a scheduled caste person, polled a large number of votes in these polling stations indicating thereby that party labels are not important in determining the direction of flow of 'LS votes'.

The foregoing discussion of the flow patterns of 'cross-voting' gives rise to an important question regarding the causal determinants of differential voting behaviour on the part of Indian electorate. As already pointed out, it is very difficult to give any general explanation for this phenomenon as the dynamics of 'tandem voting' has not been explored in details so far. On our part we have tried to indicate that the caste factor was an important factor in securing a substantial 'surplus' for Chander Singh especially in the polling stations located in the Rath' region but we have absolutely no intention of generalising on the basis of this case study alone. In fact, even within the Alwar LS constituency there were several flow patterns of 'cross-voting' in which caste factor was not dominant. In any case, our main intention in this paper is just to highlight the salience of the simultaneity factor in voting for LS and assembly elections and it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer any validated socio-political theory of the dynamics of 'cross voting' and 'coupled-voting'. It would, however, be instructive if such studies would be replicated for a large number of LS constituency with varying politico-electoral climate so that some regularities in the 'two-in-one' voting behaviour of the Indian electorate could be observed and analysed from the perspective of emerging discipline of political sociology.

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ABOUT THE BOOK

The underlying assumption in the planning of the book has been that election politics when viewed on the continuum of political development in the life story of a political system is much more comprehensive than voting behaviour which is the end product but certainly not the be-all and end-all of election politics. This assumption is all the more relevant in developing countries like India where politics is not independent of the infra-structural pulls and pressures as it is in developed countries, though even there, more often than not, the autonomy of politics has tended to appear more a myth than a reality. The study of voting behaviour has not been viewed here as an isolated and sporadic political phenomenon but as organically linked with the democratic politics of the country in general and its election politics in particular. The book thus offers a study of Indian political system in action through the specific, sharp and illuminating focus on the fourth general election.